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What a miracle it is that out of these small, flat, rigid squares of paper 
unfolds world after world after world, worlds that sing to you, comfort 
and quiet or excite you. Books help us understand who we are and how 
we are to behave. They show us what community and friendship mean; 
they show us how to live and die.  
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Abstract 
The processes involved in empathy, the ability to appreciate others’ inner experiences 
and respond appropriately to them, are central to the formation and maintenance of successful 
interpersonal relationships and communities (e.g., Castano, 2012). These skills typically 
emerge in childhood but can also be developed in adults (Teding van Berkhout & Malouff, 
2016). Engagement with fiction may enhance adults’ empathic skills because readers mentally 
simulate the social experiences depicted in stories (Oatley, 1999). Several studies have 
identified positive relationships between exposure to fiction and empathic abilities (Mumper 
& Gerrig, 2017), whereas causal findings are more mixed (see Dodell-Feder & Tamir, 2018), 
and this may reflect heterogeneity across both fiction stimuli and empathy measures.  
The present research took a multidimensional approach to investigating the nature of 
relationships between fiction and empathic abilities. Study 1 examined correlations between 
self-report empathic abilities and fiction habits. Participants (N = 404) completed a 
multidimensional task measure of fiction media-exposure and answered questions about 
fiction-engagement and empathic tendencies. Results revealed divergent associations between 
narrative modes and empathic abilities, and fiction media-exposure positively predicted the 
tendencies to become absorbed in narratives and to behave altruistically. Study 2 (N = 308) 
assessed the relationship between fiction-exposure and performance on a behavioural measure 
of empathic accuracy (the ability to accurately interpret mental state content) when using 
mentalising or experience-sharing inferencing processes. Results showed that the two 
strategies entailed similar levels of error but in opposite directions. Empathic accuracy varied 
as a function of target and valence and was positively predicted by lifetime fiction-exposure. 
Study 3 investigated the causal impact of immersion. An initial pilot study, a text pretest, two 
manipulation pilots, and an experiment (total N = 224), were conducted. Ultimately, 
immersion levels, measured across three dimensions, were not successfully manipulated. 
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Immersion dimensions correlated with self-report and behavioural empathic ability measures, 
and an exploratory analysis revealed an effect of reading on empathic accuracy for story 
characters’ mental states. Collectively, the studies provide support for the hypothesis that 
fiction-exposure and empathic abilities are associated, but limited evidence of causation. 
Methodological limitations, other influential variables, and research implications are 
discussed. The assumption that fiction and empathy are beneficial is critiqued, and future 
research avenues suggested. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Thesis 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the dissertation. It introduces the research topic: the 
relationship between fiction and empathy, outlines the research rationale, and establishes the 
organisation of the dissertation. The importance of a psychological account of fiction-
engagement is identified, supported by evidence from scholarship, as well as examples of 
social initiatives operating in the UK, USA and Canada that use fiction-based applications to 
enhance interpersonal skills. The empathy construct is defined as comprising three dissociable 
sub-components: mentalising, experience-sharing, and prosocial concern. Mentalising and 
experience-sharing are contrasted as strategies for “empathic accuracy”: the accurate 
interpretation of others’ inner states, which can lead to prosocial concern. Prosocial concern is 
established as the basis of prosocial behaviours. The case for studying empathic processes in 
neurologically typical (NT) adults is outlined, and approaches to measurement, including 
fiction-based tools, are discussed. A brief overview of empirical evidence showing 
associations between fiction and empathy is presented, and inconsistencies in the literature are 
discussed in terms of the multidimensionality of both fiction-engagement and the empathy 
construct. It is proposed that fiction formats differentially relate to dimensions of empathy, 
and that fiction-engagement may particularly support the experience-sharing strategy. The 
chapter concludes with an outline of the dissertation structure, including a summary of each 
chapter’s contents.  
1.1 Fiction and Society 
We do not have a user manual from which to write down an exhaustive set of values for a 
culture [but] we do have collective stories told by those belonging to different cultures. 
(Riedl & Harrison, 2016, p. 106) 
Humans are the only animals that create, tell, buy and sell stories. The time spent 
engaging with the Harry Potter franchise alone is estimated at more than 235,000 years 
(Barnes, 2012). Fiction is big business (Nettle, 2005), and with technological developments 
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allowing people to become immersed in stories through portable devices, virtual reality, 3D 
cinema and an increasing multitude of television channels, its ubiquity seems boundless. 
Considering the time and money spent on fiction (Loughborough University, 2015; Office for 
National Statistics, 2012)—on books, radio, TV, apps, interactive media, and trips to the 
movies or theatre—it should offer some kind of benefit otherwise, through a process of 
cultural evolution, it would surely have ceased to exist (Nettle, 2005).  
Several scholars have suggested that literature and the arts function to benefit society. 
Theatre practices in Ancient Greece promoted democracy via the staging of opposing 
viewpoints performed as dialogue, often supported by a chorus that emphasised prevalent 
moral views (Calame, 1999). The humanitarian reform of the 1700s, which included 
abolitionism, improvements in workers’ conditions and healthcare, was preceded by the 
proliferation of literacy that followed the advent of mechanical printing (Pinker, 2011). 
Literature may develop social justice (e.g., Nussbaum, 1990, 1995), functioning as a “moral 
laboratory”, wherein social attitudes can be explored and refined (Hakemulder, 2000), and it 
provides an opportunity to emotionally engage with social events without real-word 
consequences (Keen, 2007). By encouraging identification with others, literature, and the arts 
more broadly, can cultivate social intelligence (Oatley, 1999; Zunshine, 2006), and help to 
produce more cooperative, ethical citizens (Bazalgette, 2017).  
The ethos that stories can develop social skills has been adopted by several social 
enterprises aiming to encourage positive relationships among people, to increase prosocial, 
and reduce antisocial, behaviours. Roots of Empathy, a programme initiated in Canada and 
now implemented across eleven countries, uses fiction-engagement as part of a schools-based 
curriculum aimed at fostering kindness, and UK organisation EmpathyLab uses literature as 
the key tool in its social-awareness interventions for 4-11-year-olds. In prisoners, literacy is 
generally lower than in the rest of the population (e.g., Creese, 2015), and several 
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programmes aimed at offender-rehabilitation involve fiction: Book Clubs for Inmates in 
Canada, and Prison Reading Groups in the UK both use literature to develop participants’ 
prosocial skills. Prison Performing Arts in the US and Clean Break in the UK employ theatre 
programmes aimed at supporting prisoners to develop the communication and collaboration 
skills required for societal reintegration and employment, and The Reader uses shared reading 
groups to reduce social isolation in UK criminal justice and health settings. Ladder to the 
Moon’s programmes, endorsed by the Care Quality Commission, the independent regulator of 
health and adult social care services in England, use theatre and filmmaking to build 
relationships among staff and care home residents, and to facilitate the provision of person-
centred care (Ladder to the Moon, 2015).  
Despite anecdotal, academic and economic accounts of their positive impact (e.g., 
EmpathyLab, 2019; Hartley & Turvey, 2013; Johnson, Keen & Pritchard, 2011; Prison 
Reading Groups, 2016; Schonert-Reichl, Smith, Zaidman-Zait & Hertzman, 2012), the 
implementation of arts-based social initiatives remains sporadic and largely underfunded, and 
arts education is diminishing. Arts organizations in the USA and UK are increasingly reliant 
on private donors (MTM London, 2016; Woronkowicz, Nichols & Iyengar, 2012); in the UK, 
local authority spending on arts and culture declined by 17% from 2010 to 2015 (Harvey, 
2016) and funding has continued to dwindle in the UK and throughout Europe (Inkei, 2019). 
The UK National Curriculum has marginalised the arts and humanities in favour of science, 
technology, engineering and maths (STEM) subjects (Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills, 2015), and the English Baccalaureate, which the government plans to implement 
for all GCSE students by 2020, contains no arts subjects at all (Long & Bolton, 2017). 
Similarly, the US Common Core, which determines academic standards for mathematics and 
English language arts, has increased its emphasis on nonfiction, and this has led teachers to 
replace fiction with factual texts (Loveless, 2015). Articulation of the potential value of 
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literature and the arts seems to be missing something. The research reported in this 
dissertation aimed to provide some remedy, by contributing to a psychological account of the 
benefits of engagement with fictional narratives. 
1.2 Understanding Other Minds 
Fiction is inherently social; it centres on humans or humanlike agents, and their 
interactions with others (Mar & Oatley, 2008). While expository nonfiction, too, can feature 
humanlike agents, fiction is distinguished by its complex characterization and narrative 
structure, which may recruit, and consequently strengthen, the psychological mechanisms 
concerned with making sense of the social world.  
The processes involved in navigating social phenomena are supported by empathy, a 
multifaceted construct which enables perceivers to interpret and respond to the mental states 
of other individuals (Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). The psychological literature lacks a standard 
definition of empathy; however rational, theory-based inferencing is often contrasted with 
more embodied, experiential processes (e.g., Coll, Viding, Rütgen, Silani, Lamm, Catmur & 
Bird, 2017; Goldman, 2006). A useful framework from the field of social neuroscience 
encompasses both theory-based and experiential facets of empathy and a route to prosocial 
behaviour (Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). It organises empathic processes into three components: (i) 
experience-sharing: vicariously experiencing a target’s internal state, (ii) mentalising: 
explicitly interpreting a target’s internal state (e.g., through reading facial cues), and (iii) 
prosocial concern: expressing motivation to improve a target’s circumstances. According to 
this model, mentalising and experience-sharing represent two routes to the goal of interpreting 
others’ inner states or “empathic accuracy” (Ickes, 1997). This, in turn, can activate prosocial 
motivation to help or to alleviate suffering. 
Experimental studies of empathic accuracy have generally focused on children and 
groups with characteristic deficits, such as those with schizophrenia, psychopathic traits and 
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Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Fewer studies have investigated empathic accuracy in 
neurologically typical (NT) adults. In response to a legitimate need for clinical and 
developmental perspectives, this agenda has facilitated the identification of diagnostic 
markers, but it also reflects a general assumption that core empathic skills are acquired in 
childhood and cannot be improved upon in NT adults. However, empathic accuracy varies 
between NT adults, can change throughout the lifespan (Duval, Piolino, Bejanin, Eustache & 
Desgranges, 2010; Happé, Winner & Brownell, 1998; Maylor, Moulson, Muncer, & Taylor, 
2002), and is implicated in interpersonal relationships and prosocial behaviour (Castano, 
2012; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). Examining how it may be enhanced represents an important 
area of enquiry.  
Due to the emphasis on development and disorders, most well-established tests of 
empathic accuracy show ceiling effects with NT adults. Consequently, studies examining 
nuanced variation at the upper echelons of the ability have necessitated more complex 
narrative-based tasks, using written prose (e.g., Dodell-Feder, Lincoln, Coulson & Hooker, 
2013), film (e.g., Dziobek et al., 2006) and virtual reality stimuli (e.g., Spiers & Maguire, 
2006). Sensitive, fiction-based measures enable the testing of participants’ abilities to 
interpret naturalistic social scenarios. Providing physical, verbal and contextual information, 
such stimuli are more akin to real-world environments than some of the more established 
unidimensional tools (such as facial emotion recognition tests). Participants’ accuracy in 
attributing thoughts and feelings to narrative characters is considered to be indicative of their 
general empathic skills. These approaches, therefore, hinge on the assumption that the 
capacity to comprehend the experiences of fictional characters corresponds to the ability to 
comprehend others in the real world.  
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1.3 Fiction as Simulation of the Social World 
The view that fiction and reality are comparable in terms of social stimuli represents a 
key tenet of research examining fiction effects on interpersonal skills. Mar and Oatley have 
proposed that fiction constitutes a simulation of the social world (Mar & Oatley, 2008; 
Oatley, 1999, 2011b; Oatley & Djikic, 2017): a surgeon might simulate a complicated 
procedure before operating on a living person, or a research student might simulate a dataset 
before commencing data collection and analysis. In the same vein, fiction enables readers to 
imaginatively experience social interactions without directly participating in them. Mar and 
Oatley argued that tracking the experiences, intentions and emotions of fictional characters 
recruits and cultivates readers’ empathic faculties, and that its capacity to develop these skills 
represents the core function of fiction. 
This claim has received support from three areas of research: neuroscience has shown 
that similar brain regions are active when reading about an action, compared to when 
performing that same action (e.g., Speer, Reynolds, Swallow & Zacks, 2009), correlational 
research has revealed that, compared to nonfiction-readers, fiction-readers tend to 
demonstrate stronger empathic abilities (Mumper & Gerrig, 2017), and causal studies have 
indicated that reading about fictional characters can enhance mental state understanding 
(Dodell-Feder & Tamir, 2018). 
Kidd and Castano (2013) conducted five experiments in which the effects of literary 
fiction-reading (fiction by award-winning or canonical authors) were compared to the effects 
of nonfiction, popular fiction (Amazon bestsellers or stories from a popular fiction 
anthology), or no reading. Their study was widely publicised for its finding that reading 
“literary” fiction temporarily improved empathic accuracy, whereas popular fiction and 
expository nonfiction did not. Several news outlets picked up the story, leading to headlines 
such as: “Reading Fiction Makes You A Nicer Person” (Barras, 2013), “Now We Have Proof 
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Reading Literary Fiction Makes You A Better Person” (Schonfeld, 2013), and “For Better 
Social Skills Scientists Recommend A Little Chekhov” (Belluck, 2013). The authors did not 
claim that general fiction-reading improves social skills, nor that literary fiction can make 
someone “a better person”, but they did argue that literary prose incorporates complex 
characters, which recruits the mentalising faculty, whereas popular fiction merely entertains.  
Subsequent replication efforts failed to reproduce these findings (e.g., Camerer et al., 
2018; Panero, Weisberg, Black, Goldstein, Barnes, Brownell & Winner, 2016; Samur, Tops & 
Koole, 2018; cf. Kidd & Castano’s, 2018a, response). This cast doubt on the hypothesis that 
any single fiction-reading session immediately enhances people’s capacity to understand real-
world others. However, a positive correlation between lifetime exposure to fiction and 
empathy task performance was observed in the original and replication studies. Perhaps, then, 
fiction-engagement does not strengthen empathy, but empathic people tend to read more 
fiction. Alternatively, effects may be causal but not immediate, or the specific empathic 
components impacted by fiction may not have been probed by the study design (e.g., Pino & 
Mazza, 2016, showed some support for the causal hypothesis using alternative stimulus texts 
and measures). 
1.4 Multidimensionality in Fiction and Empathy Research  
Clarifying the association between fiction and empathy requires the operationalisation 
of both and raises two consequential issues: (i) the multidimensional nature of fiction-
engagement, and (ii) the heterogeneity of the empathy construct. While most research has 
tested hypotheses concerning the value of reading, fiction is engaged with via a range of 
media channels. Evidence that exposure to nonfiction books negatively predicts empathic 
abilities (Mar, Oatley, Hirsh, dela Paz & Peterson, 2006) or, at least, results in a smaller 
positive effect (Mumper & Gerrig, 2017), indicates that positive relationships between fiction 
and empathy are not contingent on reading processes. If effects on empathic abilities are 
FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES  
 8 
related to the simulation of social content rather than to general reading processes, they should 
be observable across other media too.  
Empathic abilities have been linked to engagement with stories via television (Black & 
Barnes, 2015a), movies (Mar, Tackett & Moore, 2010) and play-acting (Goldstein, Wu & 
Winner, 2009; Nettle, 2006). This raises the question, is the presentation channel (e.g., screen, 
paper, audio, live, interactive) simply a vehicle through which fictional stories impact people, 
or can the medium itself facilitate, alter or inhibit fiction effects? It could be that movies train 
viewers’ abilities to decode facial expressions, whereas reading and play-acting bolster 
people’s experience-sharing capacity by inviting them to take first-person perspectives on 
characters’ inner experiences. In view of research indicating the effects of different stories 
and channels of engagement on empathy, investigating how far relationships between fiction 
formats and empathic abilities differ could prove informative for both science and social 
enterprise. 
The content that influences empathy does not appear to be limited to acclaimed literary 
prose: research has shown that popular fiction is also associated with empathy (Fong, Mullin 
& Mar, 2013) and moral reasoning (Black, Capps & Barnes, 2018), and that certain social 
themes can motivate prosocial behaviour (e.g., Koopman, 2015). Fiction is multidimensional 
in terms of presentation format as well as story content. By examining both, researchers could 
extend current knowledge of the antecedents and consequences of fiction-engagement 
processes.  
If fiction effects on empathy are not uniquely accounted for by literary devices, other 
aspects of engagement must be at play. The narrative persuasion literature provides a possible 
solution to this problem. Engaging with narratives can alter people’s attitudes and beliefs, and 
one aspect of engagement that has been shown to augment this effect is “transportation” 
(Green & Brock, 2000) or the experience of becoming immersed in a story. If this experiential 
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process can moderate the relationship between fictional content and real-world beliefs, it may 
also impact fiction effects on empathic abilities. This idea is supported by some evidence that 
low levels of immersion in a story lead to lower scores on empathy measures (Bal & 
Veltkamp, 2013).  
The relationship between fiction and empathy, therefore, may not centre on an 
elaborative, analytical approach to complex and contradictory characters, but rather on the 
process of becoming deeply immersed in storyworlds. Immersion is another multifaceted 
construct. People may feel emotionally moved by a story, produce vivid mental images of its 
environment, or identify with its characters, and these dimensions may differently affect 
fiction-engagement outcomes. A granular approach to measuring fiction, and examining 
levels of immersion, would contribute to knowledge of the process through which fiction may 
enhance empathy.  
The next major consideration for fiction and empathy research is the selection of 
measures used to test empathic acumen. Studies examining associations with fiction have 
included self-report and behavioural tests of emotion recognition (e.g., Pino & Mazza, 2016; 
Kidd & Castano, 2013), perspective-taking (Mar et al., 2006), experience-sharing and concern 
(e.g., Bal & Veltkamp, 2013; Mar et al., 2006). The range of approaches is noteworthy, 
because processes such as decoding facial expressions, perspective-taking, belief attribution 
and emotion-sharing can dissociate; proficiency in one area does not amount to proficiency 
across all. Not only do NT adults show significant variation across empathic domains (Cox, 
Uddin, Di Martino, Castellanos, Milham & Kelly, 2012), selective deficits have been well-
documented in clinical and developmental populations. For example, alexithymia is typified 
by specific difficulties in recognising and describing emotions, people high in psychopathic 
traits may accurately attribute thoughts and feelings while lacking the emotion-sharing 
capacity, and people living with dementia can show impaired perspective-taking and belief 
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attribution abilities alongside relatively intact emotion recognition (Freedman, Binns, Black, 
Murphy & Stuss, 2013). 
The lack of correlation among empathy measures was observed by Mar et al. (2006) in 
their study of associations between fiction-exposure and empathy. They found that the ability 
to ascribe mental state terms to actors’ faces and the ability to interpret a social scene 
performed by actors were not associated. The authors suggested that these two performance-
based measures of social ability may have recruited contrasting empathic strategies: the first 
task involved ascribing mental state terms to static photographs, and may entail the 
mentalising component of empathy, whereas the video task required decoding of dynamic 
cues, and may engage a more embodied, experience-sharing approach.  
1.5 Two Strategies for Empathic Accuracy 
Children around the world are familiar with the maxim: “treat others as you would like 
to be treated yourself”, and empathy is also appealed to in order to shape adult behaviour 
(“please leave this bathroom as you would like to find it”). People are enjoined to empathise 
with the experiences and preferences of others by using their own as reference points. It is 
perhaps unsurprising, then, that the extent to which people empathise with others can depend 
on how far they identify with them (e.g., Davies, 1993).  
Perceived similarity to another person not only impacts the degree of empathy, but also 
how people empathise: whether they tend to adopt experience-sharing or mentalising 
strategies (dissimilar others are less likely to invite experience-sharing; Zaki & Ochsner, 
2012). Thus, different individuals’ empathic strategies may vary in response to the same 
target. This is noteworthy because research has shown that mentalising and experience-
sharing strategies for empathic accuracy are not equal. Zhou, Majka and Epley (2017) asked 
participants to guess people’s emotional responses to a range of positive, negative and neutral 
images. Participants were assigned to one of three conditions, (i) simulation (experience-
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sharing), (ii) theorisation (mentalising), and (iii) simultaneous (control). In the simultaneous 
condition, participants viewed a split screen showing the images that the targets viewed, 
alongside synchronised video footage of their facial reactions. In the theorisation condition, 
participants saw only the facial reaction video footage, and in the simulation condition, they 
saw only the images. Using experience-sharing, participants were significantly more accurate. 
However, when offered a financial incentive (extra cash for reaching the 80th percentile), and 
given the choice between simulation and theorisation, participants tended to select the less 
successful theorisation condition. The authors suggested that people tend to underestimate 
their ability to share others’ experiences, because they overestimate dissimilarity between self 
and others.  
According to Singer (1981/2011), by default, people empathise with only a small circle 
or “ingroup” of family and friends. Although ingroups have expanded as society has become 
more global to encompass other geographical, gender and ethnic groups, people tend to show 
bias when interpreting the experiences of “outgroup” members (e.g., Riva & Andrighetto, 
2012). Sharing in the experiences of other agents—including fictitious others—appears to 
facilitate expansion of the “empathy circle” (Pinker, 2011; Singer, 1981/2011), and stories 
have been shown to increase empathy for marginalised individuals (Batson et al., 1997). The 
process through which this occurs remains opaque; however, if fiction-engagement enables 
readers to simulate the experiences of distant others, it may particularly strengthen the 
experience-sharing empathic strategy. Perhaps, then, frequent fiction-readers would be more 
likely to select into Zhou et al.’s (2017) simulation condition, and to perform better within it.  
1.6 Fiction, Experience-sharing and Real-world Others 
Learning to share in the experiences of fictional characters may underpin the benefits of 
fiction-based social initiatives. In successful prison reading groups, offenders develop an 
appreciation for the experiences of story characters, which strengthens their understanding of 
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themselves and their communities (Prison Reading Groups, 2016). In the care sector, the 
person-centred approach advocated by organisations such as Ladder to the Moon requires, by 
definition, the ability to interpret the unique experiences and preferences of individuals (e.g., 
Health Foundation, 2016). Following an intervention in which staff and residents co-produced 
a creative film project, a care home manager described improvements in relationships among 
staff members: “after the programme we understood each others’ roles more and supported 
each other. I think we’ve been more reflective about the feelings of others” (Lyons & Gage, 
2014, p. 3). After participating in Empathy Lab’s Empathy Day, pupil “Romy” explained that: 
“if a character is lonely in a book, it will make you think about what it feels like to be lonely”. 
“Gracie” added: 
When I'd finished the book, I thought a lot about it. One day when I was in the playground 
I saw a girl who looked really lonely, she was sitting down on her own, so I went and played 
with her. The book caused me to change my behaviour. (EmpathyLab, 2017) 
Fiction-engagement appears to represent a method for activating empathic 
understanding and generating prosocial motivation. However, questions remain about the 
forms of fiction that benefit empathic abilities, and the empathic dimensions and strategies 
that can be cultivated. By addressing these questions, the present research aims to contribute 
to a granular understanding of the relationships between fictional stories and components of 
empathy.  
1.7 Summary  
Mentalising and experience-sharing represent alternative empathic processes that can be 
recruited for the same purpose: to accurately interpret the inner states of other individuals. In 
turn, these processes can motivate prosocial concern and behaviour, and so developing an 
understanding of how empathy may be enhanced is important for NT adults, as well as for 
clinical and developmental groups. The claim that fiction enables readers to simulate social 
experiences, which may help to develop their interpersonal skills, has received support from 
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empirical psychology and anecdotal evidence from real-world social enterprise. Familiarity 
with fiction positively predicts both self-report and performance-based empathic accuracy, 
and several social initiatives have reported positive outcomes for participants enrolled in 
fiction-based projects aimed at developing social understanding and prosociality.  
Experimental studies examining the immediate, causal effects of fiction-engagement on 
empathy have yielded mixed findings. This may reflect the multidimensionality of the 
empathy construct and heterogeneity across fiction presentations. Empathy comprises 
dissociable components and processes, and fiction encompasses a range of narrative modes, 
which may entail different levels of immersion. Causal studies have tended to assess explicit 
mentalising; however, if fiction enables people to simulate the experiences of dissimilar 
others, it may also help to expand people’s real-life empathic engagement beyond similar, 
ingroup members.  
1.8 Organisation of the Dissertation 
This dissertation addresses the general question: How does engaging with fiction benefit 
empathic abilities in NT adults? In Chapters 2-4, the relevant constructs are defined, and the 
research rationale and objectives are established. Chapter 2 defines and examines the empathy 
construct, presents a case for studying the phenomenon in NT adults, and reviews traditional 
approaches to measurement. Chapter 3 establishes the definition of fiction and presents a 
review of studies that have investigated relationships between fiction-engagement and 
empathic abilities. The research rationale, objectives and implications are summarised in 
Chapter 4, and the research hypotheses are articulated. Chapters 5-7 present the methods, 
results and analyses of the empirical work undertaken. Chapter 5 reports the first phase of the 
research: an exploration of relationships between fiction media and genre formats and self-
report measures of empathy. Chapter 6 presents the second phase of the research, which 
examined the relationship between fiction-exposure, and mentalising versus experience-
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sharing empathic strategies. Chapter 7 presents the third phase, which investigated the causal 
effects of immersion. In Chapter 8, the research findings are summarised, synthesised and 
discussed. Methodological limitations and potential contributions of the research are 
identified and avenues for further study are suggested. 
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Chapter 2: Empathy—A Multidimensional Construct 
The willingness to understand others and respond prosocially to their needs is central to 
the formation of successful interpersonal relationships and cohesive communities (Castano, 
2012; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). Research has indicated that helpful, prosocial behaviours 
involve both empathic and altruistic personality dimensions (Penner, Fritzsche, Craiger & 
Freifeld, 1995), and that empathy can lead to altruistic behaviours (the willingness to help 
others with no expectation of reward; Penner et al., 1995) by enabling perceivers to infer the 
mental states of others (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley & Birch, 1981). These skills 
typically develop in childhood (e.g., Perner & Wimmer, 1985) and so studies have tended to 
focus on children or adult groups with characteristic deficits. However, empathic abilities 
vary between neurologically typical (NT) adults and continue to develop across the lifespan 
(Duval et al., 2010; Happé et al., 1998; Maylor et al., 2002), and a growing body of literature 
has begun to address ways that adults’ empathic skills may be enhanced. This chapter will 
define the empathy construct and model the relationship between empathic inferencing and 
prosocial behaviour. It will outline the case for studying empathic abilities in NT adults, and 
identify key paradigms aimed at measuring these skills.  
2.1 The Empathy Concept 
I do not ask the wounded person how he feels; I myself become the wounded person. 
(Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 1855/2017) 
The term “empathy” has two etymological roots: the Greek “pathos”, which refers to a 
quality that evokes sadness or pity, and the German “Einfühlung”, literally translated as “in-
feeling” (Waite, 2012). The latter term emerged in the 19th century from the work of the 
German Romantic philosophers. Robert Vischer (1873) first used the term “Einfühlung” in his 
doctoral thesis, On the optical sense of form: A contribution to aesthetics, where he used it to 
refer to the capacity to “feel into” objects: viewing an object such as a painting or sculpture 
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could produce sensations of pleasure which were then projected into and experienced within 
the object. The term was adopted by Theodor Lipps during the 1890s, when he developed and 
refined the concept as an aspect of perception. For Lipps, the self could be projected into an 
object or person in order to experience the world from “within” that other. He described 
watching a tightrope walker: “I am high up. I am transported there. Not next to the acrobat but 
exactly within him, where he is. This is the full meaning of ‘Einfühlung ” (Lipps, translated in 
Lanzoni, 2018, p. 33). Meanwhile, “sympathy” was becoming a central theme in English 
aesthetics. In A treatise of human nature, David Hume (Hume 1739-40/1985) proposed that 
“sympathy”, the mechanism involved in sharing in the passions or views of others, 
contributed to all judgments of beauty. At the turn of the twentieth century, Edward Titchener, 
an English psychologist who studied under Wilhelm Wundt, coined the term “empathy”. 
Whereas sympathy was to feel with or identify with another, “empathy” meant to feel into a 
person’s experience or situation: “not only do I see gravity and modesty and pride and 
courtesy and stateliness, but I feel or act them in my mind’s muscles” (Titchener, 1909, p. 21). 
By 1913, most psychologists had accepted Titchener’s translation (although others had 
proposed “empathy” around this time, the term tends to be attributed solely to Titchener; 
Lanzoni, 2018).  
For the past 100 years, empathy has been studied throughout social, personality and 
developmental psychology, and neuroscience, as well as philosophy and theology. Here, 
conceptualisations of empathy have evolved since its origins in aesthetics. The evocation of 
sadness implied via the etymological element “pathos” is no longer a prerequisite (although 
some conceptions of sympathy or concern assume a negative state), and projection into the 
experience of the target—the Einfühlung dimension—represents one theoretical standpoint on 
the ways that people empathise. In its broadest terms, empathy can be defined as “the notion 
of responsivity to the experience of another” (Davis, 1980, p. 3). Considering the range of 
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disciplines in which the construct has been operationalised and measured, it is unsurprising 
that a consistent definition is currently lacking (Coplan, 2004; Cuff, Brown, Taylor & Howat, 
2016; Smith, 2017; see also Schaafsma, Pfaff, Spunt & Adolphs, 2015). De Vignemont and 
Singer (2006) commented that, “there are probably nearly as many definitions of empathy as 
people working on the topic” (p. 435). 
In a review of the empathy concept, Cuff et al. (2016) identified forty-three discrete 
definitions, which differed along several dimensions: process (e.g., emotion contagion, 
sympathy), levels of distinction between self and other, congruence (emotions congruent with 
a target versus incongruent emotions), automaticity (automatic versus controlled processes), 
trait versus state abilities, and behavioural outcomes. Cuff et al. pointed out that most 
definitions assume the presence of an observed other, but that empathy can also be evoked by 
fictional or imaginary persons. They separated affective empathy (the experience of emotion 
in response to a stimulus) from cognitive empathy (the ability to understand another’s 
feelings). Integrating the range of research definitions, Cuff et al. concluded that:  
There are functional differences between empathy and related concepts; empathy includes 
both cognitive and affective elements; the emotions of the target and observer are similar 
but not identical; other stimuli, such as imagination, can evoke empathy; a self/other 
distinction is maintained in empathy, although a degree of merging is necessary; empathy 
is affected by both trait and state influences; behavioural outcomes are not part of empathy 
itself; and finally, empathy is automatically elicited but is also subject to top-down 
controlled processes (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 7).1  
 
1 Cuff et al. (2016) proposed an affective definition (emotional response), generated via perception (direct or 
imagined) and understanding (which they referred to as “cognitive empathy”): they described an emotional 
response “dependent upon the interaction between trait capacities and state influences. Empathic processes are 
automatically elicited but are also shaped by top-down control processes. The resulting emotion is similar to 
one’s perception (directly experienced or imagined) and understanding (cognitive empathy) of the stimulus 
emotion, with recognition that the source of the emotion is not one’s own” (p. 7). In this way, their definition 
includes both cognitive and affective processes.  
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Cuff et al.’s (2016) review indicates that empathy is an important concept across several 
disciplines, but that agreement about precisely what it is, is lacking. The term has come to 
represent a broad range of processes, and these processes have also been clustered using other 
terms. “Theory of mind” (ToM; coined by Premack & Woodruff, 1978), has been widely used 
to refer to the capacity to recognise that others have different mental states to one’s own, as 
well as the ability to interpret what they are (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Apperly (2011) rejected this “linguistically awkward” term (p. 3), 
instead adopting “mindreading”. He argued that “ToM” was suggestive of something that one 
has rather than something that one does and pointed out that whether or not a person has (or 
does not have) a theory about how the mind works represents only one theoretical possibility, 
whereas “mindreading” is theoretically neutral. “Mindreading” implies more agency than 
terms such as “mind perception” (e.g., Gray, Jenkins, Heberlein & Wegner, 2010); however, 
neither “ToM” nor “mindreading” capture the importance of accuracy. If it is accepted that 
the ability is dimensional rather than categorical—it is not something one has or does not 
have, but something one is able to do to different degrees—then approaches to measurement 
must index levels of accuracy.  
Ickes (1997) distinguished between “empathic inference”, the process of making sense 
of others’ thoughts and feelings, and “empathic accuracy”, the measure of one’s skill in 
empathic inferencing. In this way, Ickes differentiated outcome from process; while a person 
can “theorise about”, “mindread” or “perceive a mind” incorrectly, they cannot be 
empathically accurate incorrectly. Furthermore, his terminology invokes the aesthetic origins 
of the construct, where it is implicit that empathy is not necessarily constrained to present, 
real-world targets, but can also be entailed when imagining others, or engaging with fictional 
characters (as established in Cuff et al.’s, 2016, review). Therefore, the term “empathic 
accuracy” will be used here to refer to the measurable ability to accurately infer the inner 
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states of (real, fictional or imaginary) others, and “empathic inference” to refer to the process 
or processes involved in interpreting those states. “Empathy” represents the umbrella term 
(e.g., Pinotti & Salgaro, 2019) encompassing these dimensions and their subcomponents. 
2.2 Components of Empathy 
The extent that imaginative processes versus the process of instantiating another’s inner 
state are required for empathy has been the subject of much debate (for an overview, see 
Gallagher & Gallagher, 2019). Zaki and Ochsner (2012) drew on findings from neuroscience 
to outline a model of empathy that incorporated both sets of processes. They identified two 
paths to empathic accuracy: mentalising (explicitly interpreting verbal and nonverbal cues), 
and experience-sharing (vicariously sharing in the target’s experience), each comprising a 
range of sub-processes. The first domain, mentalising, includes theory of mind, perspective-
taking and cognitive empathy. Imagine the host of a party receiving a gift. One can work out 
whether he or she liked the gift by interpreting the host’s verbal and non-verbal cues and by 
using prior knowledge about the recipient specifically, and gift-receiving reactions in general. 
An alternative path, experience-sharing (the second domain), refers to the tendency to engage 
the same neural systems when observing a state as when experiencing it first-hand. This path 
enables the perceiver to draw on their own feelings, either about the gift itself or the host’s 
reaction, as the basis for accurately interpreting the host’s experience. The distinction between 
mentalising and experience-sharing is a question of what the host feels, versus how the host 
feels it: experience-sharing requires not only a functional understanding of the mental state of 
the target, but a matching of that state (see Smith, 2017). 
Both mentalising and experience-sharing can lead to prosocial concern, the third facet 
of Zaki and Ochsner’s (2012) model, which is associated with prosocial behaviour. Here, the 
party host may be disappointed by the gift, and one might wish to alleviate their negative 
affect by providing a distraction, offering support or replacing the gift with something more 
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suitable.2 Via this route, either mentalising or experience-sharing could ultimately result in 
prosocial behaviour. This is in line with the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, 1987; 
Batson, 2011; Batson et al., 1981; for an evaluation of research see Batson, Lishner & Stocks, 
2015), which suggests that feeling concern for another can initiate an altruistic response.  
Zaki and Ochsner’s (2012) model has received support from neuroscientific research 
where mentalising and experience-sharing processes have been shown to initiate prosocial 
behaviour. However, the extent to which these processes are engaged, and their effects, 
depend on the context: for example, when people respond to explicit questions about targets’ 
internal states, activity in brain areas associated with mentalising predicts helping (Harbaugh, 
Mayr & Burghart, 2007), whereas when watching a target in pain, activity in areas associated 
with experiencing that pain predicts helping (Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson & Singer, 
2010). This indicates that mentalising and experience-sharing processes represent two 
separable routes to empathic accuracy which, in turn, can initiate prosocial concern and 
behaviour.  
For the purpose of this research, Zaki and Ochsner’s (2012) model has been adapted to 
establish the two routes (mentalising versus experience-sharing) to the measurable empathic 
accuracy component, and to incorporate prosocial behavioural outcomes (Figure 1). As 
cognitive and affective components activate different neural processes (Singer, 2006), the 
model incorporates the cognitive and affective distinction present in Cuff et al.’s (2016) 
review, which helps to organise different conceptualisations of empathy (Zickfeld, Schubert, 
Siebt & Fiske, 2017). Whereas Zaki and Ochsner categorised affective empathy as an aspect 
of experience-sharing, but not a mentalising process, here cognitive and affective empathy are 
distinguished in terms of content (cognitive versus affective) and process (the target content 
 
2 Some researchers have conceptualised the motivational component as a result of concern (or sympathy) but not 
as part of it (e.g., Batson et al., 1981). Others are in agreement with the idea that motivational concern is 
preceded by a cognitive (mentalising) component (e.g., Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). 
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may be affective, and yet the process of making an inference about that content may be 
unemotional [mentalising]; whereas experience-sharing implies a match between the 
empathiser and target’s emotional states). This provides a framework for examining 
mentalising versus experience-sharing abilities and their possible prosocial outcomes.  
Figure 1. The major facets of empathy and their associated processes and terms adapted from “The 
Neuroscience of Empathy: Progress, Pitfalls and Promise”, by J. Zaki and K. Ochsner, 2012, Nature 
Neuroscience, 15(5), p. 676, Nature Publishing Group (http://doi.org/10.1038/nn.3085). 
Neuroscience has focused on two processes (mentalising and experience-sharing), which can lead to 
prosocial concern. The model has been modified to incorporate cognitive and affective mentalising 
content, the measurable empathic accuracy component, and prosocial behaviour outcomes arising 
from the activation of prosocial concern. Additions to Zaki and Ochsner’s model appear in blue. 
  
The next section of this chapter is organised according to this framework. First, it sets 
out the case for studying empathic abilities in NT adults. Then it describes traditional 
paradigms for measuring abilities within the four domains: empathic accuracy via 
mentalising, empathic accuracy via experience-sharing, prosocial concern, and prosocial 
behaviour. Rather than present an exhaustive review of the measures available, this section 
will provide examples of the range of commonly used toolkits, including behavioural and 
self-report measures, from traditional vignette tasks to multidimensional approaches, that aim 
to index a range of processes via one task. This will lay the groundwork for interpreting the 
findings of research that employs these and similar measures in Chapter 3.  
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2.3 Empathic Abilities in Neurologically Typical Adults 
Since Premack and Woodruff (1978) posed the question, “does the chimpanzee have a 
theory of mind?”, research examining empathic accuracy has focused on child development, 
ASD and, more recently, clinical groups, whereas studies testing NT adults have been 
relatively infrequent. There are compelling arguments for investigating adults’ empathic 
accuracy: the ability to accurately infer others’ mental states changes across the lifespan 
(Duval et al., 2010; Happé et al., 1998; Maylor et al., 2002) and is positively associated with 
effective interpersonal relationships (Castano, 2012) and prosocial behaviour (Johnson, 2012; 
Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). Adults show different patterns of empathic ability compared to 
children. For example, in children, ASD and clinical samples, implicit empathic abilities, 
which are measured indirectly (e.g., via eye gaze) tend to dissociate from explicit abilities, 
which are measured using explicit questions (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Senju, Southgate, 
White & Frith, 2009). However, these two processes appear closely related in NT adults 
(Kanske, Böckler, Trautwein & Singer, 2015). Therefore, studying adults facilitates the 
construction of theoretical models which support an understanding of empathic development 
(Apperly, Samson & Humphreys, 2009) and identification of diagnostic markers for ASD, 
clinical and neurodegenerative disorders (e.g., Guastella et al., 2013; Poletti, Enrici & 
Adenzatio, 2012), and can inform training programmes aimed at improving empathy (for a 
meta-analysis, see Teding van Berkhout & Malouff, 2016). A challenge for researchers lies in 
establishing tools sensitive to variation at the upper echelons of the ability, since NT adults 
tend to perform at ceiling (at or near 100% accuracy) on traditional measures. 
2.4 Measuring Mentalising 
Mentalising ability can refer to identifying a target’s cognitive states (thoughts, beliefs, 
knowledge and intentions) and affective states (emotions). Both entail setting aside one’s own 
knowledge or feelings in order to attribute states to other agents whose thoughts and feelings 
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may differ from one’s own. Automatic egocentric bias—the tendency for one’s own 
perspective to influence a judgment about a target—has been demonstrated in adults and 
children in verbal and visual perspective-taking tasks (e.g. Epley, Morowedge & Keysar, 
2004), but NT adults show an ability to correct for this (Wang, Miletich, Ramsey & Samson, 
2014). Mentalising measures can examine both explicit (deliberate) mentalising and implicit 
or spontaneous (automatic) mentalising. However, some more elaborative processing, such as 
belief-attribution, has been shown to be non-automatic in adults (Back & Apperly, 2010).  
2.4.1 Implicit (spontaneous) mentalising 
The automatic tendency to mentalise about internal states is so ingrained it can apply to 
non-sentient targets, as exemplified in the following excerpt from Robert Frost’s (1969/2013) 
poem, A considerable speck (microscopic): 
A speck that would have been beneath my sight 
On any but a paper sheet so white 
Set off across what I had written there.  
[…] 
This was no dust speck by my breathing blown, 
But unmistakably a living mite 
With inclinations it could call its own. 
It paused as with suspicion of my pen, 
And then came racing wildly on again 
To where my manuscript was not yet dry; 
Then paused again and either drank or smelt— 
With loathing, for again it turned to fly.  
Plainly with an intelligence I dealt.  
[…] 
It ran with terror and with cunning crept 
It faltered: I could see it hesitate; 
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Then in the middle of the open sheet 
Cower down with desperation to accept 
Whatever I accorded it of fate. […]  
(Frost, 1969/2013, p. 357) 
Heider and Simmel (1944) demonstrated this tendency in the laboratory. They showed 
participants animations of moving shapes and after viewing two triangles moving around, in 
and out of a rectangular shape (Figure 2), participants tended to talk about the triangles as if 
they had thoughts and plans. It appeared that participants spontaneously (without explicitly 
being asked) engaged in mentalising, which led to the attribution of intentional states. This 
was supported by results from a similar study in which autistic children, who tend to show 
deficits in mentalising, were found to ascribe fewer mental state terms to the shapes compared 
to typically developing children (e.g., Abel, Happé & Frith, 2000). Developmental research 
has adopted similar approaches in order to study mentalising in typically developing children 
(e.g., Csibra, 2008; Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra & Bíró, 1995; Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom, 2007); 
however, investigation of rudiments and shortcomings limits generalisation to the 
spontaneous attribution of complex, situated mental states with NT adults (although the task 
has been used in conjunction with brain imaging techniques to examine neural correlates; e.g., 






Figure 2. In Heider and Simmel’s (1944) classic study, participants viewed a video of animated 
shapes moving around and within a rectangle. Image: Logeotalexandre (2019), licensed by Creative 
Commons (CC BY-SA: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en). 
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A more recent example of stimuli for testing spontaneous mentalising uses a virtual 
environment (VE). The Interactive Real World Task (Spiers & Maguire, 2006) requires 
participants to engage in a driving simulation video game, which involves travelling through 
London, England, from a ground-level first-person perspective. The creators of the game 
(Sony Computer Entertainment) produced a bustling cityscape using real photographs of the 
streets of London and computer-generated passers-by. The driveable streets were generated 
using Ordinance Survey map data. After taking part, participants are asked to watch a 
recording of their simulation and to report, verbally, to an interviewer, what they were 
thinking during the simulation. The simulation video can then be overlaid with this recording 
and used to code “ToM events”, points at which the participant commented on the thoughts 
and intentions of themselves or others in the simulation. The original study allowed 
researchers to observe patterns in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data in 
relation to participants’ mentalising.  
This approach is time-consuming as training is required prior to participation in VEs, 
though it may provide a worthwhile trade-off for measuring online spontaneous empathic 
inferencing. VEs offer higher ecological validity compared to other measures (Parsons & 
Mitchell, 2002), such as viewing videos of animated shapes, although the results are limited to 
the context of the virtual environment used. Preliminary data from ASD groups indicates that 
VE-based training can improve mentalising abilities (Kandalaft, Didehbani, Krawczyk, Allen 
& Chapman, 2013), and so they may be beneficial as a training tool. While the task was 
designed to elicit spontaneous mentalising, the addition of direct questions and a coding 
system containing accuracy and complexity variables could be incorporated to facilitate a 
temporal view of explicit decoding and reasoning processes. 
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2.4.2 Explicit mentalising: Cognitive content  
Self-report mentalising measures provide easy-to-administer indexes of people’s own 
views on their ability and tendency to take the perspectives of others. For example, the 
perspective-taking dimension of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis 1980; which 
consists of four independent scales probing different empathic processes) measures the self-
reported tendency to take others’ points of view. Participants indicate agreement with seven 
statements such as, “I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a 
decision”, on Likert scales. The approach relies on the participants’ abilities to accurately 
reflect on their mentalising, and risks socially desirable responding (where participants’ 
answers are biased in socially desirable directions, e.g., by reporting a higher tendency 
towards an agreeable social behaviour than they actually possess).  
Response bias is less of an issue when using behavioural approaches. False belief tasks 
have been widely used in tests of mentalising. They probe the ability to set aside one’s own 
knowledge or “true beliefs” in order to identify a target’s mistaken beliefs (Dennett, 1978). 
The traditional false belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) depicts belief-states through social 
vignettes. In the conventional object-transfer paradigm, participants must identify a target 
agent’s mistaken belief about the location of an object through understanding that the agent 
lacks the knowledge that the object has been moved. This can vary in complexity, for 
example, person A wrongly believes that the sweets are in the opaque jar because they did not 
witness person B move them to the cupboard (first-order); person B wrongly believes that 
person A will look for the sweets in the jar, unaware that person A secretly watched them 
being moved (second-order). 
False belief tasks have been used in child development studies (for a meta-analysis, see 
Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001), ASD (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), psychiatric 
disorders (Frith & Corcoran, 1996), brain damage (Winner, Brownell, Happé, Blum & Pincus, 
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1998), stroke (Happé, Brownell & Winner, 1999), and Alzheimer’s (Le Bouc, Lenfant, 
Delbeuck, Ravasi, Lebert, Semah & Pasquier, 2012). As children typically pass first- and 
second-order tasks aged 4-5 (Astington & Dack, 2008) and 6-7 (Perner & Wimmer, 1985) 
respectively, these measures tend to show ceiling effects with adults. Adaptations for use with 
NT adults include a version where participants rate the likelihood that a protagonist will look 
for her violin in various locations (Birch & Bloom, 2007). In this version of the classic task, 
participants are privy to the object’s location in two conditions, which are varied by 
plausibility (plausible and implausible). In the plausible condition, participants are told that, 
following the protagonist’s exit, her violin has been moved to a different container. The room 
has been rearranged, and the violin in the new container has been moved to the same location 
as the old container (where the protagonist might plausibly look). In the implausible 
condition, the violin had been moved to a new container and positioned in a new location, and 
so it would be implausible for the protagonist to find it there. Participants are asked to identify 
the percentage likelihood that the protagonist would look in each location. This test was 
shown to be sensitive to the interference of NT adult participants’ knowledge (“reality bias”; 
Mitchell, Robinson, Isaacs & Nye, 1996).  
False belief understanding has become synonymous with ToM; however, the construct 
validity of false belief tasks has been called into question (e.g. Bloom & German, 2000). For 
example, the False-Belief Localizer tool for isolating the neural basis of false belief 
representation (Dodell-Feder, Koster-Hale, Bedny & Saxe, 2011; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), 
is often referred to as the “ToM Localizer”, yet the neural pattern diverges from meta-analytic 
accounts of the ToM network (Spunt & Adolphs, 2014). In developmental populations, poor 
false belief task performance may reflect general task demands such as verbal or memory 
demands (Siegal & Beattie, 1991; Sullivan, Zaitchik & Tager-Flusberg, 1994). Some 
individuals with ASD pass second-order tasks while exhibiting real-world social cognitive 
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difficulties (Happé, 1994), suggesting that they may recruit compensatory verbal strategies 
(Happé, 1995) such as knowledge of complement syntax (Lind & Bowler, 2009) in order to 
pass the task. Social animation tasks such as those used in tests of implicit or spontaneous 
mentalising (e.g., Castelli et al., 2000; Heider & Simmel, 1944) circumvent this issue, though 
they lack the range of epistemological and emotional information present in real-world 
scenarios. Instead, naturalistic narrative stimuli enable researchers to embed target states in 
specific contexts (e.g. Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Saxe & Wexler, 2005), which may inhibit the 
use of other strategies (Happé, 1995). Happé’s (1994) Strange Stories Task assesses 
comprehension of short, naturalistic narratives, including joke, lie, appearance/reality, and 
contrary emotions. The range of narratives have proven more sensitive to subtle between-
group differences than false belief tasks, paving the way for more complex narrative-based 
approaches (see Section 2.8).  
2.4.3 Explicit mentalising: Affective content  
The ability to accurately infer affective states is often tested using facial expressions as 
stimuli because the ability to recognise emotions precedes mentalising (Mitchell & Phillips, 
2015). Emotion recognition tests traditionally require participants to identify basic emotions 
(happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, contempt, and disgust; Ekman & Friesen, 1971)3 
presented in photographs or brief video-clips of posed facial expressions. The emotion 
perception literature has primarily focused on macroexpressions: full-face unconcealed 
expressions lasting more than 0.5 seconds; however, strong agreement of the basic emotions 
can result in ceiling effects with NT adults (in other words, given enough time, adults tend to 
find identifying “happy”, “angry” and “sad” faces easy). One approach is to speed up 
presentation so that stimuli represent microexpressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1976), which last 
 
3 See Awasthi and Mandal (2015) for a critical review of existing theoretical models of emotional facial 
expressions (sociocultural, biological, computational) and their proposal of a comprehensive, multidisciplinary 
model.  
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up to 0.25 seconds and are usually fragmentary (appearing on the top or bottom half of the 
face). A challenge for this method is that even brief presentations can remain on the retina for 
longer (e.g., Brief Emotion Recognition Test, BART; Ekman & Friesen, 1974), though this is 
resolvable by incorporating neutral expressions as forward-backward masks (appearing before 
or after the critical image; Matsumoto et al., 2000). Microexpressions are involuntary, tending 
to signal concealed or altered emotional expressions, so perceiving them is likely to reflect the 
advanced capacity to detect deception in real-life interactions (Frank & Svetieva, 2015).  
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, 
Raste & Plumb, 2001) is a widely used test of mentalising. It requires participants to attribute 
the most appropriate mental state term (e.g., “ashamed”, “nervous”, “suspicious”, 
“indecisive”) to photographs of the eye-regions of faces. The task probes non-automatic 
processes (Bull, Phillips & Conway, 2008) and was designed to detect subtle deficits (Baron-
Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997). It has been applied to a range of domains 
including brain studies (Adolphs, Baron-Cohen & Tranel, 2002), dementia (Gregory, Lough, 
Stone, Erzinclioglu, Martin, Baron‐Cohen & Hodges, 2002) and clinical disorders (e.g. Fett, 
Viechtbauer, Dominguez, Penn, van Os & Krabbendam, 2011). The RMET demonstrates 
particularly strong predictive power with ASD groups, supporting its validity as a measure of 
the mentalising deficit associated with ASD. In Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill et al.’s 
(2001) original study, performance negatively correlated with the Autism Spectrum Quotient 
(50 forced-choice items about social skills, communication skills, imagination, attention to 
detail, and tolerance of change; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 
2001). This finding may reflect the purity of the stimuli, which minimises the opportunity to 
depend on alternative cues (such as verbal cues; see Happé, 1995).  
Although the RMET has been used in several studies with NT adult participants (e.g., 
Kidd & Castano, 2013; Mar et al., 2006), it has been found not to effectively discriminate 
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between individuals exhibiting high levels of mentalising ability (Black, 2018). Furthermore, 
recent research has indicated that it is subject to bias because it contains only Caucasian actors 
and is heavily reliant on participants’ vocabularies, requiring participants to select between 
linguistic mental state classifiers. Dodell-Feder, Ressler and Germine (2020) found more 
pronounced effects of education, race and ethnicity on RMET scores in comparison to other 
tasks (emotion identification, discrimination and non-verbal processing speed tasks). Oakley, 
Brewer, Bird and Catmur (2016) cautioned that the RMET provides an index of emotion 
recognition ability rather than the more complex mentalising processes. This is an important 
distinction as emotion recognition and other processes (e.g., attribution of thoughts and beliefs 
via explicit reasoning) can dissociate (Oakley et al., 2016). Emotion recognition stimuli 
processed via a single modality (including facial/body images or auditory voice recordings, 
e.g., Rutherford, Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2002) present a general issue of ecological 
validity, and a specific problem for studies with NT adults. Older adults tend to perform 
poorly in comparison with young adults on static emotion recognition tests but outperform 
them at recognising continuous emotions in dyadic interactions (Sze, Goodkind, Gyurak & 
Levenson, 2012). Dynamic stimuli can be used to avoid problems associated with using 
simple static images (Biele & Grabowska, 2006; Halberstadt, Dennis & Hess, 2011), although 
both static and dynamic stimuli lack information about contexts in which real-world scenarios 
are embedded (Achim, Guitton, Jackson, Boutin & Monetta, 2013).  
2.4.4 Explicit mentalising: Cognitive and affective content 
Developments in approaches to measurement have led to more complex mentalising 
tasks that yield data pertaining to both cognitive and affective mental content, at different 
levels of complexity. This facilitates the indexing of ability between processes and within 
participants. The computerised Yoni test (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007) is one 
such example. It requires integration of visual and verbal cues and has the capacity to 
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generate both behavioural and neuroimaging data. A series of vignettes feature a central 
character, “Yoni”, depicted by a schematic face—a simple cartoon “smiley”—and four 
images of a single category (e.g., faces, animals, fruit or transport) alongside sentences 
containing blanks (Figure 3). Participants indicate by selecting (clicking with the cursor) the 
appropriate image based on what Yoni is close to, thinks about, loves, does not love, or 
identifies with (first-order); and whose misfortune Yoni gloats over, whose success Yoni 
envies, and items Yoni thinks about, has or loves, that another character thinks about, has or 
loves (second-order). The task entails interpretation of proximity, eye-gaze and facial 
expressions, and provides measures of accuracy and response time across cognitive, affective 
and physical (control) trials.  
Figure 3. Yoni test stimuli. Example first-order physical (control) trial (left), second-order cognitive 
trial (centre) and second-order affective trial (right). Adapted from Neuropsychologia, 45, Shamay-
Tsoory, S. G., & Aharon-Perez, J., “Dissociable prefrontal networks for cognitive and affective theory 
of mind: A lesion study”, 3054-3067. Copyright Elsevier (2007). Reprinted with permission from 
Elsevier. 
 
In the original study, success was higher for affective content compared to cognitive 
content trials, a finding replicated by Kalbe et al. (2010), who suggested that additional facial 
expression cues in the affective condition facilitated decision-making (however, the scoring 
system does not separate out the emotion recognition dimension from the other affective 
content). Nonetheless, second-order differences between controls and patients with 
ventromedial frontal lobe damage were observed only in the affective condition, indicating 
that the task was sensitive to dissociation between cognitive and affective neural systems 
(Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007). The Yoni test has shown sensitivity to variation in 
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NT adults where false belief tasks have proven insufficient (e.g., Kidd & Castano’s, 2013, 
study of fiction effects on empathic accuracy); however, it is possible that the simplistic 
stimuli enable participants to form basic object-agent associations rather than engage in 
mentalising per se (this is also a criticism of false belief tasks; Perner & Ruffman, 2005). In 
contrast, the Why/How Task (Spunt & Adolphs, 2014) prevents the formation of basic 
associations by asking participants “how” (physical) and “why” (mentalising) questions about 
human behaviours depicted in photographs. It was designed for fMRI studies but is also 
capable of providing reliable behavioural (accuracy and response time) data.  
Stimuli comprised of simple social images have presented opportunities to examine the 
brain basis for behavioural differences between participants. Although their central limitation 
is a lack of ecological validity—they do not reflect the complexity of real-world social 
situations—they do enable specific aspects of mentalising to be isolated, though this raises the 
issue that some participants may utilise alternative, unmeasured strategies. 
2.5 Measuring Experience-sharing 
Self-report measures can probe trait experience-sharing tendencies with real or fictional 
others. The Emotional Contagion Scale (Doherty, 1997) is a 15-item measure of the tendency 
to “catch” five basic emotions: love, happiness, fear, anger, and sadness. Participants indicate 
agreement with statements like, “I get filled with sorrow when people talk about the death of 
their loved ones,” via a Likert scale anchored with “never” and “always”. The questions 
pertain to real-world others, except for one item about feelings towards fictional scenarios (“I 
cry at sad movies”). 
Emotion contagion can emerge from simple exposure to a target’s emotions or from 
interaction with a target. Guillory, Spiegel, Drislane, Weiss, Donner and Hancock (2011) took 
an experimental approach to manipulating affect and examined emotion contagion in 
interactive groups. Participants were assigned to groups of three and asked to watch film 
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clips. In the negative condition, one participant (the “experiencer”) watched a clip that 
reliably induces negative emotions while the other two participants watched a neutral clip. In 
the neutral condition all three participants watched the neutral film clip. After viewing the 
film clips all participants filled in the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988), a widely used measure of state emotion. Next, in their 
groups, participants were asked to chat, to solve word scrambles, and to listen to music, 
ostensibly for a test of multi-tasking ability. The “experiencer” in the negative group was 
assigned a word scramble task which used negative primes (the solutions were negative words 
such as “malice”) while listening to abrasive heavy metal music. This procedure was designed 
to maintain the negative emotion induced by the film. All other participants (neutral group 
participants and the partner participants in the negative group) listened to gentle jazz music 
and solved word scrambles that yielded neutral words. Finally, participants completed another 
questionnaire measure of state emotion (the affect items from the Circumplex Affect Scale; 
Russell, 1980) and were asked questions about group members’ emotions.  
The results of Guillory et al. (2011) revealed that tension was contagious: partners of 
the experiencer (whose negative affect was induced via the tasks) reported feeling 
significantly more tense compared to the neutral group. However, other emotions were not 
found to be contagious. This finding may have been due to a central limitation of the design: 
the lack of control over the “experiencer’s” expressiveness (e.g., they may have attempted to 
conceal their negative emotions from their groups), which would need to be addressed before 
drawing conclusions about the transferability of specific emotions in this context. To 
overcome this issue, a confederate actor trained to display a particular mood state can be 
planted as a “participant”. An example of this comes from Barsade (2002) who measured 
participants’ affect before and after a group interaction (his was a 2×2 design varying the 
confederate’s pleasantness and level of energy). He used external raters as well as 
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questionnaires yielding both self-report and coded measures of emotion contagion (the 
findings from this study were that participants who were with the pleasant confederate 
showed an increase in pleasant mood over time and, interestingly, the low energy groups also 
became more positive over time). Group tasks like these benefit from the ecological validity 
of the setting but are resource heavy, and their interactive nature makes it difficult to isolate 
the specific cues (e.g., facial or verbal) responsible for any effects.  
Emotion contagion does not necessarily take place face-to-face between people. 
Emotions can be transmitted through cultural artefacts such as music, film and images 
(Giuliana & Carvalho, 2016). Therefore, the vicarious experiencing of emotions can be 
assessed using music, pictorial or film stimuli. Music appears to elicit the physiological and 
experiential aspects of the emotional response system (Lundqvist, Carlsson, Hilmersson & 
Juslin, 2009), and participants who watched films of a target describing a significant happy or 
sad life event tended to experience the same emotions as the target (Hsee, Hatfield, Carlson & 
Chemtob, 1990). Such approaches tend to trade ecological validity for higher levels of 
control; however, dynamic stimuli (e.g., video clips) may offer a reasonable compromise as 
they are more naturalistic than static pictorial stimuli but offer greater control than interactive 
group situations.  
Self-report measures can assess the tendency to share in the emotions of fictional 
characters. For example, the 7-item fantasy subscale of the IRI (Davis, 1980) assesses the 
tendency to identify with fictional people and situations, with all but one item (“I daydream 
and fantasise, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me”) pertaining to 
absorption in narrative worlds and empathy for fictional characters (e.g., “after seeing a play 
or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters”). It has been suggested, therefore, 
that fantasy scores provide an index of imaginative abilities (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004) and that the scale can be treated as the trait tendency to become immersed in stories 
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(e.g., Mar et al., 2006; see also Hall & Bracken, 2011). The ability to immerse oneself in a 
storyworld is akin to the Einfühlung concept (projecting oneself into another object or person 
and experiencing it from within); however, how far this particular scale represents cognitive 
imaginative versus affective empathic processes, has been debated (Jordan, Amir & Bloom, 
2016).  
Because empathy for fictional characters appears to relate to empathy for real-world 
others (Nomura & Akai, 2012), empathy can be measured via the tendency to share in the 
emotions of fictional characters using questionnaires following a reading task. For example, 
The Identification with Character scale (Iguarta, 2010) is a 14-item scale comprising two 
dimensions: “empathic”, cognitive and affective reactions to characters (e.g., “I understood 
the characters’ way of acting, thinking or feeling”), and “merging”, the experience of 
becoming a character and losing of self-awareness (e.g., “I had the impression I was really 
experiencing the story of the characters”). Agreement with statements is indicated on a Likert 
scale anchored with “not at all” and “very much”. As there remains some debate about 
whether empathy requires the self and other to remain distinct (i.e., a lack of merging; Cuff et 
al., 2016), the dimensions of this scale could be applied depending on the theoretical 
standpoint. 
2.6 Measuring Prosocial Concern 
Prosocial concern, sympathy or “empathic concern” (Batson, Fultz & Schoenrade, 
1987; Davis, 1980) is the desire to help alleviate another’s suffering. The emotion 
experienced should be incongruent with that of the target (the observer does not share in the 
distress), but appropriate to the situation (e.g., Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). In this 
context, “appropriate” refers to feelings of sympathy and compassion rather than, for 
example, Schadenfreude (pleasure derived from another’s misfortune; Zickfeld et al., 2017). 
Unlike mentalising and experience-sharing constructs, with the empathic concern construct 
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there is a prerequisite for an “unfortunate” target. The target’s experience must be negatively 
valenced (e.g., distress) in order to activate the desire to alleviate their misfortune and 
improve their welfare. Thus, the concern component is invoked by an awareness of need 
(recall that the empathy concept was developed alongside Hume’s writings on sympathy, and 
that “pathos” constitutes part of the root of the term). 
The empathic concern subscale of the IRI is the most widely used measure of concern. 
It indexes the self-reported tendency to experience sympathy or concern for others (e.g., “I 
often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me”). Participants indicate 
agreement with seven statements on Likert scales. As with other self-report approaches, the 
measure may be susceptible to upward bias caused by socially desirable responding. A 
different self-report approach, the Empathy Index (Batson et al., 1987), asks participants to 
indicate the extent to which they have felt six emotions (“soft-hearted”, “compassionate”, 
“moved”, “tender”, “warm” and “sympathetic”) towards the stories of others (targets can be 
real or fictional), and Likert scales are anchored with “not at all” and “extremely”. While 
these two approaches do not necessarily map onto real-world empathising, they do provide an 
index of the extent that a person tends to become emotionally affected, and they have been 
shown to correlate with other (mentalising and experience sharing) dimensions of the IRI. 
2.7 Measuring Prosocial Behaviour 
Prosocial, helpful or altruistic behaviours can also be measured using self-report. For 
example, the Self-report Altruism Scale (Rushton, Chrisjohn & Fekken, 1981) requires 
participants to indicate the frequency with which they have carried out 20 acts that refer to 
helping acquaintances, strangers, and charities (e.g., “I have given money to a stranger who 
needed it or asked me for it”) on a Likert scale from “never” to “very often”. Penner et al. 
(1995) produced a prosocial personality battery comprising 56 items across two factors: other-
oriented empathy (which includes 19 items from the IRI), and helpfulness. However, socially 
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desirable responding represents a potential limitation, and some items concerning specific 
behaviours (e.g., donating blood or giving money to charity) may be impacted by factors 
beyond prosociality (such as eligibility or financial status).  
Task-based prosocial behaviour measures include dictator games in which participants 
decide how to distribute cash sums between themselves and other participants or, similarly, 
prosocial orientation tasks where they distribute points between themselves and other players 
(for an overview see Camerer, 2003). In these tasks, participant behaviour is measured in 
terms of altruistic and egoistic choices. For example, Koopman (2015) measured altruism 
dichotomously: “yes” if participants gave their participation fee to charity and “no” if they 
declined to do so. The Pen Drop task (van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami & van Knippenberg, 
2004) also yields a dichotomous outcome measure. While collecting in the experimental 
materials, the experimenter drops a set of pens, ostensibly by accident: what is measured here, 
simply, is whether or not the participant shows prosocial behaviour by lending a hand in 
picking them up. The approach can also incorporate different objects (e.g., the experimenter 
drops a pile of books; Macrae & Johnston, 1998). A drawback of this latter task is that as it 
requires live participation in the lab and consistent behaviour from the experimenter, there 
may be a substantial experimenter effect (e.g., Does, Ellemers, Dovido, Norman, Mentovich, 
van der Lee & Goff, 2018; Rosenthal, 1976). In contrast, prosocial orientation and dictator 
games, or charity giving measures, can be adapted for presentation via a computer (online or 
in the lab) which can support a more standardised approach. 
2.8 Multidimensional Approaches 
2.8.1 Fiction, film and interactive stimuli 
Using complex fictional narratives allows for the inclusion of a range of contextual 
variables. They provide opportunities for measuring both mentalising and experience-sharing 
strategies using explicit and implicit mental state questions. For example, participants in the 
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Short Story Task (SST; Dodell-Feder et al., 2013) read a fictional story about two characters 
whose romantic relationship breaks down (Hemingway, 1988). The text contains first- and 
second-order mental states and interpretation of them requires the synthesis of contextual, 
verbal and physical information presented in the text. Semi-structured questions probe explicit 
and spontaneous mentalising with explicit items scored from 0-2, and a single spontaneous 
question as a dichotomous yes/no variable. However, as the spontaneous question prompts 
participants to provide “the character’s thoughts, feelings and intentions when it applies to the 
question” (Dodell-Feder et al., 2013, p. 4), the implicit versus explicit distinction is not clear-
cut. The coding scheme does not distinguish cognitive and affective, or first- and second-
order attributions (indicated through low internal consistency; α = .54), and so the scoring 
system could be developed in the future to support a more nuanced picture of empathic 
accuracy (see Dodell-Feder et al., 2013, for some recommendations). In Dodell-Feder et al.’s 
original study, the SST demonstrated sensitivity to variation among NT adults (with scores 
ranging from 2-14 out of 16 available points), and concurrent validity with mentalising and 
experience-sharing measures (the RMET and the IRI fantasy subscale). 
Using film stimuli enables researchers to present verbal, facial and bodily cues within 
dynamic dyadic and group interactions (e.g. Barnes, Lombardo, Wheelwright & Baron-
Cohen, 2009; Bazin, Brunet-Gouet, Bourdet, Kayser, Falissard, Hardy-Baylé & Passerieux, 
2009; Golan, Baron-Cohen & Golan, 2008). They also provide the opportunity to use actors, 
which offers increased control over the content of the interactions presented. For example, the 
Interpersonal Perception Task (IPT; Constanzo & Archer, 1993) consists of thirty short, 
videotaped scenes, though a shortened version containing fifteen scenes is available (IPT-15). 
Each scene presents one of five types of social interaction: status, intimacy, kinship, 
cooperation and deception. Each scene is accompanied by a single multiple-choice question 
that requires participants to decode an aspect of the interaction, such as, “what is the 
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relationship between the man and the woman?” Although the IPT-15 has been shown not to 
correlate with some social ability tasks (Lindvall, 2008), it has been found to correlate with 
peer ratings of people’s social skills (Constanzo & Archer, 1993). This indicates that task 
scores converge on some real-world outcomes, but highlights heterogeneity among social 
ability tasks.  
The Movie Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006) presents 
more complex social scenes, which could enable a range of empathic dimensions to be 
examined. The film features four characters at a dinner party, where prominent themes are 
romance and friendship. A script development process (Field, Meyer & Witte, 2001) 
generated realistic characters that display both stable traits and transient states. Participants 
are asked direct questions about the characters’ cognitive and affective mental states, which 
requires the interpretation of vocal, physical and contextual information, alongside classic 
concepts such as false beliefs, metaphor and faux pas. Versions of the MASC include the 
original German and dubbed English editions (dubbing did not interfere with participants’ 
task focus, Dziobek et al., 2006, and generally does not impact information processing, 
Koolstra, Peeters & Spinhof, 2002). 
Dziobek et al. (2006) found that the MASC converged with three extant mentalising 
measures: a basic emotion recognition task, the RMET, and the Strange Stories Task 
(shortened). Specifically, MASC scores predicted Strange Stories Task performance in 
participants with Asperger Syndrome, and emotion recognition in controls, which indicated 
that verbal strategies may have compensated for facial processing difficulties. This highlights 
the trade-off between greater ecological validity and the problem of identifying specific 
processes used in complex tasks. Control questions are useful for partialling out variance 
caused by more general abilities; however, both groups (participants with Asperger Syndrome 
and NT participants) performed at ceiling on the MASC control questions, and so more 
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challenging questions would be required to account for other cognitive abilities (Dziobek et 
al., 2006; Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen & Rutter, 2000). Notably, the MASC was more 
sensitive to group differences than the established measures it was compared against, and this 
was supported by a more recent finding that participants with ASD showed impaired MASC, 
but not RMET performance, when compared to participants with alexithymia (a condition 
characterised by impaired emotion recognition that often co-occurs with ASD; Oakley et al., 
2016).  
Generalisability and longevity of film tasks may be limited due to the contextually 
specific nature of mental state inferences (for example, interactions may be better understood 
by similar age-groups to the characters; Griffiths, 1997). This is also true, to some extent, for 
fictional prose, where character names and the language used in dialogue may signal the ages 
of characters or the social era in which the story is situated. However, this information is more 
easily updated in prose stimuli, whereas film’s additional visual cues such as clothing and 
objects are more difficult to alter (consider how easily a film can be dated by hairstyles, 
fashion, or mobile phones used by its characters). The impact of identification with a 
particular social context is especially problematic for the study of empathic processes for 
which there may be an ingroup advantage (e.g., Matsumoto, Olide & Willingham, 2009).  
An approach that overcomes this problem is the use of social scenarios that participants 
are actively involved in. After all, individuals do not only observe the social world, they 
interact with it too. Interactive approaches to measuring empathic accuracy include a 
participative version of the Empathic Accuracy Paradigm (Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette & 
Garcia, 1990) where pairs of participants are covertly filmed waiting to participate in an 
experiment. After being debriefed, participants watch the footage back individually, and they 
are asked to describe their own thoughts and feelings, as well as to infer those of their partner. 
Partner inferences are scored for accuracy, which constitutes the dependent variable. The 
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procedure is socially valid—the interaction is real—but contingent on individuals accurately 
articulating their own mental states (Cuff et al., 2016). It is also limited to the range of states 
naturally occurring in the context, and participant motivations may influence accuracy: for 
example, interest in and perceived attractiveness of the partner factored in the original study. 
The original study did not account for the extent that accuracy may evolve or fluctuate over 
the course of the interactions, but because target moments are time-logged, this temporal 
aspect could be examined in future designs.  
2.8.2 Mentalising and experience-sharing stimuli 
The measures described in this chapter tap into different components of empathy. Smith 
(2017) invoked Goldman’s (2011) assertion that there are different “routes” to empathy. He 
pointed out that these different capacities do not themselves represent empathy, rather they 
reflect processes that can lead to empathic accuracy, a state of understanding of a target:  
None of the psychological phenomena such as imitation, emotional contagion and 
perspective-taking are to be identified with empathy. Nor are any of them strictly necessary 
for empathy […] Nevertheless, as I have indicated, these various psychological phenomena 
can feed into empathy […] On the account that I have sketched, empathy is not a process 
of any sort, rather it is a state in which one arrives having undergone those grounding 
processes, whatever they may have been. (Smith, 2017, p. 718) 
As discussed, mentalising and experience-sharing processes represent routes to the state 
of empathy, and their efficacy can be measured using empathic accuracy toolkits such as 
those described in this chapter. Due to their dissociable neural correlates, mentalising and 
experience-sharing have generally been studied separately (although recent research has 
indicated some overlap between these processes; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). While 
multidimensional approaches (e.g., Davis, 1980) have the capacity to measure and contrast 
both components, they have yet to be operationalised in this way. 
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Zhou et al. (2017) produced a behavioural paradigm with which to index and compare 
two pathways to empathic accuracy. They asked participants to estimate the emotional ratings 
that target individuals (“experiencers”) had given in response to positive, negative and neutral 
photographs. Participants were assigned to either the “theorisation” strategy, where they 
watched short videos of the experiencers’ dynamic facial responses to the photographs, a 
“simulation” strategy, where they viewed the same photographs as the “experiencers” and 
were able to use their own reactions as proxies, or a “simultaneous” condition where the 
photographs and the videos were presented side-by-side (Experiments 1-4; Figure 4). 
Consequently, the theorisation and simulation stimuli reflect mentalising (emotion 
recognition) and experience-sharing (using one’s own emotion as proxy) exercises, 
respectively. A novel mapping of these conditions onto the mentalising and experience-
sharing components identified in the model outlined in section 2.2, provides a framework 
through which to examine mentalising and experience-sharing sub-processes, and an 
opportunity to compare their respective value for empathic accuracy. 
Figure 4. Illustrative example of Zhou et al.’s (2017) simultaneous condition showing a photograph 
viewed by the experiencer (left) and video of the experiencer viewing the photograph (right). In the 
theorisation condition the photograph would be greyed out, and in the simulation condition the video 





FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES  
 43 
In Zhou et al.’s study, the two strategies for interpreting mental states were shown to be 
unequal, with the simulation strategy leading to higher empathic accuracy compared to the 
theorisation strategy. In Experiment 1, for example, participants in the simulation condition 
were more accurate than participants in the theorisation condition 92% of the time and 
participating in the simultaneous condition did not show an increase in accuracy beyond 
simulation. This paradigm enables testing of either mentalising, experience-sharing or both 
routes to empathic accuracy, via one experiment. Future research could use it to establish how 
far mentalising and experience-sharing impact concern and prosocial behaviour. While the 
task itself provides a behavioural measure, it is reliant on the accuracy of the targets’ self-
reports. Furthermore, the authors acknowledged that “simulation” may not represent the most 
effective strategy across all contexts. Situational factors, such as the valence of the target 
emotion (Kauschke, Bahn, Vesker & Schwarzer, 2019), similarity to the target and variation 
across people’s experiences (e.g., Barrett, Mesquita & Gendron, 2011) would likely modulate 
the effect of strategy. 
2.9 Selecting and Combining Measures 
Extant research on empathic accuracy has primarily focused on children, ASD, and 
clinical populations, and standard measures can suffer ceiling effects with NT adults. 
However, several classic tests have been adapted for research with adult cohorts. This chapter 
has described a range of paradigms used to investigate aspects of empathy in NT adults, some 
of which have been employed in the present research.  
Tasks measuring specific dimensions such as facial emotion recognition and cognitive 
mentalising provide “pure” measures that can distinguish between first-order and higher level 
processes, and can incorporate both cognitive and affective dimensions (e.g., Yoni test, used 
in the research presented in Chapter 7). However, these approaches can risk subtracting out 
key processes, particularly as real-world social displays can be suppressed, and so interpreting 
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mental states may require integration of verbal, physical and contextual information 
(McDonald, Flanagan, Rollins & Kinch, 2003). In contrast, interactive tasks, and those using 
VEs, have proven effective both in social skills development and in studying the neural bases 
of empathic inferencing. These, however, can be resource-heavy, reliant on participants’ 
introspective abilities (such as when participating as both empathiser and target in dyadic set-
ups), and require substantial training.  
Less resource-heavy approaches include multidimensional self-report measures, which 
provide insight into a range of processes and tendencies (e.g., the IRI, employed in the study 
presented in Chapter 5). Measures such as the IRI have been widely used and are well-
validated, though they rely on the ability of participants to accurately reflect on their own 
thoughts and behaviours and report them consistently. Using fiction as stimuli (e.g., the SST, 
used in the research presented in Chapter 7), provides realistic, complex scenarios through 
which to assess different dimensions of empathy. Fictional film enables emotion recognition 
to be tested alongside more complex processes, but the visual cues available in film may 
impact engagement with characters (and updated remakes are resource-heavy due to the 
production of script, employment of actors, crew and locations). Fictional prose stimuli are 
less resource-heavy and relatively straightforward to translate and reproduce compared to 
film. Questions can be designed to probe a range of empathic processes (thus reflecting the 
multiplicity of the empathy construct and its multifaceted cognitive architecture; Christensen 
& Michael, 2016). However, they do not allow the ability to use facial or bodily cues in 
empathic inferencing (apart for those that may be described in the text) to be tested, and so an 
additional task would be required to measure this ability. Zhou et al.’s (2017) paradigm 
provides one such opportunity, and it enables measurement of both mentalising and 
experience-sharing strategies. This paradigm is used in the research presented in Chapter 6. 
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Multidimensional measures can incorporate complex scoring systems in order to avoid 
compensatory strategies masking selective deficits when being used as diagnostic tools, and 
they provide opportunities to probe variation both within and between NT adult participants. 
In this way, multidimensional stimuli need not problematise construct validity, but they could 
prove fruitful to a nuanced assessment of the range of processes involved in empathy. The 
concomitant use of multidimensional and simpler tasks has enabled researchers to test the 
validity of multidimensional measures of empathy. It also enables the dimensions of empathy 
that may be enhanced through engagement with particular stimuli, to be clarified. This 
approach was taken in the research presented in Chapter 7, which measured empathic 
accuracy using both the Yoni test and the SST.  
2.10 Summary and Moving Forward 
This chapter defined the empathy construct and provided a rationale for studying 
empathic abilities in NT adults. A range of measurement paradigms were described, and it 
was proposed that a multidimensional approach would facilitate a nuanced understanding of 
empathic abilities in NT adults. Mentalising and experience-sharing represent routes to 
empathic accuracy and, consequently, to prosocial concern and prosocial behaviour. Because 
these skills develop through the lifespan and can be improved through training, a growing 
field of research has started to examine the methods through which they may be enhanced. 
The next chapter will turn to one activity that has been theorised to support the development 
of empathic abilities: engagement with fiction. The field of research examining fiction effects 
on empathy has incorporated a range of unidimensional and multidimensional empathy 
measures. The review of empathy measurement paradigms presented in the current chapter 
was designed contribute to a more nuanced understanding of their results. 
FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES  
 46 
Chapter 3: Fictional Worlds, Real Minds 
The previous chapter provided examples of paradigms used to test a range of empathic 
abilities, highlighting the multidimensionality of the empathy construct. A model of empathy 
was developed from Zaki and Ochsner’s (2012) tricomponent approach. This distinguished 
between mentalising and experience-sharing strategies for empathic accuracy, which can, in 
turn, initiate the prosocial concern and prosocial behaviour components. The chapter 
established the importance of studying empathic abilities in NT adults, in particular because 
empathic abilities vary throughout the lifespan, are associated with positive social outcomes 
and can be augmented through training.  
This chapter examines one activity that may enhance adults’ empathic abilities: 
engaging with fictional stories. First, it will define fiction for the purpose of the research and 
briefly outline the cultural development of fiction-reading for leisure. It will introduce 
Oatley’s (1999) fiction-as-simulation theory of the relationship between fiction and empathic 
abilities, which constitutes the theoretical framework for the empirical research conducted. It 
will provide a review of the literature on relationships between fiction and empathic abilities 
including key studies and recent meta-analyses of correlational and experimental findings. 
Indices of the strength of evidence will be provided. Correlation coefficients will be reported 
for correlational effects (with associated significance values and confidence intervals where 
reported by the study authors). Effect sizes for differences between groups will be converted 
to Cohen’s d where means, standard deviations and group sizes are available, and 
standardised beta values (β) will be used to report regression coefficients. Otherwise, effect 
sizes will be provided in their original format (e.g., Hedge’s g, z, omega squared [ω2]; for 
information on these effect sizes and their comparison to others, see Olejnik & Algina, 2003; 
Rosenthal, 2019).  
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With reference to the field of narrative persuasion, the process of becoming immersed in 
narratives will be identified as a potential factor in fiction effects on empathic abilities. It will 
be argued that fiction and empathic abilities are both multidimensional and that this 
complexity may explain inconsistent findings across the literature. The chapter will conclude 
with a proposal that the multidimensionality of both fiction and empathic abilities should be 
foregrounded in research aiming to establish the nature of the relationship between them.  
3.1 Definition of Fiction 
People encounter narratives on a regular basis; they are read, watched, listened to, or 
spoken in conversation. Fiction represents a subcategory of narrative, that which is carefully 
and purposefully constructed (Oatley, 1999). Fictional narratives are not straightforward to 
define, as narratives can take many forms. Bruner’s (1986) definition of the narrative mode, 
which “deals in human or human-like intention and action and the vicissitudes and 
consequences that mark their course” (p. 13), implies a coherent sequence of events 
surrounding humanlike agents, that could refer to a hugely diverse range of existing 
compositions (Nünning, 2014). In these terms, “fiction” can include poetry, prose, playscript 
and some history and biography works (e.g., Djikic & Oatley, 2014; Oatley, 1999).  
Drawing on Aristotle’s distinction, Oatley (1999) pointed out that history is about what 
has happened, and fiction is about what could happen. While nonfiction may contain many of 
the same features, and elicit similar responses to fiction narratives, it is concerned with 
information, whereas fiction is concerned with emotion (Oatley, 1999); in other words, 
fiction’s focus is a social one. This distinction appears to matter. Reader responses can differ 
depending on whether a text is framed as fiction or nonfiction; for example, fiction texts may 
be read more slowly allowing stylistic features to receive more attention than when they 
appear in nonfiction texts (Nünning, 2014). A further distinction concerns the construction of 
character. Fiction authors can provide insight into the private thoughts of unusual or 
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extraordinary characters, a privilege that is “out of the reach” of journalists (Nünning, 2014, 
p. 81), historians and biographers.4  
The central tenet of the social definition of fiction is that it must feature humans, or 
actors that bear psychological resemblance to humans (Mar & Oatley, 2008; Oatley, 1999). 
Isserley, the protagonist in Michel Faber’s (2000) Under the Skin, is non-human (the reader 
learns that she is an extra-terrestrial alien whose body has been surgically altered in order that 
she appear “human”). Yet, the psychological and social themes that she encounters are 
recognisably “human”: gender and power dynamics, elitism, love and compassion. Moreover, 
stories about non-human objects tend to exhibit recognisably human traits and mental states. 
In stories with a single human character, such as an explorer isolated on a mountain, the 
environment often takes the role of another character, imbued with humanlike intentions. The 
explorer might think, for example, “this mountain is trying to kill me” (Mar, 2009, p. 54).  
An attraction to human characters and themes in stories has been demonstrated in 
research with children. Children have been shown to prefer stories that contain people rather 
than objects—and the more the better—and that include descriptions of their mental states 
rather than only their actions (Barnes & Bloom, 2014). Indeed, enduring works of fiction, 
such as Shakespeare’s plays, tend to feature close, interrelated sets of characters that echo the 
structure and size of the social networks of our species. Not only that, but they tend to exploit 
people’s predisposed biases for information about relationships and status: in dramatic fiction 
the overarching comedy and tragedy genres culminate in marriage or death respectively, 
reflecting these themes at their highest stakes (Nettle, 2005). Although many works of fiction 
contain more than status battles and mating conflicts, “where scientific, political, aesthetic, or 
technical ideas impinge, they only become truly dramatic to the extent that they are made live 
 
4 Simply framing a text as “fiction” or “nonfiction” does not necessarily impact reader responses, rather the 
quality of the narrative appears crucial (e.g., Green & Brock, 2000; Nünning, 2014). Thus, the connection 
between the narrative’s events and actual events is not important, but its stylistic features and content are.  
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through the wants and relationships of the characters” (Nettle, 2005, p. 66). In other words, 
human relationships are central to fiction, and social themes are particularly visible in works 
that have transcended generations.  
Fictional narratives are not only read, they are listened to as radio dramas or 
audiobooks, viewed onscreen or at the theatre and interacted with via video games, drama and 
roleplay. The technologies for fiction production continue to evolve. In December 2018, 
streaming service Netflix released its first interactive film, Black Mirror: Bandersnatch 
(McLean & Slade, 2018): part video game, part choose-your-own adventure book, viewers 
were invited to make dichotomous yes/no decisions at key plot points, ultimately leading to 
five possible concrete endings, and multiple ways to get there. Due to the increasing range of 
technologies that mediate engagement with particular stories, people can be avid consumers 
of fiction without necessarily identifying as “readers”. At the extreme, a person need not have 
read a single book to be familiar with multiple works of contemporary and classical literature. 
Instead, they may have watched TV or film adaptations, listened to radio plays or seen 
versions performed onstage. The definition of fiction cannot be constrained to a particular 
medium. Therefore, fiction is defined, in line with Oatley (1999), as purposefully constructed 
text-based narrative that features agents and their interactions, presented via any channel 
that mediates comprehension of that narrative. 
This definition does not limit the research to full story arcs, which is in line with extant 
studies that have employed as stimuli both complete stories (e.g., Kidd & Castano, 2013) and 
extracts from longer stories (e.g., Bal & Veltkamp, 2013). The specification “text-based” 
denotes the exclusion of other forms of art such as painting, sculpture, and live art, although 
these forms may contain storytelling elements. There are several researchers already 
conducting fascinating studies in visual aesthetics, emotion and empathy (e.g., Freedberg & 
Gallese, 2007; see also Currie, 2011), and future dialogue between these areas of study may 
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converge to form a broader account of narrative impact across art forms. Text-based fictional 
narratives uniquely provide opportunities to engage with elaborate descriptions or re-
enactments of complex social situations that closely imitate their real-world counterparts.  
3.2 Fiction and Social Life 
Lord! When you sell a man a book you don’t sell him just twelve ounces of paper and ink 
and glue—you sell him a whole new life. Love and friendship and humour and ships at sea 
by night—there’s all heaven and earth in a book, in a real book I mean. (Morley, 1917/2010, 
p. 43) 
Telling stories is culturally universal (Brown, 1991) and has existed since humans 
developed the capacity for speech (e.g., Zipes, 2012). Contemporary hunter-gatherer 
societies have strong oral storytelling traditions which communicate  warnings and social 
norms and enable cooperation and coordination (Smith et al., 2017). The Cosmic Hunt story 
tells of a bear being chased by three hunters. On being hit, the bear bleeds over the leaves of 
the forest floor, creating the colours of autumn. It finally escapes its pursuers by climbing up a 
mountain and into the sky, where it emerges as the constellation Ursa Major. Versions of this 
myth have been found in Ancient Greece, Siberia, northern Europe, and the Americas, which 
indicates that it was being spoken when there was a land bridge connecting the land areas that 
are now Alaska and Russia. This dates the first oral tellings of the story to between 28,000-
13,000 BC (Storr, 2019).  
The practice of recording narratives, from cave paintings (such as a volcanic eruption 
depicted in the Chauvet cave in France dating back 36000 years; Nomade et al., 2016) to 
contemporary books, film and interactive media, allowed original versions of stories to be 
communicated to multiple people over time. The first printed story was the Epic of 
Gilgamesh, for which constituent sections were carved onto stone tablets as early as 2100 BC 
(the first surviving written version is from around 1800 BC; Dalley, 2000/1989). Since, it has 
inspired many contemporary works of literature, music, theatre, film, TV and video games 
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(Ziolkowski, 2011). Similarly, Aesop’s Fables were originally spoken and only written down 
in the 200s BC—three centuries after his lifetime—and several major texts including the 
Bible, the Sanskrit poems and the Mayan Codices were probably originally communicated 
orally. Like Aesop’s Fables, they remain in print millennia later.  
Before the invention of the printing press in the mid 1400s, all important texts had to be 
handwritten, which was a costly exercise. With the development of mechanical printing came 
a sudden increase in the publication and distribution of books, and by the late 18th century, 
reading was widespread.5 This led to a proliferation of libraries in cities and towns, a large 
general increase in literacy, as well as a shift in the content that readers were exposed to. 
Reading was no longer limited to canonical works such as the Bible; people increasingly read 
secular texts and novels, and they began to read for leisure. This reading revolution (e.g., 
Lagerfeld, 1986) not only changed what people read but how they read: alone and in silence 
where, for the first time, they had intimate access to the lives, experiences and perspectives of 
distant, unencountered others. 
By exposing readers to the lives of others, literature began to raise awareness of the 
maltreatment of certain social groups. For example, the novels of Charles Dickens drew 
attention to poverty in London and the inhumane conditions of Victorian workhouses, and 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin (Beecher Stowe, 1852/1995) highlighted the plight of slaves in the 
American South, helping to fuel the abolitionist movement of the 1850s, and lay the 
groundwork for the American Civil War in the 1860s (Kaufman, 2006). The humanitarian 
reform of the 1800s, which included improvements in women’s rights, workers’ conditions, 
and more humane treatment of criminals, coincided with the rise in novel-reading that 
followed the advent of mechanical printing (e.g., Pinker, 2011). This association suggests that 
 
5Access to reading material varied across political climates. For example, by the end of the 18th century China 
was producing more books than other countries, but education was restricted to the elite and so the non-elite did 
not have the option to read until the 20th century (Lagerfeld, 1986). 
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either the growth of fictional stories as a form of entertainment was symptomatic of an 
increasingly socially conscious society, or the sudden proliferation of fiction-reading changed 
people’s thinking on a mass scale, catalysing social reform. 
Stepping into someone else’s vantage point reminds you that the other fellow has a first-
person, present-tense, ongoing stream of consciousness that is very much like your own 
[…] Slipping even for a moment into the perspective of someone who is turning black in a 
pillory or desperately pushing burning faggots away from her body or convulsing under the 
two-hundredth stroke of the lash may give a person second thoughts as to whether these 
cruelties should ever be visited upon anyone. (Pinker, 2011, p. 211)   
According to Pinker (2011), by providing new perspectives through which to view the 
world, fiction-reading helped people to imagine themselves in the positions of others, thus 
reducing the appeal of, for example, violent acts like corporal punishment. Keen (2007) 
suggested that fiction enables the exploration of ideas and circumstances without the real-
world consequences and obligations that may arise from reading nonfiction narratives. As 
Morgan (1963) put it: “a book is the only place in which you can examine a fragile thought 
without breaking it, or explore an explosive idea without fear it will go off in your face” (p. 
4). Whereas nonfiction encourages the reader to connect the text to the real world and is more 
likely to induce action, fiction is more likely to induce empathy (Nünning, 2014), and 
provides a safe space wherein readers can exercise their “role-taking imagination” (Keen, 
2007, p. 39). This process appears to begin at a young age, as an interest in fairytales typically 
starts to develop around age four, alongside the emergence of empathic abilities (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983).  
3.3 Fiction as Simulation of the Social World 
Empathy has been associated with literary artistic practices since it originated as a 
concept. Plato predicted that a performer of literature who wept during a recitation would 
cause the audience to cry too. Aristotle observed that spectators of theatre would share in the 
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fear and suffering of characters due to their recognition that the acted scenes could reflect 
real-world situations (Pinotti & Salgaro, 2019). Paraphrasing Robert Louis Stevenson, Oatley 
(2011a) submitted that, “scientists use circles to solve problems in physics, and writers and 
readers likewise use fictional characters to think about people in the social world” (para 1). 
However, the cognitive processes involved in the effects of fictional works on empathy are, as 
yet, unidentified.  
Mar (2018a) proposed two routes through which stories may improve empathic 
abilities: (i) via the presentation of social content leading to the accumulation of social 
knowledge, and (ii) through the development of social processes, such as reasoning about 
mental states, perspective-taking and emotional engagement. These accounts are analogous to 
theory-theory versus simulation accounts of “theory of mind” or empathic inferencing (e.g., 
Coll et al., 2017; Goldman, 2006). According to the theory-theory approach, people develop a 
theory about the way others think and behave. Through observation, children and adults 
accumulate knowledge about the social world that enables those theories to be refined. This 
generally accepted perspective was challenged when Heal (1986) and Gordon (1996) argued 
that people understanding other minds should be thought of not as “theorisers” but as 
“simulators” (though some debate was happening much earlier; see Stone & Davies, 1996). 
The simulation theory proposes that people understand others by activating their own mental 
processes—those processes that they would use in the situation at hand—and using them 
online as proxies for those of the target (e.g., Coplan, 2011; Goldman, 1995). The discovery 
of mirror systems in the motor region of the brain (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese & Fogassi, 
1996) showed that perceiving an action was enough to elicit a mental simulation of that action 
(Botvinick, Jha, Fabian, Solomon & Prkachin, 2005; Keysers, Wicker, Gazzola, Anton, 
Fogassi & Gallese, 2004; see also Wicker, Keysers, Plailly, Royet, Gallese & Rizzolatti, 
2003). This represented the first neural evidence in support of Lipps’ theory that perceiving 
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and internally imitating an expression or behaviour would enable access to the emotion that 
caused it or the feeling of doing it (De Vignemont & Singer, 2006).  
Goldman’s (2006) account does not reject the theory-theory idea outright, rather it 
presents a hybrid view that understanding others involves both theorising and simulation 
processes, although the simulation mechanism is at the forefront of his proposition. This 
integrative view is also reflected in Mar’s (2018a) model of fiction effects: the social content 
of fiction (i) provides knowledge that can be used to refine theories of how others think and 
behave and (ii) recruits the same mental apparatus as is involved in interpreting real-world 
social situations. Through these routes, fiction may support real-world empathic accuracy, and 
the two pathways may overlap: readers may develop social cognitive processes as well as a 
store of social narratives that they can subsequently draw on to understand a person’s 
situation and experience (Gallagher & Gallagher, 2019). However, Mar (2018a) noted that 
most evidence in the fiction effects literature to date has supported the “process” account.  
In line with the “process” account of fiction-engagement, Gerrig (1993) hypothesised 
that the same cognitive components are recruited when people process fictional events as 
when they encounter those events in the real world. Neuroscientific evidence suggests that 
cognitive processing of fictional narratives and of the experienced social world overlap: the 
same neural mechanisms are involved in processing real events and fictional descriptions of 
similar events (e.g., Speer et al., 2009; Wallentin, Nielsen, Vuust, Dohn, Roepstorff & Lund, 
2011; see also Zwaan, 2004; for a meta-analysis, see Mar, 2011), and this effect is stronger 
for narratives than unconnected sentences (Kurby & Zacks, 2013). Oatley (2012) suggested 
that fictional narratives constitute valid representations of the experienced social world, and 
that because fiction is inherently social, it activates responses associated with real-world 
social interactions. In other words, fiction enables readers to simulate social experiences 
(Oatley, 1999). 
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This perspective is supported by evidence that brain areas (the anterior and mid-
cingulate cortex) associated with experience-sharing (having an affective response similar to 
that of a target; Walter, 2012) are activated during immersion in fiction (Hsu, Conrad & 
Jacobs, 2014) and continue to remain active afterwards (Cadwell, 2015). Tamir, Bricker, 
Dodell-Feder and Mitchell (2016) found that reading and social cognition both recruit the 
brain’s default network: a set of interacting brain regions associated with the ability to 
simulate hypothetical mental states and scenarios. Participants read passages that varied on 
imagery (vivid versus abstract) and content (mental content versus no mental content), while 
in an fMRI machine. Results showed that these dimensions led to patterns of brain activity 
differentially related to the simulation of vivid scenes versus the simulation of people and 
their minds. Moreover, their results indicated that the simulation of social scenes (identified 
via activity in the subnetwork associated with passages containing mental content) mediated 
the relationship between lifetime exposure to fiction and the tendency to spontaneously think 
about intentions when judging a target’s behaviour in a vignette task. These findings suggest 
that the social simulacrum works at the neural level: in terms of processing, fictional and real 
events appear broadly indistinct.  
Oatley and colleagues suggested that through simulating the social experiences depicted 
in fiction, readers may develop the skills associated with interpreting, making sense of, and 
responding appropriately to, social phenomena: “a play or novel runs on the minds of the 
audience or reader as a computer simulation runs on a computer” (Oatley, 1999, p. 105). In 
this view, fiction constitutes learning about the social world through the abstraction and 
simulation of social happenings, a form of “learning through experience”, which can facilitate 
empathic growth (Mar & Oatley, 2008, p. 173). This, Mar and Oatley (2008) argued, 
represents the core function of fiction.  
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A growing field of research has examined the hypothesised positive relationship 
between fiction and empathic abilities. This chapter will now turn to a review of that 
literature. First, correlational studies examining relationships between lifetime fiction-
exposure, fiction-engagement and empathic abilities will be reviewed, followed by 
experimental research examining causal effects of fiction-engagement on empathic abilities.6 
Evidence of other factors involved in the relationship between fiction and empathic abilities 
will also be addressed, particularly the role of immersion.  
3.4 Review of Research Examining Relationships between Lifetime Fiction-exposure and 
Empathic Abilities 
3.4.1 Bookworms versus nerds 
If fiction is a simulation of the social world, then readers should show relative expertise 
in social interactions, just as a pilot-in-training can develop her skills in a flight simulator 
(Mar & Oatley, 2008). However, if a person spent all of their free time reading, time for 
interacting with people in the real world would be depleted. Mar and colleagues argued that 
such reading habits would not, necessarily, be detrimental to a person's social development 
(Mar & Oatley, 2008; Mar et al., 2006). Mar et al. (2006) conducted a study to test the 
stereotype of the socially awkward “bookworm” who has “chosen the company of print over 
his peers” (p. 695). They suggested that while this stereotype may have some basis in truth, it 
might only apply to avid readers of expository nonfiction, rather than to readers of novels. 
They argued that fiction, with its multiple intentional agents and social scenarios, may 
function as a substitute for real-world social interactions. On the other hand, expository texts, 
which do not imitate social environments, would not buffer against a lack of social 
 
6 Several literature searches were conducted. The latest systematic Boolean title search was conducted on 6th 
September 2019 on the Web of Science database using the following combinations of terms to search for 
research articles: fiction* or narrative or reading or story* or stories* or litera* and empath* or social cognit* or 
theory of mind or mentaliz* or mentalis* or prosocial or altruis* or social skills or social ability* or social 
acumen. This yielded 205 results, reduced to 120 following a title sift.  
FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES  
 57 
interaction. If this is the case, it would only be the nonfiction-reading “nerds” that would 
show reduced levels of social acumen, and not the fiction-reading “bookworms”. Drawing on 
Oatley’s (1999) simulation theory, they suggested that through fiction-reading, “bookworms” 
can simulate social experiences and develop their empathic abilities without needing to leave 
their armchairs. 
To investigate this hypothesis, Mar et al. (2006) developed a new version of the Author 
Recognition Test paradigm (ART; Stanovich & West, 1989). ARTs provide a measure of 
lifetime exposure to fiction by quantifying familiarity with fiction authors as a proxy measure 
of lifetime exposure to fiction-in-print. The test consists of a list of names comprised of 
fiction authors and made-up, plausible foils. Participants are asked to select from the list those 
names that they know to be fiction authors. By incorporating foils, the task uses a signal-
detection approach to discourage guessing and control for socially desirable responding (such 
as selecting unfamiliar names in order to appear more widely read). In the case of correctly 
selected names it is assumed that participants have read the author’s books or become familiar 
with them when browsing related books in libraries, bookshops, online, and through adverts 
or recommendations. Although the task is an indirect measure of lifetime fiction-exposure, it 
has been shown to predict real-world reading abilities and habits (Mol & Bus, 2011; Rain & 
Mar, 2014; Stanovich & Cunningham, 1992; Stanovich & West, 1989; Stanovich, West & 
Harrison, 1995; West, Stanovich & Mitchell, 1993). The test has been revised to include 
updated author lists (as younger participants tend to recognise fewer of the original authors; 
Acheson, Wells & MacDonald, 2008) and genre dimensions. Mar et al.’s (2006) revision of 
the ART (ART-R) included both fiction (n = 50) and nonfiction (n = 50) author names, as 
well as plausible foils (n = 40). Both the fiction and nonfiction categories were divided into 
five genres to ensure that they represented the potential breadth of a person’s reading habits 
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(fiction: romance, sci-fi/fantasy, suspense/thrillers, domestic fiction, foreign translated; 
nonfiction: science, philosophy/psychology, political/social commentary, self-help, business).  
Mar et al. (2006) examined relationships between participants’ fiction and nonfiction 
scores on the ART-R and self-report empathy (using the IRI) along with behavioural 
measures of mentalising (using the RMET and the IPT-15; see Chapter 2). The results showed 
that fiction-exposure was positively related to scores on the RMET, whereas nonfiction-
exposure was negatively related to RMET scores. To return to the authors’ original 
distinction, “bookworms” showed a higher ability to mentalise based on emotion expressions 
whereas “nerds” showed a lower ability to do so. While fiction-exposure did not relate to 
higher IPT-15 scores (the association was negative but non-significant) nonfiction-exposure 
was significantly negatively associated with scores on the task. These results held when 
controlling for the other dimension of the ART-R (fiction or nonfiction), foil-checking, age, 
years of English fluency and general intelligence. On this mentalising task, then, while 
fiction-exposure was unrelated to task performance, nonfiction-reading “nerds” performed 
worse.  
Mar et al. (2006) found that associations between fiction-exposure (as well as 
nonfiction-exposure) and the self-report empathic ability scales were non-significant, except 
for fiction-exposure with the fantasy subscale of the IRI which, as described in the previous 
chapter, provides an index of the trait tendency to become immersed in stories. This suggests 
that people who become immersed in stories are likely to read more of them. With regard to 
the null findings for the other scales, the sample (94 participants) may have lacked sufficient 
power to detect effects. Indeed, a post-hoc power analysis conducted as part of the current 
literature review (using G*power; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007) based on the largest 
non-significant raw correlation (fiction-exposure with the empathic concern subscale, r = .09) 
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indicated that power was low at .13.7 Mar et al.’s (2006) study was the first to incorporate 
fiction and nonfiction ART dimensions, and to use the ART to examine associations with 
empathic abilities. Since then, studies investigating correlations with fiction-exposure have 
also tended to use adaptations of the ART. These have facilitated the assessment of exposure 
to different genres (Black et al., 2018; Fong et al., 2013, Kidd & Castano, 2017a) and have 
been used to control for general fiction-exposure in studies examining the immediate, causal 
effects of reading stories (Kidd & Castano, 2013; Koopman, 2016).  
3.4.2 Meta-analysis of correlational studies (Mumper & Gerrig, 2017) 
Mumper and Gerrig (2017) conducted a meta-analysis of published and unpublished 
studies that used adaptations of the ART to examine relationships between leisure-reading and 
empathic abilities. They included original research with healthy adult populations that had 
measured associations between fiction or nonfiction-reading habits with self-report empathic 
abilities (“dispositional empathy”) and task-based empathic accuracy (“theory of mind”). The 
studies included in the dispositional empathy analysis predominantly used the IRI (seven used 
the empathic concern subscale, three used the fantasy scale, one used the personal distress 
scale, and six used the perspective-taking scale). The behavioural empathic accuracy measure 
was the RMET in all but one study that used a social vignette test (created by Young, 
Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, Hauser & Damasio, 2010). In the latter, participants were asked to 
view 48 vignettes and make judgments about the permissibility of an actor’s behaviour. The 
scenarios in the vignettes were varied by actor intention (negative, neutral) and outcome 
(negative, neutral), and so participants’ judgments about moral permissibility were considered 
to reflect the extent to which participants spontaneously thought about the actor’s intentions. 
 
7 The power of a statistical test is the probability that a false null hypothesis will be rejected. Power can be 
articulated as a value between 0 and 1 where higher values indicate higher power. Typically, power of > .80 is 
considered desirable in the social sciences, which sets the chance of wrongly accepting the null hypothesis at 
20% or lower (e.g., Bakker, Hartgerink, Wicherts & van der Maas, 2016).  
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Therefore, the behavioural measures assessed either the explicit ability to decode facial 
expressions, or the spontaneous tendency to mentalise about an agent’s intentions.  
Mumper and Gerrig (2017) provided aggregate correlations between ART scores and 
the combined empathic ability measures (computed using the averages of the IRI empathic 
concern and perspective-taking scales or scores on the Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ; 
Spreng, McKinnon, Mar & Levine, 2009) and the aggregate empathic accuracy scores 
(RMET and social vignette task described above). ART scores were positively associated with 
dispositional empathy, r(16) = .070, p < .001, 95% CI [.03, .11], and with task-based 
empathic accuracy, r(12) = .211, 95% CI, p < .001 [.15, .27], and the association was stronger 
for the latter.8 However, the measures used in the studies contributing to each of the aggregate 
effects tapped into the different empathic components (as outlined in Chapter 2). This 
heterogeneity is visible at the level of individual studies. For example, in their study 
examining associations between fiction-exposure and empathic abilities described in the 
previous section, Mar et al. (2006) observed no correlations between personal distress and any 
of the other IRI subscales. There was also no association between the behavioural tasks (the 
RMET and IPT-15), nor did the behavioural tasks correlate with the self-report IRI scales, 
except for a positive association between the IPT-15 and fantasy (which could represent a 
spurious correlation symptomatic of the small sample). This lack of correlation among the 
dependent variables highlights the heterogeneity of empathic ability measures (Mar et al., 
2006) and the importance of a multidimensional approach.  
Closer inspection of the individual self-report empathic ability scales illustrates this 
point. As identified in the previous chapter, the perspective-taking scale measures the 
tendency to mentalise about other people’s points of view (e.g., “I try to look at everybody’s 
 
 8 The degrees of freedom were calculated as N-1 for each variable (N-2 in the bivariate correlations) where N is 
the number of effect sizes computed. 
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side of a disagreement before I make a decision”), whereas the empathic concern scale 
measures feelings of sympathy (e.g., “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less 
fortunate than me”). The fantasy scale assesses the tendency to identify with fictional people 
and situations, with all but one item (“I daydream and fantasise, with some regularity, about 
things that might happen to me”) pertaining to immersion in narrative worlds and empathy for 
fictional characters (e.g., “after seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the 
characters”), and so the fantasy scale may reflect an experience-sharing process (although this 
is debated; Jordan et al., 2016). The TEQ consists of 16 questions across the domains of 
experience-sharing (e.g., “when someone else is feeling excited, I tend to get excited too”), 
concern (e.g., “I have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me”) and 
mentalising (“I can tell when others are sad even when they do not say anything”).9 The 
empathy subscale of the Literary Response Questionnaire (LRQ; Miall & Kuiken, 1995) was 
used in four of the studies included in the meta-analysis. The scale contains seven items all 
related to becoming absorbed in fictional stories with the majority of questions probing the 
tendency to share in the experiences of characters (e.g., “when I read fiction I often think 
about myself as one of the people in the story”). Therefore, this scale is most closely related to 
the fantasy dimension of the IRI (although this association has yet to be tested) and may 
reflect experience-sharing.  
Therefore, while aggregate correlations are useful for comparing the effect sizes of 
fiction and nonfiction, the correlations between fiction-exposure and the individual empathic 
ability scales would provide a more nuanced insight into the effects of fiction. Additional 
correlations were reported for the IRI subscales, but not for the TEQ, LRQ, or the two 
behavioural measures (the RMET and social vignettes test) individually. The IRI results 
 
9 This question could also reflect the sharing of emotion. However, the TEQ was found to correlate with 
perspective-taking as well as the empathic concern subscale of the IRI (though the correlation was stronger with 
empathic concern) indicating that some of the TEQ questions probe variance associated with the cognitive 
component rather than with the emotional component exclusively.  
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revealed that fiction-exposure was positively associated with empathic concern, r(16) = .074, 
p < .001, 95% CI [.04, .11], and fantasy, r(14) = .178, p < .001, 95% CI [.14, .21], as well as 
perspective-taking r(15) = .079, p < .001, 95% CI [.04, .13], but not with personal distress 
r(8) = -.042, p = .222, 95% CI [-.11, .03]. This is unsurprising considering the difference 
between personal distress and the other constructs: the personal distress scale measures self-
oriented responses to others’ needs—i.e., the desire to reduce one’s own distress––which can 
lead to avoidance of empathic behaviours, rather than other-oriented responses, distinguishing 
it from the other IRI dimensions (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Batson & Shaw, 1991; 
Davis, Mitchell, Hall, Lothert, Snapp & Meyer, 1999; Penner et al., 1995; Singer & Lamm, 
2009).  
The positive relationships between reading and the individual empathic ability subscales 
that Mumper and Gerrig (2017) identified were not unique to fiction-exposure. Nonfiction-
exposure showed smaller positive correlations with perspective-taking, r(12) = .064, p = .003, 
95% CI [.02, .11], and fantasy, r(10) = .054, p = .020, 95% CI [.01, .10], and a significant 
negative correlation with personal distress, r(8) = –.095, p = .011, 95% CI [-.17, -.02]. There 
was no association between nonfiction-exposure and empathic concern, r(12) = .035, p = 
.146, 95% CI [-.01, -.08]. The aggregate correlations with task-based measures of mentalising 
(the RMET, n = 14, and social vignettes, n =1) were stronger for fiction-exposure, r(12) = 
.211, p < .001, 95% CI [.15, .27], compared to nonfiction-exposure, r(5) = .091, p = .008, 
95% CI [.02, .16]. Taken together, these findings indicate that fiction appears to be associated 
with processes involved in both the mentalising and experience-sharing domains. However, 
nonfiction also appeared to relate to mentalising abilities (RMET, social vignette task and 
perspective-taking scale) and less strongly to fantasy but not to empathic concern. Nonfiction 
was, however, negatively associated with the tendency to feel self-oriented personal distress. 
This suggests that some of the variance in mentalising and experience-sharing (if the fantasy 
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subscale is taken as an indicator of experience-sharing tendency) is accounted for by 
nonfiction-reading. However, the activation of the concern component at least may be unique 
to fiction. It could be that nonfiction leisure-reading cultivates the ability to reason about 
others’ mental states and to imagine other worlds, whereas fiction may particularly invoke 
other-oriented affective or motivational processes.  
3.4.3 Other correlational evidence from studies with adults 
Mumper and Gerrig’s (2017) meta-analysis provided a comprehensive review of 
correlational studies examining relationships between lifetime fiction- and nonfiction-
exposure and empathic abilities. However, some experimental studies examining fiction 
effects (which will be reviewed in the next part of this chapter) have also included the ART, 
usually to control for variance associated with previous fiction habits, and they have also 
reported correlations with empathic ability measures. Kidd and Castano (2013; Experiments 
1, 4 and 5) found that ART scores (Acheson et al., 2008) positively predicted RMET scores, p 
< .01, but not (Experiment 2) the Diagnostic Analysis of Nonverbal Accuracy 2-Adult Faces 
test (DANVA-AF; Nowicki, 2010, which measures facial emotion recognition using full 
faces). The positive association with RMET scores was also found in a replication of Kidd 
and Castano (2013) by Panero et al. (2016), z = 4.46, p < .001, and in a conceptual replication 
by Kidd, Ongis and Castano (2016), where higher scores on the ART led to higher RMET 
performance, β = .25, p = .01, and β = .30, p < .01, in two analyses using different stimulus 
texts. 
Other studies have reported correlations between fiction and empathic abilities without 
using the ART. Johnson (2012) examined the relationship between empathic feelings 
experienced during reading a passage of fiction and performance on empathic ability 
measures. After reading, participants viewed morphed faces showing various levels of fear 
and happiness. Participants that experienced more concern-related feelings during fiction-
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reading (e.g., “compassionate”; Batson et al., 1987) tended to say that fear was present on 
faces even when it was not: for each unit increase in emotions during reading, there was an 
8% increase in participants’ ratings for fearfulness, p = .01. In other words, they showed bias 
towards fearful facial expressions, thus accuracy for detecting fearful faces was lower for 
those that experienced emotions during reading (dropping by about 10% for each unit increase 
in emotions), p = .016. Accuracy for happy faces was not significantly affected. This is 
interesting for two reasons: first, it indicates that fiction-induced empathic processes that are 
not contingent on dispositional empathy (since trait concern was included in the regression 
models) relate to people’s ability to mentalise about others’ emotional states. Second, it 
suggests that the effects of empathic feelings during reading are not always positive. In this 
study, effects appeared to be influenced by context as they impacted the reading of fearful but 
not happy expressions; the bias was shown only for expressions that conveyed “need” 
(Johnson, 2012). As discussed in the previous chapter, concern is evoked by an awareness of 
need and, therefore, fiction-induced concern may predispose people to identify need from 
faces.  
According to the empathy model established in the previous chapter, concern may lead 
to prosocial behaviour. Indeed, Johnson (2012) found that higher levels of fiction-induced 
feelings were associated with a higher likelihood of helping in the pen drop task outlined in 
the previous chapter (van Baaren et al., 2004): for each unit increase in emotions during 
reading, participants were 13% more likely to pick up the pen, p = .042). However, 
dispositional empathic concern was not associated with the prosocial behaviour outcome 
(although it was associated with the bias for fearful facial expressions). Therefore, some of 
the increase in prosocial behaviour may have been accounted for not by an increase in 
concern, but by participants modelling prosocial behaviour portrayed by the story characters 
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(Johnson, 2012). Further research is required to clarify the relationship between concern, 
fiction-induced feelings and prosocial behaviour. 
3.4.4 Correlational evidence from studies with children  
The focus of the studies described has been on NT adults which, for the reasons outlined 
in the previous chapter, is the target population of the present research. However, it is worth 
noting that correlational research has shown similar effects with children. Mar et al. (2010) 
examined 4-6-year-olds’ levels of exposure to children’s literature, television and film using 
four exposure measures based on the ART (authors and titles of literature, television 
programme titles and film titles), which were given to the participants’ parents to complete. 
Five mentalising abilities were tested (the accurate attribution of desires, beliefs, knowledge, 
false beliefs and emotions). Additionally, parents completed the ART-R (Mar et al., 2006), 
which contained fiction and nonfiction authors of books for adults, as a measure of their own 
exposure to fiction. Controlling for vocabulary, age, gender and income, exposure to 
children’s literature (assessed via parents’ familiarity with children’s literature) positively 
predicted children’s mentalising scores, β = .30, p < .05, and this effect was found regardless 
of the parents’ own exposure to fiction. Using the same control variables, a positive effect was 
also found for exposure to children’s films, β = .30, p < .05, but not to children’s television. 
As yet, it is unclear whether the same pattern is seen in adults.  
Research has examined the effects of children’s engagement with other fiction formats. 
In quasi-experimental studies with children and adolescents, Goldstein and colleagues 
examined the social benefits of acting compared to other types of arts classes. Goldstein et al. 
(2009) compared high school students taking elective acting classes with students from the 
same population not taking acting classes. They found a large effect of class taken on RMET 
performance, d = 0.83, p = .008, with acting students scoring higher on average. They also 
scored higher on a self-report empathy task (the Index of Empathy for Adolescents; Bryant, 
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1982) which measures empathic concern and experience-sharing through questions such as, “I 
think it is funny when I see someone cry” (reverse-scored), and “even when I don’t know why 
someone is laughing, I laugh too”. Goldstein et al. (2009) internally replicated this finding 
using the MASC (a film measure described in the previous chapter) and the empathic concern 
subscale of the IRI. Again, actors scored higher for mentalising, but this did not reach 
statistical significance, d = 0.58, p = .057. There was no difference between empathic concern 
scores for the acting and non-acting students (in fact, the acting students scored slightly lower 
on average). 
In another quasi-experimental design, Goldstein and Winner (2012) compared children 
aged 6-11 who were already enrolled on or were recruited to acting classes versus visual arts 
classes. Before taking the classes, there were no differences between the groups on 
mentalising (measured using the Strange Stories Test, the RMET and the Faux Pas test which 
assesses the ability to recognise insults; Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones & Plaisted, 
1999) or empathic concern (measured using the Index of Empathy for Children; Bryant 1982). 
However, the children in the acting course group did show higher levels of experience-sharing 
at baseline, measured using the Fiction Emotion-Matching task created for the study. In the 
task, participants were asked about the feelings of characters in film clips and their own 
emotional responses to them. This measure was scored according to matches between the 
emotions articulated by the participants for the targets and for themselves. After 10 months of 
participation, children on the acting course had made significant gains in their Index of 
Empathy scores (concern and experience-sharing) compared to the controls. On the Fiction 
Emotion-Matching task the actors scored significantly higher than the controls, d = 1.23, p = 
.008, but there was no interaction with time; in other words, the children enrolled on the 
acting class were more likely at both pre-test and post-test to share in the experiences of 
fictional characters presented on film. It may be, therefore, that children who tend to share in 
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the emotions of fictional characters are simply more drawn to taking acting classes, as the 
majority of participants self-selected into groups rather than being randomly assigned.  
Children on the acting course did not show significant improvement compared to 
children on the visual arts course on any of the mentalising measures. The authors suggested 
that this was due to low ecological validity as the simplistic stimuli did not incorporate the 
range of visual and auditory cues that would be true to life. They conducted a follow-up study 
with secondary school students enrolled on competitive acting training, visual arts or music 
training (arts and music students formed the combined control group). They found that actors 
showed increases in mentalising, assessed using the Empathic Accuracy Paradigm described 
in the previous chapter, d = 0.84, p = .026, and a non-significant trend towards gains in trait 
experience-sharing, d = 0.56, p = .06, measured using the Basic Empathy Scale for 
Adolescents (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006), which contains questions like, “after being with a 
friend who is sad about something, I usually feel sad”. Again, the actors showed higher levels 
of emotion sharing on the Fiction Emotion-Matching task (this time using television 
programmes), d = 0.73, p = .036, though these differences were also found before training 
commenced, and they were not impacted by time. Actors also performed higher on the RMET 
before training. The findings from Goldstein and colleagues’ studies show that children who 
signed up for acting courses tended to have higher baseline levels of experience-sharing, and 
adolescents who enrolled on acting training tended to show higher baseline levels of both 
mentalising and experience-sharing (Goldstein et al., 2009, Goldstein & Winner, 2012). 
Acting training appears to lead to gains in some empathic abilities above other arts training, 
specifically concern and experience-sharing in younger children, and mentalising and 
experience-sharing in adolescents. However, as the studies by Goldstein and colleagues were 
quasi-experiments with pre-determined groups (no random assignment), inferences cannot 
confidently be made about the direction of cause, and other factors such as social-
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developmental opportunities and experiences may have come into play during the study 
durations.  
Gentile et al. (2009) examined the effects of videogaming on the prosocial behaviour 
component, specifically whether video games with prosocial content were related to prosocial 
behaviours. In their study with Singaporean children (Study 1), participants’ exposure to 
prosocial and violent video games was measured by asking them to list their three favourite 
games, the number of hours they spent on each weekly, and to rate how often players help or 
kill others in the game. This approach had previously demonstrated good construct and 
predictive validity (e.g., Anderson & Dill, 2000). Additionally, the authors checked validity 
by correlating the participants’ ratings with expert ratings for the game, and agreement was 
satisfactory, r = .75, p < .001. Prosocial behaviour was measured using eleven helping items 
(e.g., “I would spend time and money to help those in need”) and seven cooperation items 
(e.g., “I feel happy when I share my things with others”) from the Prosocial Behaviour 
Questionnaire (Cheung, Ma & Shek, 1998), plus items adapted from the Children’s Empathic 
Attitudes Questionnaire (Funk, Fox, Chan & Curtiss, 2008) related to trait empathy (e.g., 
“when I see a student who is upset, it really bothers me”), and other scales related to 
aggression and emotional awareness. Prosocial game playing was positively related to all 
helping behaviours, cooperation and sharing, and empathy. In their longitudinal study, Gentile 
et al. (2009, Study 2) asked Japanese children to rate how often in the past month they had 
played video games with prosocial scenes using 5-point Likert scales anchored with “not at 
all” and “very often”. Here, prosocial behaviour was assessed via self-report: participants 
were asked how frequently they had performed prosocial acts (e.g., “I helped a person who 
was in trouble”). The authors identified a bidirectional relationship between prosocial gaming 
and prosocial behaviour, showing that prosocial game-play influenced behaviour 3-4 months 
later, β = .069, p < .001, and vice versa, β = .074, p < .001 (Study 1). 
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Recall that Johnson (2012) proposed that prosocial content might increase prosocial 
behaviour through a general learning mechanism. As it is not clear whether prosocial gaming 
increased empathy in Gentile et al.’s (2009) study, it may be that general learning accounts for 
some of the variance in prosocial behaviour that they identified. Taken together, correlational 
results from studies with children provide support for the hypothesis that fiction-engagement 
is positively associated with empathic abilities and prosocial behaviour and indicate that 
effects are not limited to reading. The extent that gains in empathic abilities are involved in 
fiction effects on prosocial behaviour, and the potential influence of other factors, remains 
unclear.  
In conclusion, evidence from correlational studies supports the view that fiction and 
empathic abilities are associated (namely mentalising, experience sharing and concern), but 
the findings do not establish causation. It could be that reading fiction cultivates empathy, or 
that people high in empathic abilities tend to engage with more fictional stories (and empathic 
children with films; Mar et al., 2010). Alternatively, other factors may account for the 
relationship. For example, people with certain personality traits may be drawn to reading 
fiction, and those same traits may make them more empathic. However, fiction-exposure is 
not likely to be self-selected by young children. While children with more developed 
empathic faculties could request access to certain fiction media or drama classes, these 
requests are not necessarily met by caregivers (Mar et al., 2010). Although this provides some 
indication of a causal effect of fiction, findings from studies with children do not necessarily 
generalise to adults. Several researchers have used experimental approaches with NT adult 
groups in order to test the hypothesis that reading passages of fiction causally influences 
empathic abilities. This chapter will now turn to a review of that literature.  
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3.5 Review of Research Examining Causal Effects of Fiction-engagement on Empathic 
Abilities  
3.5.1 Literary fiction improves “theory of mind” 
A causal link between fiction and mentalising ability was established by Kidd and 
Castano (2013). They hypothesised that reading literary (acclaimed or canonical) fiction, 
would causally impact empathic accuracy. Across five experiments, participants in the 
“literary” condition (Experiments 1-5) were randomly assigned to read one of a set of short 
stories or passages from novels by contemporary award-winning authors (PEN/O Henry 
Award for short literary fiction or US National Book Award for Fiction winners) or acclaimed 
authors (e.g., Anton Chekhov). In the “popular” condition (Experiments 2-5) participants read 
passages from Amazon bestsellers (e.g., Gone Girl; Flynn, 2012) or from stories featured in 
an anthology of popular fiction (Hoppenstand, 1998). In the nonfiction condition (Experiment 
1) they read factual narratives (e.g., How the Potato Changed the World, Mann, 2011, or The 
Story of the Most Common Bird in the World, Dunn, 2012). After reading, participants took 
part in a series of empathic accuracy tasks, a false belief task, the RMET, DANVA-AF and 
Yoni test. In Experiments 2 and 5, participants in a control condition did not engage in any 
reading task. 
Results showed that RMET scores were higher for people that read literary fiction 
compared to nonfiction (Experiment 1, ωp2 = 0.05, p = .01), popular fiction (Experiments 3 
and 4, both ωp2 = 0.04, both ps = .04), and either popular or nonfiction (Experiment 5, ωp2 = 
0.01, p = .04). The authors suggested that reading literary fiction had recruited the social 
cognitive mechanism associated with interpreting others’ mental states and thereby improved 
performance on the mentalising task post-reading. The findings gained a great deal of traction 
and the study has been cited well over 1000 times. However, two initial replication studies 
(combined N = 1798) failed to reproduce the finding that reading literary fiction immediately 
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enhances mentalising, finding no effect of literary fiction compared to nonfiction, popular 
fiction and no reading (Panero et al., 2016; Samur et al., 2018).  
There are several reasons that replication attempts may fail. Effect sizes in the original 
study were small, and so low statistical power may have been a factor (Samur et al., 2018), 
although the replications counteracted this problem via high-powered studies. Kidd and 
Castano (2017b) argued that the replication efforts did not sufficiently imitate the original 
study methods. Specifically, they suggested that Panero et al. (2016) did not ensure 
participants read their assigned texts, that participants who did not complete the ART were 
not excluded and, most importantly, that two of the replication experiments did not 
satisfactorily use random assignment, indicated via highly unbalanced groups (the nonfiction 
condition contained around three times the number of participants in the literary and popular 
conditions in each experiment). Despite these legitimate concerns, Panero et al. (2017) noted 
that Kidd and Castano’s (2017b) re-analysis of their data still did not yield the same pattern of 
results as the 2013 study. Instead, RMET performance was higher for literary fiction 
compared to popular fiction (LSM10 = 27.21 and 25.60 respectively, p = .04), but not 
compared to the expository nonfiction-reading control group: participants in the nonfiction 
group outperformed those in the popular fiction group (LSM = 28.32 and 25.60 respectively, p 
= .004; though this latter effect was moderated by fiction-exposure). Furthermore, scores in 
the nonfiction group were no different compared to the literary fiction group. This suggests 
that there was an advantage to reading nonfiction compared to popular fiction, and no 
disadvantage compared to literary fiction.  
It could be that expository and literary texts contain similarly complex linguistic devices 
responsible for effects on mentalising and that there is no benefit to reading literary fiction 
over literary nonfiction. Kidd and Castano (2017b) described this as an “unexpected finding” 
 
10 Least squares mean: the mean estimate adjusted for covariates and missing data in the model.  
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(p. 4) and referred to Kidd and Castano’s (2013) finding that literary fiction and nonfiction 
did differ on the RMET (Experiment 1), as support for the claim that reading literary fiction 
benefits mentalising relative to nonfiction. However, a subsequent replication of Experiment 1 
was conducted by Camerer et al. (2018) as part of a series of replication attempts of twenty-
one experiments published in the prestigious journals Science and Nature between 2010 and 
2015, and this failed. In response, Kidd and Castano (2018a) argued that Experiment 1 was 
the least refined of their (Kidd & Castano, 2013) original series of five discrete experiments 
and not the most appropriate to replicate. In light of this, the nonfiction comparisons and their 
implications warrant further investigation.  
Kidd and Castano (2018a) argued that their (Kidd & Castano, 2013) fifth experiment 
had been refined as a result of the previous four sets of findings and so it was higher-powered, 
the hypothesis was narrowed, and it entailed more rigorous checks (e.g., for inattentive 
participation). They suggested that the fifth experiment would therefore be more reliably 
replicated than the first. Kidd and Castano (2018b) conducted three pre-registered replications 
of the fifth experiment. They used an analytical approach (Small Telescopes approach; 
Simonsohn, 2005) to compare the effects they identified to those which would have been 
detected using only 33% power in the original study (based on a sensitivity analysis of the 
original effects). This identifies whether a replication effect serves as evidence for the null 
hypothesis, or whether it is simply inconclusive. Using this technique, their third study was a 
successful replication and the other two were characterised as inconclusive.  
Publicity surrounding the Kidd and Castano’s (2013) study focused on the interesting, 
statistically significant findings for the RMET, but discounted the null findings for the 
DANVA-AF and Yoni test. Further, in Experiment 5, the inclusion of covariates took the 
significance value for the effect of fiction condition on RMET scores over the alpha threshold, 
p = .06, indicating that the effect was unstable. Van Kujik, Verkoeijen, Dijkstra and Zwaan 
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(2018) conducted a p-curve analysis of Kidd and Castano’s (2013) original results. The p-
curve analysis procedure was developed by Simonsohn, Nelson and Simmons (2014) to 
examine the distribution of significant p-values in order to identify whether a set of significant 
findings is the result of p-hacking or selective reporting. It indicated that the evidential value 
of their findings was low. One explanation noted by van Kujik et al. is that Kidd and Castano 
included different covariates in their analysis of the RMET data than they did for the Yoni test 
data, which was unexplained. Nevertheless, their replication (they replicated Kidd and 
Castano’s, 2013, Experiment 5, to follow up the p-curve analysis) did identify a significant 
effect of condition on both the RMET and Yoni test cognitive content scores, in line with 
Kidd and Castano’s original pattern of results. Kidd et al. (2016) also conducted a successful 
conceptual replication of Kidd and Castano’s (2013) finding that reading literary fiction 
(using a different text selection) leads to higher RMET scores (LSM = 26.22) compared to 
popular fiction (LSM = 24.71), p = .02, and to no reading (LSM = 24.64), p = .05.  
Evidence from the replication attempts is certainly mixed, including several null results. 
The prospect that the original positive findings could have represented Type 1 errors raises 
doubt not only about the effect of literary fiction, which will be returned to later in this 
chapter, but about the impact of fiction in general. 
3.5.2 Meta-analysis of experimental studies (Dodell-Feder & Tamir, 2018) 
Dodell-Feder and Tamir (2018) conducted a meta-analysis of the effects of fiction-
reading on empathic abilities. They included only true experiments (where participants were 
randomly assigned to conditions) that measured empathic abilities which, in line with 
Mumper and Gerrig’s (2017) meta-analysis of correlational research, included tests of the 
ability to perceive and interpret social information and tests of responses to that information 
(based on the definition by Fiske & Taylor, 2013). Their meta-analysis included 14 studies 
which yielded 53 individual effect sizes derived from fiction-reading (n = 1615) and 
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nonfiction-reading or no reading control participants (n = 1843). The range of empathic 
ability measures used were categorised according to Zaki and Ochsner’s (2012) model 
differentiating mentalising and experience-sharing. The mentalising category included 
behavioural (e.g., RMET) and self-report measures (e.g., IRI perspective-taking subscale). 
The experience-sharing category included self-report measures only (e.g., the Multifaceted 
Empathy Test-Emotional Empathy component; Dziobek et al., 2008, which quantifies the 
strength of affective response to images of individuals in distress).  
The results of the meta-analysis supported the primary hypothesis that participants that 
read fiction would score higher on the empathic ability measures compared to participants that 
read nonfiction or did not read, Hedge’s g = .15, p = .029, 95% CI [.02, .09]. A more granular 
inspection of the results facilitates a nuanced assessment of the relationship between fiction-
reading, mentalising and experience-sharing processes, prosocial concern and behaviour. 
Table 1 shows the effect sizes included in the meta-analysis arranged by empathic ability 
(assessed post-reading), method (behavioural or self-report) and the precise measures used to 
assess each. The presentation of results here diverges from Dodell-Feder and Tamir (2018) in 
order to reflect the model of empathy established in the previous chapter. Specifically, the 
empathic concern measures have been separated from the experience-sharing measures in 
order to represent the separate concern component. Average effect sizes have been calculated 
for mentalising, experience-sharing, prosocial concern and prosocial behaviour and, then, for 
measurement format (self-report or behavioural) where applicable. One result was omitted 
from these calculations as it was not clear which questionnaire items were used in the study 
(the EQ–Emotional Reactivity scale used by Pino & Mazza, 2016, g = 0.14).  
The average effect size for comparisons between fiction and nonfiction or no reading 
was g = 0.60 (SD = 0.58), for experience-sharing. One particularly large effect size may have 
positively biased the result (g = 1.51). Excluding this value, the average was 0.37 (SD = 
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0.33). For mentalising measures, the average effect size was 0.12 (SD = 0.32). Effects were 
larger for behavioural (M = 0.14, SD = 0.34) compared to self-report tasks (M = -0.02, SD = 
0.21), for which the average effect was negative, indicating that the scores for participants in 
the fiction conditions were lower than for the comparison groups. There were more positive 
effects than negative effects for self-report tasks, but larger effects on the negative side. This 
indicates that of the studies included in the meta-analysis, behavioural tests of mentalising 
were positively impacted by fiction-reading, although when reflecting on their abilities, 
participants did not necessarily consider themselves to be more skilled or more frequent 
mentalisers. All but one of the self-report mentalising measures used the perspective-taking 
subscale of the IRI. As this provides an index of the dispositional tendency to see things from 
others’ points of view, it may not detect immediate fiction effects.  
The average effect size for the concern measures (which were all based on fiction versus 
nonfiction comparisons) was also negative (M = -0.03, SD = 0.32). Only two of the six effect 
sizes were negative, but one particularly so, g = -0.55. Again, most of the measures used were 
dispositional concern scales (and both negative values were measured using the IRI empathic 
concern scale). Fiction-reading had a positive effect on prosocial behaviour (g = 0.40) 
although only one effect size was provided. Fiction also positively impacted experience-
sharing on average (M = 0.60, SD = 0.58) and no values were negative (the excluded study 
value was also positive). This aggregation of effect sizes across empathy components reveals 
that the largest effect of fiction across studies was on experience-sharing. The positive effect 
of fiction on mentalising was only present when behavioural measures were employed. Self-
report measures were useful for assessing correlations between dispositional empathic 
abilities and fiction-exposure but may not be sensitive to immediate change caused by fiction 
manipulations.  
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Table 1 
Measures and Effect Sizes Adapted from Dodell-Feder and Tamir’s (2018) Meta-analysis. Effect Sizes are Organised First by Empathic 
Component, then Measure Format, Measure, Effect Size, Study Details and Comparison Group.  
Empathic 
ability 
Method Measure Effect size 
(Hedges’ g) 
Author(s), year. Comparison 
group 
Mean effect sizes (SD)  
Mentalising      Mentalising: M = 0.12 (0.32) 
 Behavioural Faces Test (Identify emotion from picture of 
actor’s facial expression) 
 0.95 Pino & Mazza, 2016 Nonfiction Behavioural: M = 0.14 (0.34) 
  Social-Reasoning Task (Infer mental state of 
character in story) 
 0.66 Mar, 2007 Nonfiction  
  Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
(RMET: recognise emotions from eye regions 
of faces) 
 0.54 Kidd & Castano, 2013 Nonfiction   
  RMET  0.37 Samur et al. No reading   
  RMET  0.36 Kidd et al., 2016 No reading   
  RMET  0.34 Samur et al. Nonfiction   
  RMET  0.28 Kidd & Castano, 2013 No reading   
  RMET  0.22 Samur et al. No reading   
  RMET  0.17 Samur et al. Nonfiction   
  RMET  0.16 Black & Barnes, 2015b Nonfiction   
  RMET  0.08 Djikic et al., 2013 Nonfiction   
  RMET  0.06 Samur et al. Nonfiction   
  RMET  0.03 Panero et al., 2016 No reading   
  RMET -0.04 Panero et al., 2016 Nonfiction   
  RMET -0.07 Weisberg No reading   
  RMET -0.08 Panero et al., 2016 Nonfiction   
  RMET -0.10 Liu & Want Nonfiction   
  RMET -0.15 Panero et al., 2016 Nonfiction   
  RMET -0.23 Samur et al.  Nonfiction   
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  Diagnostic Analysis of Nonverbal Accuracy – 
Affective (DANVA-AF: recognise emotions 
from whole faces) 
 0.44 Kidd & Castano, 2013 No reading   
  DANVA-AF  0.33 Panero et al., 2016 No reading   
  Multifaceted Empathy Test – Cognitive 
Empathy (MET-CS: identify mental state 
from pictures) 
 0.24 Pino & Mazza, 2016 Nonfiction   
  Emotion Attribution Task (identify character’s 
emotion based on vignette of situation) 
 0.16 Pino & Mazza, 2016 Nonfiction   
  Imposing Memory Task (IMT: infer beliefs 
and emotions of story characters; increasing 
complexity) 
 0.10 Panero et al., 2016 No reading   
  Yoni test (infer thoughts and emotions to 
schematic face based on eye gaze and facial 
expression 
 0.05 Kidd & Castano, 2013 No reading   
  Yoni test -0.22 Panero et al., 2016 No reading   
  IMT -0.02 Weisberg No reading   
  IMT -0.24 Panero et al., 2016 Nonfiction   
  False belief task (infer character’s belief or 
action based on their false belief)  
 1.05 Pino & Mazza, 2016 Nonfiction   
  False belief task -0.13 Kidd & Castano, 2013 No reading   
  False belief task -0.20 Kidd & Castano, 2013 Nonfiction   
  False belief task -0.50  Panero et al., 2016 Nonfiction   
 Self-report     Self-report: M = -0.02 (0.21) 
  Interpersonal Reactivity Index – Perspective-
taking (IRI-PT: report tendency to take others’ 
perspectives) 
 0.17 Djikic et al., 2013 Nonfiction   
  IRI-PT  0.17 Weisberg No reading   
  IRI-PT  0.06 Mar Nonfiction   
  IRI-PT -0.13 Johnson et al., 2013 Nonfiction   
  IRI-PT -0.22 Johnson et al., 2013 Nonfiction   
  IRI-PT -0.33  Liu & Want Nonfiction   
  Empathy Quotient – Cognitive Empathy (EQ-
CE: report ability to take others’ perspectives) 
 0.16 Pino & Mazza, 2016 Nonfiction   
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Experience- sharing     Experience-sharing: M = 0.60 
(0.58) 
 Self-report Empathy (rate understanding for a group’s 
experience [marginalised social group or 
depressed/bereaved individuals]) 
 1.51 Johnson et al., 2013 Nonfiction   
  Empathy  0.83 Johnson et al., 2013 Nonfiction   
  Empathy   0.06 Koopman, 2015 Nonfiction   
  Multifaceted Empathy Test -Implicit 
Emotional Empathy (MET-IEE: indicate 
emotional arousal in response to images of 
individuals in distress) 
 0.36 Pino & Mazza, 2016 Nonfiction   
  Multifaceted Empathy Test -Explicit 
Emotional Empathy (MET-EEE: indicate 
strength of feeling for image of individuals in 
distress) 
 0.23 Pino & Mazza, 2016 Nonfiction   
  Empathy Quotient – Emotional Reactivity 
(EQ-ER) 
 0.14 Pino & Mazza, 2016 Nonfiction Not included in calculation 
Prosocial concern     Prosocial concern: M = -0.03 
(0.32) 
 Self-report IRI-Empathic Concern 
(IRI-EC: report concern or sympathy for 
others) 
 0.25 Mar Nonfiction   
  IRI-EC  0.25 Liu & Want Nonfiction   
  IRI-EC  0.14 Djikic et al., 2013 Nonfiction   
  IRI-EC -0.28 Bal & Veltkamp, 2013 Nonfiction   
  IRI-EC -0.55 Bal & Veltkamp, 2013 Nonfiction   
  Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ: 
empathic responses to others) 
 0.00 Koopman, 2015 Nonfiction   
Prosocial behaviour     Prosocial behaviour: M = 0.4 (0.0) 
 Behavioural Charity donation (opportunity to give 
participation compensation to charity) 
 0.40 Koopman, 2015 Nonfiction   
Note. Effect sizes (Hedge’s g) represent the standardised mean difference between fiction-reading and comparison group in post-reading empathy measures. Positive values 
indicate better performance in the fiction-reading group. Mean effects sizes and standard deviations are presented for each component, and by measure format within 
components. Authors without dates represent unpublished studies. 
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3.5.3 Experimental findings from studies with children 
Studies with children have provided some evidence of effects of engaging with fiction 
on social abilities (e.g., Goldstein et al.’s, 2009, and Goldstein & Winner’s, 2012, quasi-
experiments described earlier). Larsen, Lee and Ganea (2017) tested the impact of reading 
about human characters versus anthropomorphised animal characters on children’s prosocial 
behaviour. In a control condition, children read a story about seeds. Afterwards, 
all of the children were invited to choose ten stickers as a reward for taking part. The 
experimenter explained to each participant that another (anonymous) child would receive no 
stickers as they had not taken part, and the participant was then given the opportunity to 
secretly share any number of the stickers that they had chosen with that child. The number of 
stickers given away constituted the prosocial behaviour measure.  
Children who read about human characters were more likely to share their stickers after 
reading (M = 2.91, SD = 2.37) compared with children who read about animal characters (M = 
1.69, SD = 1.73) or seeds (M = 1.53, SD = 1.98). P-values were calculated by comparing the 
mean differences in sticker-sharing in each condition and were p = .001 for the human 
compared to animal condition and p = .002 for the human compared to control (seeds) 
condition. The authors concluded that realistic stories were important for promoting prosocial 
behaviour. As there was no explicit measure of empathy, it is unclear how far it would factor 
in this effect. There were instances of prosocial behaviour depicted in the stories, and so it 
could be that the children simply replicated the prosocial actions of the characters. If this were 
the case, realism may have been important to the children’s tendencies to identify with the 
characters and their social context, allowing them to accumulate applicable social knowledge, 
and this may have mediated the effect on prosociality. Future research would be required to 
test empathy and identification with characters as potential contributors to the effect on 
behaviour. 
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Schellenberg (2004) assigned 6-year old children to either drama lessons, music lessons 
or a waiting list control group for a 36-week period. The music group was the critical 
condition in this study, and children in this group showed an increase in IQ compared to the 
other two groups. However, children that received drama lessons showed an improvement in 
social abilities (measured using a composite score of parent ratings of a range of social 
behaviours) from before to after the intervention, p < .001, that was not evident in the music 
groups, and a comparatively large improvement compared to the other groups, d = .057, p < 
.01. This could have been due to the narrative content engaged with via drama, which 
included characters and their mental states. Alternatively, it could have been the result of 
other aspects of the drama class, such as improvisation, engaging with imagined props, or 
interactions with other children. Finally, it may have resulted from external factors that were 
unrelated to the classes. All classes contained the same number of children and so the results 
appeared specific to the drama context rather than to the size of the group, although the 
processes responsible for the observed effects remain opaque. Studies with children suggest 
that fiction may impact social skills and behaviours, though they have not provided answers to 
the question, arising from both the correlational and causal literature, of which factors are 
involved in such effects.  
3.6 Factors Involved in Fiction Effects 
3.6.1 Publication status and individual differences  
Mumper and Gerrig’s (2017) meta-analytic procedure revealed small but significant 
relationships between fiction and empathy. However, a limitation of meta-analyses is that 
they inevitably reflect the quality of the data entered into the analysis (Esterhuizen & 
Thabane, 2016). This can result in positively biased results (larger than the true effects) due to 
an over-representation of significant findings in the literature since null findings are often 
unpublished (“file-drawer effect”; Rosenthal, 1979). Mumper and Gerrig (2017) included nine 
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unpublished studies in their analysis, which were obtained through communications with 
authors of published findings. Publication status had no effect on fiction habits or 
dispositional empathy, although the authors acknowledged that there may be more 
unpublished studies on the topic that were not located. In Dodell-Feder and Tamir’s (2018) 
meta-analysis of causal effects, published studies yielded larger effect sizes compared to 
unpublished studies, though publication status did not moderate the effect of fiction on 
empathic accuracy. Both meta-analyses (Dodell-Feder & Tamir, 2018; Mumper & Gerrig, 
2017) found no evidence of a file-drawer effect.  
In the causal meta-analysis, Dodell-Feder and Tamir (2018) noted significant 
heterogeneity among effect sizes which they attributed to within-study variance caused by the 
different formats of the empathic ability measures, or by different comparison groups. For this 
reason, the authors examined the impact of six moderators: publication status (published, 
unpublished), sample (online via Mechanical Turk, student sample), comparison group 
(nonfiction, no reading), format of empathic ability measure (self-report, behavioural), 
empathic ability (mentalising, experience-sharing), and participant characteristics (age, 
gender). None of these factors moderated the small effect of fiction on empathic ability 
aggregate scores. Gender and study design did not moderate the correlations in Mumper and 
Gerrig’s (2017) meta-analysis either, lending evidence to a systematic relationship.11  
Individual differences that were not addressed in the meta-analyses may also impact 
fiction effects on empathic abilities. Nettle (2006) showed that professional actors, whose 
careers involve engaging with fictional narratives via play-texts and performing as characters, 
tend to score higher on the Empathizing Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, 
 
11 It is notable that empathic domain (mentalising or experience-sharing) also did not appear to moderate the 
effect; however, there was some overlap within the empathic ability categories, with concern and experience-
sharing grouped together. The approach taken in this chapter distinguished empathic concern from experience-
sharing and looked at average correlations for different measure formats within these classifications (whereas 
Dodell-Feder & Tamir, 2018, compared measure formats across the whole sample). 
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Gurunathan & Wheelwright, 2003) compared to general population samples, dmales = .049, p < 
.001; dfemales = .057, p < .001. This finding could reflect a third variable, a personality trait that 
is associated both with empathic abilities and with being drawn to the acting profession. 
Similarly, the children that signed up for drama classes in Goldstein and colleagues’ studies 
described above (Goldstein et al., 2009, Goldstein & Winner, 2012) showed higher levels of 
empathic abilities compared to controls both before and after training. Therefore, a 
dispositional factor may both increase the tendency to choose drama classes and improve 
performance on empathic ability tasks.  
Mar, Oatley and Peterson (2009) attempted to rule out these kinds of individual 
differences. They examined relationships between fiction-exposure and the Big Five 
personality traits (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Their pilot studies showed that fiction-exposure 
was related to trait openness to experience, r = .22, p < .05, but not to the other four traits 
(conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism). People high in this trait tend 
to show higher levels of open-mindedness, motivation to seek new experiences, creativity and 
absorption in activities (particularly artistic activities). Controlling for this trait and other 
demographic differences (age, gender, English fluency and IRI fantasy scores), fiction-
exposure still predicted performance on the RMET, such that for each author recognised 
RMET scores increased by 7%, p < .05.  
Mar et al.’s (2009) findings, coupled with those of Dodell-Feder and Tamir’s (2018) 
and Mumper and Gerrig’s (2017) meta-analyses, indicate that demographic differences, Big-
Five personality traits and the publication status of results do not account for relationships 
between fiction-exposure and empathy dimensions.  
3.6.2 Content and format 
3.6.2.1 Fiction format: medium. Although fiction- and nonfiction-exposure tend to 
correlate (people that tend to read more, read more of both; Mar et al., 2006, 2009) the results 
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of Mumper and Gerrig’s (2017) meta-analysis showed that lifetime exposure to fiction 
uniquely accounted for some variance in empathic abilities above and beyond exposure to 
nonfiction. This indicates that fiction specifically, rather than general reading processes, is 
related to empathy.  
Mar et al.’s (2010) research with children showed that correlations differed depending 
on story format (exposure to books and film were positively associated with empathic abilities 
but exposure to television was not). In adults, causal research has indicated that the effects of 
fiction do not appear limited to prose; for example, viewing theatre has been shown alter 
people’s attitudes and behaviours (e.g., Heide, Porter & Saito, 2012; Stephens-Hernandez et 
al., 2007; Valente & Bharath, 1999). Black and Barnes (2015a) used the same paradigm as 
Kidd and Castano (2013) to examine the effects of television dramas. Results showed that 
participants performed better on the RMET after watching award-winning TV dramas 
compared to documentaries, d = .043, one-tailed p = .017. However, the version of the ART 
used (Acheson, et al., 2008) and entered into the statistical model as a covariate assesses 
familiarity with fiction authors and not with TV dramas. As familiarity with TV dramas was 
not captured by the measure and therefore not controlled for, causation is less certain. It is 
unclear whether there would be effects of watching fiction on other empathic ability 
outcomes.  
The aphorism, “the medium is the message” (McLuhan, 1964/1994), encapsulates the 
notion that media presentation is fundamental to the way content is received.12 Different 
fiction media likely incur different levels of engagement (e.g., van Laer, De Ruyter, Visconti 
& Wetzels, 2014): viewing media, for example, may not require full attention, which can 
facilitate other cognitive processes (e.g., memory production; McDonald, Sarge, Lin, Collier, 
 
12 For the title of a subsequent publication (McLuhan, Fiore & Agel, 1967/2008), McLuhan revised the phrase to 
“the medium is the massage” (my italics). According to the McLuhan estate, the latter title was an error in 
typesetting that McLuhan liked, and kept, as the play on words captures media’s effects on the whole sensorium 
(McLuhan, n.d.).  
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& Potocki, 2015; see also Mar et al., 2010). A comprehensive account of fiction effects must 
address the multifaceted nature of fiction-engagement. 
3.6.2.2 Fiction content: genre. Kidd and Castano (2013) suggested that literary fiction 
utilises devices such as unusual linguistic features, inconsistent characterisation and gaps in 
the narrative that provide “grist for the mills” (Zunshine, 2006, p. 16) of empathic abilities 
(see also Hakemulder, 2000; Koopman & Hakemulder, 2015). Drawing on Barthes’ (1974) 
distinction between “readerly” and “writerly” texts, this process, they argued, requires readers 
to take a creative, “writerly” approach to actively constructing the inner lives of complex 
characters, thereby recruiting the cognitive mechanisms associated with attributing mental 
states to others. In contrast, popular fiction is “readerly”, containing consistent and predictable 
characters, so the need to interpret their mental states in order to make sense of the narrative is 
reduced. Along the same lines, Storr (2019) described the distinction between mass and 
literary media in terms of how moments of change are approached in the storyline: “change in 
mass-market story is quick and clear and easily understandable, while in high literature it’s 
often slow and ambiguous and depends on plenty of work from the reader, who has to ponder 
and de-code the connections for themselves” (p. 54). He highlighted that this distinction is not 
limited to novels, but also applies to film media. Art-house films such as the works of David 
Lynch, for example, may disrupt the logic of cause and effect, requiring the viewer to decode 
the chronology of events, characters intentions and experiences. 
Historically, fiction effects research lacks systematic comparisons of literary and non-
literary fiction. Studies have tended to involve variables other than literariness (Koopman & 
Hakemulder, 2015), resulting in mixed evidence for the importance of literary features. Kidd 
and Castano (2017a) conducted a factor analysis—an approach to identifying the underlying 
factor structure of a measure—on the ART (Acheson et al.’s, 2008, version) in order to 
distinguish familiarity with literary versus non-literary genre-fiction (see also Moore & 
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Gordon, 2015). Controlling for age, gender and dispositional empathic concern (IRI subscale), 
familiarity with literary fiction authors positively predicted mentalising (RMET) scores, β = 
.22, p = .018, but familiarity with genre-fiction authors did not. De Mulder, Hakemulder, van 
den Berghe, Klassen and Van Berkum (2017) found that literary fiction-exposure correlated 
with mentalising about cognitive content on the Yoni test described in the previous chapter, r 
= .21 (p-values were not provided), but not affective content (Yoni test affective component 
or RMET). Because the design was correlational, the direction of cause could not be 
determined. 
Kidd and Castano’s (2013) experiments, described earlier in this chapter, showed a 
positive causal effect of fiction on mentalising across five discrete experiments. In addition to 
the failed replications addressed above (section 3.5.1), there are two reasons to question the 
specificity of the effect to literary fiction: first, the fiction-exposure measure (Acheson et al., 
2008) did not distinguish between literary and popular fiction, and so prior exposure to the 
different genres was not controlled for. Second, the contents of the text stimuli were not 
matched across conditions, and so the observed effects may not have been specific to 
literariness but, rather, artefacts of engaging with particular themes (Koopman, 2016).  
This raises the problem of classifying literariness. Keen (2011) criticised distinctions 
between “high and “low” literature but identified that literary fiction contains “complicated, 
changeable, and category-resistant characters” in contrast to the “stereotyped characters 
engaged in predictable actions” of popular fiction (p. 303), or complex “round” versus 
simplistic “flat” characters, to use E.M. Forster’s (1927/1974) distinction. However, she also 
suggested that it is precisely because simpler characters’ experiences and struggles are 
unambiguous, that they may invoke greater empathy than more complex characters. Kidd and 
Castano’s (2013) stimuli were fiction from “literary” and “popular” anthologies. Establishing 
the extent to which the stories selected actually differed in terms of content would require a 
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linguistic or thematic analysis. A range of texts were selected for each group, which would 
have reduced the impact of potentially confounding differences between single stimulus texts, 
although the statistical procedure did not account for this source of heterogeneity within 
groups (Panero et al., 2016). 
An alternative approach to that taken by Kidd and Castano (2013) is to examine 
particular textual features or themes, rather than classifications of literariness. There are 
several aspects of style which can be used to distinguish literary from popular fiction (Kidd et 
al., 2016). Koopman (2016) investigated the effects of literary features by providing one 
group of participants with a text containing “foregrounding”. Foregrounding refers to striking 
literary features that depart from everyday language use and are subjectively experienced as 
making a text seem more original (Koopman, 2016; for examples of text with and without 
foregrounding, see Kuzmičová, Mangen, Støle & Begnum, 2017). A second group of 
participants was assigned to read versions of the same text without foregrounding (in which 
common alternatives were used in place of semantic, phonetic and grammatical 
foregrounding) and a third without imagery (in which metaphors were replaced by literal 
alternatives). Results showed that participants that read the original story with foregrounding, 
compared to those that read the version without foregrounding, scored higher on self-reported 
understanding of the experiences of people in similar situations to the protagonists, d = 0.86, p 
< .01. For this measure, participants indicated agreement with statements on 7-point Likert-
style scales. Statements included inferencing items (e.g., “I can understand people who, 
multiple years after a beloved has died, are still preoccupied with the loss”) and items 
indicating prosocial concern (e.g., “the basic insurance policy should cover people who keep 
struggling with loss after many years”). Internal consistency was somewhat low, a = .60, 
though effects were still significantly lower for the version without foregrounding. This 
indicated that uniquely literary features may be responsible for some increase in 
FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES  
 87 
comprehension of, and concern for, people’s experiences after reading about characters in 
similar situations. It remains unclear whether foregrounding specifically, rather than other 
literary features, accounts for such gains in empathic abilities.  
Along similar lines, Hakemulder (2004) found that a text about immigration that 
contained foregrounding led to more positive attitudes towards immigrants compared to a 
version of the text in which foregrounding had been reduced. Participants read versions of 
passages from Rushdie’s (1988) The Satanic Verses, which features two Indian immigrants 
being tracked by police until one of them is wrongfully arrested. Foregrounding was reduced 
in one condition via the deletion of descriptive detail and unusual metaphor. This shortened 
the sentences, resulting in a simpler summary of events. A third (control) group of 
participants did not read either text. Participants were subsequently asked to indicate 
agreement with items about attitudes towards immigrants in Western Europe. Readers of the 
original text (with foregrounding) indicated beliefs that intolerance towards migrants was 
more problematic compared to readers of the text without foregrounding and participants that 
did not read, d = 0.48 and 0.90 respectively, p < .05, assuming equal group sizes. However, 
this effect was not observed for three other scales about attitudes towards migrants: their 
motives in relocating, difficulties faced in their new environments, and levels of acceptance of 
acceptance from their new communities. The latter showed a significant effect of reading 
group but differences disappeared when planned contrasts were conducted. This could have 
been due to low power which led to a weakly significant initial omnibus test, p < .05 (exact p-
value unavailable). In light of this, the extent that the story altered readers’ schemas regarding 
immigration is not clear.  
Kuzmičová et al. (2017) showed a different pattern of results. They gave participants 
either a literary text or a non-literary version of a text in which foregrounding was reduced. 
Participants were first asked to mark passages that they found striking or evocative in the text, 
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and then asked to elaborate on three of the sections that they had marked. The version lower 
in foregrounding led to more explicitly empathic elaborations compared to the original story. 
Van Peer, Hakemulder and Zyngier (2007) found no impact of foregrounding on their affect 
measures (feeling “moved”, “touched” and “sad”), though Koopman (2016) pointed out that 
this may be due to the affect items measured, or due to only one line of text being 
manipulated across conditions. Evidence that foregrounding is the aspect of literary fiction 
that impacts empathy is, so far, inconclusive.  
In a conceptual replication of Kidd and Castano (2013), Kidd et al. (2016) found that 
participants who read literary texts scored higher on the RMET (LSM = 26.22) compared to 
those who read popular fiction and (LSM = 24.71), p = .02, and a baseline (no reading) 
condition (LSM = 24.98), p = .05. Their supplementary linguistic analysis examined reflective 
function using a computer programme that quantifies mental state terms used reflectively, 
such as, “I felt really angry and then it changed to sadness” (as opposed to the non-reflective 
mere presence of mental state terms, e.g., “I was angry, now I am sad”). They analysed each 
of the texts used by Kidd and Castano (2013) to demonstrate that reflective function was 
higher in the literary condition compared to the popular condition, p = .044. Further, a 
correlation analysis positively related reflective function to RMET scores, r = .48, p = .02. 
This suggests that the inclusion of mental state terms may support mentalising when linked to 
reflective markers, and that these tend to appear in canonical texts and literary award winners 
(as this is how the texts were classified in the original experiment).  
Djikic and Oatley (2014) argued that literary fiction provides an artistic experience that 
activates personality fluctuations, and that these fluctuations can lead to long-term change. 
Djikic, Oatley, Zoeterman and Peterson (2009) found that a short story by Chekhov prompted 
significantly greater self-reported personality change than a content-matched documentary 
version; however, it is unclear whether this change was contingent on literary features (such 
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as foregrounding) specifically, or narrative features more generally (the presentation as 
fiction). Personality was measured as an overall change in the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, 
Donahue & Kentle, 1991), which is a 44-item self-report measure of the Big Five personality 
traits. The authors ran a one-tailed test (t-test) despite absolute scores on the BFI measures 
having been calculated due to the lack of a directional (positive versus negative) prediction, 
which increases the possibility of a Type 1 error. Even so, significance was only at trend level 
for the full, composite BFI, p = .053, and the findings were non-significant for each of the 
five individual scales. A regression analysis showed an association between condition and 
BFI change. Here, significance was at the alpha threshold, p = .05, and so further testing 
would be required to assess the stability of the effect. Emotion change was measured before 
and after reading and consisted of self-report questions about the intensity of ten emotions 
(sadness, anxiety, happiness, boredom, anger, fearfulness, contentment, excitement, 
unsettledness, and awe) at the time of completion. There was significant emotional change for 
participants that read the literary text rather than the documentary version, p < .009 [sic]. The 
predictive effect of condition on personality change (established via regression) did not reach 
significance when the variance caused by emotion change was controlled. Therefore, reading 
material appeared to lead to changes in the intensity of emotional states, but the effect on 
personality was less certain. 
Black and Barnes’s (2015a) finding that award-winning TV dramas positively 
influenced emotion recognition compared award-winning dramas with documentaries and not 
with other (non-acclaimed) narrative dramas. Therefore, the narrative element of the stimuli, 
rather than artistic features, may have been responsible for the observed effect. However, 
Djikic, Oatley and Moldoveanu (2013) found that perceiving a text as “artistic” and 
“interesting” predicted self-reported increases in perspective-taking ability measured using the 
IRI subscale, r = .25, p < .05, whereas whether a text was fiction or nonfiction was not a 
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significant predictor. As both artistry and perspective-taking were subjective measures, 
whether change actually occurred, and whether this change was prompted by literariness, 
remains speculative.  
In a correlational study, Fong et al. (2013) examined adults’ exposure to four genres: 
domestic fiction, romance, science-fiction/fantasy, and suspense/thriller, and their 
relationships with mentalising (RMET scores). When other factors (age, gender, English 
fluency, exposure to nonfiction, and personality measured using the BFI) were controlled, 
only the romance and suspense/thriller genres were associated with the ability to mentalise 
about emotions, r = .17, p < .01, and r = .12, p < .03, respectively, with domestic fiction at a 
trend level of significance, r = .10, p < .08. The authors noted that 95% confidence intervals 
for domestic fiction did not include 0, though they did for suspense/thriller. They suggested, 
therefore, that the correlations concerning these two genres were less certain compared to the 
association between exposure to romance stories and mentalising.  
Examining other outcome variables, Fong, Mullin and Mar (2015) correlated the same 
four genres as Fong et al. (2013) with sexual attitudes, though they only observed associations 
for the composite fiction-exposure measure (which was associated with increased gender role 
egalitarianism and fewer gender role stereotypes). However, Black et al. (2018) measured 
exposure to seven genres and found that people who recognised more literary, science-fiction 
and fantasy authors indicated that they considered more morally dubious scenarios to be 
permissible, whereas people who recognised more romance authors found fewer scenarios 
morally permissible. It is unclear if, and how far, egalitarian attitudes and moral permissibility 
judgments are associated with empathic abilities, although these findings indicate that 
associations with fiction-exposure can vary, not only in terms of literary versus popular 
classifications, but at the level of thematic genres.  
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The importance of artistic, literary features and their associated processes in effects on 
empathic abilities is far from clear. On the one hand, studies have indicated that devices such 
as complex, unpredictable characters and striking aesthetic features in literary fiction are key 
to augmenting social abilities; on the other hand, there is evidence that non-literary fiction has 
positive effects on social skills. It remains possible that fiction-induced improvements in 
empathic abilities are entailed by features that are often associated with, but not exclusive to, 
literary texts (such as foregrounding). Addressing the issue of defining literary fiction, 
Koopman (2018) pointed out that it is not enough for a literary text to deviate from 
“everyday” language, it must also be noticed by the reader (here, she draws on Miall & 
Kuiken, 1994). Participants’ awareness of the artistry of the text may contribute to its effects 
and, conversely, readers may be able to engage with popular fiction in “literary” ways: 
literary fiction may require deep engagement to produce effects on empathy, and popular 
fiction may not require this to be understood but may allow it (Barnes, 2018). The question to 
answer, then, is not whether literary fiction is more suited to creating change than popular 
fiction, but which specific features, themes or processes produce such effects. 
3.6.3 A possible role for immersion 
Dodell-Feder and Tamir (2018) pointed out that although their meta-analysis provided 
evidence of a positive, causal effect of fiction-reading on empathic abilities, it did not provide 
information about the processes involved in these effects, and they suggested that future 
research should aim to elucidate these. Most research evidence to date supports the role of 
fiction-engagement processes (rather than the influence of specific fictional content; Mar, 
2018a) in fiction effects on empathy. However, further clarification of the nature of these 
processes and their effects on specific dimensions of empathy is needed. As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, it has been suggested that literary devices such as striking aesthetic features 
and complex, unpredictable characters require readers to fill in “gaps” in the narrative, and 
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entail an active, “writerly” approach to interpreting characters’ inner experiences. This 
recruits and improves mentalising processes (De Mulder et al., 2017; Hakemulder, 2000; Kidd 
& Castano, 2013; Pino & Mazza, 2016; Zunshine, 2006). Such narrative devices are typically 
associated with literary fiction (acclaimed or canonical works; Gavaler & Johnson, 2017; 
Hakemulder, 2000; Kidd & Castano, 2013); however, studies reviewed here have also linked 
popular genre-fiction with empathic abilities (e.g., Fong et al., 2013), as well as prosocial 
behaviour (Koopman, 2015) and moral reasoning (Black et al., 2018). Moreover, suspenseful 
narrative, which can feature in popular thrillers, has been linked to activity in areas of the 
brain associated with social cognition (Lehne, Engel, Rohrmeier, Menninghaus, Jacobs & 
Koelsch, 2015). Taken together, these findings suggest that fiction effects on empathic 
abilities are not contingent on processes unique to literary reading. 
A possible solution to this problem arises from the field of narrative persuasion 
research. Although the messages in fiction tend to be implicit, fictional stories can alter 
people’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviours in predetermined directions (Slater, 2002). This can 
occur via analytic (Chaiken, 1987; Escalas, 2007; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and narrative 
persuasion processes (Green & Brock, 2000; Green, Garst & Brock, 2004). Analytic 
persuasion assumes the analysis of explicit messages, whereas narrative persuasion facilitates 
the impact of implicit messages through a non-critical, experiential process of becoming 
immersed or “transported” into a story (Gerrig, 1993). As discussed earlier, Gerrig’s (1993) 
transportation theory was fundamental to Oatley’s (1999) simulation account of fiction effects 
on empathic inferencing. However, despite the theory of fiction as simulation being quite well 
accepted, the role of immersion in fiction effects on empathy has not been sufficiently 
addressed. 
Green and Brock (2000) posited transportation as the process through which narrative 
persuasion occurs. They developed a measure of transportation comprising eleven primary 
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questions about quality of engagement, such as, “when I was reading the narrative, I could 
easily picture the events in it taking place”, and four additional questions relating to story-
specific content, for example, “while reading the narrative, I had a vivid image of the boy” 
(Green & Brock, 2000, p. 704). The scale, therefore, predominantly measures mental imagery, 
and one question probes emotional engagement with characters (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2009; 
Green & Brock, 2002). Results showed that higher transportation led to more story-consistent 
beliefs (e.g., after reading a story about the murder of a young girl by a psychiatric patient, 
highly transported participants were more likely to agree with restrictions to psychiatric 
patient freedom). While attitudinal change indicates that fiction can have transformative 
effects, it does not necessarily signify a shift in empathic abilities. It has been found, however, 
that increasing empathy for individual members of marginalised groups improves attitudes 
towards the group as a whole (people with HIV/AIDS and people experiencing homelessness; 
Batson et al., 1997), and so empathic processes may be implicated in attitude change. 
Furthermore, effects could vary between readers: as relationships between fictional 
characters, their thoughts and feelings, are often implicit, fiction may generate change not 
through persuasion but through indirect communication. In other words, the direction of 
change may not be predetermined, but may vary in relation to the specific mind engaging with 
it (Djikic & Oatley, 2014). 
If transportation can facilitate the persuasive impact of implicit messages via a 
peripheral, as opposed to a central, elaborative route (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981), non-critical 
engagement processes may also facilitate the development of empathic abilities. As Oatley’s 
theory suggests, the more engaged people feel with story characters and events, the more 
likely they are to take those experiences with them to the world outside the story (Oatley, 
1999, 2012; Mar & Oatley, 2008).  
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Immersion in stories is conceptually linked with empathic processes. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the fantasy subscale of the IRI measure of empathy tends to be treated as a 
measure of trait transportability or imaginative abilities (e.g., Mar et al., 2006; see also Hall & 
Bracken, 2011). All but one item refers to immersion in stories and empathy for fictional 
characters, and scores positively predict transportation (e.g. Mazzocco, Green, Sasota & 
Jones, 2010). This trait has been shown to correlate with both self-report and behavioural 
measures of empathy (e.g., Mar et al., 2006, identified a positive correlation with performance 
on the Interpersonal Perception Task-15, r = .28, p < .05, as well as with the perspective-
taking, r = .24, p < .05, and empathic concern, r = .42, p < .05, dimensions of the IRI). The 
inverse of this relationship has also been shown: Gavaler and Johnson (2017, Experiment 1) 
found that adding mental state explanations to narratives increased transportation, d = 0.48, p 
= .004. Thus, immersion appears to be associated with empathy-related content.  
Bal and Veltkamp (2013) provided some evidence of a causal effect of immersion on 
empathic abilities. In Study 1, participants read a chapter from a fictional story by Arthur 
Conan Doyle, or two news stories from a newspaper. Results showed that participants 
reported higher concern a week after reading, though not immediately after reading. This was 
only true for fiction-readers and only if they had been transported into the story: the 
interaction effect was significant, β = .17, p < .05. In Study 2, participants read a chapter from 
a novel by José Saramago, or a set of five newspaper stories. Results showed that increases in 
transportation enhanced concern for fiction-readers, whereas nonfiction-readers higher in 
transportation showed a decrease in empathy, β = .18, p < .05. Non-transported fiction-readers 
in both studies showed lower empathic concern after a week. The impact of transportation in 
both studies was only qualified through the interaction with condition, and it is difficult to 
draw conclusions based on the fiction versus nonfiction comparison as the texts were not 
well-matched. For example, in Study 2, transportation was significantly higher in the fiction 
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condition, which is unsurprising given that the fiction condition contained a single narrative, 
whereas the nonfiction condition contained a selection of discrete stories (in Study 1, the two 
conditions were not compared for transportation). While change in empathic concern from 
time 1 (baseline) to time 3 (one week after reading) was graphically depicted, time was not 
included in either analysis as a within participants variable. Therefore, it is not clear how far 
individuals’ empathic concern changed over time and the extent that this change was 
associated with transportation levels. While these problems are not inconsequential, the 
findings merit further research into the role of transportation in fiction effects on empathic 
concern, and on other empathic domains.  
Kidd and Castano (2013) found that transportation during reading did not correlate with 
empathic accuracy. However, it is important to note that this was not the focus of their study, 
and so transportation was not experimentally manipulated (and did not differ significantly 
between fiction-reading conditions). Experiments 1 and 2 revealed no relationship between 
transportation and mentalising about cognitive content, but the measure, a false belief task, 
suffered ceiling effects with the NT adults tested. Mentalising about affective content was 
measured using the RMET in Experiments 1, 3, 4 and 5, and the DANVA-AF in Experiment 
2 (effects of reading literary texts were significant for the RMET but not the DANVA-AF). 
The RMET and the DANVA-AF test both measure the ability to recognise mental states from 
the faces of actors (eye regions versus whole faces respectively). As empathy is 
multidimensional, it may be that immersion impacts some but not other empathy components. 
Experiment 5 identified a non-significant trend towards higher transportation in the literary 
(M = 3.90) compared to popular condition (M = 3.83 [SDs unavailable]) p = .07, though a 
comprehensive investigation of the effect of transportation on empathic accuracy would 
require transportation to be manipulated between groups.  
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Johnson’s (2012) correlational study showing fiction effects on prosocial behaviour 
found that transported readers experienced more sympathetic emotions towards story 
characters (e.g., “compassionate”; Batson et al., 1987) and that this accounted for some of the 
increase in prosocial behaviour after reading. Johnson, Cushman, Borden & McCune (2013) 
followed this study with an experimental approach where they assigned participants to one of 
three groups. In the critical imagery-generation condition participants were given instructions 
on generating imagery and asked to do so while reading the story. In two control conditions, 
participants were asked to focus on verbal-semantic information (the meaning of particular 
words within sentences), or to read the text in the same way that they would usually read a 
story for leisure. Results showed that participants who generated more imagery while reading 
the narrative became more transported. They were over three times more likely than 
participants in the leisure-reading group to behave in a prosocial way by responding to a call 
for survey participation by an ostensibly unfunded researcher for a nominal fee of $0.05, z = 
2.47, p = .007. The comparison with the verbal-semantic condition approached, but did not 
reach, significance, z = 1.59, p = .056. A limitation of the study was that it did not include a 
manipulation check (to assess how far participants had followed the instructions and either 
generated imagery or focused on the meaning of words). A failure of the manipulation could 
explain the lack of difference between the visual-semantic and leisure-reading groups.  
Most important for the current argument, the authors conducted a mediation analysis 
which revealed that transportation fully mediated the effect of the imagery training on 
affective empathy for the story characters (using the same measure from Batson et al., 1987, 
as the Johnson, 2012, study described above). Both transportation and affective empathy 
mediated effects on prosocial behaviour (z = 2.3, p = .01, and z = 2.0, p = .02, respectively). 
This indicates that imagery when reading promotes immersion, which leads to prosocial 
behaviour both directly, and indirectly through increasing affective empathy for story 
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characters. The story was specifically designed to elicit empathy and included prosocial 
content. The authors suggested that their findings were consistent both with Oatley’s (1999) 
simulation theory, and with a general learning approach (e.g., Gentile et al., 2009) in which 
the content of a story produces an internal state that leads to a behaviour. In this case, the 
internal state produced by the content of the story was empathic concern for the characters.  
In contrast, Bormann and Greitemeyer (2015) found that immersion did not account for 
increased RMET scores caused by playing video games containing storytelling features. 
Participants either engaged with or ignored (via a distraction task) the narrative features of a 
video game which had received critical acclaim for its excellent narrative. In the game, the 
player is required to take on the role of a character whose quest is to resolve the mystery of 
her missing family. A third group of participants played a different game that involved 
climbing a virtual wall and did not involve other characters, explicitly or implicitly. As levels 
of social content were not comparable across the two games, Bormann and Greitemeyer 
called for future research to explore the mechanisms responsible for the impact of the 
narrative game. Furthermore, their immersion scale incorporated nine items which assessed 
physical (e.g., “when moving through the game world I feel as if I am actually there”), 
emotional (e.g., “I experience feelings as deeply in the game as I have in real life”), and 
narrative immersion (e.g., “when playing the game I feel as if I was part of the story”). The 
nine items were averaged to generate a composite immersion score, but the underlying 
constructs could impact empathy dimensions in different ways; engaging with the narrative 
could activate some but not other dimensions of immersion and these, in turn, could impact 
some but not other dimensions of empathy. In other words, the composite measure may fail to 
capture effects both on and of individual dimensions of immersion.  
Narrative immersion is multifaceted: it involves character identification (reacting to and 
reacting with characters; Iguarta, 2010), mental imagery, and affective responses (e.g., Green 
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& Brock, 2002). These constructs have rarely been studied simultaneously. Differences in 
these processes may lead to different outcomes concerning empathy domains. Taking a 
multidimensional approach to both narrative immersion and empathic accuracy would help to 
establish how far dimensions of immersion impact different inferencing processes. 
It is not only the field of research examining fiction effects on social cognition that 
would benefit from an understanding of the fiction-engagement processes that impact 
empathic abilities. As addressed in Chapter 2, several tasks commonly used to measure these 
skills employ narratives as stimuli. For example, the SST requires participants to read a 
fictional narrative about a couple whose romantic relationship breaks down (Hemingway, 
1988), and empathic accuracy is assessed via a range of questions about the mental states of 
the story characters. In the original validation study Dodell-Feder et al. (2013) found positive 
correlations between trait fantasy, RMET scores and scores on the SST questions. If 
participants high in trait fantasy became more transported in the stimulus story, this could 
have impacted their empathic accuracy scores (this was not measured in the study, but fantasy 
has been shown to predict transportation; Mazzocco et al., 2010). Individual differences in 
levels of immersion may influence empathic accuracy and, if so, immersion should be 
accounted for in empathy tests which use narratives as stimuli. 
3.7 Making Sense of the State of the Art 
Getting “lost” in a good book (Nell, 1988, p. 8) provides a distraction from people’s 
everyday lives but does not necessarily entail any psychological benefit. Fiction could 
represent nothing more than a “virus of the mind” that has hijacked humans’ adaptive 
capacity to communicate complex social information (e.g., Brodie, 2009). However, research 
indicates that there may be benefits to engaging with fiction. Self-report and behavioural data 
have captured associations between exposure to fiction and both mentalising and experience-
sharing abilities. Nonfiction-exposure, too, appears to positively relate to mentalising (though 
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not to empathic concern) but correlations are weaker than for fiction. Therefore, the evidence 
indicates that reading in general is associated with advantages in empathic abilities, but 
variance in some empathic abilities is uniquely attributable to fiction. Furthermore, fiction-
reading may benefit some empathic components in particular. The breakdown of Dodell-
Feder and Tamir’s (2018) meta-analysis of causal effects (Table 1) revealed that the effects of 
fiction-reading appear to be largest for experience-sharing measures.  
It is not all about reading, however; at least, it should not be. Fiction varies both in 
presentation format and in content. Research has reported positive associations in child 
populations between empathic abilities and engagement with fiction via books, film, and 
through acting. Experimental research has indicated that reading books, acting, and viewing 
some TV dramas, are linked to higher empathic abilities in adult populations. How far 
exposure to different modes of fiction relates to empathic abilities remains unclear. The 
question of which themes or genres may particularly support empathic abilities is also, as yet, 
unanswered, though research has indicated that effects are more nuanced than broad “literary” 
versus “popular” classifications or “high-brow” versus “low-brow” evaluative distinctions. 
Taking a more granular approach to measuring both fiction and empathic abilities will 
contribute to an understanding of how far the content presented in fiction, and the processes 
used to engage with that content (Mar, 2018a), account for fiction’s effects.  
Experimental studies have revealed small but positive effects of fiction on empathic 
abilities. A nuanced reading of meta-analytic data indicates that effects are largest for self-
report experience-sharing, followed by mentalising measured via behavioural tasks, and that 
there are also positive effects on prosocial behaviour. This foregrounds the 
multidimensionality of empathy. The range of measures employed to assess empathy 
constructs has led to heterogeneity both within Dodell-Feder and Tamir’s (2018) meta-
analysis and across the literature. The current literature indicates that effects of fiction on 
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empathic abilities are generally positive but small. This does not mean that they are not 
important. As Dodell-Feder and Tamir pointed out, empathic abilities are associated with a 
range of positive outcomes including social connection (e.g., Goldstein, Vezich & Shapiro, 
2014), wellbeing (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000) lower levels of illness (Yang, Boen, Gerken, Li, 
Schorpp & Harris, 2016) and even longevity (Holt-Lunstad, Smith & Layton, 2010). 
Considering the regularity with which people can access fictional narratives, as well as the 
extent that empathy is associated with positive outcomes, a small effect can be considered 
meaningful.  
In spite of the potential social impact of fiction, the processes involved in its effects on 
empathy remain opaque. As the experiential process of becoming immersed in stories has 
been shown to increase narrative persuasion, and in light of some evidence that immersion 
may increase empathy, this mechanism warrants further investigation. Taking a 
multidimensional approach to both fiction and empathic abilities could provide insight into 
the mediators of their relationship. In turn, this would help to identify the contexts in which 
fiction may be most beneficial for empathic abilities.  
3.8 Summary and Moving Forward  
This chapter introduced the definition of fiction adopted in the current research. 
Correlational and causal studies investigating relationships between fiction and empathic 
abilities were reviewed. It was proposed that a range of factors may influence fiction effects, 
particularly media format, genre, and immersive processes, and that research should explicitly 
address the multidimensionality of each construct and approaches to their measurement. This 
may help to make sense of inconsistencies across the literature and to clarify avenues for 
further research. The next chapter presents the rationale and hypotheses for the three phases of 
empirical work conducted that aimed to address these issues. 
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Chapter 4: Rationale and Objectives 
The previous two chapters established definitions of fiction and empathy, discussed 
traditional approaches to measurement, and used this information to frame a review of 
correlational and experimental studies that have investigated relationships between fiction-
engagement and empathic abilities. It was stipulated that future research should address the 
multidimensionality of both in order to elucidate the processes involved in their associations. 
This chapter will present the rationale for the empirical research conducted in the current 
project. First, the multidimensional approach identified in the previous two chapters will be 
refreshed. Next, three studies will be defined, which aimed to clarify the nature of 
relationships between fiction and empathy. Main hypotheses will be determined, and further 
predictions and exploration outlined. Next, general methodological principles and potential 
implications of the research will be identified. A table of the full set of hypotheses will be 
provided at the end of the chapter. These can be tracked through the following three chapters, 
which function both as standalone empirical reports, and which document the progression 
from each study to the next. 
4.1 The Multidimensional Approach 
Fiction is multidimensional: it can be engaged with via a range of media formats, and 
story content varies across thematic genres. Empathic abilities, too, are heterogeneous and 
dissociable: skills in emotion recognition are not equal to skills in mentalising about a target’s 
false beliefs, or the tendency to feel concern towards others in need. Empathy can be 
considered not as a unidimensional construct, but as an umbrella term encompassing the range 
of processes that support people’s understanding of others (e.g., de Waal, 2011). The variety 
of fiction stimuli used in fiction effects research, and the range of empathy dimensions tested, 
may have contributed to heterogeneity across effects reported in the fiction-empathy 
literature, and rendered the processes involved in these effects opaque. The literature to date 
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has identified small, positive effects of fiction on empathic abilities (e.g., Dodell-Feder & 
Tamir, 2018), and so this line of enquiry need not be abandoned, rather it requires a nuanced 
approach. While all studies in the present project were designed to address the complexities of 
fiction and empathy, the first study focused on the multidimensionality of fiction, the second 
on the multidimensionality of empathy, and the third on the immediate effects of immersion 
in fiction, taking the multidimensionality of immersion into account. In so doing, the present 
research aimed to contribute to knowledge of how far fiction-engagement benefits empathic 
abilities, and the conditions under which effects occur.  
4.1.1 Study One: Fiction is multidimensional 
4.1.1.1 Fiction media-exposure and empathic abilities. Studies reviewed in Chapter 3 
have shown that general exposure to fictional stories is positively associated with empathic 
abilities, indicating either that fiction inculcates these skills or that empathic people tend to 
read more fiction. Such studies have used variations of the ART paradigm (Stanovich & 
West, 1989) described in the previous chapter, in order to quantify exposure to printed 
fictional prose. However, people engage with fiction via a range of media formats: they may 
read stories, view them onscreen or live at the theatre, for example. Some studies have 
identified relationships between engagement with fiction via other media channels (e.g., 
television dramas; Black & Barnes, 2015a) and empathic abilities, though, as yet, there exists 
no tool to test adults’ exposure to fiction via non-reading formats. The first study in the 
present doctoral research entailed the production of such a tool, designed to provide a 
composite measure of exposure to fictional stories via a range of media formats, as well as to 
enable the examination of individual relationships between fiction media dimensions and 
empathic abilities. Based on previous evidence that film and theatre can impact attitudes and 
empathy, it was hypothesised that, in addition to print-exposure, film and play-exposure 
would also positively predict empathic abilities. Inclusion of these dimensions would go some 
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way toward representing the range of formats through which people commonly engage with 
fiction. Mentalising, experience-sharing, concern and prosocial behaviour components, as 
identified in the empathy model developed in Chapter 2, were measured using the well-
established IRI self-report scales, and the self-report altruism scale (all described in Chapter 
2). In order to examine how far multidimensional fiction-exposure relates to the components 
of empathy, the following hypotheses were tested:  
H1: Fiction-exposure via print, film and plays combined would positively predict 
perspective-taking. 
H2: Fiction-exposure via print, film and plays combined would positively predict fantasy. 
H3: Fiction-exposure via print, film and plays combined would positively predict 
empathic concern. 
H4: Fiction-exposure via print, film and plays combined would positively predict 
altruism. 
Additionally, individual associations between the fiction media-exposure scales and 
empathic abilities were explored to examine the strength and direction of associations across 
the dimensions of fiction-exposure and empathy. Furthermore, as participants may not have 
equal access to all of the media formats measured in the test of fiction media-exposure (e.g., 
due to proximity to a theatre), they were also asked about their preferences for different media 
formats. These preferences were examined for correlations with empathic abilities. This also 
enabled relationships between fiction-exposure and fiction preferences to be tested.  
4.1.1.2 Enjoyment of fictional genres and empathic abilities. Medium may impact the 
effects of fictional social content on empathic abilities, though there remains debate about the 
nature of that social content. Chapter 3 reviewed the argument that literary fiction, due to its 
complex characters and unpredictable narratives, is uniquely positioned to recruit the 
cognitive mechanisms associated with understanding others (e.g., Hakemulder, 2000; Kidd & 
Castano, 2013). While there is evidence to support this claim (e.g., Kidd & Castano, 2013; 
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Kidd & Castano, 2017a; Djikic & Oatley, 2014; van Kujik et al., 2018), other studies have 
failed to reproduce these effects (Camerer et al., 2018; Panero et al., 2016; Samur et al., 2018; 
see also Panero et al., 2017; Kidd & Castano, 2017b; Kidd & Castano, 2018b). Chapter 3 
identified potential reasons for inconsistencies in the fiction effects literature, including the 
limitations of cross-sectional research designs examining immediate effects with 
heterogeneous sets of short fiction extracts (fiction effects may require an incubation period, 
for example; Appel & Richter, 2007). Study 1 addressed this in two ways: first, by examining 
associations with long-term fiction-exposure (correlations have been shown in several studies) 
and, second, by examining a range of genres in order to reflect the themes and tropes that non-
technical, broad “literary” versus “popular” classifications fail to distinguish. This approach 
was motivated by studies that have demonstrated relationships between social abilities and 
non-literary fiction genres (e.g., Black et al., 2018; Fong et al., 2013), as well as specific 
themes and features (e.g., depression and grief, Koopman, 2015; and suspenseful storylines, 
Lehne et al., 2015). Study 1 aimed to establish how far particular empathic abilities are 
associated with non-literary story types, in addition to examining how far fiction media 
formats predict empathic abilities. This was addressed through an exploration of relationships 
between people’s preferences for different thematic genres and their empathic abilities.  
4.1.1.3 Experience of acting and empathic abilities. In participatory engagement with 
fiction through acting, empathy can function not only as an outcome of engaging with 
fictional characters but as a method (Gallagher & Gallagher, 2019). Previous research, 
outlined in Chapter 3, has identified positive relationships between acting experience and 
empathic abilities. There is some evidence that enrolment on acting classes may support 
empathic development in children (Goldstein & Winner, 2012; Goldstein et al., 2009; 
Schellenberg, 2004), and professional actors tend to show higher self-report empathic abilities 
compared to the general population (Nettle, 2006). However, it is unclear how far experience 
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with acting relates to different empathic dimensions, and so the present study also aimed to 
explore relationships between acting experience and empathic abilities. The findings could lay 
the groundwork for future research aiming to compare fiction-engagement modes—reading 
novels, watching actors portray characters on film or at the theatre, and portraying characters 
first-hand—and their effects.  
The first study aimed to scope out relationships between fiction media-exposure, media 
and genre preferences, acting experience and empathic abilities. Based on the empathy 
framework established in Chapter 2, it aimed to measure self-report mentalising, experience-
sharing and concern (using the IRI which was featured in several of the studies reviewed in 
Chapter 3), as well as the prosocial behaviour component. To the author’s knowledge, this 
represents the first study to examine relationships between exposure to fiction via different 
media and empathic abilities, and to include the prosocial dimension. 
4.1.2 Study Two: Empathy is multidimensional 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that empathy is not something one has or does not have; 
rather it encompasses a set of inferencing processes that can be enacted with different degrees 
of success. Empathic accuracy represents the measurable ability to accurately interpret a 
target’s internal mental states using those inferencing processes (Ickes, 1997). The empathy 
model described in Chapter 2 illustrates that empathic accuracy can be achieved using 
mentalising or experience-sharing inferencing strategies. Once a target’s mental state has been 
identified via one of these routes, prosocial concern and behaviour may be activated (Zaki & 
Ochsner, 2012). Recent research has indicated that the two strategies for empathic accuracy 
differ in value: Zhou et al. (2017) found that sharing in the experiences of targets led to more 
accurate mental state inferences compared to explicitly interpreting targets’ facial expressions 
(mentalising about affective content) and that participants tended to undervalue the more 
successful experience-sharing approach.  
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4.1.2.1 Contextual features of stimuli. As explained in Chapter 2, Zhou et al. (2017) 
conceded that while “simulation” (the experience-sharing strategy) was shown to be the more 
effective strategy in their set of experiments, this may not be the case across all situations. 
Contextual features that can have an effect on empathic inferencing include characteristics of 
the experiencer (e.g., via an ingroup advantage; Adams et al., 2010; Matsumoto et al., 2009) 
and the valence of the target mental state content (Kauschke et al., 2019). Thus, the present 
study aimed to replicate Zhou et al.’s (2017) finding of an effect of strategy, while also 
accounting for differences in valence and target experiencer, as well as to assess any 
interactions. Specifically, the following hypotheses were tested: 
H5: There would be an effect of empathic strategy on empathic accuracy, with 
participants that used the experience-sharing strategy showing higher empathic accuracy 
compared to participants that used the mentalising strategy. 
H6: There would be an effect of valence on empathic accuracy. 
H7: There would be an effect of experiencer on empathic accuracy. 
H8: There would be an interaction effect of strategy, valence and experiencer on empathic 
accuracy.  
4.1.2.2 Fiction-exposure and empathic accuracy. As yet, no studies have examined 
how far fiction-exposure relates to mentalising versus experience-sharing strategies via 
behavioural rather than self-report approaches. In Dodell-Feder and Tamir’s (2018) meta-
analysis of causal effects, reviewed in Chapter 3, mentalising was measured using a range of 
self-report and behavioural tasks, but all studies that measured experience-sharing did so 
using self-report scales. The second study aimed to address this gap in the literature. This line 
of enquiry reflects a novel mapping of Zhou et al.’s (2017) behavioural paradigm onto the 
components of empathy identified in the model outlined in Chapter 2.  
If fiction is a simulation of the social world, then participants who share in the 
experiences of fictional characters may be more adept at using their own mental states as 
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proxies for those of real-world others and, therefore, less likely to undervalue the experience-
sharing strategy. Indeed, the previous chapter identified that studies in Dodell-Feder and 
Tamir’s (2018) meta-analysis of causal fiction effects had shown average larger effects of 
fiction-reading on experience-sharing than on mentalising or prosocial concern dimensions. 
Study 2 aimed to assess how far fiction-exposure relates to mentalising and experience-
sharing strategies for empathic accuracy, and whether the likelihood of selecting one strategy 
over the other would vary as a function of fiction-exposure (based on Zhou et al.’s, 2017, 
approach). In so doing, it could help to establish whether the strategies deployed in 
understanding others in the real world, which have varying success rates, may be influenced 
by fiction, both in terms of the level of accuracy that they generate, and their perceived value. 
Specifically, the following hypotheses were tested: 
H9: Fiction-exposure would positively predict empathic accuracy. 
H10: There would be an interaction effect of fiction-exposure and empathic strategy on 
empathic accuracy, such that participants with high fiction-exposure would score higher 
on the empathic accuracy task, and this effect would be greater in the experience-sharing 
condition rather than the mentalising condition. 
H11: Fiction-exposure would predict empathic strategy choice such that participants with 
higher fiction-exposure would show a higher likelihood of selecting experience-sharing 
rather than mentalising.  
Study 2 aimed to replicate previous findings that fiction-exposure is positively 
associated with empathic accuracy by using a behavioural task measure that distinguished 
mentalising and experience-sharing inferencing strategies. It also aimed to explore the impact 
of contextual factors, the effects of valence and of different target experiencers. Considering 
the potential for an ingroup advantage (Matsumoto et al., 2009), the extent that participants 
identified with the target experiencers was also explored. Study 2 represents the first explicit 
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comparison of mentalising versus experience-sharing empathic strategies in the relationship 
between fiction-exposure and empathic accuracy.  
4.1.3 Study Three: Effects of immersion in fiction on empathic accuracy. 
Mixed findings from experimental studies of fiction effects on empathic accuracy have 
cast doubt on the hypothesis that reading a passage of fiction can enhance empathic skills. 
However, Dodell-Feder and Tamir’s (2018) meta-analysis revealed a small but positive effect 
of fiction-reading on empathic accuracy task performance overall. The third and final study in 
the present research aimed to contribute to this literature via an experimental approach.  
The mechanisms underpinning fiction effects remain unidentified (Dodell-Feder & 
Tamir, 2018). As argued in Chapter 3, immersion in stories, the experience of becoming 
“lost” (Nell, 1988, p. 8) or “transported” (Gerrig, 1993), is conceptually linked with empathy. 
Some studies have shown that the tendency to become immersed in narratives supports 
empathic abilities (e.g., Bal & Veltkamp, 2013; Johnson, 2012), although other studies have 
revealed no effect (e.g., Kidd & Castano, 2013). As outlined in the previous chapter, research 
in the adjacent field of narrative persuasion has demonstrated that manipulating immersion in 
a story impacts its persuasive effects, such that high immersion leads to more story-consistent 
beliefs after reading (Green & Brock, 2000). The present research aimed to identify whether 
immersion in a story would impact empathic accuracy and, if so, whether effects would hold 
across empathy dimensions.  
4.1.3.1 Dimensions of empathy. As Dodell-Feder and Tamir (2018) pointed out, studies 
have tended not to examine which specific empathic skills may be improved by fiction-
engagement and so the measures used in such studies have included a range of mentalising, 
experience-sharing and prosocial behaviour dimensions. The range of tasks have incorporated 
mental state content that is either cognitive (e.g., false belief tasks), affective (e.g., Emotion 
Attribution Task) or both (e.g., Yoni test), and they have generally required explicit responses 
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to questions. In Mumper and Gerrig’s (2017) meta-analysis of correlational studies reviewed 
in the previous chapter, only one vignette task measured implicit empathic inferencing, and in 
Dodell-Feder and Tamir’s (2018) meta-analysis of experiments also reviewed in Chapter 3, 
only the SST measured spontaneous mentalising (along with accuracy for explicit mental state 
content).  
The third study in the current project aimed to examine how far reading a passage of 
fiction would contribute to both explicit and spontaneous inferences about cognitive and 
affective mental state content. To do so, two of the multifaceted tests used in previous studies 
were employed: the Yoni test and the SST (both described in Chapter 2). The Yoni test uses 
static vignettes and therefore requires mentalising based on visual cues. The SST, in contrast, 
incorporates questions about naturalistic story stimuli and may recruit both mentalising and 
experience-sharing inferencing strategies. Combined, these tests assess spontaneous empathic 
inferencing and explicit empathic accuracy for cognitive and affective mental state content. 
Both are capable of identifying variation among NT adults. As proposed in Chapter 2, using 
complex, naturalistic tasks and simpler tasks concomitantly enables a range of empathic 
accuracy dimensions to be measured without compromising construct validity. Specifically, 
the research aimed to test the following hypotheses: 
H12: Participants who were immersed in a narrative during reading would show higher 
empathic accuracy for cognitive content after reading compared to participants who were 
not immersed. 
H13: Participants who were immersed in a narrative during reading would show higher 
empathic accuracy for affective content after reading compared to participants who were 
not immersed. 
H14: Participants who were immersed in a narrative during reading would show higher 
explicit empathic accuracy after reading compared to participants who were not 
immersed. 
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H15: Participants who were immersed in a narrative during reading would be more likely 
to make a spontaneous empathic inference after reading compared to participants who 
were not immersed. 
4.1.3.2 Dimensions of immersion. In the previous chapter it was argued that immersion, 
like fiction and empathy, is multidimensional. Being immersed in a story may entail 
imaginative imagery, identification with characters and emotional engagement, and these 
dimensions may relate differentially to the mentalising, experience-sharing and concern 
components of empathy. It may be that fiction—or certain fictional content—induces one or 
more dimensions in particular and, in turn, these may influence different facets of empathy. 
Thus, Study 3 aimed to examine whether immersion in a story impacts empathic accuracy 
after reading, and to account for the potential contribution of its different dimensions. 
4.2 General Methodology and Data Analysis Procedures 
The present study aimed to contribute to the literature identifying relationships between 
lifetime exposure to fiction and empathic skills, as well as causal effects of narrative-
engagement on empathic accuracy. The correlational and experimental approaches taken in 
the current research project are in line with previous studies of fiction effects on empathic 
domains described in Chapter 3, and the measures used were based on existing research. 
Established empathy scales and behavioural empathic accuracy tasks were selected (the IRI, 
self-report altruism scale, Yoni test and SST, all described in Chapter 2), and a version of 
Zhou et al.’s (2017) empathic accuracy task (see Chapter 2) was created due to unavailability 
of the original stimuli. In order to assess correlations with fiction-exposure, two versions of 
the ART were used (Acheson et al., 2008; Mar et al., 2006), and the latter was updated for the 
current study (Appendix D). There was no extant tool to assess lifetime exposure to different 
media, and a new version of the ART was created for this purpose (see Chapter 5 and 
Appendix A). Other questions (e.g., demographic questions, control and exploratory 
questions) were constructed using a range of response modes, including Likert-style scales, 
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text entry, ranking questions and slider scales. Materials for all studies were presented in 
Qualtrics unless otherwise stated (e.g., hard copy stimulus text in Study 3, Experiment 1).  
Data were collected online (Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3 Experiments 2–4) and in a 
university lab (Study 2 stimuli; Study 3 Experiments 1 and 5). All data analyses were 
conducted using SPSS versions 23 and 24 (IBM Corp., Released 2015, 2016) and power 
analyses using SPSS syntax or G*Power (Faul et al., 2007). All studies received a favourable 
opinion from the Kingston University ethics committee and complied with the British 
Psychological Society’s standards for the treatment of human participants.  
4.3 Potential Implications 
 4.3.1 Implications for scholarship 
 The research presented in this dissertation took a multidimensional approach to 
investigating how fiction-engagement may benefit empathy. The findings could inform 
knowledge in three core areas: (i) scholarship on the nature of relationships between fiction 
and empathic abilities, (ii) approaches to the measurement of fiction-exposure and empathic 
accuracy, (iii) knowledge of the processes involved in fiction effects.  
First, the primary aim of this research was to contribute to knowledge of relationships 
between fiction and empathic abilities as, to date, findings have been mixed. Previous studies 
have incorporated a range of approaches, which may account for some heterogeneity in the 
extant findings. The multidimensional approach taken here aimed to provide a more granular 
perspective on these relationships, and to foreground approaches to measurement. Across the 
whole project, a variety of stimuli enabling access to a range of empathy components—
including cognitive and affective mental state content, explicit and spontaneous mentalising 
and experience-sharing processes—were used in order to scope and clarify the potential 
effects of fiction-engagement. To the author’s knowledge, the present research represents the 
first to examine correlations between exposure to different fiction media and empathic 
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abilities, to examine relationships between fiction-exposure and mentalising versus 
experience-sharing strategies using a behavioural approach, and to investigate the immediate 
effects of manipulating immersion in a story on a range of cognitive and affective behavioural 
empathic ability dimensions. 
Second, two measures were developed and produced as part of this research: an 
adaptation and extension of the ART which incorporated three fiction media formats, and a 
version of Zhou et al.’s (2017) empathic accuracy tool, which facilitated the comparison of 
mentalising versus experience-sharing processes. These paradigms may be further developed 
in future research. For example, the empathic accuracy task design, which diverged from 
Zhou et al.’s method in that the same set of target experiencers was examined across all 
participants (whereas Zhou et al. varied experiencers between participants), could be 
developed to facilitate measurement of the moderating effects of demographic differences 
between target experiencers (and their relationships to participant demographics). The new 
ART measure could be extended to include other fiction media scales (e.g., video game-play) 
in order to support the development of fiction effects models that reflect the multiplicity of the 
fiction landscape. 
Third, clarifying the role of immersion would develop knowledge of the conditions in 
which fiction effects occur. This knowledge could contribute to new approaches to classifying 
fiction for the purposes of experimental research; for example, by indexing attributes that 
contribute to immersion. In turn, this could help to develop theoretical models of the 
processes through which fiction affects empathy dimensions. It could also impact empathy 
research more broadly: in addition to forming the stimuli in studies of fiction-engagement, 
fictional narratives are also regularly employed in test protocol aimed at assessing empathic 
accuracy (e.g., Dodell-Feder et al., 2013; Dziobek et al., 2006; Happé, 1994). They have been 
useful in studies with NT adults because they are less susceptible to ceiling effects than 
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traditional tasks (for an example of ceiling effects using a theory of mind test in a study from 
the field of fiction effects, see Kidd & Castano, 2013). However, individual differences in 
immersion tend not to be accounted for in such studies. If immersion in fiction impacts 
empathic accuracy, variance in scores obtained via fiction-based tasks may be confounded by 
differences in immersion. If this is the case, empathy researchers employing stories as stimuli 
should consider partialling out variance in empathy scores caused by individual differences in 
immersion or the trait tendency to become immersed (e.g., IRI fantasy subscale). Beyond a 
contribution to the field of fiction effects, then, this research may also have implications for 
the measurement of empathy in other fields. 
4.3.2 Social implications  
Empathic abilities are essential for making sense of the social world, maintaining 
interpersonal relationships and generating community cohesion. The real-world implications 
of the research are, therefore, potentially far-reaching. As discussed in Chapter 1, anecdotal 
evidence for the positive social impact of fiction already exists through reports from book 
clubs, theatre in education initiatives, and role-play in corporate, medical, social care and 
criminal justice contexts, which have indicated that fiction-based interventions can enhance 
social functioning. Studies showing positive effects of fiction on social outcomes have 
provided some empirical support for such claims, but because results have been mixed, and 
key studies have failed to replicate, the field has yet to reach concrete conclusions about 
whether, and under what conditions, fiction impacts empathy.  
If the current project found effects of fiction on empathic accuracy with NT adults, it 
would support the idea that empathic skills can be trained, even at the upper echelons, through 
fiction-based interventions. By investigating the conditions in which such effects may occur, 
including different fictional themes, formats and levels of immersion, and through examining 
different dimensions of empathy, the current project could provide insight into how best to 
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exploit fiction as a tool for developing empathic and prosocial tendencies. This information 
may also lay foundations for future interventions with groups that show characteristic deficits 
in specific empathic dimensions (e.g., mentalising in ASD and experience-sharing in 
psychopathy; Freedman et al., 2013). Consequently, this research could help to bridge the gap 
between anecdotal and scientific accounts of the value of literary arts-based social initiatives. 
4.4 Project Hypotheses 
Table 2 presents the full set of hypotheses addressed across three studies.  
Table 2  
Research Hypotheses and Exploratory Aims of Studies 1–3. 
 Hypotheses 
Study 1 
H1 Fiction-exposure via print, film and plays combined would positively predict perspective-
taking. 
H2 Fiction-exposure via print, film and plays combined would positively predict fantasy. 
H3 Fiction-exposure via print, film and plays combined would positively predict empathic 
concern. 
H4 Fiction-exposure via print, film and plays combined would positively predict altruism. 
 Further exploration: The research aimed to explore relationships between (i) exposure to 
fiction via print, film and plays and empathic abilities (perspective-taking, empathic 
concern, fantasy and altruism), (ii) preferences for media formats and thematic genres, and 
empathic abilities, (iii) experience of acting and empathic abilities. 
Study 2 
H5 There would be an effect of empathic strategy on empathic accuracy, with participants that 
used the experience-sharing strategy showing higher empathic accuracy compared to 
participants that used the mentalising strategy. 
H6 There would be an effect of valence on empathic accuracy. 
H7 There would be an effect of experiencer on empathic accuracy. 
H8 There would be an interaction effect of strategy, valence and experiencer on empathic 
accuracy. 
H9 Fiction-exposure would positively predict empathic accuracy. 
H10 There would be an interaction effect of fiction-exposure and empathic strategy on empathic 
accuracy, such that participants with high fiction-exposure would score higher on the 
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empathic accuracy task, and this effect would be greater in the experience-sharing 
condition rather than the mentalising condition. 
H11 Fiction-exposure would predict empathic strategy choice such that participants with higher 
fiction-exposure would show a higher likelihood of selecting experience-sharing rather 
than mentalising. 
Further exploration: As facial expressions recognition can be affected by an ingroup 
advantage (Matsumoto et al., 2009), the research aimed to examine how far identification 
with experiencers would impact accuracy scores. 
Study 3 
H12 Participants who were immersed in a narrative during reading would show higher empathic 
accuracy for cognitive content after reading compared to participants who were not 
immersed. 
H13 Participants who were immersed in a narrative during reading would show higher empathic 
accuracy for affective content after reading compared to participants who were not 
immersed. 
H14 Participants who were immersed in a narrative during reading would show higher explicit 
empathic accuracy after reading compared to participants who were not immersed. 
H15 Participants who were immersed in a narrative during reading would be more likely to 
make a spontaneous empathic inference after reading compared to participants who were 
not immersed. 
Further exploration: In order to assess the extent that different facets of immersion are 
impacted by fiction, and associated with empathy, three dimensions of immersion would be 
measured using an imaginative transportation scale, an emotion scale and an identification 
with character scale.  
 
4.5 Summary and Moving Forward 
Taking a multidimensional approach to the study of relationships between fiction and 
empathic abilities could develop knowledge of the potential benefits of fiction-engagement, 
and influence scholarship in the field of fiction effects as well as in empathy research. This 
chapter has provided an outline of three studies which aimed to contribute to these areas of 
knowledge and established specific hypotheses for each. The next three chapters (Chapters 5, 
6 and 7) present the research conducted. Each chapter includes a brief abstract, introduction, 
method, results and discussion, and although each contains some signposting to ideas 
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presented in other chapters, they can be read as standalone research reports. Chapter 8 
synthesises the full set of findings through a general discussion, identifies the strengths and 
limitations of the project, and outlines avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 5: Relationships between Fiction Media, Genre, and Empathic Abilities 
Fiction enables readers to simulate the social experiences of characters. Research using 
ARTs has indicated that fiction print-exposure positively relates to aspects of empathy and 
may promote prosocial behaviours (Mumper & Gerrig, 2017). Whether associations hold 
across different media formats and thematic genres remains unclear. This study took a 
multidimensional approach to both fiction-exposure and empathic abilities. Specifically, it 
aimed to replicate previous findings that lifetime fiction-exposure positively predicts 
empathic abilities. It aimed to extend this literature by examining relationships between 
exposure to fiction through reading and non-reading formats, mentalising and experience-
sharing dimensions of empathy, and the tendency to behave prosocially. Further, it aimed to 
explore relationships between people’s preferences for different fiction-engagement channels, 
genres, and empathic abilities. Participants (N = 404) completed a multidimensional task 
measure of fiction media-exposure designed for the study and answered questions about their 
fiction-engagement, empathic and altruistic tendencies. Results showed divergent associations 
between fiction format, genre, and empathic abilities, and fiction media-exposure positively 
predicted the tendencies to become imaginatively absorbed in narratives and to help others. 
Exposure to fiction via print positively predicted self-report altruism and fantasy. Fiction 
formats and thematic genres were differentially related to adults’ empathic abilities. The 
current chapter reports this correlational study, beginning with a recap of the relevant 
literature.  
5.1 Introduction 
The ability to understand others and respond appropriately to their needs is central to the 
formation of successful interpersonal relationships and cohesive communities (Castano, 2012; 
Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). Recall that prosocial, helpful behaviours involve both empathic and 
altruistic personality dimensions (Penner et al., 1995) and that empathy can lead to altruism 
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(the willingness to help others with no expectation of reward, Penner et al., 1995) by enabling 
perceivers to interpret others’ mental states (Batson et al., 1981). As discussed in Chapter 3, 
these skills typically develop in childhood (e.g., Perner & Wimmer, 1985) and so studies have 
tended to focus on children or groups with characteristic deficits. However, empathic abilities 
vary between NT adults and can change through the lifespan (Duval et al., 2010; Happé et al., 
1998; Maylor et al., 2002). Research has begun to address how adults’ empathic skills and 
prosocial tendencies may be enhanced.  
5.1.1 Fiction effects on empathic abilities 
Fiction-reading may cultivate social understanding and increase prosocial behaviour via 
the transmission of social knowledge, or because fiction comprehension involves the same 
cognitive processes as real-world events (Mar et al., 2009; see also Gerrig, 1993). The 
“process” view (Mar et al., 2009) that readers foster their empathic abilities by mentally 
simulating the social experiences depicted in fiction (Mar & Oatley, 2008; Oatley, 1999, 
2016), has received support from three strands of research: first, neuroscience has revealed 
that readers’ brains show activity in areas associated with the experiences they read about 
(e.g., Speer et al., 2009; Wallentin et al., 2011) and that narrative fiction activates the brain’s 
empathy network (Hsu et al., 2014). Second, cognitive experiments have demonstrated 
positive effects of fiction-reading on both mentalising (explicit reasoning about thoughts and 
emotions) and experience-sharing capacities (vicariously experiencing another’s inner state, 
e.g., Coll et al., 2017; and see Dodell-Feder & Tamir’s, 2018, meta-analysis), as well as 
prosocial behaviour (e.g., Johnson, 2012; Koopman, 2015), and attitude change (e.g., Appel & 
Richter, 2007; Green & Brock, 2000). Although attitude change does not necessarily 
implicate empathic or prosocial processes, empathising with an individual’s story can 
improve attitudes towards their social group (Batson et al., 1997). If the same mechanisms are 
involved in real-word and fiction-induced empathy, empathy for fictional characters—which 
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serve as proxies for real-world others—could lead to real-world altruism (see Batson et al., 
1981; Klimecki, Mayer, Jusyte, Scheeff & Schönenberg, 2016; though see Keen, 2007). 
Third, correlational studies have shown that while exposure to nonfiction print is positively 
associated with empathic understanding, correlations tend to be larger for fiction (Mumper & 
Gerrig, 2017). While expository nonfiction can feature social themes and humanlike agents, 
fiction is distinguished by its complex characterisation and narrative structure, which may 
recruit, and consequently strengthen, the psychological mechanisms involved in 
intersubjectivity (Mar & Oatley, 2008). 
The general hypothesis that fiction immediately enhances people’s capacity to 
understand real-world others has been called into question. Studies have failed to reproduce 
Kidd and Castano’s (2013) finding that reading literary fiction immediately enhances 
mentalising, finding no effect compared to nonfiction, popular fiction and no reading 
conditions: replication efforts by Camerer et al. (2018), Panero et al. (2016), Panero et al. 
(2017), and Samur et al. (2018) failed, whereas those by Kidd and Castano, (2018b), and van 
Kujik et al. (2018) yielded mixed results. These findings have raised doubts about causation, 
although Dodell-Feder and Tamir’s (2018) meta-analysis indicated a small effect of fiction on 
empathic abilities (Hedge’s g =.15–.16). However, Kidd and Castano’s (2013) finding that 
fiction-exposure (measured using an ART) was a moderate predictor of mentalising ability 
(Experiments 1, 4 and 5, ωp2 = .13, .15, and .07 respectively; see Cohen’s, 1988, rules of 
thumb for effect size) was replicated in both studies. Therefore, causal effects seem unstable 
(cf. Kidd & Castano’s, 2018a, response to the failed replication attempts), though evidence for 
the relationship between lifetime exposure to fiction and empathic abilities appears robust.  
5.1.2 Modes of fiction-engagement 
Studies of associations between fiction and empathic abilities have primarily focused on 
reading. However, fiction is not only read in print; it can be experienced onscreen and at the 
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theatre, as well as through first-person video games and live acting or roleplay. Evidence 
suggests that engagement modality may impact empathic abilities: viewing filmed narratives 
has been shown to enhance mentalising in adults (Black & Barnes, 2015a), and to predict the 
ability in children (Mar et al., 2010), and live theatre has been found to alter audiences’ social 
attitudes (Heide et al., 2012; Stephens-Hernandez et al., 2007; Valente & Bharath, 1999). 
Interactive video game play has been linked to increases in prosocial behaviour (Gentile et al., 
2009), and acting lessons have been found to improve social behaviours in children 
(Schellenberg, 2004) and may increase empathic understanding in children and adolescents 
(Goldstein & Winner, 2012). Adolescent acting students (Goldstein et al., 2009) and 
professional adult actors (Nettle, 2006) tend to score higher than matched controls on self-
report and task-based empathic ability measures. These findings suggest that processes 
involved in engaging with fictional content, rather than those specific to reading, are linked to 
empathic skills. The present study aimed to examine whether there is a cumulative effect of 
different forms of fiction-engagement on empathic abilities, and how far effects vary across 
modes of engagement.  
5.1.3 Literary and genre-fiction 
Despite evidence that fiction-exposure accounts for variance in empathic abilities above 
and beyond nonfiction-exposure (Mumper & Gerrig, 2017), there has been relatively little 
research examining the thematic and stylistic features of fiction that evoke responses to stories 
(e.g., Valkenburg, Peter & Walther, 2016). Kidd and Castano (2013) proposed that the 
relationship between fictional narratives and the ability to understand others is unique to 
literary fiction (their study used acclaimed and canonical texts). They argued that whereas 
popular fiction is generally formulaic and predictable, literary prose entails active, “writerly” 
comprehension, requiring readers to interpret complex narratives by establishing characters’ 
motivations, thoughts and emotions, thus engaging their capacities for mentalising. Across a 
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series of five experiments (reviewed in Chapter 3), they assigned participants to read 
segments of either literary, popular or nonfiction prose, and then assessed their mentalising 
abilities using the RMET. They found that participants in the literary fiction condition tended 
to score higher on the task. Subsequent research has supported this finding. Using a pre- and 
post-test design, Pino and Mazza (2016) showed improved mentalising after reading literary 
compared to science-fiction and nonfiction texts, and reading a text high in literary 
foregrounding (striking textual features) compared to non-literary versions of the same text 
has been found to lead to higher empathic understanding for emotional experiences (e.g., of 
grief; Koopman, 2016). Using onscreen stimuli, Black and Barnes (2015a) found that 
participants who viewed award-winning TV dramas showed higher mentalising abilities 
compared to those who viewed documentaries, and recent studies have indicated positive 
relationships between familiarity with literary fiction and mentalising ability (De Mulder et 
al., 2017, Kidd & Castano, 2017a). 
Recent research, however, has raised doubt about the unique value of literary fiction in 
providing “grist for the mills” (Zunshine, 2006, p. 16) of empathic abilities. Exposure to the 
romance genre, for example, has been shown to positively predict mentalising (Fong et al., 
2013). It seems unlikely that romance contains more literary features than other genres or that 
romance exposure is particularly associated with acclaimed literature; on the contrary, it has 
been found that romance readers are less likely to appreciate figurative language, multiple 
plotlines and perspectives than literary fiction-readers, Miesen, 2004). Rather, the genre’s 
emphasis on social interactions may potentiate empathic development. Furthermore, popular 
genre-fiction is associated with moral reasoning (Black et al., 2018), reading about certain 
social themes (e.g., depression) can motivate prosocial behaviour (Koopman, 2015), and 
fiction-generated suspense has been linked to brain regions involved in social cognition 
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(Lehne et al., 2015). If fiction effects are associated with specific thematic content, 
relationships between thematic genres and empathic abilities are likely to vary.  
5.1.4 Towards the multidimensional approach 
Fiction is multidimensional and can be classified in terms of thematic genre as well as 
media format. Empathic abilities, too, are multifaceted: understanding and responding 
prosocially towards others involves mentalising and experience-sharing components (Zaki & 
Ochsner, 2012) and extant research has documented a lack of correlation among measures 
(Davis, 1980; Ickes, 1997; Mar et al., 2006). Studies assessing relationships between fiction 
and empathic ability measures have yielded mixed findings; for example, Kidd and Castano 
(2013) found that reading a passage of literary fiction led to higher scores on the RMET, the 
most common measure used in the field (e.g., Black & Barnes, 2015a, 2015b; Fong et al., 
2013; Kidd & Castano, 2013, 2017b; Mar et al., 2006; or see the meta-analyses by Dodell-
Feder & Tamir, 2018; Mumper & Gerrig, 2017). Pino and Mazza (2016) did not replicate this 
result but showed improvements on two other tests of mentalising (a false-belief task and a 
facial emotion recognition test) and no improvement on experience-sharing measures. 
Inconsistencies across the literature may reflect different empathic processes probed by a 
range of measures, as well as the employment of broad, heterogeneous fiction classifications. 
As described in Chapter 3, Author Recognition Tests (ARTs; Stanovich & West, 1989) 
measure familiarity with fiction authors as a proxy for lifetime exposure to fiction-in-print, 
and they have been widely used to assess relationships between fiction-exposure and 
empathic abilities. There currently exists no equivalent tool to assess exposure to fiction via 
different media presentations, which would help to reflect the range of formats that showcase 
fictional storytelling. Despite actors’ portrayals of characters being widely available onscreen 
and at the theatre, the extent to which the processes involved in interpreting these resemble 
those involved in interpreting character depictions in printed novels has received little 
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empirical attention (Goldstein & Filipe, 2018). Thus, it cannot be taken for granted that fiction 
effects on empathic abilities would be the same across different media formats. The aims of 
this study were to (i) replicate previous findings that fiction-exposure positively relates to 
empathic abilities, (ii) extend the literature by assessing the cumulative effect of exposure to 
different fiction formats through the construction of a multidimensional measure (testing 
Hypotheses 1- 4 articulated in Chapter 4), and (iii) explore how far relationships between 
modes of engagement with fiction, thematic genres and empathic abilities would vary (the 
exploratory analysis articulated in Chapter 4, section 4.1.1).  
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited via a university research participation scheme (24%), a 
research participant recruitment website (Call for Participants, 10%), or followed links to the 
Qualtrics survey posted to university and researcher accounts on social media sites (Facebook 
and Twitter, 66%). Consequently, respondents were either undergraduate Psychology students 
or members of the public interested in research participation. The survey was closed at 405 
completed responses. One participant was excluded for having fewer than three years’ English 
fluency (one year), resulting in total N = 404 (81% females, Mage = 36.5, SDage = 13.77, age 
range 17-74). Participants were native English speakers (85%) or reported a minimum of 
three years of fluency (M = 13.4, SD = 8.6). Average time spent in post-compulsory education 
was 6.2 years (SD = 3.68). Participants were compensated with university course credit, if 
relevant, and were given the opportunity to enter a prize draw to win a £100 online shopping 
voucher. The study was given a favorable opinion by the Faculty Research Ethics Committee 
at Kingston University London and complied with the British Psychological Society’s 
standards for the treatment of human participants.  
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5.2.2 Materials 
5.2.2.1 Fiction Media-exposure Test. The Fiction Media-exposure Test (FMET) is a 
measure of exposure to fiction adapted for this study from previous ARTs (Acheson et al., 
2008; Mar et al., 2006). The original ART (Stanovich & West, 1989) provides a well-
validated, proxy measure of fiction-exposure through the recognition of author names. It is 
assumed that participants recognise author names due to having read their books or through 
browsing related authors in libraries, bookshops and online. Because familiarity with fiction 
may be considered socially desirable, the test contains both real fiction authors (e.g., James 
Joyce) and plausible foils (e.g., Robert Tierney) to deter guessing. 
The FMET was designed to provide a measure of fiction-exposure along three 
independent dimensions: print, film and play-exposure (Appendix A). The play-exposure 
dimension was used to examine exposure to performed plays (theatre), rather than to those 
that may be read, for example, on literature courses. Therefore, names were selected from two 
lists of significant 20th century plays generated by the National Theatre (n.d.) and the New 
York Theater (2003). In line with earlier ARTs, name recognition was treated as a proxy 
measure of exposure to plays through theatre attendance, familiarity with playwrights, or via 
advertisements in venues and online. Similarly, films were Golden Globe Best Motion Picture 
award winners and nominees (Hollywood Foreign Press Association, n.d.) from 1953 to 2016. 
Recognition is assumed to reflect knowledge of films through viewing at cinemas, on DVD or 
via streaming apps, familiarity with related works, or advertising. The print-exposure scale 
contains 30 fiction author names featured in an earlier ART (Acheson et al., 2008). Names 
were selected to represent authors of printed fictional prose that showed a range of 
recognition rates in Acheson et al.’s (2008) study: recognition rates for the 30 names selected 
for the FMET varied from 5%-99% of participants compared to Acheson et al.’s (2008) 
recognition rates of 2%-99%. The FMET comprised 30 names in each dimension, alongside 
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25 foils in the print (author recognition) scale, and 15 in each of the film and play dimensions 
(foil-selection tends to be low on ARTs; Fong et al., 2013; Mar et al., 2006). 
To correct for indiscriminate responding, FMET scores were computed as the number 
of correct names selected minus the number incorrect foils selected within each scale. Internal 
consistency was very good with the present sample, indicated by a Cronbach’s alpha value of 
.97 for the full measure and .92, .91 and .93 for the print, film and play scales respectively. 
Item deletion did not improve internal consistency except in the case of one play name (Six 
Degrees of Separation); as the increase was not substantial ( = .94), the item was retained in 
the analysis. 
5.2.2.2 Fiction preferences. Fiction-exposure does not reflect depth or quality of 
engagement, and some media may be less accessible than others (e.g., due to location and the 
availability of resources). Therefore, participants were asked to rank-order their favourite to 
least favourite media from four options regardless of external factors such as time, cost and 
convenience. Three options, “read a novel”, “watch a film”, and “watch a play”, paralleled the 
FMET dimensions. Watching television represents the most popular leisure activity in the US 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017) and UK (Seddon, 2011), and so a fourth option, “watch a 
TV show/series”, was included. Responses to this question triggered a bespoke element, with 
participants subsequently asked to rank-order the reasons they tended to select their preferred 
three media formats. Seven options reflected information and education (“interest in 
creatives”, “learning”), enhancing social interactions (“to discuss it with others”, “it’s 
something I should have seen/read”), escapism (“to forget about things”) and affect (“mood 
improvement”, “mood indulgence”; see McQuail, 2010). The results for these follow-up 
questions are reported in Appendix B. 
Enjoyment of six genres was measured to test associations between thematic content 
and empathic abilities. Drama, comedy, crime/thriller, romance, and experimental/postmodern 
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were selected as diverse examples of fiction genres that could apply to each media format. 
Additionally, the factual/documentary genre was included based on previous findings that, 
compared to fiction, reading or viewing nonfiction is associated with lower scores on 
mentalising tests (Black & Barnes, 2015a, 2015b; Kidd & Castano 2013; Mar et al., 2006). 
Participants indicated enjoyment of each genre on 5-point Likert scales from “not at all” to “a 
great deal”.  
5.2.2.3 Acting experience. Experience of participation in fiction through acting was 
assessed using a single-item 5-point scale with answers ranging from “no experience” to 
“highly experienced (current professional)”. 
5.2.2.4 Empathic abilities. In line with Penner et al. (1995), who provided a two-factor 
solution for measures of prosociality using a battery composed of altruism and empathy 
scales, altruism was measured using a truncated version of Rushton et al.’s (1981) self-report 
altruism scale, and empathy was measured using three scales from the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). 
The IRI asks respondents to indicate agreement with statements on 5-point Likert scales 
across four independent 7-item dimensions: perspective-taking, empathic concern, fantasy and 
personal distress. Recall that Mumper and Gerrig’s (2017) meta-analysis revealed significant 
correlations between fiction-reading and all IRI dimensions except for the personal distress 
subscale. This scale measures self-oriented responses to others’ needs––i.e., the desire to 
reduce one’s own distress––which can lead to avoidance of empathic behaviours, 
distinguishing it from other IRI dimensions (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Batson & 
Shaw, 1991; Davis et al., 1999; Penner et al., 1995; Singer & Lamm, 2009) and so it was not 
used in this study. The perspective-taking scale measures the ability to mentalise about other 
people’s points of view (e.g., “I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I 
make a decision”). The fantasy scale assesses the tendency to become absorbed in imagined 
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worlds and share in the experiences of predominantly fictional characters (e.g., “after seeing a 
play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters”) and represents the 
experience-sharing dimension. The empathic concern scale measures prosocial concern 
towards others (e.g., “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than 
me”). Cronbach’s alpha () values for the IRI with this sample were .77 for empathic 
concern, .81 for perspective-taking and .81 for fantasy. 
The self-report altruism scale requires participants to indicate the frequency with which 
they have carried out acts that refer to helping acquaintances, strangers, and charities (e.g., “I 
have given money to a stranger who needed it or asked me for it”), on a 5-point scale from 
“never” to “very often”. Of the original 20 items, nine covering a range of helpful acts toward 
acquaintances, strangers and charity were selected and modified for use in the present study. 
The scale was truncated to reduce the number of questions participants were required to 
answer in the study, and internal consistency using this approach was satisfactory ( = .70).  
5.2.2.5 Control variables and demand characteristics. Self-report data were gathered 
on age, gender, English fluency and years of education as these may impact exposure to 
fiction media or empathic abilities (for instance, gender differences have been shown in 
empathic abilities; Davis, 1980). Irrelevant items were integrated with the IRI and self-report 
altruism scale to mask the purpose of the research (e.g., “I get little enjoyment from cleaning 
my home”). Participants were informed that points would be deducted for foil-checking on 
the FMET, and one point was deducted for each foil selected. Respondents could skip or 
select “I don’t know” to any of the questions.  
5.2.3 Procedure 
The study was administered using Qualtrics and took approximately 15-minutes to 
complete. After providing consent, participants answered the demographic, and fiction media 
and genre preferences questions. The primary measures, the FMET and empathic ability 
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questions (altruism and IRI scales) were then administered in a random order. Apart from the 
demographic questions, all measures were internally randomised. Participants were fully 
debriefed online.  
5.2.4 Data analysis 
Reliability analyses were conducted on the FMET, IRI and altruism scales and 
Cronbach’s alpha values are reported above. The data showed heteroscedasticity and non-
normality across the FMET, IRI and altruism scales (assessed with visual inspection of plots 
and the Shapiro-Wilk test), and the presence of outliers on all scales except fantasy and print-
exposure. Therefore, non-parametric and robust statistical tests were employed: the Mann 
Whitney-U Test was used to examine effects of gender and language, weighted least squares 
multiple regression analyses were used to predict empathic abilities from fiction-exposure and 
control variables, and Spearman’s rho (rs) was used for raw correlations. Partial correlations 
were conducted using Pearson’s r following rank transformations on the data, and controlled 
for age, gender and education (Appendix B). All correlations were computed using pairwise 
deletion, and confidence intervals were bias-corrected and accelerated using Preacher and 
Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping procedure (N = 5000).  
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Demographic variables  
Age and education were significantly associated with all fiction-exposure dimensions 
and altruism, all ps < .001. There were significant effects of language on print, film and play-
exposure, all ps < .001, while effects on empathic abilities were non-significant. Females 
scored higher than males on all IRI scales, though there was no effect of gender on altruism. 
Males recognised more film names than females, but males and females did not differ on the 
print or play-exposure dimensions of the FMET (gender differences are reported in Table 3).  
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Table 3 
Gender Comparisons for IRI, Self-report Altruism Scale and FMET. 
  Females Males    
  Mdn SE Mdn SE U p 
Perspective-taking 26 .50 23  .69 14878.50  .001 
Empathic concern 29 .32 26  .73 16241.50 < .001 
Fantasy 25 .41 23 1.13 14419.50  .004 
Altruism 25 .49 25  .79 12446.50  .498 
Print-exposure 12 .60 12 1.08 11003.00  .345 
Film-exposure 18 .51 20  .85  9082.00  .002 
Play-exposure  6 .58  8.5 1.25 10109.50  .051 
Note. N = 401 (329 participants identified as female and 72 as male). 
5.3.2 Fiction media-exposure  
Means, standard deviations and inter-scale correlations for the FMET, IRI and altruism 
scales are presented in Table 4. Participants recognised more film names (M = 17.9, SD = 
6.79), than print authors (M = 11.92, SD = 6.95), or plays (M = 7.47, SD = 6.69), F(2, 806) = 
922.20, p < .001, η2 = .70, p < .001, for all comparisons. Foil-checking on the FMET was low: 
95% of participants selected fewer than five foils across all three scales. There were strong 
positive associations among the print, film and play recognition scales, as well as among the 
IRI and altruism dimensions, all ps < .001. Additionally, fantasy positively correlated with 
print-exposure, and altruism with all fiction-exposure scales, all ps < .01. Partial correlations 
(df = 393) revealed a similar pattern of results (Appendix B): associations reached 
significance between fantasy with play, r = .15, p = .003, 95% CI [.05, .24], and film-
exposure, r = .15, p = .002, 95% CI [.05, .26], though the correlation between altruism and 
film-exposure did not reach significance.  
 






Means, Standard Deviations and Raw Inter-Scale Correlations for FMET, IRI and Self-Report Altruism Scale. 
 
  M SD 1   2   3   4   5   6   7     
                                    
1. Print-exposure 11.92 6.95 -   .74 *** .80 *** .29 *** .05   -.01   .13 **   
( = .92)     [.69, .79] [.75, .83] [.18, .36] [-.05, .14] [-.11, .08] [.04, .22]  
2. Film-exposure 17.90 6.79     -   .79 *** .24 *** .05 
 
.02   .08     
( = .91)       [.75, .83] [.05, .21] [-.05, .14] [-.08, .15] [-.01, .19]  
3. Play-exposure 7.47 6.69         -   .29 *** .04   .001   .09 
 
  
( = .93)         [.21, .38] [-.05, 14] [-.06, .07] [-.01, .19] 
4. Altruism 25.12 5.60             -   .30 *** .27 *** .13 ** 
( = .70)           [.21, .39] [.17, .36] [.03, .22] 
5. Perspective-taking 24.46 5.27                 -   .55 *** .30 *** 
( = .81)             [.48, .62] [.21, .39] 
6. Empathic concern 27.75 4.65                     -   .38 *** 
( = .77)               [.29, .47]  
7. Fantasy 
( = .81) 
24.30 5.88                         -     
Note. N = 404, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals are presented in brackets.  
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5.3.2.1 Regression analyses. Regression models were conducted to predict each of the 
empathic abilities using FMET scores (scale), gender (categorical), age (scale), education 
(ordinal converted to scale for multiple regression) and language (categorical). 
5.3.2.1.1 Assumption tests. There was independence of observations for all models, 
indicated by Durbin Watson statistics of near 2 (values were 1.93, 2.09, 1.94 and 1.93 for 
altruism, fantasy, empathic concern and perspective-taking respectively). Correlations among 
predictors were < .7 for all models, indicating no problem with multicollinearity. Further, 
there were satisfactory Tolerance (> .1) and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values (< 10). All 
models met the assumption of linearity, assessed via visual inspection of studentised residuals 
against predicted values. Inspection of partial regression plots showed linearity between each 
IV and DV, and the data were normally distributed. In the model for fantasy, there was a 
slight negative skew, but this was not substantial and did not require transformation of the 
data. There were no outliers in the model for fantasy. There were three outliers in the altruism 
data (inspection of studentised residuals identified values that were -3.2, +3.47 and +3.19 SDs 
from the mean), three in the empathic concern data (-3.25 -3.46 and -3.85 SDs), and one in the 
perspective-taking data (-3.25 SDs), but there were no high leverage or highly influential 
points in any case (all Cook’s Distance values < 1; Cook & Weisberg, 1982) and so all of 
these values were retained. Visual inspection of a scatterplot of the studentised residuals 
against the predicted values indicated some heteroscedasticity, hence multiple least squares 
regression models were used. These revealed the same pattern of results as standard multiple 
regression models. 
5.3.2.1.2 Weighted least squares regression models. Fiction-exposure (the combined 
FMET scales) and control variables (gender, age, education and language) significantly 
predicted 4% variation in fantasy, 6% of empathic concern, 4% of perspective-taking and 
10% of altruism, all ps < .01. Coefficients (B) and model fit statistics are reported in Table 5. 
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Gender was the only significant contributor to the models for empathic concern and 
perspective-taking, both ps < .001, whereas fiction-exposure, age and gender were significant 
contributors to fantasy, all ps < .05, and fiction-exposure and age to altruism, both ps < .01. 
Due to correlations between the IRI and altruism measures, regression analyses were also 
conducted with the inclusion of each of the three remaining empathic ability scales as 
predictors, which revealed the same pattern of results.  
Table 5 
 
Predictors of Empathic Abilities. 
 




Coefficients (B)         
Constant 18.88 *** 17.43 *** 21.32 *** 19.14 *** 
 [15.07, 22.69] [13.23, 21.41] [18.32, 24.33] [15.82, 22.47] 
Fiction-exposure 0.05 ** 0.06 ** 0.02  0.03  
 [.01, .08] [.02, .10] [-.01, .05] [-.001, .07] 
Age 0.08 *** -0.05 * 0.01  -0.03  
 [.03, .13] [-.10, -.001] [-.03, .05] [-.08, .01] 
Gender 0.70  2.55 ** 2.85 *** 2.38 *** 
 [-.79, 2.20] [.94, 4.16] [1.74, 3.95] [1.17, 3.59] 
Education 0.01  0.08  -0.003  0.09  
 [-.14, .17] [-.08, .25] [-.11, .10] [-.04, .21] 
Language 0.15  1.27  0.29  0.46  
 [-1.44, 1.74] [-.38, 2.90] [1.08, 1.65] [-1.05, 1.97] 
Model fit         
R2 .10  .05  .07  .05  
adj. R2 .10  .04  .06  .04  
F 9.35  4.32  5.70  3.88  
p < .001  .001  < .001  .002  
Note. N = 399; *p < .05, **p<.01, ***p < .001; 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals are 
presented in brackets. 
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5.3.3 Genre and media preferences 
Comedy was the most popular genre (38% of participants reported the highest 
enjoyment rating), followed by crime/thriller (37%), factual/documentary (31%), drama 
(30%), romance (13%) and experimental/postmodern (5%). Raw correlations for genre 
enjoyment, media preference and empathic abilities are presented in Table 6. Significant 
associations between genre preferences and empathic abilities were all positive: fantasy was 
associated with all genres except crime/thriller and factual/documentary, all ps < .01, 
perspective-taking and empathic concern with all genres except crime/thriller, and altruism 
with experimental/postmodern, factual/documentary and comedy, all ps < .05. Partial 
correlations revealed a similar pattern of results (Appendix B).  
Watching a film was the preferred media option (57% of participants ranked it as their 
top or second preference), followed by reading a novel (53%), watching TV (52%), and 
watching a play (38%). Preference for reading novels positively correlated with fantasy and 
altruism, both ps < .001, and preference for plays with altruism, p < .001, and empathic 
concern, p < .05. In contrast, preference for film negatively correlated with altruism, p < .01, 
and preference for TV with altruism, p < .001, perspective-taking, p < .01, and empathic 
concern, p < .05. Partial correlation results were similar (Appendix B); however, the positive 
relationship between altruism and reading novels, and the negative relationship between 
fantasy and watching TV were marginal, p = .093 and p = .055, respectively.  
Results revealed both positive and negative relationships among media and genre 
preferences (df = 351): there were positive associations between preference for plays and 
enjoyment of drama, rs = .16, p = .003, 95% CI [.06, .25] and experimental/postmodern, rs = 
.24, p < .001, 95% CI [.14, .34]; and negative associations between preference for novels 
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Table 6  
 
















    Altruism Perspective-taking Empathic concern Fantasy 
Genre Enjoyment           
Drama       .08                      .11 * .18 *** .27 *** 
  [-.02, .18] [.004, .20] [.08, .29] [.17, .36] 
Romance  -.06  .15 ** .27 *** .21 *** 
  [-.17, .04] [.05, .24] [.16, .35] [.11, .31] 
Crime/Thriller  .04  .07  .06  .06  
  [-.07, .14] [-.04, .17] [-.05, .16] [-.05, .16] 
Experimental/Postmodern  .14 ** .18 *** .17 ** .14 ** 
  [.03, .24] [.08, .28] [.06, .27] [.04, .24] 
Comedy   .13 * .13 * .19 *** .18 *** 
  [.03, .23] [.03, .23] [.08, .29] [.08, .28] 
Factual/Documentary   .13  * .13 *  .13  * .08   
  [.02, .23] [.03, .23} [.03, .23] [-.03, .19] 
Media Preferences†      
Novels  .18 ***      .08    .04  .16 *** 
  [.07, .27] [-.02, .18] [-.06, .14] [.07, .25] 
Film  -.13 ** -.04  -.04  -.08  
  [-.23, -.03] [-.13, .06] [.05, -.13] [-.18, .02] 
Plays  .21 *** .08  .11 * -.01  
  [.12, .31] [-.02, .18] [.02, .21] [-.11, .08] 
TV  -.26 *** -.13 ** -.12 *    -.09  
  [-.35, -.17] [-.23, -.03] [-.22, -.03] [-.18, .01] 
Note. N = 353, †N = 403, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals are presented in brackets. 
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and comedy, rs = -.10, p = .05, 95% CI [-.21, -.002], and preference for TV and 
experimental/postmodern, rs = -.22, p < .001, 95% CI [-.32, -.12].  
5.3.4 Acting experience 
A higher level of acting experience was associated with higher levels of altruism, rs = 
.15, p = .003, 95% CI [.05, .24], print, film, and play-exposure, rs = .098, 95% CI [.09, .20], rs 
=.19, 95% CI [.09, .28], and rs =.25, 95% CI [.15, .35] respectively, df = 400, all ps < .05. 
5.4 Discussion 
The present study took a multidimensional approach to investigating associations 
between fiction and empathic abilities. Consistent with the primary prediction and extending 
the work of previous studies examining print-exposure (e.g., Fong et al., 2013; Kidd & 
Castano, 2013; Mar et al., 2006, 2009), fiction-exposure via printed prose (authors), film and 
plays combined, and control variables, significantly predicted perspective-taking, fantasy, 
empathic concern and altruism. However, fiction-exposure only contributed to the predictions 
for altruism and fantasy (supporting Hypotheses 2 and 4). Females tend to score higher than 
males on the IRI (Davis, 1980), and this was the case with the present sample. There were no 
gender differences in altruism, or the print- or play-exposure dimensions of the FMET 
(similarly, Mar et al., 2006, reported no gender differences in author recognition), although 
males recognised more film names than females.  
Individually, print-, film-, and play-exposure differentially correlated with empathic 
abilities. The more authors and plays participants recognised, the higher their levels of 
altruism. Fantasy was positively associated with all fiction media dimensions when age, 
gender, education and English language fluency were controlled, and with print-exposure with 
and without the inclusion of control variables. Effects sizes were small in magnitude, which is 
consistent with previous studies (Mumper & Gerrig, 2017). Specifically, the correlation 
between print-exposure and fantasy was similar (r = .13 in the present study compared to r = 
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.18 in their meta-analysis). The correlation was similar for perspective-taking (r = .05, non-
significant, compared to .08 in the meta-analysis). In the present study, print-exposure 
negatively correlated with empathic concern (r = .01, non-significant) whereas the association 
was positive in Mumper and Gerrig’s meta-analysis (r = .07), though this was in line with the 
negative effect reported in Dodell-Feder and Tamir’s (2018) meta-analysis of causal effects (g 
= -.03). Effects on concern may be difficult to determine because, in the model of empathy 
used in the present research, it is mediated by empathic inferencing strategies. Future research 
may clarify fiction effects on the concern component, and the role of other components of 
empathy.  
Correlations between media preferences and empathic abilities generally reflected those 
for media-exposure. Preference for reading novels positively correlated with fantasy and 
altruism and preference for plays with altruism and empathic concern. Contrastingly, 
preference for film negatively correlated with altruism, and TV with altruism, empathic 
concern and perspective-taking.13 In order to rule out the possibility that respondents who 
reported a preference for film and TV represented viewers of nonfiction programmes (i.e., 
documentaries, “reality TV”, or news), correlations between media and genre preferences 
were also examined. There was no relationship between the factual/documentary genre and 
any media preferences, and except for a negative relationship between TV and 
experimental/postmodern, film and TV were not associated with any specific genres. Acting 
experience was linked to higher levels of altruism, and with exposure to all FMET dimensions 
(most strongly with play-exposure). This suggests that people with experience of acting are 
more familiar with stories in general and tend to exhibit more helping behaviours. 
 
13 The FMET was designed to measure printed prose, live theatre, and filmed media presentations of fiction. 
Considering the differences in results for film and TV preferences, it would be useful to establish a TV-exposure 
dimension to facilitate a nuanced understanding of the impact of exposure to the range of fictional narratives 
available onscreen. 
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Enjoyment of the factual/documentary genre was associated with altruism, perspective-
taking and empathic concern; however, correlations with empathic abilities tended to be 
stronger for the fiction genres (in line with prior research, see Mumper & Gerrig, 2017). 
Specifically, enjoyment of drama and romance were positively associated with perspective-
taking, empathic concern and fantasy; and comedy, the most popular genre, and 
experimental/postmodern, the least popular genre, were both associated with higher levels of 
all empathic abilities measured. These findings indicate that relationships between fiction and 
empathic abilities are not unique to literary prose and that empathic processes may be 
induced, to different degrees, by a range of narrative content. 
5.4.1 Fiction-engagement content and processes 
Media presentation is fundamental to the way content is received (e.g., McLuhan, 
1964/1994). Actors and fiction-readers, who tended to report higher levels of altruism in the 
present study, imaginatively construct storyworlds “from within” (Hakemulder, 2000, p. 11). 
In contrast, filmed media provides images of the environment, as well as visual (facial, bodily 
and proximal) and auditory (tonal, prosodic and musical) cues for interpreting characters’ 
inner states and may entail a more passive engagement style. Mar et al. (2010) found that 
exposure to storybooks and film, but not TV, positively predicted mentalising ability in 
children, which aligns with the present finding that preference for TV was negatively 
associated with all empathic ability measures except fantasy. Preference for film negatively 
correlated with altruism in the present adult sample. Future research may clarify relationships 
between onscreen fiction forms and empathic abilities and establish any interaction with age.  
Recall that Kidd and Castano (2013) proposed that active, writerly comprehension, 
which can strengthen readers’ abilities to mentalise about others’ internal states, is induced by 
literary texts. In this view, the stylistic features that distinguish literary from genre-fiction, 
such as complex and unpredictable characters (Kidd & Castano, 2018b) may stimulate 
FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES  
 138 
personality change and foster empathic understanding (Djikic & Oatley, 2014; Kidd & 
Castano, 2013, 2017a). In the present study, only comedy and experimental/postmodern 
genres were associated with all empathic ability measures and, along with 
factual/documentary, were the only genres associated with altruism. Just as certain media 
presentations can elicit more active engagement, these genres may entail a particularly 
writerly engagement style by subverting expectations and requiring multiple perspectives to 
be tracked: experimental/postmodern narratives incorporate techniques such as fragmentation, 
multiple plotlines and unreliable narration, and interpreting comedy involves the integration 
of incongruent mental states, verbal expressions and context.14 However, comedy, as well as 
romance and drama genres, can be formulaic, and is generally associated with commercial 
mass media, rather than with literary media. Relationships between popular genres and 
empathic abilities could result from the incorporation of literary devices, or features of genre-
fiction may, too, activate processes that mediate fiction-empathy relationships. 
The process of becoming transported (Gerrig, 1993), or “lost” in storyworlds (Nell, 
1988, p. 8), imagining story environments and simulating the experiences of fictional 
characters (e.g., Mar et al., 2006), appears to mediate the effects of engaging with fictional 
social content on attitudes (Green & Brock, 2000), empathy dimensions (Bal & Veltkamp, 
2013; see also Taylor & Carlson, 1997), and prosocial behaviour (e.g. Johnson, 2012; 
Schellenberg, 2004). In the present framework, the IRI fantasy subscale is treated as a 
measure of experience sharing. However, unlike other IRI dimensions which measure self-
reported empathy for real-world others, the fantasy subscale probes the trait tendency to 
become imaginatively absorbed in fictional stories and share in the experiences of fictional 
characters. In the present study this tendency was associated with increased exposure to all 
 
14 Stimuli featuring comic narratives are frequently used to test advanced mentalising abilities (e.g., Aykan & 
Nalçacı, 2018; Happé, 1994; Winner et al., 1998). 
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FMET dimensions. It is unclear how far fantasy relates to other media formats not examined 
in this study (previous research, for example, has reported lower levels of absorption when 
reading via electronic screens compared to printed literature, Mangen & Kuiken, 2014), and 
the extent to which it maps onto experience-sharing with real-world others.  
Johnson (2012) found that differences in immersion (transportation) accounted for 
variation in altruistic behaviour immediately after reading; however, this finding may have 
been partly due to readers modelling the prosocial actions of story characters (a social 
learning process; Johnson, 2012; see also Gentile et al., 2009). The relationship between the 
FMET and self-reported altruism shown in the present study indicates that some variability in 
altruistic tendencies is attributable to general fiction-exposure, rather than specific to stories 
portraying prosocial content (characters and scenarios). Controlling for fantasy and the other 
IRI dimensions did not significantly alter the prediction for altruism, indicating that neither 
the trait tendency to become absorbed in stories, nor general empathic abilities, accounted for 
substantial variance. Considering the patterns involving altruism in this study, further research 
may explore the effects of reading on altruistic behaviours using task-based approaches. 
Future studies may also help to establish how far levels of immersion elicited by different 
media formats relate to empathic processes in the context of real-world others, and the extent 
to which individual differences in the fantasy trait contribute to these effects. 
 The observed associations among fiction media formats, genres and empathic 
dimensions support the view that variance in empathic abilities is partly linked to the social 
content of fiction, rather than to more general reading processes (Mar et al., 2006; Oatley, 
1999). It may be that fiction formats which entail writerly engagement with themes and 
content, or those that incur high levels of immersion and the simulation of characters’ inner 
states, support empathic abilities (see Mar et al., 2009). Alternatively, fiction effects may 
occur via more than one route. Prosocial motivation can arise from mentalising about others’ 
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experiences or by sharing in those experiences vicariously (Zaki & Ochsner, 2012), and the 
extent to which people engage their mentalising and experience-sharing faculties during 
exposure to different fiction media and thematic content may vary.  
Media format and thematic genre were both implicated in associations between fiction 
and empathic abilities, and so future studies may productively incorporate media and genre-
exposure dimensions (e.g., Black et al., 2018; Kidd & Castano, 2017a) in order to establish 
interactions (studies controlling for fiction-exposure may also benefit from the 
multidimensional approach). Examining the full extent of fiction-engagement (video games, 
for example, may also support empathic skills, e.g., Bormann & Greitemeyer, 2015; Gentile et 
al., 2009) was beyond the scope of this study, but the present findings justify further research 
into a more comprehensive range of fiction formats, and examination of the processes 
underpinning their effects on prosociality. 
5.4.2 Limitations and future research 
The correlational design of this study does not provide evidence for causation. It could 
be, for example, that altruistic people are motivated to read about fictional characters, and that 
the complexities of comic and postmodern narratives are sought by empathic individuals (e.g., 
Hall & Bracken, 2011). Other variables may also be implicated, including intelligence, 
knowledge, verbal abilities, social needs (e.g., Djikic & Oatley, 2014; Gabriel & Young, 
2011; Mol & Bus, 2011; Stanovich et al., 1995; see also Mar et al., 2009) and other 
personality traits (for example, dark triad traits are associated with deficits in affective, but 
not cognitive empathy; Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). Prior research has shown that fiction-
exposure predicted RMET performance when gender, and traits fantasy and openness were 
controlled (Mar et al., 2009). The multidimensional approach of the present study showed that 
fiction-exposure significantly explained variance in fantasy and altruism when gender, age, 
education and language were controlled. This study did not address the social nature of 
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different modes of fiction-engagement, which may play a role. For example, appreciation of 
plays or comedy might reflect enjoyment of being part of a live audience. Future research 
may elucidate the impact of social contextual factors in relationships between fiction and 
empathic abilities. 
A lack of correlation among empathy measures has been documented (e.g., Mar et al., 
2006) and further research is required to establish how far the fiction scales used in this study 
would relate to performance on behavioural empathic ability measures. For example, 
participants may complete self-report measures in ways perceived to be socially desirable. To 
address this, irrelevant items were included with the empathic ability measures to mask the 
study’s aims (average values for all IRI scales were in line with prior research, Konrath, 
2013), and the FMET incorporated a points-deduction system to control for guessing. The 
film and play names for the FMET were selected from lists of award-winning and significant 
works, whereas the print scale contained both literary and popular fiction authors. Therefore, 
it is not possible to draw conclusions about the importance of exposure to literary fiction; 
however, links between empathic abilities and genre preferences (such as comedy, which is 
generally associated with commercial, rather than literary media), indicate that relationships 
between fiction-exposure and empathic abilities are not exclusive to literary works.  
Examining media and genre preferences in addition to fiction media-exposure facilitated 
a more comprehensive perspective of fiction-engagement, though multiple tests increase the 
risk of false positive results. However, the observed consistencies across relationships 
between media-exposure and media preferences with empathic abilities suggest avenues for 
future research. The FMET combined scores did not significantly contribute to the predictive 
models for empathic concern and perspective-taking, which was surprising considering 
previous findings linking print-exposure with these dimensions (Mumper & Gerrig, 2017). 
Fifteen percent of participants were not native English speakers and may have been less 
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familiar with some of the names in the FMET. This could have reduced the strength of 
correlations which were generally weaker for print-exposure than those reported in other 
research (see Mumper & Gerrig’s, 2017, meta-analysis). Fiction- and nonfiction-exposure 
tend to correlate (Mar et al., 2006, 2009), but nonfiction-exposure was not controlled in this 
study, and fiction authors who have also published some nonfiction works were not omitted 
from the FMET. Therefore, variance caused by nonfiction-exposure may have attenuated or 
accounted for some of the observed effects. In this study, enjoyment of the 
factual/documentary genre showed small, positive associations with perspective-taking, 
empathic concern and altruism, and it may be that person-centred nonfiction such as 
biography and memoir also contain the narrative aspects associated with empathic 
development. Future research should aim to comprehensively account for variance caused by 
nonfiction media-exposure. 
5.4.3 Summary and moving forward  
People engage with a variety of fictional genres through an increasing range of formats. 
This study involved the development of a new tool based on previous ARTs, which enables 
the measurement of exposure to fiction via print, film and plays, and associations with 
empathic abilities. Correlations between empathic abilities and experience of acting, as well 
as media and genre preferences were explored. Results revealed that fiction-exposure, via 
printed prose, film and theatre combined, positively predicted variance in self-reported 
fantasy and altruism. Media and genre preferences and acting experience differentially 
correlated with empathic abilities, indicating that both engagement channel and thematic 
content are important in relationships between fictional stories and empathy. In particular, 
there were significant negative correlations between preference for film and TV and some 
empathic abilities (film with altruism and TV with all scales). It may be that the processes 
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involved in engaging with film reduce empathic abilities, or a third factor may come into play, 
such as preference for particular content, or other motivational factors.  
The findings point to a central role for media presentation in relationships between 
fictional social content and empathic abilities. Divergent associations between genre and 
media formats and empathic abilities could implicate both “content” and “process” 
explanations of fiction effects, which are not mutually exclusive (Mar, 2018a). Genres may 
provide access to particular social knowledge, and certain storylines and presentation 
modalities may engage specific empathic processes to different degrees. It may be that 
transmission of social knowledge and simulation of social experience support alternate 
(mentalising versus experience-sharing) routes to empathic accuracy, and the consequential 
activation of altruistic motivation. Further research may extend these findings and help to 
clarify the antecedents and consequences of fiction-engagement, and the factors that moderate 
effects. 
The next phase of this research focused on establishing relationships between fiction-
exposure and experience-sharing versus mentalising processes. In Study 1, empathic abilities 
were measured via self-report scales which may have been subject to socially desirable 
responding. Therefore, in Study 2, a behavioural measure was employed. The FMET may be 
extended in future studies aiming to establish a range of media dimensions of fiction- and 
nonfiction-exposure, but as it does not contain nonfiction dimensions, a version of the original 
ART was used in the next study. Study 2 aimed to examine associations between fiction-
exposure and a behavioural measure of empathic accuracy, which enabled the explicit 
comparison of mentalising and experience-sharing processes.  
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Chapter 6: Relationships between Fiction-exposure and Mentalising versus Experience-
sharing Strategies for Empathic Accuracy 
The previous chapter identified associations between fiction-exposure and self-report 
empathic abilities. The present study extended this line of enquiry by assessing relationships 
between fiction-exposure and a behavioural measure of empathic accuracy. Empathisers can 
interpret a target’s experience of an event by using prior knowledge and decoding facial and 
voice cues (mentalising), or they can use their own emotional response as a proxy for the 
target’s (experience-sharing). An empathic accuracy task was produced, based on a previous 
study examining the relative efficacy of these strategies (Zhou et al., 2017). It enabled 
assessment of the effect of inferencing strategy on accuracy for targets’ emotional ratings for 
positive, neutral and negative images. The main hypothesis that fiction-exposure would 
positively predict empathic accuracy, and that this effect would be stronger for participants 
that used the experience-sharing strategy, was tested. The two strategies entailed similar 
levels of error but in opposite directions, highlighting nuanced differences between empathic 
inferencing strategies. Empathic accuracy varied as a function of target and valence and was 
positively predicted by lifetime fiction-exposure.  
6.1 Introduction 
Empathic accuracy, the ability to accurately infer the internal experiences of another 
person or target (Ickes, 1997), represents an essential component of intersubjectivity. It 
enables behaviour prediction (Nichols & Stich, 2003), and is associated with positive 
relationships (Castano, 2012), interpersonal cooperation and prosocial behaviour (Paal & 
Bereczkei, 2007). Zaki and Ochsner (2012) modelled two pathways to empathy: mentalising 
(explicitly interpreting verbal and nonverbal cues) and experience-sharing (vicariously 
sharing in the target’s experience). This model was developed to incorporate the empathic 
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accuracy component (the measurable ability to accurately infer a target’s mental state 
content), and this was outlined in Chapter 2.  
Zhou et al. (2017) compared the efficacy of two strategies for empathic accuracy. Their 
two critical empathic inferencing conditions can be mapped onto the empathy model defined 
in Chapter 2, in order to facilitate a comparison of mentalising and experience-sharing 
approaches. In their study (Experiments 1-4), participants were asked to estimate the 
emotional ratings that target individuals (“experiencers”) had previously given in response to 
a range of positive, negative and neutral photographs. Participants provided their estimations 
after viewing short videos of the experiencers’ facial expressions (“theorisation” condition), 
or the photographs themselves (“simulation” condition). Therefore, participants in the 
theorisation condition engaged in a mentalising task (which required them to infer affective 
content), whereas participants in the simulation condition engaged in an experience-sharing 
task, where they were able to use their own reactions to the pictures as proxy for the 
experiencers’. Participants in a third “simultaneous” condition viewed both the photographs 
and the videos simultaneously. In Experiments 2-3, participants were further split into a 
“bound” or “free choice” condition. In the former they were assigned to their condition, 
whereas in the latter they were invited to select their preferred (theorisation or simulation) 
condition following video training on each method.  
Using the simulation strategy led to higher empathic accuracy compared to the 
theorisation strategy and participants tended to overestimate the insight gained through 
theorisation compared to simulation. Indeed, when financially incentivised to perform well––
participants were informed that they would receive additional payment if their performance 
reached the 80th percentile (Experiments 2-4)––participants in the free-choice condition 
tended to self-select into the less effective theorisation (mentalising) group. Not only were the 
two strategies for interpreting mental states shown to be unequal, participants also misjudged 
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their relative utility. Zhou et al. (2017) argued that their finding that participants were 
reluctant to use their own experience as a guide for estimating someone else’s was analogous 
to findings from the field of affect forecasting where participants tend to under-appreciate the 
value of using another person’s experience as a guide for their own (Gilbert, Killingsworth, 
Eyre & Wilson, 2009). 
6.1.1 Fiction-exposure and empathic strategies 
The correlational research reviewed in Chapter 3 indicated that lifetime exposure to 
fiction is positively associated with empathic accuracy via both experience-sharing and 
mentalising routes. When measures were organised into experience-sharing and mentalising 
(as well as concern and prosocial behaviour) categories, relationships with experience-sharing 
were shown to be the strongest. However, experience-sharing was measured using 
dispositional scales rather than behavioural tasks, whereas mentalising was measured using a 
combination of both. The present study aimed to assess the relationship between fiction-
exposure and both strategies for empathic accuracy using a behavioural measure.  
Frequent fiction-readers are regularly exposed to the emotional states of characters 
where the range of circumstances and experiences may be very different to the reader’s own. 
If readers become practiced at using their own mental apparatus to make sense of characters’ 
experiences, they may also tend to use their own beliefs, motivations and emotions as proxy 
for real-world others. This could result in an improved ability to recognise mental states in 
others based on their own emotional experiences, and tendency to trust this capability. Zhou 
et al.’s (2017) results suggest that experience-sharing is a beneficial strategy for accurately 
interpreting the emotional states of targets. Fiction-exposure may positively predict both the 
ability to accurately interpret emotions using this strategy, and the willingness to engage it. 
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6.1.2 Other factors affecting empathic accuracy 
Zhou et al. (2017) acknowledged that “simulation” may not represent the most effective 
strategy across all contexts, and that situational factors would likely moderate the value of 
each strategy. The present study aimed to account for variance in empathic accuracy that 
could be caused by two contextual variables inherent to the stimulus materials: identity of the 
target experiencer and valence of the target emotion.  
6.1.2.1 Target. In their two-systems account, Zaki and Ochsner (2012) referred to 
research indicating that people are less likely to adopt an experience-sharing approach with 
targets that they perceive as dissimilar to themselves (Hein et al., 2010). Zhou et al. (2017) 
suggested that participants’ over-confidence in their ability to infer mental states from facial 
expressions may be due to the tendency to overestimate dissimilarity between self and others 
and so underestimate their tendency to have a similar emotional response to a target. This can 
lead to an ingroup advantage in accuracy (Adams et al., 2010; Matsumoto et al., 2009). 
Therefore, the identity of the target individual may impact the extent to which experience-
sharing and mentalising strategies are successfully engaged (e.g., Barrett, Mesquita & 
Gendron, 2011).  
6.1.2.2 Valence. People show attentional bias toward emotionally salient information 
(“affect-biased attention”; Todd, Cunningham, Anderson & Thompson, 2012) when viewing 
complex scenes (Humphrey, Underwood & Lambert 2012). Positive and negative emotion 
expressions are associated with differences in the neural activity of the perceiver (Kilts, Egan, 
Gideon, Ely & Hoffman, 2003) and are recognised at different speeds (positive expressions 
tend to be recognised faster than negative expressions, e.g., Leppänen & Hietanen, 2003). 
Little research has examined where variations in accuracy occur between emotion expressions 
of differing valence in neurologically typical adults, though studies have indicated 
interactions with psychiatric disorders (e.g., borderline personality disorder; Unoka, Fogd, 
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Füzy & Csukly, 2011) and that both depressive patients and controls show lower accuracy for 
sad expressions compared to happy ones (Surguladze, Young, Senior, Brébion, Travis & 
Phillips, 2004). The present study aimed to examine how far participants’ estimates for the 
mental states of targets were accurate, the direction of any error (i.e., whether errors tend to be 
over-positive or over-negative) and the extent to which this would vary as a function of 
valence.  
6.2 The Present Study 
Considering the potential impact of valence and target, the present study diverged from 
Zhou et al.’s (2017) procedure in two ways: first, stimuli were produced containing six 
targets. This was aimed at increasing generalisability and to enable differences in 
identification with targets to be accounted for in the analysis (Zhou et al.’s participants were 
assigned to one of twelve targets and this source of variance was not addressed in their 
analysis). Second, overall differences in empathic accuracy were computed using absolute 
values in line with Zhou et al., and raw scores in order to establish differences in the direction 
of errors in empathic accuracy. Whereas converting scores on the dependent variable into 
absolute values would result in a compression of the variance associated with the full range of 
positive and negative responses, using the full scale via the computation of raw scores would 
facilitate a more nuanced measure of empathic accuracy. The aims of this study were to: 
replicate Zhou et al.’s finding that the experience-sharing strategy leads to higher empathic 
accuracy compared to mentalising (Hypothesis 5 of the hypotheses articulated in Chapter 4), 
examine the direction of errors across levels of valence and target (Hypotheses 6-8), predict 
empathic accuracy from lifetime fiction-exposure (Hypothesis 9) and examine the moderating 
role of strategy (Hypothesis 10), predict empathic strategy choice from lifetime fiction-
exposure (Hypothesis 11) and explore the impact of identification with the target.  





Zhou et al. (2017) based their sample size on the simple heuristic that each 
“experiencer” (they had 12) was paired with at least two participants in each condition. This 
approach yielded a large effect of condition, t(70) = 7.26, p < .001; they reported a common 
language effect size (CL)15 of 92.3% for the difference between theorisation and simulation 
with 24-25 participants per group (Experiment 1, total n = 73). Further, Mumper and Gerrig’s 
(2017) meta-analysis correlating fiction-exposure with RMET (93%) or actor-intention 
vignette scores (7%), r = .21, p < .001, d = .43, two-tailed, ⍺ = .05, indicated that a sample 
size of 200 would be required to detect the correlation between fiction-exposure and empathic 
accuracy task performance at > 80% power (N = 200 for .86 power). Power analyses were 
conducted using SPSS syntax (Appendix C), and 204 participants were recruited via the 
Qualtrics platform in return for financial compensation. However, inspection of the data 
revealed that the sample consisted entirely of females due to a fault in the online screening 
logic and so a further 120 male participants were recruited (total N = 324). Four participants 
were excluded due to reporting a technical (stimulus loading) error, three participants were 
excluded for straight-lining (selecting the same response throughout the study), and 15 
participants were excluded for response durations greater than three standard deviations from 
the mean, resulting in a final sample size of 302. The sample consisted of 100 males (33%) 
and 202 females (67%) aged 18-86 (M = 50.2, SD = 15.8), resident in the UK (34%), USA 
(37%) or Canada (29%).  
 
15 The CL statistic (McGraw & Wong, 1992) reflects the probability that a score sampled at random from one 
distribution would be greater than that of another distribution. The value here indicates that a score selected 
from the simulation condition would be higher than a score selected from the theorisation condition in 92.3 out 
of 100 cases.  




6.3.2.1 Development of empathic accuracy test stimuli. It was not possible to access 
Zhou et al.’s (2017) original materials, and so the empathic accuracy stimuli were developed 
from scratch. In line with Zhou et al., a group of students (five females, three males, aged 23-
45, M = 31.83, SD = 9.28) were recruited to act as target “experiencers” voluntarily or in 
return for course credit if applicable. They were informed that their data would be used as 
stimuli in a set of future experiments that aimed to “explore how adults can improve their 
abilities to understand what other people are thinking and feeling”. The experiencers were 
asked to rate their emotional responses to 60 pictures from the Geneva Affective Picture 
Database (GAPED; Dan-Glauser & Scherer, 2011) on a 9-point Likert-style scale from 
“extremely negative” to “extremely positive” (the scale used the same labels as Zhou et al., 
2017). A variety of positive, negative and neutral pictures were selected (20 each), in order to 
generate a range of emotional responses. All materials were administered in Qualtrics and 
participants took part on a computer in a lab, with the experimenter present. The images were 
presented in a random order and each appeared for 7 seconds. With the participants’ 
permission, their faces were filmed through a webcam for the duration of the task. 
Participants were given the following instruction:  
During this exercise, you will be filmed through the webcam. Try to sit fairly still with your 
hands away from your face. You don't need to worry about the camera as we will only be 
using small sections of the footage. […] We are interested in your emotional reactions to 
the image, so don't try to hide how you are feeling—you can let your facial expressions 
reflect your true feelings about the image.  
During participation, the computer screen was simultaneously recorded. This enabled 
the two video streams to be aligned using video editing software (Final Cut Pro) and edited 
into 60 5-second clips of the participants’ facial reactions to each picture. The 5-second clips 
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were extracted from the point at which the image had loaded (the additional two seconds 
accounted for issues with the loading of images). 
The video clips presented alongside a still image of the experiencer formed the stimuli 
for the theorisation condition, and the GAPED pictures presented alongside the same still 
image of the experiencer formed the stimuli for the simulation condition (Figure 5). These 
were neutral screenshots taken prior to each experiencer’s exposure to the images, and they 
remained the same across each trial for the experiencer. The still image of the experiencer was 
included in both conditions so that participants were equally aware of the experiencers’ 
demographic characteristics. The materials were presented in Qualtrics. The final stimulus set 
consisted of 60 trials across six experiencers (four females and two males, aged 19-45), with 
10 trials per experiencer, plus two “practice” experiencers (one male aged 40 and one female 
aged 65) with five trials in total (two and three per experiencer, respectively) in both the 
theorisation and simulation conditions. The practice experiencers were selected due to 
technological problems resulting in incomplete datasets for those experiencers. The 
distribution of positive, negative and neutral images across the six experiences is shown in 
Figure 6. 
Figure 5. Screenshot of the theorisation (mentalising) condition practice stimuli (left panel) and the 
simulation (experience-sharing) condition practice stimuli (right panel).  
 
6.3.2.2 Empathic accuracy test. Participants were asked to predict the emotional ratings 
of the six target experiencers in response to the 60 pictures from the GAPED database that the 
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experiencers viewed. Strategy (theorisation vs. simulation) was varied between participants: 
participants were randomly assigned to either the simulation (experience-sharing) condition, 
in which they viewed the same pictures as the experiencers, or the theorisation (mentalising) 
condition, in which they viewed video footage of the experiencers reacting to the pictures. 
Participants in both conditions were given the following instruction: 
In a previous study, we asked the experiencers to look at some pictures. We asked them to 
tell us how they felt about each picture on a scale from "extremely negative" to "extremely 
positive". We call this their "emotional rating". Your task is to estimate the experiencer's 
emotional rating for each picture that they viewed, using the same scale. 
Trials in each condition lasted for 5 seconds. After each trial, participants were asked 
two questions: first, either, “what was your emotional rating for this clip of the experiencer?” 
(theorisation participants) or “what was your emotional rating for this picture?” (simulation 
participants). These questions were designed to address the possibility that the participants’ 
own feelings in response to the video clips would interfere with their rating for the target in 
the theorisation condition. Second, in both conditions, participants were asked, “what was the 
experiencer’s emotional rating for this picture?” The differences between responses to this 
question and the experiencers’ actual ratings were used to measure empathic accuracy 
(calculated by subtracting the experiencer’s original rating from the participant’s estimate and 
so higher difference scores represented lower empathic accuracy). To both questions, 
participants responded using the same scale that the experiencers had used. Internal 
consistency was good ( = .87).  
6.3.2.3 Empathic strategy choice. Following completion of the empathic accuracy test, 
participants were informed that there were two versions of the task and presented with 
examples of each via looped videos (taken from the practice experiencer sets). They were then 
asked the question, “which option you think would be the most successful in enabling you 
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to estimate the experiencers' ratings as accurately as possible?” Strategy choice was recorded 
via a single dichotomous “theorisation” versus “simulation” item.  
6.3.2.4 Identification with target. An ingroup advantage (Matsumoto et al., 2009) could 
impact the effect of experiencer. Before each empathic accuracy experiencer block, 
participants viewed a still image of the experiencer and were asked to indicate how similar 
they considered the experiencer to be to themselves on a single-item sliding scale from “we 
are completely different” (0) to “we are completely alike” (100). 
Figure 6. Distribution of positive, negative and neutral images across the six experiencers. 
6.3.2.5 Fiction-exposure. This study used Mar et al.’s (2006) revised version of the 
ART (ART-R), which incorporates ten genres (five fiction, e.g., romance, thriller; and five 
nonfiction, e.g., science, business) across mutually exclusive fiction and nonfiction categories. 
The inclusion of the nonfiction dimension allows nonfiction-exposure to be controlled. The 
original ART-R contains 50 fiction authors, 50 nonfiction authors and 40 foils. The test was 
updated for the current study: one original name from the nonfiction category, “Norman 
Mailer,” was replaced with “Mary Beard”, due to the author’s profile as an author of both 
fiction and of nonfiction (Mailer won the Pulitzer Prize in both categories), and “M. D. 
Johnson Spencer” was amended to “Spencer Johnson”. A further five names (10%) were 
added to each of the fiction and nonfiction categories and evenly spread across genres to 
ensure that recent works were incorporated (each of the additions had been published or 
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republished since 2013). Foil-checking tends to be low (Mar et al., 2006) and so the foils 
section was left unedited. The updated version of the ART-R used for this study contained 55 
fiction names, 55 nonfiction names, and 40 foils (150 items total; Appendix D). A reliability 
analysis indicated that internal consistency was very good (α = .94; N = 139),16 and item-
deletion did not improve scale reliability in any case.  
6.3.2.6 Perspective-taking. Self-report data on trait perspective-taking were collected 
using the 7-item perspective-taking subscale of the IRI (described in Chapter 2): perspective-
taking measures the dispositional tendency to mentalise about other people’s points of view 
(e.g., “I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision”). The 
scale showed good reliability with this sample (α = .77).  
6.3.3 Procedure 
After providing consent and demographic information, participants completed the ART-
R, perspective-taking scale, and empathic accuracy test (in their randomly assigned condition) 
and answered the empathic strategy question (Figure 7). With the exception of the empathic 
strategy measure, which always followed the empathic accuracy test, the order of tasks was 
randomised, and within-task items were internally randomised (in the empathic accuracy test, 
trials were randomised within experiencer blocks, which were randomised within conditions).  
6.3.4 Data analysis 
Ninety-five percent confidence intervals were bias-corrected and accelerated using 
bootstrapping (N = 1000).17 Empathic accuracy scores were calculated by subtracting the 
target experiencer’s actual rating from the participant’s rating for the experiencer, for each 
trial, averaged across the 60 trials. Therefore, a value of zero indicates no difference between 
 
16 The following 11 items received no hits and therefore accounted for zero variance and were not included in 
the reliability analysis: Douglas Rushkoff, Smir D. Aczel, Stephen R. Cowley, Barry Z. Posner, Margarita 
Azmitia, Oscar Barbarin, Reuben Baron, Carl Corter, Frank Keil, Lynn Liben and Frances Fincham. 
17 This increased the speed of the procedure compared to the 5000 bootstrap replicates used in the previous 
analysis, and was above the generally sufficient number of 500 (Pattengale, Alipour, Bininda-Emonds, Moret & 
Stamatakis, 2009). 
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participants’ estimates and experiencers’ actual ratings, values closer to zero indicate higher 
empathic accuracy and larger values indicate lower empathic accuracy. Absolute difference 
values provide the magnitude of errors (differences between participant ratings for 
experiencers and experiencers’ own ratings) in line with Zhou et al.’s (2017) approach, and 
raw difference scores establish the general direction of errors. Raw negative values indicate 
that participants’ average estimates were over-negative whereas raw positive values indicate 
that the participants’ average estimates were over-positive. 
Figure 7. Experimental procedure. After demographic measures, the order of tasks was randomised 
(with the exception of empathic strategy choice which always followed the empathic accuracy task). 




6.4.1 Preliminary analyses 
6.4.1.1 Scale scores. Average ART-R, perspective-taking and absolute and raw 
difference scores are presented in Table 7. Participants recognised more fiction authors than 
nonfiction authors in both conditions (in line with the ART-R scores reported by Mar et al., 
2006, although both means were lower than those reported in Mar et al.’s study), and foil-
selection was low. The theorisation group reported marginally higher perspective-taking 
tendencies compared to the simulation group, p = .047, but after correcting the error rate for 
the testing of both absolute and raw scores, this effect is non-significant. Absolute difference 
FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES 
 
 156 
scores indicated that participant errors were broadly equal when using the simulation 
compared to the theorisation strategy, p = .118. Raw difference scores demonstrated a more 
nuanced pattern of results with participant estimates in the theorisation condition tending to be 
over-negative, whereas estimates in the simulation condition tended to be over-positive.  
6.4.1.2 Inter-scale associations. A robust (Spearman) correlation analysis was 
conducted to establish relationships among the demographic variables, the ART-R, 
perspective-taking and outcome variables, organised by condition (Tables 8a, 8b). Fiction-
exposure, nonfiction-exposure and foil selection correlated in both conditions. Gender and 
perspective-taking were associated in the simulation condition, with females (M = 17.24, SD 
= 5.57) scoring higher than males (M = 14.60, SD = 4.24), t(132.26) = -3.28, p = .001, 95% CI 
[-4.22, -1.04]. Education level was positively associated with fiction-exposure in the 
theorisation condition, and age positively correlated with fiction-exposure in both conditions 
and with nonfiction-exposure in the theorisation condition.  
Raw difference scores showed a statistically significant association with only one 
variable, fiction-exposure, and only in the theorisation condition. This indicated that empathic 
accuracy based on video footage of the experiencer increased (because higher raw difference 
scores indicate lower accuracy) when participants had been exposed to more fiction (although 
this could represent a spurious correlation). The null finding in the simulation condition may 
have been due to the positive and negative signs of raw scores cancelling out across aggregate 
means. The absolute scores, which provide a more accurate measure of the magnitude of 
mean differences, correlated with fiction-exposure and nonfiction-exposure in both 
conditions, such that higher levels of accuracy (lower difference scores) were associated with 
higher levels of both fiction- and nonfiction-exposure. These effects were stronger for fiction-
exposure. Correlations between fiction-exposure and raw and absolute difference scores are 
presented in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Correlations between fiction-exposure (mean centred form) and raw (left) and absolute 
(right) difference scores.  






Correlations Among Variables within Simulation Condition. 




  Gender Education FE NE Foils  PT Raw  Abs  Strategy 
choice 
Simulation condition (N = 155)  
Age              -.06   .01  .30 ***       .13         .03  -.03     -.01  -.05  .06 
  [-.23, .12]    [-.16, .17] [.16, .45]  [-.03, .08] [-.13, .19] [-.18, .14] [-.16, .14]  [-.20, .11]  [-.11, .002] 
Gender   -           -.10  .12  -.05  .03  .25 **    -.03  -.02  -.01 
      [-.25, .05] [-.04, .27]  [-.21, .11] [-.13, .19] [.11, .40] [-.19, .13]  [-.20, .15]  [-.18, .14] 
Education      - .02  .12     -.01  .02  -.001  -.14  .04 
    [-.14, .18]  [-.03, .27] [-.17, .15] [-.15, .18] [-.17, .17]  [-.31, .03]  [-.11, .18] 
Fiction-exposure (FE)     - .61 *** .28 *** .05  -.08  -.30 *** -.08 
       [.49, .71] [.13, .41] [-.09, .21] [-.23, .08]  [-.41, -.17]  [-.24, .10] 
Nonfiction-exposure (NE)      - .29 *** .06  -.01  -.21 ** -.08 
          [.14, .42] [-.10, .23] [-.18, .15]  [-.32, -.09]  [-.23, .08] 
Foil selection (Foils)                 - -.06  .05  .02  -.06 
          [-.21, .08] [-.13, .21]  [-.13, .16]  [-.20, .09] 
  Perspective-taking (PT)           - .16  -.09  -.05 
            [.01, .31]  [-.25, .09]  [-.22, .11] 
Raw difference (Raw)           -  .08   -.01 
              [-.17, .35]   [-.15, .15] 
Absolute difference (Abs)               -  -.001 
                [-.17, .16] 





Correlations Among Variables within Theorisation Condition. 
  Gender Education FE NE      Foils      PT Raw  Abs  Strategy 
choice 
Theorisation condition (N = 145)  
Age  -.14 .15 .36 *** .29 *** .06  -.08  -.06   -.004  .08 
  [-.28, .02] [-.01, .29] [.22, .50] [.14, .43] [-.11, .22] [-.24, .23] [-.23, .10]  [-.18, .17]  [-.08, .24] 
Gender   - .02 .12  .02  -.02  .15  -.01  -.12  .09 
   [-.14, .18] [-.04, .29] [-.14, .18] [-.17, .14] [-.01, .33] [-.16, .14]  [-.28, .04]  [-.07, .26] 
Education     - .17 * .22 ** .17 * .12  -.11  -.20 * -.06 
    [.01, .32] [.04, .38] [-.02, .34] [-.05, .28] [-.28, .05]  [-.35, -.04]  [-.24, .11] 
Fiction-exposure (FE)    - .67 *** .20 * .10    -.20 * -.29 ** .01 
      [.56, .75] [.04, .36]  [-.07, .25] [-.36, -.05]  [-.39, -.19]  [-.17, .17] 
Nonfiction-exposure (NE      - .24 ** .10  -.09  -.18 * -.01 
        [.07, .39] [-.07, .26] [-.25, .07]  [-.29, -.07]  [-.17, .16] 
Foil selection (Foils)        - .13  -.01  .02  .08 
          [-.03, .28] [-.18, .15]  [-.15, .25]  [-.09, .24] 
Perspective-taking (PT)           - .07  -.03  -.08 
            [-.10, .25]  [-.20, .15]  [-.24, .07] 
Raw difference (Raw)           -  .31 *** -03 
              [-.01, .54]  [-.18, .16] 
Absolute difference (Abs)               -  -.10 
                [-.25, .07] 
Note. * p < 05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals (bootstrap N = 1000) are presented in brackets.  
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6.4.1.3 Empathic accuracy as a function of participant gender. Nether raw nor 
absolute scores differed as a function of participant gender in either the simulation or 
theorisation conditions, all ps > .05. Inclusion of the perspective-taking covariate did not alter 
this result.  
6.4.1.4 Identification with target.  
There were no significant associations between identification with target and raw 
differences between ratings for self and experiencer, with the exception of Experiencer A in 
the theorisation condition, r(145) = .22, p = .008, 95% CI [.05, .38]. Nor was identification 
with target associated with empathic accuracy in either condition. Therefore, this variable was 
not included in further analyses. 
6.4.2 Primary Analyses  
6.4.2.1 Empathic accuracy as a function of empathic strategy. Independent t-tests 
using the absolute and raw difference scores addressed the hypothesis that there would be an 
effect of strategy on empathic accuracy. As shown in Table 7, using absolute difference 
scores yielded a non-significant effect of condition, indicating that the average error was 
similar in magnitude across the two conditions. However, the effect on raw difference scores 
was statistically significant, t(300) = 4.13, p < .001, 95% CI [.12, .33], such that simulation 
condition estimates tended to be over positive (M = .12, SD = .44), whereas theorisation 
condition estimates tended to be over-negative (M = -.11, SD = .50). While this represents a 
very small mean difference in the context of the 9-point response scale, the size of the 
difference would have been compressed as a result of positive and negative values cancelling 
out across the dataset. The assessment of the direction of error using the raw scores supported 
the prediction that accuracy would differ between strategies, but it did not replicate Zhou et 
al.’s (2017) finding that accuracy was greater in the simulation condition.  
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6.4.2.2 Empathic accuracy as a function of strategy, experiencer and valence. Figure 
9 shows the overall pattern of results for strategy, experiencer and valence and illustrates the 
different information provided by the absolute and raw difference scores. Both panels show 
that accuracy tended to be higher for neutral images (as differences scores were closer to 0). 
The raw scores revealed that participants tended to be over-negative when estimating 
experiencer ratings for positive images, and over-positive when estimating experiencer ratings 
for negative images. In other words, participants’ estimates for the experiencers were 
generally more conservative than the experiencers’ own ratings. The effects of strategy, target 
and valence were analysed using two 2(strategy: simulation, theorisation) × 6(experiencer: A, 
B, C, D, E, F) × 3(valence: positive, neutral, negative) mixed analyses of variance on the 
absolute and raw difference scores.  
6.4.2.2.1 Assumption checks. There were several outliers and the assumption of 
homogeneity of variances was violated in several conditions, as assessed using Levene’s test. 
However, ANOVA should be fairly robust to deviations from normality with a large sample 
size, and to heterogeneity with fairly equal sample sizes (Norman, 2010), and so the analysis 
proceeded as planned. The assumption of sphericity was violated, indicated by Mauchly’s test 
(which may have been due to over-sensitivity with large samples; Weinfurt, 2000), and so 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values are reported (Maxwell & Delaney, 2004).  
6.4.2.2.2 Mixed ANOVAs. The same pattern of results was found using both sets of 
scores: using the absolute scores revealed significant main effects of strategy, F(1, 300) = 
4.42, p = .036, ηp2 = .015, valence, F(2, 600) = 375.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .56, and experiencer, 
F(4.22, 1265) = 131.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .31, and a significant three-way interaction effect, 
F(7.62, 2286) = 39.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .12. In light of the three-way interaction, the data were 
then split by condition to assess the simple two-way interactions. The assumption of 
sphericity was violated for both groups (Mauchly’s test p < .001) and so Greenhouse-Geisser 
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adjusted values are reported. The interaction between experiencer and valence was 
statistically significant in both the simulation, F(7.08, 1089) = 12.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .07 and 
theorisation, F(6.60, 962) = 98.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, conditions. Using the raw scores also 
showed significant main effects of strategy, F(1, 300) = 21.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .07, valence, 
F(1.27, 379) = 745.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .71, and experiencer, F(4.29, 1286) = 38.18, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .11, and a three-way interaction effect, F(7.58, 2272) = 34.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .102. 
Simple effects analyses revealed significant interactions between experiencer and valence in 
both the simulation condition, F(6.29, 968) = 116.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .43, and the theorisation 
conditions, F(8.49, 1240) = 317, p < .001, ηp2 = .69. Independent t-tests were conducted to 
assess whether there were differences between the simulation and theorisation conditions for 
experiencer, valence, and experiencer × valence interactions for both the absolute (Appendix 
E.1) and raw difference scores (Appendix E.2). 
 6.4.2.3 Fiction-exposure as predictor of empathic accuracy. A multiple linear 
regression was conducted to predict empathic accuracy using absolute difference scores from 
fiction-exposure, nonfiction-exposure and foil selection on the ART-R. All assumptions were 
met (linearity, normality, homoscedasticity, independence of residuals, and lack of 
multicollinearity). Three outliers were retained in the analysis (there were no extreme 
leverage points). The ART-R dimensions predicted 9% variation in absolute difference 
scores, F(3, 298) = 9.32, p < .001, R2 = .09, adj. R2 = .08. Only fiction-exposure, β = -.28, p < 
.001, 95% CI [-.02, -.005], significantly contributed to the prediction, such that for each 
fiction author recognised, empathic accuracy scores increased by .011 (B = -.011).18 The 
same procedure using the raw difference scores revealed similar results. There was 
independence of residuals as indicated by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.08. There was 
 
18 Negative beta values represent increases rather than a decreases because empathic accuracy was computed as 
inverted difference scores. 
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linearity and homoscedasticity as assessed by visual inspection of partial plots and 
studentised residuals versus unstandardised predicted values, respectively. The data were 
normally distributed as assessed via visual inspection of the histogram and P-P plot. All 
correlation coefficients were < .7 and Tolerance values were > 0.1 (the lowest was .47 
indicating no issues with multicollinearity). Four outliers were identified, but as only one 
leverage value was above 0.2 (0.25) and no Cook’s distance values were above 1 (highest 
value = 0.16), none were excluded. The model predicted 4% of variance in raw difference 
scores, R2 = .19, adj. R2 = .035, F(3, 298) = 3.57, p = .014. Fiction-exposure, β = -.17, p = 
.031, 95% CI [-.02, -.001], and foil selection β = .14, p = .027, 95% CI [.008, .13], 
significantly contributed to the model. Inclusion of age, which was positively associated with 
fiction-exposure in the present sample, revealed the same pattern of results, and age did not 
significantly contribute to either model.  
A moderator analysis was conducted to assess the role of condition in the relationship 
between fiction-exposure and empathic accuracy. Mean centring was not used in the model as 
values of “0” were meaningful. The interaction term did not produce a significant increase in 
explained variance in the absolute, F(1, 298), = .15, p = .70, or raw scores F(1, 298) = 1.50, p 
= .23, indicating that the positive relationship between fiction-exposure and empathic 
accuracy did not differ across the simulation versus theorisation conditions. These results 
supported the hypothesis that fiction-exposure would positively predict empathic accuracy, 
but the effect was not shown to vary as a function of condition.  
6.4.2.4 Fiction-exposure and strategy condition as predictors of empathic strategy 
choice. In line with Zhou et al.’s (2017) findings, participants indicated that viewing videos of 
the experiencers (theorisation, 64%) would represent the more effective strategy for 
estimating their emotion ratings in response to pictures, compared to viewing the same 
pictures (simulation, 36%). Of participants who had completed the task in the theorisation 
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condition, 48% selected theorisation as the most effective strategy and 52% selected 
simulation. In contrast, in the simulation condition 80% of participants indicated that 
theorisation would represent the most effective strategy, compared to 20% that selected 
simulation. A Chi-square test (with all expected cell counts > 5) revealed that the association 
between previous strategy condition and strategy choice was statistically significant, χ2(1) = 
34.30, p < .001. 
Binary logistic regression was used to predict empathic strategy choice from fiction-
exposure, nonfiction-exposure, foil-selection and strategy condition. Relationships between 
the continuous variables and the logit of the outcome variable were linear, as assessed using 
the Box-Tidwell procedure (Box & Tidwell, 1962) with Bonferroni correction (alpha was 
divided by the eight interaction terms, resulting in statistical significance accepted at p < 
.00625; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), all ps > .016. There were no significant outliers. The 
model was statistically significant χ2(4) = 36.25, p < .001 (the Hosmer and Lemeshow test 
indicated that it was a good fit for the data, χ2[8] = 10.49, p = .23) and explained 16% 
(Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in strategy choice. Sensitivity was 72.5%, specificity was 
54.2%, predictive value for theorisation was 74% and for simulation was 52.3%, with the 
model correctly classifying 66% of all cases. Results revealed that fiction-exposure did not 
predict strategy choice: only the condition in which participants had completed the empathic 
accuracy task significantly contributed to the prediction, B = -1.50, p = .001, 95% CI [-2.09, -
1.00]. Participants assigned to the theorisation condition for the task were 18% less likely to 
select the theorisation strategy compared to participants assigned to the simulation condition 
(calculation: odds ratio = .22 / [1 + odds ratio] = 0.18). Participants tended to consider the 
condition they had completed the task in as less effective for estimating others’ emotional 
experiences. 







Figure 9. Mean absolute (top) and raw (bottom) empathic accuracy scores (difference between experiencer scores and participant scores for experiencer) in 
the simulation (light grey) and theorisation (dark grey) groups for each of the six experiencers.  




6.5.1 Empathic accuracy varies as a function of empathic strategy  
This study aimed to examine whether exposure to fiction is associated with mentalising 
or experience-sharing strategies for empathic accuracy. It attempted to replicate Zhou et al.’s 
(2017) findings that sharing in the experiences of targets (simulation) leads to higher empathic 
accuracy compared to mentalising based on facial cues (theorisation), and that participants 
tend to overvalue the theorisation strategy. In order to detect nuanced (positive and negative) 
variation in empathic accuracy, raw scores were calculated as well as absolute scores (the 
latter was in line with Zhou et al.). The absolute scores showed that the average magnitudes of 
error (differences between participants’ ratings for the targets and the targets’ actual ratings) 
were similar across the two conditions. However, the raw scores revealed that estimates in the 
theorisation condition tended to be over-negative whereas estimates in the simulation 
condition tended to be over-positive: when viewing experiencers’ facial expressions, 
participants showed a negative bias, whereas when sharing in the targets’ experiences by 
viewing the same set of pictures, participants showed a positive bias. Therefore, the present 
study did not replicate Zhou et al.’s finding that simulation represents the most effective 
strategy for accurately estimating the affective states of others (and did not support directional 
Hypothesis 5). Rather, each strategy was found to result in a similar level of error, although 
the direction of error differed.  
Positive and negative biases for facial expressions have been well documented (for a 
review, see Kauschke et al., 2019). As negative bias (e.g., Baumeister, Bratlavsky, Finkenauer 
& Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001) may serve an adaptive, predictive function, enabling 
perceivers to quickly identify a potential human threat (Hansen & Hansen, 1988), participants 
that viewed the facial expressions of targets may have been particularly predisposed to this 
bias. However, negative bias has also been documented with images (e.g., Pritsch 
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Telkemeyer, Mühlenbeck & Liebal, 2017) and yet it was not present in the simulation 
(picture-viewing) condition; in fact, it appeared to be reversed.  
Two explanations may account for this finding: first, participants in the simulation 
condition may have moderated the initial negative bias via a process of reappraisal 
(Baumeister et al., 2001; Petro, Tong, Henley & Neta, 2018). In the theorisation condition 
participants were asked about (i) their emotional responses to the videos of the experiencers 
and (ii) their estimates of the experiencers’ emotional ratings for the pictures. In contrast, in 
the simulation condition participants were asked about (i) their own emotional responses to 
the pictures and (ii) their estimate of the experiencers’ emotional ratings for the pictures. 
Considering the same stimuli twice may facilitate a modification of the original estimate, and 
so reappraisal may represent a key process in the experience-sharing strategy. Further, as 
people tend to regulate their own negative emotions in order to minimise negative states 
(Baumeister et al., 2001), participant estimates may have been positively biased in the 
simulation condition where their own affective responses served as referents for the 
experiencers’.  
Second, Zhou et al. (2017) pointed out that simulation may not represent the most 
effective strategy in all situations, rather it tends to be undervalued compared to theorisation, 
and this pattern is likely to be systematic. People’s overconfidence in their ability to read 
facial expressions may lead to bias (the robust over-confidence effect; e.g., Pallier et al., 
2002) whereas under-confidence in experience-sharing may minimise bias. While this could 
explain negative bias in the theorisation condition, it does not alone explain positive bias of 
equal magnitude in the simulation condition. The experimental paradigm is predicated on the 
assumption that the experiencers’ perspectives on their initial emotional responses were 
accurate and not themselves subject to bias. If the experiencers’ ratings reflected the initial 
negative bias, simulation estimates could be more accurate than the error magnitudes would 
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suggest. Future research may elucidate the effect of bias and the role of reappraisal in both 
experiencer and perceiver on empathic accuracy. 
6.5.2 Empathic accuracy varies as a function of target and valence 
Empathic accuracy varied as a function of target and valence and this differed between 
strategy conditions (supporting Hypotheses 6-8). Furthermore, almost all target × valence 
interactions were significant. Generally, estimated affect ratings for neutral pictures were the 
most accurate, and were the least accurate for negative pictures. Some experiencers’ emotions 
were easier to detect than others, and this differed depending on whether the pictures were 
positive, negative or neutral. As identification with target did not relate to empathic accuracy, 
providing no evidence of an ingroup advantage (e.g., Adams et al., 2010; Matsumoto et al., 
2009), it may be that particular experiencers expressed certain emotions more or less overtly 
than others. Research has indicated that the sex of the target can moderate the effect of 
valence on emotion labelling, for example Garrido and Prada (2017) found that participants 
correctly classified more “happy” expressions in static images of women and more “angry” 
expressions in men, though there was no interaction with “neutral” expressions. In the present 
study, participants showed generally higher levels of accuracy when rating the emotions of 
Experiencer E (male), although inspection of the target × valence interactions illustrates that 
accuracy with this experiencer was far higher for neutral images compared to both positive 
and negative images (Figure 9). It may be that individual differences in emotional 
expressiveness, the ability to accurately convey feelings nonverbally, impacted empathic 
accuracy in the present study. This tendency shows stability across contexts (Allport & 
Vernon, 1933) and is associated with other personality traits (positively with extraversion and 
negatively with neuroticism; Riggio & Riggio, 2002) as well as gender (women tend to be 
more nonverbally expressive than men; Hall, 1990). 
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Individual differences in the empathiser may also play a role in the ability to interpret 
positive, negative and neutral facial expressions across different experiencers. For example, 
individuals vary in “valence focus”, the tendency to emphasise positive and negative 
information in verbal reports, which has been linked to an increased ability to process 
affective stimuli, and a heightened sensitivity towards negative facial expressions (Barrett & 
Niedenthal, 2004). Furthermore, the mood of the empathiser can bias recognition of 
incongruent emotions (e.g., a negative bias in participants primed with a sad mood and a 
positive bias in participants primed with a happy mood; Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2010). 
These findings reflect the importance of context when determining the most effective strategy 
for accurately interpreting the inner states of others. Future research may clarify the impact 
and interactions of individual differences in empathisers and experiencers on empathic 
accuracy for a range of emotions.  
 6.5.3 Fiction-exposure as a predictor of empathic accuracy 
The correlation analysis revealed that fiction- and nonfiction-exposure were both 
negatively associated with absolute difference scores, indicating that the more people had 
read, the higher their empathic accuracy (supporting Hypothesis 9). Relationships were 
stronger for fiction-exposure in both conditions, in line with previous findings discussed in 
Chapter 3. Regression analyses revealed that fiction-exposure positively predicted variance in 
empathic accuracy even when nonfiction-exposure was controlled. This effect did not interact 
with condition, suggesting that while fiction-exposure is associated with empathic accuracy, it 
is not uniquely related to one empathic strategy over the other (and so Hypothesis 10 was not 
supported). It could be that both mentalising and experience-sharing strategies are enhanced, 
over time, through exposure to fiction, or that individuals with higher empathic skills tend to 
read more fiction.  
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 6.5.4 Fiction-exposure as a predictor of empathic strategy choice 
Zhou et al. (2017) found that participants over-valued theorisation, tending to self-select 
into this strategy condition despite simulation being the more effective approach to empathic 
accuracy. In the present study, accuracy in the theorisation and simulation conditions was 
comparable, yet theorisation also represented the most popular choice with the present 
sample. The strategy that had been previously used in the task (via the assigned condition) 
predicted strategy choice (in both conditions, participants tended to select the condition that 
they had not previously taken part in), but no other factors, including fiction-exposure, were 
found to significantly contribute to the prediction (and so Hypothesis 11 was not supported). 
This supports Zhou et al.’s suggestion that while the effectiveness of strategy may vary across 
contexts, there is a systematic tendency for people to overvalue their ability to read faces and 
undervalue insight gained from sharing in another’s experience.  
6.5.5 Limitations and recommendations for future research 
As both absolute and raw difference values were employed to measure empathic 
accuracy, it is important to consider the potential error rate inflation. However, Bonferroni-
adjustments for the two sets of dependent variables (raw and absolute scores) did not 
significantly alter the pattern of results (unless otherwise stated) and this approach provided a 
more nuanced view of the variance in empathic accuracy. By establishing the differences in 
empathic accuracy entailed by taking mentalising versus experience-sharing approaches, as 
well as the impact of contextual factors including the emotional content of the stimulus and 
individual differences between both experiencers and empathisers, the field will be better 
positioned to make recommendations for developing this integral social skill.  
Identification with targets did not impact empathic accuracy in either condition. It may 
be that the perceived similarity to target question did not reliably access the extent to which 
participants identified with each experiencer. Indeed, the general lack of relationship between 
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identification with the target and the difference between participants’ own ratings for the 
video clip or picture and their ratings for the experiencers suggests that this may be the case. 
Therefore, other factors may have led to the variation in empathic accuracy caused by 
different target experiencers, such as expressiveness or inhibition. Future research may 
develop this line of enquiry by examining effects across strategies. Participants were asked 
about which strategy they thought would be most useful after completing the task in their 
assigned condition, and so responses may have been biased by participants’ experience of 
using the strategy assigned to them. Indeed, strategy used in the task was the only significant 
predictor of strategy selected after the task. Future research could examine strategy choice 
before the task is completed to obtain a purer measure.  
Empathic accuracy was calculated in this study by computing the raw differences 
between participants’ ratings for the target and the target’s own ratings. The experimental 
paradigm, therefore, relies on the experiencers’ abilities to accurately interpret their own 
affective responses. Employing dynamic facial reactions as stimuli represents a more 
ecologically valid method for assessing empathic accuracy compared to static photographs or 
schematic faces (e.g., Dobs, Bülthoff & Schulz, 2018), though the trade-off is that 
experiencers’ self-reports could be subject to biases. Future research additionally employing 
validated behavioural tasks may help to establish systematic differences in empathic accuracy 
between mentalising and experience-sharing processes. 
Finally, the tests concerning fiction-exposure yielded relationships rather than causal 
effects. Fiction-exposure appeared to predict empathic accuracy, though it is unclear whether 
it improves this skill or whether people with higher levels of this skill tend to read more 
fiction. Further research is required to identify the causal effects of fiction on the selection 
and value of each inferencing strategy.  
FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES 
 
 172 
6.5.6 Summary and moving forward 
This study tested the respective value of mentalising versus experience-sharing 
strategies for accurately inferring others’ affective states. It examined whether fiction-
exposure predicts empathic accuracy, and the moderating role of inferencing strategy. 
Empathic accuracy was found to vary as a function of individual differences and situational 
aspects including valence, the identity of the target, and strategy used. It was positively 
predicted by fiction-exposure, although the effect of fiction-exposure was not impacted by 
mentalising or experience-sharing strategy.  
Analysis of the raw scores revealed that mentalising and experience-sharing entailed 
similar levels of error, but that the direction of error diverged: mentalising based on facial 
cues resulted in negative bias, whereas experience-sharing—using one’s own affective 
experience as proxy for the targets’—led to positive bias. It was suggested that reappraisal 
processes may play a role in accurately interpreting the affective states of oneself and others. 
Their impact on both mentalising and experience-sharing strategies for empathic accuracy 
could be fruitfully examined through future research.  
This represents the first study to examine the relationship between fiction-exposure and 
mentalising and experience-sharing task performance. While the effects of condition 
diverged, condition did not moderate the positive impact of fiction-exposure on empathic 
accuracy. This indicates that fiction-exposure processes may support both mentalising and 
experience-sharing routes to empathic accuracy. However, the findings for fiction-exposure 
did not enable causal conclusions to be made, and so further research is required to examine 
causal effects of fiction on the empathy components. Furthermore, the empathic accuracy 
measure relied on the experiencers’ abilities to accurately reflect on their own mental states 
and so it would be beneficial to examine fiction effects using validated behavioural measures 
of empathic accuracy.  
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The next and final study in this thesis aimed to examine causal effects of fiction on 
empathic accuracy using established empathic accuracy measures. It aimed to investigate one 
process through which fiction may enhance performance on empathic accuracy tests: narrative 
immersion. If stories are a simulation of the social world, becoming deeply immersed may 
mediate the effects of fiction on tests of empathy. As discussed in Chapter 3, previous 
research has indicated associations between immersion (or related constructs) and empathic 
accuracy. The final study in the present research project aimed to examine the effects of 
immersion in a story on empathic accuracy using an experimental approach.  
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Chapter 7: An Experimental Investigation of the Effect of Narrative Immersion on 
Empathic Accuracy After Reading 
In the previous two chapters, research was presented that established correlations 
between fiction-exposure and self-report (Chapter 5) and behavioural (Chapter 6) empathic 
ability measures. The present study extends this research by examining the causal effects of 
fiction-engagement, and specifically by testing the effect of one mechanism through which 
fiction may impact empathic accuracy: immersion. In line with the multidimensional 
approach to measurement taken throughout this research, this study incorporated multiple 
measures of immersion in order to tap into different aspects of the phenomenon. In an 
exploratory pilot study (N = 61), the experimental manipulation failed to vary levels of 
identification with characters, empathic feelings during reading and transportation into the 
storyworld. A re-design was undertaken which involved a materials pretest, followed by two 
manipulation pilots and a final experiment (total N = 163). The pretest and pilots established 
an immersive text and a cognitive load manipulation strategy for varying immersion levels. 
However, in the main experiment, the manipulation did not successfully vary immersion 
levels, and so a correlation analysis was undertaken which revealed positive associations 
between immersion measures, self-report and task-based empathic ability measures. An 
exploratory analysis examined the general prediction that reading would enhance empathic 
accuracy scores. This was found to be the case for one empathic accuracy measure (empathic 
accuracy for story characters’ inner states), when controlling for demographic differences, 
trait empathy, fiction- and nonfiction-exposure, p = .040. This chapter presents the full set of 
five discrete experiments that contributed to the research agenda. It closes with a discussion of 
the methodological challenges involved in the study, and makes recommendations for future 
research aiming to establish the nature of fiction effects on empathic abilities, and the 
mechanisms through which such effects may occur.  
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7.1 Introduction  
Empathic accuracy, the ability to accurately infer other people’s mental states (Ickes, 
1997), is essential to interpreting and responding appropriately to their thoughts, emotions and 
behaviours. Research has shown that the same cognitive and neural mechanisms are involved 
in the processing of both real and fictional events (e.g., Speer et al., 2009; Wallentin et al., 
2011), suggesting that fictional narratives have validity as representations of the social world 
(Oatley, 2012; see also Gerrig, 1993; Zwaan, 2004). Through simulating the social 
experiences depicted in fiction, readers may develop their empathic inferencing abilities, 
leading to higher real-world empathic accuracy (e.g., Mar & Oatley, 2008; Oatley, 1999). 
The meta-analyses described in Chapter 3 indicated that fiction-reading has an 
immediate, positive effect on empathic accuracy task performance (Dodell-Feder & Tamir, 
2018) and that lifetime exposure to fiction positively correlates with empathic accuracy, as 
well as with self-report concern, experience-sharing and mentalising (Mumper & Gerrig, 
2017). Furthermore, studies have shown that associations between fiction-reading and 
empathic abilities sustain when individual differences in general intelligence, age and English 
fluency, nonfiction exposure (e.g., Mar et al., 2006), openness to experience and the tendency 
to become absorbed in stories (Mar et al., 2009) are controlled.  
7.1.1 Fiction and nonfiction  
Social experiences are depicted in nonfiction as well as fiction narratives. Fictional 
narratives may uniquely induce empathy during reading because they enable the exploration 
of ideas and circumstances without the real-world obligations that may be implicated when 
reading nonfiction. In this way, fictional narratives may provide a “safe zone” in which to 
experience, infer and explore characters’ inner states (Keen, 2007, p.4). While lifetime 
exposure to nonfiction is also positively associated with empathic accuracy, correlations tend 
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to be stronger for fiction and are observed when nonfiction-exposure is controlled (Mar et al., 
2006; Mumper & Gerrig, 2017). 
7.1.2 The “process” account 
Stories may improve empathic abilities via the presentation of social information, or 
through the development of social processes, such as reasoning about mental states, 
perspective-taking and emotional engagement (Mar, 2018a). Most research evidence has 
supported the latter, “process”, account (Mar, 2018a). For example, it has been suggested that 
literary devices such as striking aesthetic features and complex, unpredictable characters 
require readers to fill in “gaps” in the narrative, and entail an active, “writerly” approach to 
characters’ inner experiences, which recruits and improves mentalising processes (De Mulder 
et al., 2017; Hakemulder, 2000; Kidd & Castano, 2013; Pino & Mazza, 2016; Zunshine, 
2006). Such devices are primarily associated with “literary” fiction (fiction containing 
specific textual features such as foregrounding, e.g., Koopman, 2016; Kuzmičová et al., 2017, 
or that which has been previously classified as acclaimed or canonical, e.g., Kidd & Castano, 
2013).  
On the other hand, popular genre-fiction has also shown associations with empathic 
abilities (e.g., Fong et al., 2013) and moral reasoning (Black et al., 2018), and reading a 
suspenseful narrative has been linked to activity in areas of the brain associated with social 
cognition (Lehne et al., 2015). The first study in the current research project (reported in 
Chapter 5), showed positive associations between enjoyment of genre-fiction and empathic 
abilities (romance and drama genres showed small-medium positive correlations with self-
report perspective-taking, empathic concern and fantasy, and experimental and comedy 
genres were positively associated with the same three IRI subscales and, additionally, with 
self-report altruism). Therefore, examination of the processes that mediate fiction effects, 
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which may transcend broad literary and popular classifications, would help to refine 
knowledge of the relationships between fiction and empathic abilities.19  
7.1.3 Narrative immersion 
As outlined in Chapter 3, research in the field of persuasion has foregrounded the 
impact of immersive process in narrative effects. Studies in this area have shown that fictional 
stories can alter people’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviours in predetermined directions (Slater, 
2002), which can arise from the reader’s analysis of explicit messages (analytic persuasion; 
Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) or via the non-critical, experiential process of 
becoming immersed, “lost” (Nell, 1988, p. 8) or “transported” (Gerrig, 1993) into a story 
(narrative persuasion; Green & Brock, 2000; Green et al., 2004). Gerrig suggested that the 
process of becoming transported into a storyworld may return readers to their original world 
in some way altered, and Green and Brock (2000) posited transportation as the process 
through which narrative persuasion occurs. They developed a measure of transportation 
comprising eleven primary questions about quality of engagement, such as, “when I was 
reading the narrative, I could easily picture the events in it taking place”, and four additional 
questions relating to story-specific content, for example, “while reading the narrative, I had a 
vivid image of the boy” (Green & Brock, 2000, p. 704). Results showed that higher 
transportation led to more story-consistent beliefs. For example, after reading a narrative 
about the murder of a young girl by a psychiatric patient in an Ohio shopping mall, highly 
transported readers were more likely to agree with story-consistent items such as there being a 
high prevalence of violence in the USA and in shopping malls. 
 
19 In the study presented in Chapter 5, enjoyment of the factual/documentary genre was also positively 
associated with perspective-taking, empathic concern and altruism, although the associations were generally 
smaller than for the fiction genres. This was in line with previous studies showing that positive correlations 
between empathic abilities and nonfiction-exposure tend to be smaller than with fiction-exposure (Mumper & 
Gerrig, 2017). The narrative elements that mediate fiction effects may also transcend fiction versus nonfiction 
distinctions. Future research may examine the effects of varying the framing of narrative as fiction or nonfiction 
(for an example, see Green & Brock’s, 2000, study of narrative persuasion). 
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Similarly, de Graaf, Hoeken, Sanders and Beentjes (2012) found that identification with 
a character during reading impacted attitudes after reading. Participants read a story told from 
the perspective of one of two characters with opposing points of view. Identification with the 
characters mediated the impact of perspective on attitudes after reading. If immersive 
processes such as transportation and identification with characters can facilitate the persuasive 
impact of implicit messages, such non-critical experiential processes may also facilitate 
empathy after reading.  
7.1.4 Immersion and empathy 
In Chapter 3, the conceptual overlap between immersion in stories and empathic 
processes was identified with reference to tools used to measure empathy. Gavaler and 
Johnson (2017, Experiment 1), for example, showed that adding mental state explanations to 
narratives increased transportation. As discussed in Chapter 2, the fantasy subscale of the IRI 
tends to be treated as a measure of trait immersion or transportability (e.g., Mar et al., 2006; 
see also Hall & Bracken, 2011) as all but one item refers to immersion in stories, mental 
imagery, and feelings towards fictional characters. Scores for this trait have been shown to 
positively correlate with performance on the IPT-15, a behavioural measure of empathic 
accuracy which, as described in Chapter 2, entails interpretation of filmed interactions 
between people (r = .28, p < .05; Mar et al., 2006). Fantasy also tends to correlate with the 
perspective-taking and empathic concern dimensions of the IRI (r = .24 and .42 respectively 
both ps < .05; Mar et al., 2006). The tendency to become absorbed in narratives appears to 
overlap with dimensions of empathy as diverse as the ability to accurately interpret facial 
expressions and the self-reported tendency to feel concern towards others. Evidence from 
neuroscience has also indicated an overlap between immersion and empathy, where studies 
have shown that areas of the brain associated with experience-sharing (the anterior and mid-
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cingulate cortex; Walter, 2012) are activated during immersion in fiction (Hsu et al., 2014) 
and continue to remain active after reading (Cadwell, 2015). 
7.1.5 Causal effects of immersion 
Behavioural research has further supported the link between immersion and empathy, 
with some studies indicating that immersion in fiction may lead to increases in empathic 
abilities after reading. Bal and Veltkamp (2013) found that emotional transportation 
(measured using Busselle & Bilandzic’s, 2009, scale) into a narrative increased self-reported 
empathic concern a week after reading, whereas a lack of transportation appeared to reduce 
empathic concern. However, this effect only held for participants that read fiction rather than 
nonfiction (Study 1) and transportation was higher for fiction-readers (it may have been 
impacted by the presentation of a single coherent narrative in the fiction condition, as opposed 
to the selection of short, discrete texts presented in the nonfiction condition; Study 2). 
Therefore, the effect on empathic concern could have been due to fiction-engagement 
processes other than transportation.  
Johnson and colleagues (Johnson, 2012; Johnson et al., 2013) provided evidence of a 
positive effect of transportation on empathic feelings during reading and subsequent real-
world prosocial behaviour. Johnson (2012) found that transported readers experienced more 
sympathetic emotions towards story characters (e.g., “compassionate”; Batson et al., 1987) 
which, in turn, accounted for some increase in prosocial behaviour after reading. Johnson et 
al. (2013) assigned participants to one of three groups and instructed them to (i) generate 
imagery while reading, (ii) focus on verbal-semantic information (the meanings of particular 
words within sentences), or (iii) read the text in the same way that they would usually read a 
story for leisure. Participants who generated more imagery while reading the narrative became 
more transported and were subsequently over three times more likely than participants in the 
leisure reading group to behave in a prosocial way (by responding to a call for survey 
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participation by an ostensibly unfunded researcher for a nominal fee of $0.05). Here, the 
manipulation appeared to alter levels of transportation, although there was no manipulation 
check to assess how far instructions had been followed. Nevertheless, transportation fully 
mediated the effect of the imagery training on sympathetic feelings for the story characters 
(using the same measure from Batson et al., 1987, as the Johnson, 2012, study described 
above), and both transportation and sympathetic feelings for characters mediated effects on 
prosocial behaviour. This indicated that immersion in a narrative can promote prosocial 
behaviour both directly, and indirectly through increasing sympathy for story characters. 
In contrast to these findings, in their study of the effects of reading literary fiction, Kidd 
and Castano (2013) observed no correlation between transportation and empathic accuracy 
task performance. Specifically, there was no relationship between transportation and cognitive 
mentalising (reasoning about thoughts and beliefs), although the measure, a false-belief task, 
suffered ceiling effects (Experiments 1 and 2). There was also no effect on interpreting 
emotions presented in pictures of faces (measured using the RMET, Experiments 1, 3, 4 and 5 
and the DANVA-AF, Experiment 2). Transportation was not the focus of their study, 
however, and so it was not experimentally manipulated, and other effects of the reading 
manipulation may have attenuated any relationships. While immersion in fiction and empathy 
appear to be related, further research is required to establish if, and how far, immersion 
causally influences empathy after reading.  
7.1.6 Narratives as stimuli 
In Chapter 3, it was proposed that understanding the impact of immersion in narratives 
could have implications for understanding fiction effects, as well as for methods used to test 
empathic abilities. In narrative tasks (such as the SST and MASC described in Chapter 2) 
empathic accuracy is operationalised as the ability to correctly interpret the inner cognitive 
and affective states of the story’s protagonists. However, texts are not equally transporting to 
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all readers (Green & Brock, 2000), and individual differences in identification with the 
characters, and the production of mental imagery and emotions during reading, may account 
for or attenuate variance in empathy task scores (see also Mar, 2018b). An investigation of 
immersion effects on empathic accuracy would not only contribute to knowledge of fiction 
effects, it could also inform the use of story stimuli in the field of empathy research. 
7.1.7 Manipulating immersion 
Immersion is a multifaceted process. It involves character identification, vicarious 
experiencing of characters’ personalities and emotions, seeing events from characters’ 
perspective and assuming their goals (Cohen 2001; Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008; Iguarta, 
2010; Oatley, 1994, 1999; Slater & Rouner, 2002), attentional focus, mental imagery, and 
emotional engagement (Green & Brock, 2002). While there are overlaps between these 
aspects of narrative engagement, there are also important differences. For example, Green and 
Brock’s (2000) definition of transportation includes an emotional aspect but does not require 
this to be related to characters, and identification with characters can extend beyond direct 
engagement with the narrative itself (de Graaf et al., 2012).  
Immersion is multidimensional but its constituent constructs are rarely studied 
simultaneously. Research that has examined the effects of immersive processes on empathic 
abilities after reading (such as the studies described above) have focused on transportation, 
following Green & Brock’s (2002) operationalisation of the construct. However, immersive 
processes may differentially impact fiction effects on components of empathy. It would be 
advantageous to take a multidimensional approach to both narrative immersion and empathic 
accuracy in order to establish if, and how far, immersion in fictional narratives impacts 
accuracy for mental state content. 
 Green and Brock (2000) successfully implemented a dual-task paradigm in order to 
manipulate transportation levels in participants during reading. The present study took a 
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similar approach to manipulating immersion levels in order test the hypothesis that high 
immersion while reading fiction, compared to low immersion, would lead to higher explicit 
empathic accuracy for cognitive and affective content, as well as a greater likelihood of 
spontaneously inferring mental states (Hypotheses 12-15 articulated in Chapter 4). It aimed to 
test the effect of this manipulation on different dimensions of immersion, and to identify 
effects on different measures of empathic accuracy, in order to clarify the influence of 
immersion in fiction effects on empathy. 
7.2 Experiment 1 Method 
7.2.1 Participants  
Sixty-one social sciences students (84% female, aged 18-57, M = 25.2, SD = 8.6) 
volunteered to participate in a study “investigating how people read stories” in return for 
course credit. Participants were native English speakers (67%) or reported a minimum of 3 
years’ English fluency (M = 9.05, SD = 4.37).  
7.2.2 Materials 
7.2.2.1 Fictional story. The End of Something (Hemingway, 1988) is a short story (1424 
words) that forms the stimulus text for the SST (Dodell-Feder et al., 2013; described in 
Chapter 2). The narrative depicts two protagonists, Nick and Marjorie, out fishing together. 
They talk, argue, and break up. Marjorie leaves and Nick’s friend Bill appears. Nick and Bill 
engage in a brief conversation about the relationship having ended, which indicates that Bill 
had known about the breakup being forthcoming. The narrative contains descriptions of the 
environmental setting, the characters’ physical behaviours, and dialogue between them. Two 
of the original character names were modernised (Marjorie was changed to Mandy and Bill 
was changed to Will) and contextually specific terms were changed (e.g., “lumber schooners” 
was changed to “lumber boats”). The Flesch Reading Ease Score (FRES; Flesch, 1948) 
quantifies ease of reading comprehension on a scale of 0-100 (higher scores reflect easier 
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texts), and the score for the text was 93, indicating that it was very easy to comprehend. The 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level (FKGL) estimates the education level at which a text should 
typically be understood and a value of 2.7 indicated that the text could be read by students in 
UK Key Stage 2 (US Grade 3). No participants reported having read the story before. 
7.2.2.2 Empathic accuracy.  
7.2.2.2.1. Explicit and spontaneous mental state inferencing. The SST (Dodell-Feder et 
al., 2013) is a narrative-based test of explicit and spontaneous first- and second-order 
empathic accuracy (described in Chapter 2). Participants are asked to read The End of 
Something (above), and subsequently to answer questions about the characters and narrative 
and provide a summary of the story. The characters’ inner thoughts and feelings are not made 
explicit in the story, and so high scores on the SST reflect the ability to synthesise contextual, 
verbal and physical information. Spontaneous mental state inferencing is measured as the 
presence or absence of a mental state inference in the story summary (first question). Then, 
eight questions probe explicit mental state inferencing, for example, ‘Why is Nick afraid to 
look at “Mandy?”, and five non-mental state (control) questions probe story comprehension. 
The data were scored using the simple rubric laid out by Dodell-Feder et al. Spontaneous 
empathic inferencing was scored as a dichotomous variable (present versus absent), and all 
other responses were scored on a scale of 0-2 for accuracy and complexity.  
7.2.2.2.2 Cognitive and affective mentalising. The Yoni Test (Shamay-Tsoory & 
Aharon-Peretz, 2007) measures cognitive (24 trials) and affective (24 trials) first- and second-
order mentalising and is sensitive to variation in healthy adults (see the description of the task 
in Chapter 2). The test features a central character, Yoni, depicted as a simple schematic face 
or “smilie”, surrounded by four other images from a single category (e.g., cartoon animals, 
toys or photographs of people’s facial expressions). Sentences appear at the top of the screen, 
and participants are asked to select the appropriate image to fill in the blanks in the sentences 
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(e.g., “Yoni loves BLANK”). In the first-order condition, participants must interpret Yoni’s 
eye gaze and facial expression; in the second-order condition, participants must additionally 
interpret the gaze and expressions of surrounding characters, also depicted as schematic faces 
(e.g., “Yoni is thinking about the toy that BLANK loves). Sixteen control trials require 
interpretation of spatial relationships between Yoni and the surrounding objects (e.g., “Yoni is 
close to BLANK”).  
7.2.2.3 Narrative immersion. Narrative immersion was measured using three scales 
tapping into aspects of the phenomenon. The Transportation Scale (Green & Brock, 2000, 
2002) comprises 11 general questions about vividness of cognitive attention to the story, 
imagery, feelings of suspense, emotional involvement and lack of awareness of real-world 
surroundings (e.g., “while I was reading the narrative, I could easily picture the events in it 
taking place”), plus questions about the characters and plot of the specific story. For the 
present study, five story-specific questions were included (e.g., “I had a vivid mental image of 
Nick”). Participants indicated agreement with statements from “not at all” to “very much” on 
a 7-point Likert-style scale. The internal consistency estimate was good with this sample (α = 
.86). Affective empathy (feelings during reading) was measured using the Empathy Index 
(Batson et al., 1987). Participants were asked to indicate how far six words, “softhearted”, 
“compassionate”, “moved”, “tender”, “warm” and “sympathetic” reflected how they felt 
while reading a story, in this case, the Hemingway text. Agreement was indicated on 5-point 
Likert scales from “not at all” to “extremely”. Six irrelevant items (e.g. “intelligent”) were 
included. Internal consistency was high (α = .89). The Identification with Character Scale 
(Iguarta, 2010) is a 14-item scale comprising empathic (cognitive and affective empathic 
reactions to characters, e.g., “I was worried about what was going to happen to the 
characters”), and merging (the experience of becoming a character and losing self-awareness, 
e.g., “I had the impression I was really experiencing the story of the characters”) dimensions. 
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Agreement with statements was indicated on a 5-point Likert scale from “not at all” to “very 
much”. Internal consistency was high (α = .94).20 
7.2.2.4 Trait empathic abilities. Three 7-item subscales from the IRI (Davis, 1980) 
multidimensional measure of trait empathy described in Chapter 3 were used: empathic 
concern, perspective-taking and fantasy (as previously mentioned, the personal distress scale 
reflects egoistic rather than altruistic responses to others in need, distinguishing it from the 
other subscales and so it was not used in this study). Empathic concern measures the trait 
tendency to feel concern and compassion for others (α = .74), fantasy measures the tendency 
to become absorbed in narratives (α = .77), and perspective-taking measures the tendency to 
reason about others’ mental states (α = .68). Deletion of one item on the perspective-taking 
scale, “if I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other 
people’s arguments” would have increased alpha to .76. However, alpha tends to be lower 
than true reliability (e.g., Peterson & Kim, 2013), and as this was exploratory research using 
an established scale with a fairly small sample, the item was retained. Fourteen irrelevant 
items (e.g., “I have no difficulty in cooking a complicated meal”) were included to mask the 
aims of the study. 
7.2.2.5 Fiction-exposure. Acheson et al.’s (2008) version of the ART (see Chapter 3) 
was used (α = .94). This version contains 65 fiction author names (e.g., “Alice Walker”) and 
65 plausible foils (composed of made-up names, e.g., “Beatrice Dobkin”, or names of people 
who are not authors e.g., “John Landau”). Participants were required to select the names that 
 
20 A principle components analysis (PCA) was run on the narrative immersion measures to assess whether the 
three measures were distinct from one another. The KMO measure was .80 which indicated “meritorious” 
sampling adequacy (Kaiser, 1974) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (p < .001) indicating that the 
data were factorisable. The analysis revealed a complex factor structure. Eight components accounted for 76.6% 
total variance and a forced three factor model was run which accounted for 57.2% variance, both with several 
cross-loadings. This indicates overlap across the constructs. Exploratory regression models were run as part of 
the procedure with transportation, affective empathy and identification computed as a single (additive) variable; 
however, the pattern of results was the same as those reported in the main regression analysis.  
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they knew to be fiction authors. In order to discourage guessing, participants were given the 
following instruction: 
Below is a list of names. Some of them are authors and some of them are not. Please select 
the ones that you know for sure are authors. Points are deducted for guessing, so you should 
only select those you are absolutely certain about. You can work quickly, clicking only those 
that you know. If you are unsure, just move on to the next name. Please answer truthfully, 
and do not try to look up the answers. It does not matter whether you know any or not—we 
are interested in finding out any names in particular that you have experience of. 
7.2.2.6 Genre experience. In line with Study 1 (Chapter 5), participants were asked to 
indicate their tendency to read from the same set of seven genres (comedy, romance, 
crime/thriller, sci-fi/fantasy, drama/realistic, classical literature and nonfiction) on 5-point 
Likert scales anchored with “not at all” and “a great deal”.  
7.2.2.7 Demographic questions. Participants were asked to indicate their gender 
identity, age, English fluency and highest education qualification. 
7.2.3 Procedure 
Participants completed the demographic questions, trait empathic ability questions (IRI 
subscales), genre questions and fiction-exposure task, and were randomly assigned to one of 
two groups (immersion, distraction) to read the fictional short story. Instructions for reading 
varied between the groups: participants were asked to (i) read the story and try to imagine the 
characters and surroundings (immersion condition) or (ii) read the story while noting down 
words that would be difficult for a pupil in school year 5 (aged 9-10) to understand 
(distraction condition). This approach was based on that used in Green and Brock’s (2000) 
Experiments 2-4, where some participants were instructed to identify segments of text that 
would be difficult for fourth-graders (UK year 5) to understand, which was designed to reduce 
transportation. After reading, participants completed the SST questions first as the stimulus 
forms part of the SST measure. These were followed by the narrative immersion scales 
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presented in a random order, after which the Yoni test was completed, as it was the only 
measure that did not require memory of the text. Items were randomised within tasks, except 
for the SST, wherein the order of questions is predetermined. All measures were administered 
electronically, the empathic accuracy test via Inquisit and all other measures via Qualtrics. 
The stimulus text was provided as a printout as immersion has been shown to be lower for 
text presented on a digital screen (Mangen & Kuiken, 2014). Participants in the distraction 
condition were additionally provided with a pen and paper for their notes. 
7.2.4 Data analysis 
Reliability analyses were conducted using Cronbach’s alpha (coefficients are reported in 
the Measures section). Pearson’s r was used for all inter-scale associations, and the point-
biserial correlation coefficient (rpb) was used for all correlations involving the dichotomous 
spontaneous mentalising variable, with the exception of the gender and SST spontaneous 
empathic accuracy correlation, which used Fisher’s exact test (Fisher’s exact test was reported 
rather than Pearson Chi-Square, as one expected cell count was less than 5 at 4.1). Gender 
differences and the effect of the manipulation on immersion scales were assessed using 
independent t-tests. Following a null finding for the effect of the manipulation (reported 
below), regression analyses were conducted to examine relationships between levels of 
immersion and the empathic ability outcomes measures. Spontaneous mentalising was 
predicted using binomial logistic regression, and multiple linear regression was used to 
predict all other dependent variables. All statistical tests were two-tailed, and confidence 
intervals were bias-corrected and accelerated using bootstrapping (N = 1000).  
7.3 Results  
7.3.1 Preliminary analysis 
7.3.1.1 Group differences. Independent t-tests showed no significant differences in trait 
levels of empathic concern, perspective-taking or fantasy between the two conditions, all ps > 
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.376 (the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met for all tests). Mean differences are 
presented in Table 9. 
7.3.1.2 Gender differences. There was a statistically significant effect of gender on the 
SST explicit inferencing measure, with females (n = 51; M = 10.24, SD = 2.27) scoring higher 
than males (n = 10; M = 7.1, SD = 3.73), t(59) = 3.56, p = .001, 95% CI [1.37, 4.90]. The 
assumption of homogeneity of variances was met in all cases as indicated by non-significant 
results for Levene’s test, p < .05. Males and females differed in genre enjoyment only in the 
case of the romance genre, which females preferred significantly more than males, p = .015. 
There were no gender effects on the SST spontaneous mentalising measure, p = .075, fiction-
exposure, SST story comprehension, transportation, affective empathy or character 
identification, all ps > .23, or on any of the Yoni test dimensions, all ps > .14. 
Table 9  











Immersed 2.88 (0.41) 3.06 (0.58) 2.96 (0.59) 3.55 (1.05) 2.85 (0.84) 2.82 (0.94) 
Distracted 2.98 (0.47) 3.08 (0.55) 3.03 (0.70) 3.62 (0.95) 2.97 (0.60) 3.00 (1.00) 
Mean 
difference 
p = .376 
[-.33, .13] 
p = .885 
[-.31, .27] 
p = .651 
[-.40, .25] 
p = .760 
[-.59, .43] 
p = .608 
[-.55, .32] 
p = .477 
[-.68, .32] 
Note. “Transp.” = Transportation. Affective empathy and identification were averaged across 5-point scales; all 
other scales were 7-point scales. Immersed n = 31, Distracted n = 30, except for identification where Distracted n 
= 29. Bootstrapped (N = 1000) 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals for the mean differences 
are presented in brackets. 
 
7.3.1.3 Raw correlations. Inter-scale correlations are presented in Table 10. Significant 
correlations were generally positive, associations between the IRI subscales, the SST 
measures and Yoni test scales were small-medium, and associations between the narrative 
immersion scales were large in magnitude (Cohen, 1988). Trait fantasy was moderately 
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positively associated with transportation and character identification, empathic concern with 
affective empathy and character identification, and perspective-taking with all narrative 
immersion scales. Higher scores on the Yoni test physical trials were associated with a lower 
likelihood of making a spontaneous mental state inference on the SST. No other correlations 
reached significance. Although cognitive and affective scores on the Yoni test trials were 
related, neither was associated with the explicit or spontaneous SST questions. The 
exploration of genre was not relevant to the hypotheses and so these effects are not reported; 
however, self-reported tendencies to read from different genres were not associated with any 
empathic accuracy measures (all ps > .05). 
7.3.1.3.1 Assumption checks and transformations for correlation analysis. The 
assumption of homogeneity was violated for the point-biserial correlations for identification, 
explicit mentalising, and the Yoni test control condition, all ps < .041. It was met in all other 
cases as indicated by non-significant results for Levene’s test. Applying a transformation to 
the variables of concern (squaring) removed outliers and heteroscedasticity for the character 
identification and explicit mentalising variables (Levene’s test was non-significant at p = 
.130, and p = .079, respectively). The correlation between spontaneous and explicit 
mentalising remained significant rpb(59) = .31, p = .014, 95% CI [.06, .54], and between 
spontaneous mentalising and character identification remained non-significant, rpb(59) = -
.006, p = .97, 95% CI [-.26, .26].  
Applying a rank transformation to the Yoni test physical trials data removed 
heteroscedasticity (Levene’s test based on median, p = .090) and outliers, and the relationship 
between the Yoni physical trials and spontaneous mentalising remained non-significant, 
rpb(59) = -.20, p = .118, 95% CI [-.44, .05]. Box plots revealed outliers on the “yes” and “no” 
distributions of the fiction-exposure scale, the “yes” distribution of the perspective-taking 
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Table 10  
 
Correlations between Trait Empathy, Fiction-exposure, Narrative Immersion and Post-test Empathic Accuracy Measures in Experiment 1. 
Note. N = 61, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals are presented in brackets.  
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Fiction-exposure .13 .05 -.07 .24 .14 .06 .10 .17 .18 .08 .20 .15 
 [-.07, .31] [-.19, .29] [-.32, .16] [.01, .47] [-.14, .38] [-.15, .26] [-.09, .30] [-.05, .40] [-.04, .38] [-.14, .26] [-.006, .37] [-.11, .37] 
2. Fantasy  .25* .45*** -.12 .38** .18 .42*** .07 .15 -.016 .014 -.009 
  [.01, .48] [.28, .61] [-.39, .18] [.17, .58] [-.06, 39] [.21, .60] [-.18, .31] [-.10, .40] [-.21, .22] [-.21, .26] [-.28, .25] 
3. Perspective-taking   .32* .03 .49*** .47*** .48*** .04 .09 -.10 .08 .17 
   [.10, .51] [-.23, .30] [.23, .69] [.29, .62] [.25, .65] [-.27, .33] [-.20, .34] [-.32, .14] [-.20, .33] [-.08, .43] 
4. Empathic concern    -.10 .24 .38** .33** -.12 -.05 -.13 .10 -.01 
    [-.33, .12] [-.01, .50] [.20, .55] [.07, .54] [-.39, .15] [-.30, .21] [-.34, .12] [-.17, .34] [-.28, .26] 
5. Story comprehension     -.08 -.089 -.06 .14 .14 -.037 .26* .22 
     [-.34, .21] [-.34, .18] [-.35, .23] [-.12, .39] [-.10, .37] [-.28, .19] [.01, .48] [-.04, .45] 
6. Transportation      .66*** .78*** .051 .073 .15 .03 .05 
      [.50, .78] [.65, .87] [-.23, .30] [-.20, .31] [-.08, .39] [-.22, .26] [-.20, .29] 
7. Affective empathy       .71*** -.17 -.11 .05 .09 -.01 
       [.57, .83] [-.37, .03] [-.33, .10] [-.19, .30] [-.23, .35] [-.25, .26] 
8. Character identification        -.003 .04 .06 .102 .08 
        [-.27, .24] [-.21, .26] [-.18, .29] [-.18, .36] [-.21, .34] 
9. Yoni cognitive         .80*** .40*** .06 -.13 
         [.65, .89] [.18, .59] [-.19, .41] [-.34, .11] 
10. Yoni affective          .48*** -.004 -.16 
          [.25, .67] [-.26, .32] [-.38, .09] 
11. Yoni physical           -.104 -.26* 
           [-.32, .20] [-.43, -.06] 
12. SST: Explicit            .35** 
[.13, .53] 
13. SST: Spontaneous              
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scale, and the “no” distribution of the Yoni test control condition. These were not due to data 
errors and were retained in the analysis. The Shapiro-Wilk test for the Pearson product 
moment correlations indicated deviations from normality on the “yes” distribution of the 
perspective-taking subscale, story comprehension, explicit mentalising, the Yoni test 
cognitive, affective and control conditions, all ps < .048, and the “no” distribution for the 
Yoni test control condition, p < .001. Due to these violations, robust correlations were also 
conducted using Spearman’s rho (rs). The pattern of results remained the same and, 
additionally, fiction-exposure significantly correlated with story comprehension, rs(61) = .29, 
p = .023, 95% CI [.05, .48], and cognitive mentalising, rs(61) = .27, p = .034, 95% CI [.02, 
.50]. 
7.3.1.4 Manipulation check. As shown in Table 9, the immersed and distracted groups 
did not differ on any of the immersion scales, all ps > .477 (the assumption of homogeneity of 
variances was met for all tests). The effect of condition remained non-significant when 
fantasy was included as a covariate, all ps > .22. In sum, the manipulation did not have the 
desired effect of varying immersion levels across any of the immersion dimensions.  
7.3.2 Primary analysis 
Because the manipulation failed, the planned hypothesis tests were not conducted 
(effects of condition on Yoni test scores, SST explicit and SST spontaneous scores). Instead, 
regression analyses were used to examine how far the narrative immersion measures predicted 
empathic accuracy after reading.  
7.3.2.1 Short Story Task. The narrative immersion measures (transportation, 
identification, and affective empathy), story comprehension and gender were used to predict 
explicit empathic inferencing on the SST.  
7.3.2.1.1 Assumption checks. Correlations between the transportation, affective empathy 
and identification scales could indicate multicollinearity, but tolerance and VIF statistics were 
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acceptable. The highest correlation in the matrix was .58 (transportation with identification), 
the Durbin-Watson statistic was satisfactory at 2.28, indicating independence of observations, 
and collinearity diagnostics were satisfactory (lowest tolerance = .32 and highest VIF = 3.09). 
Visual inspection of the histogram and P-P plot indicated that the data were normally 
distributed, and partial regression plots showed linearity and homoscedasticity. There were no 
standardised residuals or studentised deleted residuals ± 3 standard deviations. There were no 
problematic leverage values, with all values below 0.2 except for two at 0.21 and 0.22. These 
results were considered unproblematic in combination with Cook’s Distance values which 
were all < 1, suggesting no highly influential points (Cook & Weisberg, 1982).  
7.3.2.1.2 Multiple linear regression. The model was statistically significant, F(5, 55) = 
4.32, p = .002, R2 = .28, adj. R2 = .22, though gender, B = -3.33, 95% CI [-5.54, -1.06], p = 
.004, and story comprehension, B = 0.35, p = .013, 95% CI [.06, .61], were the only 
significant contributors. The pattern of results was the same with the inclusion of the trait 
empathy scales, fiction-exposure, age and education; again, only gender and story 
comprehension added significantly to the prediction, which accounted for 17% variance in 
explicit mentalising, F(11, 49) = 2.12, p = .036, R2 = .32, adj. R2 = .17.  
7.3.2.1.3 Binary logistic regression. Narrative immersion, story comprehension and 
gender did not significantly predict the likelihood of making a spontaneous mental state 
inference when summarising the story for the SST, χ2(5) = 9.22, p = .1, although gender, B = -
1.76, p = .012, 95% CI [-3.39, -.81], was individually significant with females 17% more 
likely to make a spontaneous inference than males. No outliers were found, and the model 
was an adequate fit, indicated by a non-significant Hosmer and Lemeshow test result, p = 
.95. The addition of the trait empathy scales, fiction-exposure, age and education did not 
substantially change the result and no individual variables significantly altered the odds of 
making a mental state inference, χ2(11) = 10.75, p = .465. 
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7.3.2.2 Yoni test cognitive.  
7.3.2.2.1 Assumption checks. The Durbin-Watson statistic (2.12) indicated that the 
observations were independent. Collinearity diagnostics were satisfactory (lowest tolerance = 
.32, and highest VIF = 3.15), and the highest correlation was .57 (transportation with 
character identification). Visual inspection of the histogram and P-P plot indicated that the 
data were normally distributed and partial regression plots showed linearity and 
homoscedasticity. There were no standardised residuals or studentised deleted residuals ± 3 
standard deviations. There were three leverage values just above the 0.2 “safe” threshold 
(0.21, 0.22 and 0.29), though these were well below the 0.5 “problematic” threshold, and 
Cook’s Distance values were all below 1, suggesting no highly influential points.  
7.3.2.2.2 Multiple linear regression. Narrative immersion, story comprehension and 
performance on the affective and control Yoni test trials significantly predicted Yoni 
cognitive scores, F(6, 54) = 16.84, p < .001, R2 = .65, adj. R2 = .61, though performance on 
the affective trials was the only significant contributor, B = .85, p < .001, 95% CI [.64, 1.06].  
7.3.2.3 Yoni test affective. A second regression model substituted cognitive for affective 
mentalising.  
7.3.2.3.1 Assumption checks. The Durbin-Watson statistic (2.17) indicated no issue with 
autocorrelation and collinearity diagnostics were satisfactory (lowest tolerance = .32 and 
highest VIF = 3.13). The histogram and P-P plot indicated that the data were normally 
distributed and partial regression plots showed linearity and homoscedasticity. There were no 
standardised residuals or studentised deleted residuals ± 3 standard deviations. There were 
three leverage values just above the 0.2 “safe” threshold (0.21, 0.23 and 0.25), though these 
were well below 0.5, and Cook’s Distance values were all below 1, suggesting no highly 
influential points.  
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7.3.2.3.2 Multiple linear regression. The model significantly predicted affective 
mentalising scores on the Yoni test, F(6, 54) = 18.69, p < .001, R2 = .68, adj. R2 = .64, though 
only the Yoni test cognitive, B = .63, p < .001, 95% CI [.48, .80], and control trials, B = .12, p 
= .024, 95% CI [.012, .23], were significant contributors.  
7.3.2.3.3 Inclusion of covariates. Including gender, age, education, trait empathy levels 
and fiction-exposure in the models did not significantly alter the pattern of results: only 
cognitive mentalising added significantly to the model for affective mentalising F(13, 47) = 
9.22, p < .001, R2 = .71, adj. R2 = .64, and only affective mentalising significantly contributed 
to the prediction for cognitive mentalising F(13, 47) = 7.96, p < .001, R2 = .69, adj. R2 = .601. 
All assumptions were met for these models (the Durbin-Watson statistic was 1.98 for the 
model predicting cognitive mentalising, and 2.05 for the model predicting affective 
mentalising. No correlations were greater than .58 and the highest VIF value was 3.41). 
7.3.2.4 Yoni test order. To assess whether scores differed for first- and second-order 
trials, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to assess the effects of order 
(first, second) and trial type (cognitive, affective, control) on Yoni test scores. Results showed 
that the effect of trial type was non-significant, F < 1, though there was a significant main 
effect of order, F(2, 60) = 27.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .32, and a significant interaction effect, F(2, 
59) = 7.86, p = .001, ηp2 = .21. Follow-up regression models were conducted to assess 
whether narrative immersion predicted first and second-order cognitive and affective Yoni 
test scores. All models (which included story comprehension) were non-significant, all ps > 
.10. 
7.4 Discussion 
The aims of the pilot experiment (Experiment 1 in this chapter) were to assess whether 
immersion in a narrative impacted explicit and spontaneous mental state inferencing (using 
the SST measure), and mentalising about cognitive and affective content (using the Yoni test). 
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The experimental manipulation failed to impact levels of immersion in the Hemingway story, 
the SST stimulus text. Therefore, regression models were used to assess how far immersion 
levels across three immersion scales predicted empathic accuracy. These findings did not 
support the prediction that higher immersion would relate to higher empathic accuracy.  
7.4.1 Limitations 
The results revealed strong correlations between self-reported empathic ability traits 
measured using the IRI and narrative immersion: transportation correlated with perspective-
taking, and character identification and affective empathy during reading with both 
perspective-taking and empathic concern. This suggests that similar processes may underpin 
relationships with real-world and fictional others; thus, it remains possible that immersion 
impacts empathic accuracy, but that the present study failed to detect the effect. One reason 
for this could be the capacity of the stimulus text to evoke immersion. Ernest Hemingway, the 
author of the stimulus story, has an economical, non-decorative style, which may have 
accounted for the observed generally low immersion levels. Immersion scores were low 
across both groups (average total scale scores in both groups were below 50 for 
transportation, below 29 for identification with character and below 12 for affective empathy, 
compared to maximum possible scores of 96, 56 and 24 respectively. The transportation 
scores reported in Green and Brock’s, 2000, experiments ranged from 31-99 of a possible 
105). Additionally, the instruction designed to lower immersion levels may have encouraged 
perspective-taking, as participants were effectively tasked with considering the text from the 
perspective of a 9-10 year-old child, which could have attenuated the group difference. 
Finally, due to the lack of a no reading control group in the present experiment, it was not 
possible to detect any effects of reading a story on empathic accuracy. The following 
experiments were designed to address these limitations.  
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7.4.2 Moving forward 
The next experiment aimed to retest the hypothesis that high immersion in a fictional 
narrative would lead to greater empathic accuracy compared to low immersion, while 
addressing the central limitations of Experiment 1: low immersion in the narrative across both 
experimental groups and potentially problematic instruction in the distraction group, and the 
lack of a no reading control group. The exploration of genre was superfluous to the main aim 
of the study and so in order to focus on the effects of immersion, questions about genre were 
not included in the next iteration of the study. Ahead of the main experiment, a pretest 
established the most immersive of three texts, and two pilot studies tested experimental 
procedures designed to manipulate immersion.  
7.5 Experiment 2: Text Selection Pretest 
A pretest was conducted to identify an immersive text by establishing effects of 
different stories on the dimensions of immersion. Two new texts were added for comparison 
with the Hemingway story used in the pilot: a passage from a popular fiction novel and a short 
story written for the study. The study aimed to compare the effects of the three texts on 
immersion, while controlling for trait fantasy as an index of the general tendency to become 
immersed in stories.  
7.5.1 Method 
7.5.1.1 Participants. Fourteen participants (10 females, 4 males) completed the study 
online via a participant recruitment website (Call for Participants) in return for a £10 online 
shopping voucher. The study was presented using Qualtrics. One participant was excluded for 
incomplete data (indicating that they withdrew from the study) and another two were 
excluded for reporting having read one or more of the texts prior to participating, resulting in 
N = 11 (8 females) aged 25-58 (M = 33.45, SD = 8.81). All participants spoke English as their 
main language.  
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7.5.1.2 Materials.  
7.5.1.2.1 Stimulus texts. Three fictional texts were chosen for the study: a literary text, a 
passage from a popular fiction novel, and a short story written by the researcher. The literary 
text was Ernest Hemingway’s (1988) The End of Something, which forms the stimulus text for 
the SST (Dodell-Feder et al., 2013) and was used in the pilot study. The popular fiction text 
was a section of The Unlikely Pilgrimage of Harold Fry, a bestseller by Rachel Joyce (2012), 
in which the central character, a retired man called Harold, decides to journey across England 
on foot in order to visit an old acquaintance whom he learns is dying. In the selected segment, 
(pp. 22-29, 2006 words), Harold spontaneously decides to begin his journey. He visits a local 
petrol station where he purchases food and interacts with a sales assistant. Like The End of 
Something, the focalisation is third-person (“Harold did…”, rather than “I did…”). This 
section was selected as it is a similar length to The End of Something, appears early in the 
novel and so does not require additional, contextual knowledge of the story, and because it 
contains descriptions of the environment and of the protagonist’s inner thoughts, which may 
support immersion. As discussed in Chapter 3, the inclusion of mental state references has 
been associated with higher levels of immersion in narratives (Gavaler & Johnson 2017, 
Experiment 1) and the lack of mental state information in the Hemingway text may have 
contributed to the low immersion levels observed in the pilot study. The final text, The Wallet 
(1788 words), is a short story written for the study (Appendix F). The narrative was written 
from the first-person perspective as this focalisation has been shown to enhance identification 
with character (de Graaf et al., 2012). The narrative follows a protagonist’s journey to work 
during a cold morning. On the way, the protagonist finds a wallet and makes efforts to return 
it to its owner despite their discomfort in the cold weather and the consequence that they will 
be late for an important work meeting. The outcome of the story is positive: the owner of the 
wallet shows gratitude and the protagonist’s employer hints at promotion. In other words, the 
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protagonist performs an altruistic act, for which they are rewarded. In order to elicit 
immersion, the narrative included descriptive passages depicting the surrounding 
environment, and detail about the protagonist’s inner states (from a first-person perspective). 
The protagonist remains unnamed throughout the text, and descriptions were constructed so as 
not to signify a specific gender or cultural identity, in order to encourage identification. 
7.5.1.2.2 Narrative immersion. The same three scales were used to measure immersion 
as in the pilot study: the Transportation Scale (Green & Brock, 2002; α = .84), the Empathy 
Index (Batson et al., 1987; α = .96), and the Identification with Character Scale (Iguarta, 
2010; α = .94). 
7.5.1.2.3 Fantasy. The fantasy subscale of the IRI (Davis, 1980), used in the pilot, was 
included as an index of the trait tendency to become immersed in stories (e.g., Mar et al., 
2006; Hall & Bracken, 2011; α = .83).  
7.5.1.3 Procedure. After entering their demographic details, participants were asked to 
complete the fantasy subscale of the IRI. They were then asked to read the three fictional 
passages, which were presented in a random order. After reading each story, participants were 
asked to complete the three narrative immersion measures, which were internally randomised 
and presented in a random order.  
7.5.1.4 Data analysis. The effects of story on the three immersion variables were 
examined using three repeated measures analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs), partialling out 
variance caused by the trait tendency to become immersed in stories (fantasy). Descriptive 
statistics using scores averaged across items are presented to facilitate interpretation of the 
scales across the three reading groups (identification and affective empathy were averaged 
across 5-point scales, whereas transportation was averaged across a 7-point scale).  
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7.5.2 Results  
7.5.2.1 The effect of text on immersion. Means averaged across each scale are 
presented in Table 11. Due to anticipated low power, pairwise comparisons were examined 
for non-significant main effects (Bonferroni adjusted values are reported, and the same pattern 
of results emerged with no adjustment). 
7.5.2.1.1 Identification with character. Controlling for trait fantasy, the overall effect of 
stories on the identification with character scale was non-significant, F(2, 18) = 2.04, p = .16, 
ηp2 = .19 (the assumption of sphericity was met, indicated by Mauchly’s test statistic, p = 
.062). However, pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference between the 
Hemingway story compared to the other two stories, such that total character identification 
scores for the Hemingway characters were lower the compared to characters in The Wallet, p 
= .002, and the Joyce characters, p = .047. There was no difference between identification 
scores for characters in The Wallet versus Joyce characters, p = 1.  
Table 11 
Overall Means (and Standard Deviations) of Scale Scores Averaged Across Items for 
Immersion Measures Presented by Story.  
Story Identification Affective Empathy Transportation 
Hemingway 2.22 (0.88) 2.11 (0.28) 3.39 (0.24) 
Joyce 3.01 (0.83) 3.20 (1.19) 4.52 (0.75) 
The Wallet 3.08 (0.94) 2.61 (1.00) 3.95 (0.99) 
Note. Affective empathy and character identification were measured on 5-point Likert scales, and transportation 
was measured on a 7-point Likert-style scale. Values greater than 3 are on the positive side of the scale for 
affective empathy and character identification, but values greater than 4 are on the positive side of the 
transportation scale.  
 
7.5.2.1.2 Affective empathy. Controlling for fantasy, the overall effect of story was non-
significant, F(1.26, 11.34) = 1.04, p = .35, ηp2 = .10 (the assumption of sphericity was not 
met, indicated by Mauchly’s test statistic, p = .029, and so Greenhouse Geisser’s adjusted F-
ratio is reported). Pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference between the 
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Hemingway and Joyce stories, with participants reporting lower levels of affective empathy 
for the Hemingway text, p = .008. No other comparisons were significant. 
7.5.2.1.3 Transportation. Controlling for fantasy, the effect of story on transportation 
was non-significant, F(1.27, 11.40) = 1.94, p = .19, ηp2 = .18 (the assumption of sphericity 
was not met, indicated by Mauchly’s test statistic, p = .032, and so Greenhouse Geisser’s 
adjusted values are reported). Again, pairwise comparisons revealed significant differences 
between stories. Transportation scores for the Hemingway story were significantly lower than 
for the Joyce story, p < .001, and no other comparisons were significant. 
7.5.3 Moving forward 
The popular fiction passage from the Joyce story was found to have the most impact on 
the immersion scales overall and so it was selected to form the stimulus text for the full 
experiment. The next experiment was designed to pilot an adaptation of the original 
manipulation, which failed in the first experiment, with the newly selected immersive text. 
7.6 Experiment 3: Distraction Task Manipulation Pilot 
The manipulation pilot was designed to test the between-participants effect of an 
adaptation of the dual task paradigm. This was designed to reduce immersion levels in one 
group without inducing participants to take the perspective of another individual or group (as 
was a potential confound in Experiment 1).  
7.6.1 Method 
7.6.1.1 Participants. Thirty-eight participants were recruited via the same online 
participant recruitment website as the text pretest (Call for Participants) and were given the 
option of entry into a prize draw to win a £10 online shopping voucher in return for 
participating. Three participants were excluded for reporting a main language other than 
English, four were excluded for reporting having read the story prior to participating in the 
study, and one for failing to respond correctly to a basic story comprehension question 
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(requiring correct selection of the central characters’ names). This resulted in a final sample of 
30 participants (23 females) aged 21-66 (M = 33.33, SD = 12.70).  
7.6.1.2. Materials. The stimulus text was the same passage from The Unlikely 
Pilgrimage of Harold Fry (Joyce, 2012) used in the text pretest. The same three immersion 
scales were used as in the pilot study and text pretest (Transportation Scale, α = .88; Empathy 
Index, α = .87; Identification with Character Scale, α = .92). Again, trait fantasy was 
measured using the IRI fantasy subscale (α = .78). Attention check questions were included 
with the immersion scales, which required participants to select a specific option (e.g., “if you 
are paying attention, please select scale point 3”). Participants were excluded from the 
analysis if inspection of the dataset revealed incorrect answers to any of these checks. 
Following the story, participants were asked two basic multiple-choice comprehension 
questions: “where did Harold buy a cheeseburger from?” (correct answer: a petrol station) and 
“who was Harold trying to contact?” (correct answer: Queenie). Skip logic was set up in 
Qualtrics such that participants were automatically taken to the debrief if they failed to answer 
either of these questions correctly and their data were flagged for exclusion. 
7.6.1.3 Procedure. Participants first completed the demographic questions and fantasy 
scale. They were randomly assigned to one of two groups (immersion, distraction task) to 
read the fictional passage. Participants in the immersion group received the following 
instruction: “please take your time to read it all and allow yourself to become really absorbed 
in the story. Use your imagination to visualise the environment and the characters as much as 
you can. Try to put yourself in the position of the main character and imagine things from 
their point of view”. Participants in the distraction task group received an alternative 
instruction: “please take your time to read it all and look out for examples of proper nouns. A 
proper noun is a name used for a person, place or organisation, spelled with a capital letter 
(e.g., Tim, America or Starbucks). After reading the story, you will be asked about these”.  
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7.6.1.4 Data analysis. In line with the pilot and text pretest, immersion and fantasy 
scale scores were averaged across items to support interpretation of scores relative to scale 
points. T-tests were conducted to establish the effect of the manipulation on immersion levels 
and ANCOVAs were used when fantasy was included as a covariate. Confidence intervals 
were bias-corrected and accelerated using bootstrapping (N = 1000).  
7.6.2 Results  
7.6.2.1 Effect of manipulation. Average mean immersion levels for each group are 
presented in Figure 10. Immersion levels were low compared to the pretest levels. There were 
no significant effects of condition on transportation (Mimmersion = 4.27, SD = 0.91; Mdistraction = 
4.20, SD = 1.19), identification with character (Mimmersion = 2.73, SD = 0.70; Mdistraction = 2.56, 
SD = 0.80), or affective empathy (Mimmersion = 3.02, SD = 0.65; Mdistraction = 3.03, SD = 0.93), 
all Fs < 1 (the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met for all tests indicated by non-
significant Levene’s test statistics, all ps > .05). Fantasy did not differ between conditions, 
t(28) = .034, p = .97, 95% CI [-3.74, 3.86], and inclusion of the fantasy covariate did not alter 
the pattern of results (for effects of condition, all Fs < 1).  
7.6.3 Moving forward  
The new distraction task manipulation failed to vary immersion in the stimulus text 
established in the pretest. Because participants either received an instruction designed to 
induce immersion, or a distraction task instruction designed to reduce it (effectively two 
different manipulations) and there was no control condition, it is difficult to assess which had 
the most impact on the way that participants engaged with the text. Nevertheless, there was a 
lack of difference between the two groups on all three immersion scales, and so an alternative 
approach was required to manipulate levels of immersion. This was the focus of the second 
manipulation pilot.  
 














Figure 10. Raw transportation, affective empathy and identification scores presented for immersion 
and distraction conditions (Experiment 3). Affective empathy and character identification were 
measured on 5-point Likert scales, and transportation was measured on a 7-point Likert-style scale. 
Error bars are standard errors of the mean.  
 
7.7 Experiment 4: Cognitive Load Manipulation Pilot 
In their examination of the effects of transportation on narrative persuasion, Green and 
Brock (2000) used a dual task approach designed to reduce immersion levels in one group. A 
similar approach was used in the pilot (Experiment 1) and first immersion manipulation pilot 
(Experiment 3), where it failed to manipulate immersion levels. This necessitated an 
alternative strategy for varying immersion. Like the previous distraction task manipulation, a 
cognitive load task was also drawn from the narrative persuasion literature where it has been 
employed to distinguish between automatic and elaborative processing of text (e.g., Rocklage, 
Rucker & Nordgren, 2018; Tormala & Petty, 2004; Zemborain & Johar, 2007; see also 
Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Green and Brock (2000) proposed that transportation 
is “qualitatively different” (p. 702) from the cognitive elaboration associated with dual 
process accounts of narrative persuasion (which contrast a central, elaborative route with a 
heuristic, peripheral route; e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; see also Lord, Lee & Sauer, 1995; 
MacKenzie, Lutz & Belch, 1986). However, based on Green and Brock’s (2000) finding that 
completing an additional task while reading effectively reduced immersion, it was predicted 
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that the cognitive load manipulation would reduce levels of immersion, and hypothesised that 
this, in turn, would have an effect on post-reading empathic accuracy. The current experiment 
aimed to test the effect of the cognitive load manipulation on immersion levels.  
7.7.1 Method 
7.7.1.1 Participants. Fifty participants were recruited via the same participant 
recruitment website used in the previous experiments (Call for Participants). Links to the site 
were posted on university social media forums (Facebook and Twitter), and participants were 
given the option to be entered into a prize draw to win a £10 online shopping voucher. 
Fourteen participants were excluded either for failing attention checks (n = 10) or ballot box 
stuffing (completing the study multiple times; n = 4), and seven participants were excluded 
for having read the stimulus story prior to participating in the study. This resulted in total N = 
29 (27 females) aged 18-66 (M = 36.76, SD = 12.57). Due to issues with attempts at ballot 
box stuffing, study completion durations were also inspected. All participants in the final 
sample completed the study within 3 standard deviations of the mean.  
7.7.1.2 Materials. Materials were the same as those used in the previous immersion 
manipulation pilot (Experiment 3) and were presented in Qualtrics online. 
7.7.1.3 Procedure. Participants completed demographic questions and the fantasy 
subscale of the IRI (internally randomised). They were assigned to either a high or low 
cognitive load condition and asked to remember an ostensibly random number: a standard 
cognitive load manipulation (Rocklage et al., 2018; Tormala & Petty, 2004; see also Gilbert & 
Hixon, 1991). Participants in the high cognitive load condition were asked to keep in mind an 
eight-digit number (31875649), and participants in the low cognitive load condition were 
asked to keep in mind a two-digit number (27), while reading the stimulus text. Instructions 
were the same for both groups of participants:  
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On the next page, you will be presented with a number. It will appear for 20 seconds before 
the page moves on. Your task is to remember that number, as you will be asked to recall it 
later. It's really important for the study that you don't write the number down or copy and 
paste it, just try to keep it in mind.  
After reading the story, all participants were asked to enter the number that they had been 
required to keep in mind, and then to complete the three narrative immersion scales (internally 
randomised and presented in a random order). 
7.7.1.4 Data analysis. Scale scores were averaged across items (across a 7-point scale 
for transportation and 5-point scales for identification and affective empathy). Scale reliability 
was computed using Cronbach’s alpha. Group differences were examined using t-tests and 
ANCOVAs. Confidence intervals were bias-corrected and accelerated using bootstrapping (N 
= 1000).  
7.7.2 Results  
7.7.2.1 Scale reliability. Cronbach’s alpha values for this sample were .77 for the 
fantasy scale, .95 for the identification with character scale, .93 for affective empathy and .76 
for transportation.  
7.7.2.2 Fantasy. The high cognitive load group showed higher levels of trait fantasy 
(averaged across the scale, M = 3.66, SD = 0.42) compared to the low cognitive load group 
(M = 3.11, SD = 0.87), t(26.92) = -2.26, p = .032, 95% CI [-7.27, -0.35]. Consequently, the 
analysis of the manipulation effect was conducted both with and without the fantasy 
covariate.  
7.7.2.3 Effect of manipulation. Average mean immersion levels for each load group are 
presented in Figure 11. Without the inclusion of the covariate fantasy, t-tests (assuming equal 
variances due to non-significant Levene’s test results, p > .05) revealed that there were no 
significant differences between the high and low cognitive load conditions on any of the three 
immersion scales, all ps > .20. ANCOVAs including the fantasy covariate revealed significant 
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effects of condition across all scales (the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met in 
all cases indicated by non-significant Levene’s test statistics, ps > .05). Identification with 
character was higher in the low cognitive load condition (M = 2.91, SD = 1.04) compared to 
the high load condition (M = 2.81, SD = 0.83), F(1, 26) = 4.40, p = .046, ηp2 = .15; affective 
empathy was also higher in the low load (M = 3.26, SD = 1.05) compared to the high load 
condition (M = 2.80, SD = 0.95), F(1, 26) = 7.21, p = .012, ηp2 = .22; and transportation was 
also higher in the low load (M = 3.95, SD = 0.92) compared to the high load condition (M = 









Figure 11. Raw transportation, affective empathy and identification scores presented for high and low 
cognitive load conditions (Experiment 4). Affective empathy and character identification were 
measured on 5-point Likert scales, and transportation was measured on a 7-point Likert-style scale. 
Error bars are standard errors of the mean. 
 
7.7.3 Moving Forward 
This experiment examined the effects of a cognitive load manipulation on immersion in 
the selected immersive text. The results showed that the low cognitive load condition 
(retaining a two-digit number) led to higher levels of immersion across all three measures 
compared to the high cognitive load cognition (retaining an eight-digit number) when 
variance caused by trait fantasy, which was not matched across the groups, was partialled out 
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(examination of the fantasy data revealed a greater spread in the low cognitive load group, 
where total scores ranged from 11-31 [M = 21.79, SD = 6.12], compared to the high cognitive 
load group where total scores ranged from 21-31 [M = 25.60, SD = 2.95]). Additionally, the 
high and low cognitive load group sizes were unequal (n = 10 and n = 19, respectively), and 
the sample size was small. Taking these factors into account, the cognitive load manipulation 
appeared an appropriate strategy for varying immersion during reading with a larger sample in 
an investigation of the effects of narrative immersion on empathic accuracy post-reading. 
7.8 Experiment 5: Effects of Narrative Immersion on Empathic Accuracy 
Manipulating cognitive load was shown to successfully vary immersion across all three 
scales when trait fantasy was controlled. The effect was in the expected direction: participants 
in the high cognitive load condition tended to report lower immersion levels compared to 
participants in the low cognitive load condition. Therefore, this approach was used to vary 
immersion levels with the selected immersive text in the main experiment, which aimed to 
examine the effects of immersion on empathic accuracy measures.  
7.8.1 Method 
7.8.1.1 Participants. A power analysis was conducted in G* Power (Faul et al., 2007). 
The smallest effect of cognitive load on identification with character, established in the 
second manipulation pilot (ηp2 = .15), was used in the computation. This indicated that a total 
sample of 49 (24-25 participants per group) would be required to detect the effect of the 
manipulation on immersion at 80% power, when controlling for trait fantasy. The small effect 
size of fiction on empathic accuracy (Dodell-Feder et al., 2018) and of immersion in fiction 
on empathic concern (Bal & Veltkamp, 2013) indicated that a much larger sample (N > 193) 
would be required to achieve 80% power to detect effects of reading and of immersion; 
however, this sample size was unattainable due to resource constraints. Data were gathered 
from 100 participants who were all undergraduate and postgraduate students of psychology at 
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Kingston University London. Participants received course credit for volunteering their time 
and were also offered the opportunity to enter a prize draw to additionally win a £10 online 
shopping voucher. It was a requirement of the study that participants spoke English as their 
main language. Four participants reported other main languages and one participant reported 
four main languages including English, and these participants were excluded from the dataset. 
Two participants were excluded for failing one or more attention checks (there were two 
forms of attention check question: simple questions about the story content and Likert-style 
questions explicitly requiring participants to select a particular response to show that they are 
attending to the questions, as described in the pilots). This resulted in a total sample size of 93 
(75 females, aged 18-54, M = 24.75, SD = 7.62). Most participants had completed A-levels or 
equivalent (54%), 37% had completed a graduate degree, and 9% a postgraduate degree. 
Participants were assigned to either the high cognitive load (n = 28), low cognitive load (n = 
35) or no reading (n = 30) conditions.  
7.8.1.2 Materials. 
7.8.1.2.1 Fictional story. The passage from The Unlikely Pilgrimage of Harold Fry 
(Joyce, 2012) established in the pretest (Experiment 2) and used in the manipulation pilot 
studies (Experiments 3 and 4), formed the stimulus text. No participants reported having read 
or heard of the story prior to participating.  
7.8.1.2.2 Narrative immersion. The Identification with Character Scale (α = .94), 
Empathy Index (α = .90) and Transportation Scale (α = .80) were used, as used in the pretest 
and pilots.  
7.8.1.2.3 Empathic accuracy. The Yoni test and the SST were used to measure empathic 
accuracy, as described in the pilot study. The Yoni test measured cognitive and affective 
mentalising abilities and the SST measured explicit and spontaneous empathic accuracy. No 
participants reported having previously read or heard of the SST stimulus text. Inter-rater 
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reliability for the SST was assessed using 10% of transcripts rated by the experimenter and 
two independent coders, with Fleiss’s kappa calculated for spontaneous empathic inferencing, 
and Kendall’s coefficient of concordance for explicit empathic accuracy. Inter-rater reliability 
was good for the spontaneous item (based on classifications of Cohen’s kappa, see Altman, 
1999), κ = .72 , p < .001, 95% CI [0.36, 1.08]), for the explicit mental state attribution items, 
W = .77, p = .013, and very good for the comprehension items, W = .94, p = .003 (see 
Gibbons & Chakraborti, 2011). Internal consistency was adequate overall (α = .75), and 
Cronbach’s alpha was .70 for explicit mental state attribution and .53 for comprehension 
individually. These values were above those of .54 and .31 reported by Dodell-Feder et al. 
(2013), who anticipated that alpha would be negatively impacted by the range of first- and 
second-order questions.  
7.8.1.2.4 Trait empathy. Trait empathic abilities were measured using the perspective-
taking (α = .71), empathic concern (α = .76) and fantasy (α = .70) IRI subscales. Fourteen 
irrelevant items (e.g., “I have no difficulty in cooking a complicated meal”) were included 
across the scales to mask the aims of the study. 
7.8.1.2.5 Fiction-exposure. The adapted version of Mar et al.’s (2006) Author 
Recognition Test-Revised (ART-R), used in Study 2 (Chapter 6), was used to facilitate 
measurement of both fiction- and nonfiction-exposure (Appendix E). The test comprised 55 
fiction names, 55 nonfiction names, and 40 foils (150 items total). Internal consistency was 
good with this sample (α = .87). 
7.8.1.3 Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three story 
conditions: high cognitive load during reading, low cognitive load during reading, or no 
reading. First, the demographic questions and control measures (randomised within and 
between scales) were administered. Participants in the no reading group then proceeded to the 
next section of the experiment, and participants in the reading groups were asked to read the 
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story text while keeping in mind an eight-digit number (high cognitive load) or a two-digit 
number (low cognitive load). After reading, the story participants were asked to report the 
number they had been given, to answer basic questions about the story (attention check), and 
to complete the narrative immersion scales (internally randomised and presented in a random 
order). Participants were then asked to complete the Yoni test, followed by the SST, always in 
this order to temporally separate the two reading sessions (Joyce stimulus text and 
Hemingway SST text, Figure 12).  
Figure 12. Flow diagram illustrating the experimental procedure. Note that participants in the reading 
groups read two stories (the Joyce stimulus text and the Hemingway text used in the SST) and 
participants in the no reading group read only the Hemingway story as part of the SST measure. 
 
7.8.1.4 Data analysis. As in the previous experiments, scale scores were averaged 
across items in order to facilitate interpretation of their relationships to scale point labels. 
Correlations were used to examine relationships among variables, and the effects of the 
cognitive load manipulation were assessed using independent t-tests, and ANCOVAs when 
covariates were included. Effects of reading group on Yoni test scores and SST explicit scores 
were reported with and without the inclusion of covariates (using ANOVAs and ANCOVAs, 
respectively), and the effect of reading group on SST spontaneous scores was assessed using 
binary logistic regression. Due to the non-significant effect of the manipulation (reported 
below), the analyses compared the three reading groups (high load, low load and no reading)  
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and reading versus no reading (high and low load groups combined). Confidence internals 
were bias-corrected and accelerated using bootstrapping (N = 1000). 
7.8.2 Results  
7.8.2.1 Group and gender differences. Trait fantasy, empathic concern and perspective-
taking did not differ significantly between the reading conditions, all Fs < 1.10, all ps > .33, 
and neither did fiction-exposure or nonfiction-exposure, both Welch’s Fs < 3.00, both ps > 
.05. There were no gender differences on any of the SST explicit or spontaneous dimensions, 
or on the Yoni test cognitive, affective or physical trials, all ps > .54. Females scored higher 
on empathic concern, t(91) = -.28, p = .007 [-3.67, -3.93], and lower on nonfiction-exposure, 
t(91) = 3.25, p = .002 [0.54, 4.08], compared to males. 
7.8.2.2 Data distribution. Data were non-normally distributed across several scales 
(SST, ART-R and Yoni test dimensions, character identification and empathic concern). This 
appeared to result from the presence of outliers across all of the scales concerned (assessed 
using boxplots). These were retained in the analysis, and robust (Spearman) correlations were 
conducted. 
7.8.2.3 Inter-scale correlations. Raw correlations between reading condition, 
immersion and empathic accuracy scores are presented in Table 12. Inter-scale correlations 
were in line with previous research showing associations among the subscales of the IRI 
(Davis, 1983), explicit and implicit empathic inferencing abilities in NT adults (Kanske et al., 
2015), as well as fiction- and nonfiction-exposure (Fong et al., 2013; Mar et al., 2006). The 
immersion scales positively correlated with perspective-taking and empathic concern, and 
fantasy with transportation and character identification, but not with affective empathy. Yoni 
test cognitive and affective trials were associated with explicit empathic accuracy on the SST, 
and cognitive trials with spontaneous empathic inferencing on the SST, but neither measure 
was associated with the trait empathic ability (IRI) scales.  
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7.8.2.4 Effect of manipulation. Average immersion scores for each load group are 
presented in Figure 13. Transportation, identification and affective empathy scores were low 
compared to the text pretest in the high cognitive load group (M = 3.70, SD = 0.83; M = 2.60, 
SD = 0.96; and M = 2.87, SD = 0.89, respectively) and in the low cognitive load group (M = 
3.53, SD = 0.95; M = 2.54, SD = 0.90; and M = 3.01, SD = 0.92, respectively). Mean 
differences were non-significant for all of the three dimensions (smallest non-significant p = 
.457 for transportation). Fantasy did not differ between the high and low cognitive load 
groups, t(61) = -.61, p = .546, 95% CI [-2.94, 1.57], and the effects of condition remained 
non-significant when fantasy was included as a covariate, all Fs < 1. Mean differences were 
non-significant for transportation, t(61) = -.76, p = .457, 95% CI [-.62, .28], identification, 
t(61) = -.23, p = .816, 95% CI [-.05, .23], and affective empathy, t(6) = .60, p = .546, 95% CI 
[-.32, .60]. There was no difference between the high and low cognitive load groups on 
fantasy, t(61) = -.61, p = .546, 95% CI [-2.94, 1.57], and the effects of condition remained 
non-significant when fantasy was included as a covariate, all reading condition Fs < 1. The 
assumption of homogeneity of variances was met for all tests.  
The extent to which participants made an effort to retain the number in the high 
cognitive load condition may have attenuated the association between reading condition and 
immersion levels. To assess this, accuracy of recall was correlated with the immersion. All 
participants in both cognitive load conditions attempted to report the number they were asked 
to keep in mind. In the low load condition, all responses were accurate. In the high load 
condition, correct digits were given a score of 1, resulting in scores between 0 (0% accuracy) 
and 8 (100% accuracy). In cases where participants had reported fewer than eight digits, 
individual values were coded from left-to-right until a value was inaccurate and then from 
right-to-left in order to establish the location of the missing values (e.g., a recalled number of 
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318649 would receive a score of 6 against the true number of 31875649). There were no 
associations between recall and transportation, r(26) = -.20, p = .32, 95% CI [-.54, .15], 
character identification, r(26) = -.14, p = .49, 95% CI [-.47, .20], or affective empathy, r(26) = 
-.09, p = .67, 95% CI [-.37, .18]. This pattern held when trait fantasy was controlled, all rs < 









Figure 13. Raw transportation, affective empathy and identification scores presented for high and low 
cognitive load conditions (Experiment 5). Affective empathy and character identification were 
measured on 5-point Likert scales, and transportation was measured on a 7-point Likert-style scale. 
Error bars are standard errors of the mean. 
 
7.8.2.5 Exploratory analysis: Effects of fiction-reading on empathic accuracy. As no 
differences in immersion were detected between the two reading (high and low load) groups, 
they were combined in order to enable comparisons between participants who read the 
stimulus story and those who did not. The independent variable for the following tests was 
reading, with reading (n = 63) versus no reading (n = 30) conditions. Nonfiction-exposure was 
higher in the reading versus the no reading group, t(91) = -2.35, p = .024, 95% CI = [-1.38, 
1.19], but there were no group differences in fiction-exposure, or on the trait empathy scales,  
all ts < ± .67, all ps > .514. 





Correlations between Fiction-exposure, Trait Empathy, Narrative Immersion and Post-test Empathic Accuracy in Experiment 5. 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Fiction-exposure .64*** .01 .05 .04 .33** .30* .20 .211 .10 .08 .06 -.09 
 [.49, .78] [-.17, .19] [-.15, .23] [-.14, .21] [.16, .53] [.07, .49] [-.08, .44] [-.003, .43] [-.09, .23] [-.14, .28] [-.14, .25] [-.27, .11] 
2. Nonfiction-exposure - -.03 .03 .02 .19 .13 .17 .12 .17 .09 .09 -.11 
  [-.24, .18] [-.16, .22] [-.18, .20] [-.03, .39] [-.10, .36] [-.11, .43] [-.14, .36] [.01, .33] [-.07, .22] [-.11, .29] [-.29, .08] 
3. Fantasy  - .34*** .45*** .20 .39** .22 .47*** .08 .12 .06 .14 
   [.13, .54] [.17, .67] [-.03, .40] [.19, .56] [-.04, .48] [.25, .66] [-.19, .37] [-.19, .41] [-.20, .27] [-.13, .39] 
4. Perspective-taking   - .58*** .09 .49*** .54*** .45*** .08 .06 .21 .12 
    [.45, .71] [-.13, .30] [.28, .65] [.34, .71] [.27, .62] [-.15, .31] [-.17, .31] [-.02, .43] [-.12, .36] 
5. Empathic concern    - .05 .42*** .50*** .49*** .14 .13 .09 .11 
     [-.17, .28] [.19, .62] [.34, .64] [.31, .63] [-.11, .39] [-.16, .40] [-.16, .31] [-.15, .35] 
6. SST story     - .17 .08 .09 .17 .16 .39*** .13 
comprehension      [-.10, .38] [-.16, .32] [-.19, .33] [-.13, .47] [-.14, .44] [.17, 57] [-.11, .40] 
7. Transportation      - .67*** .81*** .05 .19 .34** .16 
       [.49, .81] [.71, .99] [-.19, .30] [-.08, .46] [.13, .53] [-.10, .43] 
8. Affective empathy       - .72*** .06 .15 .28* .07 
        [.53, .86] [-.17, .28] [-.11, .40] [.05, .47] [-.20, .32] 
9. Character         - .02 .18 .34** .16 
identification         [-.20, .26] [-.06, .40] [.11, .55] [-.10, .39] 
10. Yoni cognitive         - .69*** .23* .22* 
          [.53, .80] [.05, .42] [.02, .42] 
11. Yoni affective          - .39*** .17 
           [.24, .55] [-.02, .36] 
12. SST: Explicit            - .29** 
[.10, .48] 
13. SST: Spontaneous             - 
Note. N = 93; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals are presented in brackets
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7.8.2.5.1. Yoni test. Average Yoni test scores for participants who read and those who 
did not read are presented in Table 13. A mixed ANCOVA with reading condition as the 
between-participants variable, Yoni test trial type (cognitive, affective), and order (first, 
second) as within-participants variables, and first and second-order physical (control) scores 
as covariates, was used to assess the effect of reading on scores. Only two-way interactions 
between second-order physical trials (covariate) × trial type, F(1, 89) = 7.15, p = .009, ηp2 = 
.07, second-order physical trials × order, F(1, 89) = 35.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .29, and trial type × 
order, F(1, 89) = 4.75, p = .032, ηp2 = .05, and the three-way interaction between these 
variables, F(1, 89) = 8.67, p = .004, ηp2 = .09, were statistically significant. The main effect of 
reading and two-way interactions involving the reading condition were non-significant, all ps 
> .10, as was the three-way interaction, F < 1.21 Additionally controlling for age, gender, 
fiction-exposure, and the three trait empathy scales revealed the same pattern of results (for 
effects involving reading condition, and this was the same with the inclusion of nonfiction-
exposure, which had been found to differ between groups, all Fs < 1.11). These same tests 
were run with the high and low cognitive load conditions separated and the same pattern of 
results emerged with no significant effects of reading condition (for main and interaction 
effects involving reading condition, all Fs < 1).  
7.8.2.5.2 SST. The effect of reading group (reading versus no reading) on SST explicit 
scores was assessed using t-tests and ANCOVA. There was a non-significant effect of reading 
group on SST explicit scores, t(91) = .19. p = .851, 95% CI [-1.19, 1.44], though controlling 
for trait empathy, age, gender, fiction-exposure and comprehension of the SST text, the effect 
reached statistical significance, F(1, 84) = 4.00, p = .049, ηp2 = .05. Comprehension of the 
 
21 The data for the order 1 cognitive trials were negatively skewed, and this was not improved using square root 
or log transformations. Covariance matrices were unequal (assessed using Box’s test, p = .011) and there was 
heterogeneity of variances in the cognitive order 1 data indicated by Levene’s test (p = .001). However, 
ANOVA tends to be robust to such deviations (Norman, 2010) and so this was unlikely to substantially alter the 
result.  
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SST, the only other significant predictor, accounted for the majority of variance, F(1, 84) = 
25.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .24. Addition of nonfiction-exposure, which was found to differ 
between the reading groups as reported above, did not alter the effect of reading condition, 
F(1, 83) = 4.34, p = .040, ηp2 = .05. However, when the three reading conditions were 
separated out (high cognitive load, low cognitive load and no reading) the effect of condition 
was no longer statistically significant, F(2, 83) = 2.77, p = .069, ηp2 = .06. This result was the 
same when nonfiction-exposure was included in the model, F(2, 82) = 2.71, p = .073, ηp2 = 
.06, and was likely due to the reduction in power associated with the decompression of the 
reading group. The assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes was met for all IV × 
covariate interactions, except for fiction-exposure in the model using the reading versus no 
reading IV (p = .045). 
Binary logistic regression was used to predict the likelihood of making a spontaneous 
mental state inference on the SST using the same variables (reading versus no reading, age, 
gender, the three trait empathy scales, and fiction-exposure). The model was significant, χ2(8) 
= 16.63, p = .034), and prediction success was 63% (71% for those who did not make a 
spontaneous empathic inference and 55% for those who did), which was an improvement 
compared to the baseline model (55%). Nagelkerke’s R2 of .22 indicated a moderately weak 
prediction. Only story comprehension, p = .006, and fiction-exposure, p = .018, significantly 
contributed to the prediction, such that a one-point increase in story comprehension was 
associated with an increase in the odds of making a spontaneous mental state inference of 
1.34, and a one-point increase in fiction-exposure was associated with a decrease in odds 
(0.83). Reading condition was not associated with a change in the odds of making a 
spontaneous mental state attribution, p = .119.  
When nonfiction-exposure, which differed between the reading versus no reading 
groups (as reported above), was included in the model, fiction-exposure no longer accounted 
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for a change in odds, p = .116. In this model, χ2(9) = 17.54, p = .041, Nagelkerke’s R2 = .23, 
comprehension of the SST story was the only significant predictor, p = .006, and accounted 
for an increase in the odds of making a spontaneous mental state inference of 1.34 for each 
one-point increase in comprehension. Using the same variables and separating out the 
cognitive load conditions (high load, low load and no reading), revealed the same pattern of 
results.  
Table 13 
Mean Yoni Test Scores (with Standard Deviations) for Reading and No Reading Groups. 
Trial Type Order Reading No reading Total 
Cognitive 1 11.49 (0.91) 11.80 (0.48) 11.59 (0.81) 
 2 19.51 (3.90) 18.80 (4.24) 19.27 (4.00) 
Affective 1 11.25 (1.26) 11.43 (0.90) 11.31 (1.15) 
 2 29.54 (4.99) 29.57 (4.68) 29.55 (4.87) 
Physical 1 7.43 (1.30) 7.43 (1.33) 7.43 (1.35) 
 2 5.03 (1.51) 5.33 (1.45) 5.13 (0.15) 
 
7.8.3 Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to examine the effects of narrative immersion on 
empathic accuracy task performance, taking the multidimensionality of immersion and 
empathic accuracy into account. Following a pilot study in which an attempt to manipulate 
narrative immersion levels failed, a pretest identified an immersive stimulus text, and two 
pilots established a method for varying immersion, which led to the employment of a 
cognitive load manipulation in the final experiment. In that final experiment, however, the 
cognitive load manipulation failed to impact immersion levels: immersion did not differ 
across the high and low cognitive load conditions. This may have been due to a combination 
of factors including low immersion overall, and low power (a post-hoc power analysis was 
conducted, which indicated that the study had very low power to detect the effect of the 
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experimental manipulation). Consequently, Hypotheses 12-15, which predicted effects of 
immersion on empathic accuracy domains, were untested. Instead, correlations between 
immersion and story comprehension, empathic accuracy, trait empathy, and fiction- and 
nonfiction-exposure were identified, and the effect of reading versus no reading on empathic 
accuracy was assessed in order to test the general prediction that fiction-reading would 
increase empathic accuracy. 
7.8.3.1 Immersion and empathic abilities. Scales within measures tended to be 
positively correlated, and this was line with previous research (Davis, 1983; Fong et al., 2013; 
Kanske et al., 2015; Mar et al., 2006). There was a lack of correlation between self-report and 
behavioural empathy measures which also reflected previous findings, and the 
multidimensionality of empathy (e.g., Ickes, 1997; Mar et al., 2006): neither the Yoni test nor 
the SST were associated with self-report concern, perspective-taking or fantasy in either the 
first pilot experiment (Experiment 1 in this chapter) or the revised experiment (Experiment 5 
in this chapter). The self-report scales require people to reflect on their tendencies to feel 
concern for others, to take others’ points of view or to become immersed in narratives, rather 
than the ability to accurately interpret others’ inner states, which is the subject of the 
behavioural tasks. Moreover, Yoni test and SST scores did not correlate. Differences in the 
stimuli (the mental states of schematic faces versus relatively naturalistic story characters) 
may entail different inferencing strategies. The extent that mentalising versus experience-
sharing strategies are employed (see Chapter 2) may both influence empathic accuracy and be 
influenced by immersion. The lack of correlation among measures emphasises the complexity 
of the empathy construct and the need for a multidimensional approach to measurement.  
The immersion scales, transportation, character identification and affective empathy, all 
positively correlated with trait perspective-taking and empathic concern. This suggests that 
similar processes may underpin the ways that people think about both fictional characters and 
FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES 
 
 219 
other people in their daily lives. Furthermore, character identification and transportation were 
positively associated with fantasy; however, affective empathy was not. The Empathy Index 
contains items such as “sympathetic” and “warm”, which reflect the concern component, 
rather than the imaginative abilities probed by items in the identification and transportation 
scales, highlighting the multidimensionality of narrative immersion (de Graaf et al., 2012). 
The immersion scales were all positively associated with explicit mental state reasoning 
on the SST but not with the Yoni test. In other words, becoming immersed in one stimulus 
story appears to relate to the ability to accurately interpret the mental states of characters in 
another story. It may be that immersion supports the interpretation of characters depicted in 
fiction, but that this effect does not generalise to other targets. Alternatively, immersion may 
support the empathic inferencing processes probed by the SST but not those probed by the 
Yoni test. For example, immersion in stories may particularly facilitate experience-sharing 
rather than cognitive mentalising (e.g., Stansfield & Bunce, 2014), and experience-sharing 
may have been induced by the SST text. While the direction of cause remains uncertain, these 
findings support the proposition that dimensions of immersion and empathic abilities are 
related.  
7.8.3.2 Fiction-reading and empathy.  
7.8.3.2.1 Fiction-exposure. As anticipated based on prior research (Mar et al., 2006, 
2009), fiction-exposure positively correlated with nonfiction-exposure in the present study, 
and with transportation and story comprehension on the SST. Unexpectedly, it was not 
associated with trait empathic abilities in this sample. As the size of the correlation between 
fiction-exposure and trait empathy is small in magnitude (Mumper & Gerrig, 2017), the 
present study may have lacked sufficient power to detect it. Fiction-exposure increased the 
odds of making a spontaneous mental state inference on the SST, but not when nonfiction-
exposure was included in the model. This indicates that the increased likelihood of reflecting 
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on the mental states of characters was not accounted for by fiction-exposure alone. Rather, 
both fiction and nonfiction may explain some variance, but not enough to be individually 
significant (which may partly reflect a reduction in precision associated with the increase of 
parameters in the latter model).  
7.8.3.2.2 Fiction-reading versus no reading. Chapter 3 reviewed research that has cast 
doubt on the assertion that fiction-reading, compared to nonfiction-reading or no reading, 
enhances empathic accuracy task performance (e.g., Camerer et al., 2018; Panero et al., 2016, 
Samur et al., 2018). In the present exploratory analysis, the effect of fiction-reading on 
explicit SST scores reached significance, but only when holding constant trait empathic 
abilities, age, gender, comprehension of the SST text and ART scores, p = .049, and p = .040, 
when nonfiction-exposure was controlled). This provides some support for the causal impact 
of reading on empathic accuracy.  
The stimulus text used in the present study was a short passage extracted from a longer 
story. Causal effects of fiction may develop through exposure to longer passages or via 
repeated immersive experiences, whereas short experimental manipulations may not be 
sufficient to detect effects (Mar, 2018b). Indeed, the effects of narrative persuasion appear to 
be progressively internalised over a period of incubation (“sleeper effect”; Appel & Richter, 
2007; Kumkale & Albarracín, 2004), and the same may be true of effects on empathic 
accuracy. Playing prosocial video games has been shown to lead to subsequent prosocial 
behaviour (Gentile et al., 2009) and high transportation to increase dispositional empathy two 
weeks after reading fiction (Bal & Veltkamp, 2013). Therefore, the effects of immersion on 
empathic accuracy may not be observed through immediate testing, instead requiring a 
longitudinal approach (e.g., Pino & Mazza, 2016). Alternatively, immediate effects may 
occur, but they may be small in magnitude, necessitating high-powered studies (see Black & 
Barnes, 2015b, for an example of causal effects shown using a within-subjects design). This 
FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES 
 
 221 
may go some way to explain the mixed literature on fiction effects on empathic accuracy 
while the correlational research seems robust. For example, De Mulder et al. (2017) found no 
direct effects of reading literary texts on Yoni test and RMET performance, though they did 
find an effect of lifetime exposure to fiction on Yoni test cognitive trials. Further research is 
needed to establish the direction, induction and timespan of causal effects (see also Mar, 
2018b; Mar, Oatley, Djikic & Mullin, 2011). 
7.8.3.3 Limitations. The attempt to manipulate immersion failed across all three 
immersion dimensions and so the primary hypothesis that high immersion would lead to 
higher empathic accuracy compared to low immersion could not be tested. It is possible that 
the present study failed to detect the effect of the manipulation. Despite a pretest establishing 
a relatively immersive text (albeit with low power), and pilot studies identifying a procedure 
for manipulating immersion levels, they were low across the sample. The stimulus text 
passage may not have sufficiently induced immersion, and this may have attenuated the effect 
of external cognitive load instructions (see Green & Brock, 2000, Experiment 4). The absence 
of a no-load control condition (rather there was a no reading control condition) means that 
these possibilities could not be explored using the present dataset, and future research may 
usefully address this limitation.  
Sample characteristics may have influenced the results of this study. First, although age 
and gender were controlled in Experiment 5, most of the participants were female, which 
limits generalisability of the results. This is particularly relevant as gender differences have 
been shown in empathic abilities (e.g., Davis, 1980). Second, the pretest and manipulation 
pilot participants volunteered online in return for payment, whereas the participants for the 
main experiment were recruited via a university research participation scheme in return for 
course credit. As a result, motivational or situational factors may have accounted for 
differences in the ability to become immersed: although instructions were presented using the 
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same online platform for both lab and online participants, lab participants attended advance-
booked appointments whereas online pretest and pilot participants may have participated at a 
time when they felt motivated and distractions were minimal. Research has indicated that 
online participants may play closer attention to manipulation instructions than traditional 
subject pool participants (Hauser & Schwarz, 2016). The potential impact of sample 
characteristics may be explored in relation to this field of research in the future as it raises a 
broader question about the generalisability of fiction-engagement effects across populations.  
7.8.3.4 Contribution and future directions. The present study did not support the 
hypothesis that immersion would increase empathic accuracy, neither did it refute the 
proposition. The correlation analysis revealed positive associations between immersion, 
dimensions of trait empathy and explicit empathic accuracy (effects were medium-large; see 
Cohen, 1988). Specifically, transportation and identification with character were positively 
associated with the trait empathy scales, perspective-taking, empathic concern and fantasy. 
The third immersion scale, which measured empathic feelings during reading, was associated 
with perspective-taking and empathic concern. Furthermore, all three immersion scales 
showed positive associations with a behavioural measure of empathic accuracy: the explicit 
mental state attribution questions on the SST (effects were small-medium; see Cohen, 1988). 
These findings support the view that immersion in literature and empathic abilities are 
associated. It may be that immersion does play a role in fiction effects on empathic accuracy 
as it has been shown to do in the field of narrative persuasion, but that the experiment 
reported here did not detect the causal effect (due to the insufficient manipulation and low 
overall power). Alternatively, people who are more empathic may tend to become more 
immersed in fiction. Future research addressing the limitations of the current study may 
establish the direction of this relationship.  
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The potential relationship between immersion in fiction and subsequent empathic 
accuracy task performance may be of relevance to researchers from other fields who employ 
narrative-based tools to test empathy levels (e.g., the MASC and SST; see Chapter 2). 
Immersion in the stimulus text for the SST was shown to be low on average in the present 
study; however, immersion varies across individuals and may be differently induced by 
fictional content.22 Future research may help to clarify the role played by individual 
differences in immersion—and its antecedents—in fiction effects on empathic accuracy 
domains. This, in turn, could have implications for researchers using narratives as empathy 
task stimuli, who might consider accounting for the role of immersion in their research 
designs. 
The present study lent some support to the general causal hypothesis that fiction-reading 
immediately enhances empathic accuracy: participants who read the popular fiction passage 
compared to those who did not, scored higher on the SST when individual differences in trait 
empathy, fiction habits, comprehension and demographic differences were controlled. 
However, this test measured empathic accuracy for story characters (albeit from a second 
story) and so it is unclear whether the effect would generalise to other contexts (there was no 
effect on the Yoni test empathic accuracy measure). Furthermore, the effect was only 
demonstrated when controlling for a range of individual differences and so further research is 
needed to establish the stability of this effect. In view of the mixed results reported using 
experimental designs (e.g., Camerer et al., 2018; Panero et al., 2016; Samur et al., 2018; van 
Kujik et al., 2018), further research may continue to examine the influence of individual 
differences. This could facilitate the development of a comprehensive model of fiction effects 
 
22 In the present study, one participant experienced a strong emotional reaction to the Joyce story that was 
incongruent with the characters’ depicted emotional levels, indicating a distinctly personal (non-isomorphic) 
connection with the characters’ circumstances. This illustrates the relevance of individual–perhaps 
autobiographical (e.g., Bluck, Baron, Ainsworth, Gesselman & Gold, 2013)–factors in affective engagement 
with story characters. 
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on empathic accuracy, including mediators and moderators (for example, see Mar’s, 2018a, 
Social Processes and Content Entrained by Narrative model, which maps the pathway from 
story exposure to enhanced social cognition, and acknowledges moderators such as 
immersion, personality, and situational factors).  
The present study emphasised the need for a multidimensional approach to immersion, 
as well as to fiction and empathy in order to clarify the nature of their relationships. Future 
research could explore a range of texts in order to produce a more granular perspective on the 
textual features that enhance empathic abilities and the cognitive process through which such 
effects occur. Clarifying the scope of fiction as a tool for enhancing social skills could have 
implications for work with groups that experience difficulties in interpreting people’s 
thoughts and feelings (e.g., ASD), as well as downstream consequences such as increasing 
altruistic behaviours (e.g., Johnson, 2012).  
7.9 Summary and Moving Forward 
Fiction-readers “not only enter a narrative world, they may also become highly involved 
with the people they find there” (Green & Brock, 2000, p. 702). Fiction enables readers to 
experience a range of events in the lives of human or humanlike characters (Mar & Oatley, 
2008) and so fiction-reading may benefit real-world empathic accuracy. Several studies have 
reported relationships between lifetime exposure to fiction and empathic abilities, and others 
have shown small, positive effects of fiction on empathic accuracy after reading. However, 
the mechanisms associated with such effects remain unidentified. Through a series of 
experiments, the present study established a procedure for manipulating levels of immersion 
in a popular fiction text. In the final experiment, however, the manipulation failed to 
distinguish group immersion levels, and so causal inferences about the impact of immersion 
could not be made. A correlation analysis showed positive associations between immersion 
dimensions and both self-report (perspective-taking, empathic concern and fantasy) and 
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behavioural (interpreting the mental states of story character) empathic ability measures. An 
exploratory analysis revealed a positive effect of reading compared to no reading on empathic 
accuracy, though further research is required to establish the stability of this effect. Future 
research employing high-powered and longitudinal designs may elucidate the antecedents and 
consequences of immersion in fiction, which may help to develop models of fiction effects on 
empathic abilities and subsequent prosocial behaviours, and have implications for real-word 
social interventions. 
The present study concludes the empirical work undertaken in the current project. Two 
previous studies, presented in Chapters 5 and 6, examined relationships between fiction-
exposure and empathic abilities. The present study aimed to contribute to the causal literature 
through an investigation of the effects of narrative immersion on empathic accuracy. Due to 
the failure to manipulate immersion levels, causal inferences about the effects of immersion 
could not be made, though there was limited support for the causal hypothesis that reading 
fiction enhances empathy compared to not reading. Correlations between immersion 
dimensions and empathic abilities provided evidence for the assertion that immersion in 
narratives and empathic abilities are associated. The next and final chapter in this thesis aims 
to summarise and synthesise the results from all three studies, discuss their implications in the 
context of the theoretical framework established in Chapters 2 and 3, identify the strengths 
and limitations of the research project, and highlight avenues for future enquiry. 
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Chapter 8: General Discussion 
The previous three chapters reported the studies that constitute the empirical work of 
this thesis. This chapter will recap the main research aim, and discuss the findings in relation 
to extant literature and the multidimensional approach proposed in Chapters 2 and 3. Factors 
contributing to relationships between fiction and empathy will be addressed, methodological 
limitations identified, and the extent to which the findings support the theory that fiction 
benefits empathy will be discussed. The assumptions that fiction is beneficial for empathy, 
and that empathy itself is beneficial, will be critiqued. The chapter will conclude by 
establishing the original contribution and potential implications of the present research and 
consider avenues for further study. 
8.1 Recap of Main Aim  
I have often noticed that we are inclined to endow our friends with the stability of the type 
that literary characters acquire in the reader’s mind. No matter how many times we reopen 
“King Lear,” never shall we find the good king banging his tankard in high revelry, all 
woes forgotten, at a jolly reunion with all three daughters and their lapdogs. Never will 
Emma rally, revived by the sympathetic salts in Flaubert’s father’s timely tear. Whatever 
evolution this or that popular character has gone through between the book covers, his fate 
is fixed in our minds, and, similarly, we expect our friends to follow this or that logical and 
conventional pattern we have fixed for them. (Nabokov, 1955/2000, p. 265) 
Bewildered at the incongruity of an old friend’s behaviour, Nabokov’s narrator explains 
that he expects real people to show consistency, just as fictional people tend to do. Telling and 
receiving stories is a practice so ingrained (MacDorman, 2019) that people commonly use 
fictional characters and their interactions as referents for real-world people and their 
interactions. Both are expected to exhibit coherence and behave, more or less, predictably. In 
Nabokov’s passage, the narrator is, himself, fictional, as is the friend that he refers to, 
invoking Oatley’s (1999) proposition that fiction can constitute a valid imitation of the social 
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world. Oatley, Mar and colleagues have argued that by providing a simulation of the social 
world, fiction can recruit and enhance the cognitive mechanisms associated with 
understanding and responding to real-world others (Mar & Oatley, 2008; Oatley, 1999; 
2011b; Oatley & Djikic, 2017).  
In the real world and in fiction, prior knowledge of a person is often sufficient to 
interpret their thoughts or feelings in a given situation. Sometimes, however, that knowledge 
is limited or non-existent, and so the perceiver must base their inferences on other knowledge, 
facial expressions, gestures or verbalisations. Alternatively, they can generate inferences 
based on how they, themselves, would respond to the same situation, and generalise those 
feelings to the other person. These two approaches represent mentalising and experience-
sharing strategies for empathic accuracy: the measurable ability to accurately infer thoughts 
and feelings. Consequently, a prosocial concern component—the desire to help, or to alleviate 
the other person’s suffering—may be activated, which can, in turn, initiate prosocial 
behaviour. Empathy, therefore, is multidimensional (e.g., Davis, 1980): a person with strong 
mentalising skills does not necessarily experience high levels of concern, and correctly 
interpreting emotions may not equate to correctly determining intentions (e.g., Oakley et al., 
2016). Fiction is multidimensional too: stories vary along theme and style dimensions, can be 
presented via different media channels and induce different immersive experiences. The 
present research aimed to examine links between modes of narrative engagement and 
empathic processes, in order to provide a granular perspective on the relationship between 
fiction and empathy. 
8.2 Current Findings 
The general premise that fiction enhances empathic abilities was explored in the current 
research using a multidimensional approach. Mentalising and experience-sharing strategies, 
empathic concern and prosocial behaviour components were measured using self-report tools 
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requiring participants to reflect on their skills and behaviours (Study 1), and behavioural 
measures to assess empathic accuracy for cognitive and affective content (Studies 2 and 3). 
Relationships between empathic abilities and fiction-exposure were assessed (Studies 1 and 
2), including exposure to fiction via different media formats (Study 1). The causal effects of 
becoming immersed in a passage of fiction were investigated (Study 3). Overall, the findings 
lent some support to the theory that fiction enhances empathic abilities, although the most 
promising evidence was correlational.  
8.2.1 Fiction is multidimensional: Summary and discussion of Study 1 results 
If stories themselves are universal, the way we tell them changes with the technology at 
hand. Every new medium has given rise to a new form of narrative. (Rose, 2011, p. 2) 
I find television very educating. Every time somebody turns on the set, I go into the other 
room and read a book. (Attributed to Groucho Marx; The Reader’s Digest Association, 
1950) 
Study 1 aimed to examine the extent to which self-report empathic abilities relate to 
lifetime fiction-exposure via different media formats. Additionally, it aimed to explore how 
far people’s preferences for media, genre, and acting experience would be associated with 
components of empathy. 
8.2.1.1 Media. A new fiction-exposure tool, the FMET, was created to test how far 
fiction-exposure via prose, film and plays would predict variation in empathic abilities. The 
FMET was found to positively predict variation in self-report altruistic behaviours and self-
report fantasy, but not empathic concern or perspective-taking, supporting the general 
prediction that fiction-exposure is differentially associated with dimensions of empathy. The 
positive prediction for altruism contributes to limited previous research identifying positive 
effects of fiction on prosocial behaviour (e.g., Johnson, 2012). The positive prediction for 
fantasy (which has been identified as an experience-sharing measure; Chapter 2, Section 2.5), 
also aligns with previous research showing that experience-sharing is the component most 
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impacted by fiction (when previous studies’ effect sizes were averaged within empathy 
dimensions; Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2). Results for perspective-taking and empathic concern, 
however, diverged from previous findings: Mumper and Gerrig’s (2017) meta-analysis 
identified positive associations between fiction-exposure and both scales. In the current study, 
positive predictions for both were statistically significant but the FMET did not significantly 
contribute to either prediction; rather, gender was the only contributor. Therefore, self-report 
mentalising and concern, as measured using the IRI subscales, appear to be impacted by 
gender, and perhaps by other, unmeasured individual differences, which will be addressed 
later in this chapter.  
At the level of individual associations, print and play-exposure positively correlated 
with altruism, and print-exposure with fantasy (all fiction scales positively correlated with 
fantasy when age, gender, education and English language fluency were controlled, 
highlighting the influence of individual difference variables). In line with Mumper and 
Gerrig’s (2017) meta-analysis, effects were small in magnitude. Relationships with empathic 
dimensions were similar for people’s preferred media formats. Additionally, television was 
included in the preferences scales, and it negatively correlated with empathic concern, 
perspective-taking and altruism. Preference for film also negatively correlated with altruism 
(though film-exposure showed a positive relationship with altruism). These findings could 
reflect variation across narrative structure (story arcs in TV drama serials are distributed 
across several episodes) or engagement with exposition via news, documentary, and reality 
TV, rather than with fictional narratives. However, a follow-up analysis revealed no 
association between preference for TV and enjoyment of nonfiction, though there was a 
negative association with enjoyment of postmodern narratives. Future research could usefully 
examine the combined effects of media presentation and thematic content. 
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8.2.1.2 Active engagement with medium. Visual cues provided in film and TV may 
alter the extent that mentalising and experience-sharing processes are activated and exercised. 
Film is “plagued” by realistic effects, and because its narrative mode is “showing”, it can be 
considered an expository medium (Bal, 1985/2009, p. 44). For example, film icon Bette Davis 
could reportedly dilate her pupils at will in order to highlight moments of arousal, aggression 
or ardour (Higham, 1982). Camera angles, close-ups and music can emphasise pivotal plot-
points, generate atmosphere, and support characterisation. In contrast, readers must 
imaginatively conjure characters and events, entailing a more active and imaginative mode of 
engagement (see Hakemulder, 2000).  
Narratives can be actively participated in via video games, roleplay and acting. Acting, 
in particular, requires the construction of character from inside that character (see 
Hakemulder, 2000) as actors must have sufficient knowledge of the character’s experiences, 
beliefs and intentions to engender a convincing portrayal. In the present study, experience of 
acting was positively associated with altruism, although associations did not reach 
significance for the three IRI scales. It is not clear why acting experience was only associated 
with altruism; it may because the self-report acting experience scale did not reflect acting 
proficiency, only experience. Previous research has found that actors tended to score higher 
than the general population on self-report empathy scales (Nettle, 2006) and that acting 
classes may have a positive effect on mentalising and experience-sharing (e.g., Goldstein & 
Winner, 2012). These findings indicate that the empathy domains could be associated with 
acting but that effects were not detected in the current study. Again, this may reflect the 
influence of other, unmeasured variables (e.g., social and motivational factors, discussed later 
in this chapter).  
8.2.1.3 Genre. Study 1 showed divergent relationships between enjoyment of different 
genres and empathic abilities, supporting the proposal that narrative modes have different 
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effects on empathy. In Mumper & Gerrig’s (2017) meta-analysis, nonfiction-exposure was 
associated with perspective-taking and empathic concern, but associations were stronger for 
fiction. Similarly, in Study 1, enjoyment of nonfiction was associated with perspective-taking, 
empathic concern and fantasy, but associations tended to be larger for fiction (e.g., people 
who enjoyed drama and romance narratives were more likely to show higher levels of 
perspective-taking, empathic concern and fantasy than people that enjoyed nonfiction).  
8.2.1.4 Active engagement with content. As anticipated, different fiction genres were 
associated with different empathic abilities: crime/thriller was not associated with any 
empathic abilities measured, whereas postmodern and comedy narratives both positively 
correlated with all four. This raises the question of what postmodern and comedy narratives 
have in common. Postmodern narratives contain features like unreliable narrators, 
fragmentation and multiperspectivity (the ability to track multiple perspectives; Nünning, 
2014), and so the narrative arc may be complex, non-linear and its outcomes unexpected. 
Similarly, comic narratives can be incongruous and surprising (for a brief history of the 
“incongruity theory of comedy”, see Morreall, 2009). Like reading, compared to other forms 
of media engagement (described above), these elements may invite an active style of 
engagement, which recruits the mechanisms associated with interpreting real-world others. 
On the other hand, comic characters and narratives can be formulaic and predictable, and they 
are often associated with commercial, rather than with literary media. Sitcoms, for example, 
are among the oldest and most ubiquitous forms of TV programming (e.g., Dalton & Linder, 
2005). Nuanced differences within genres may be examined through future research aiming to 
identify the specific narrative ingredients responsible for the observed effects. In this way, 
future studies may extend the work of researchers like Koopman, Hakemulder, Van Peer and 
others (e.g., Hakemulder, 2004; Koopman, 2016; Van Peer et al., 2007) who have already 
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facilitated a more granular perspective of fiction effects through their explorations of specific 
textual features.  
8.2.1.5 Multidimensionality. In Chapter 3 it was proposed that different modes of 
engagement with fiction may relate to different components of empathy, and the findings 
from Study 1 supported this proposition. Positive relationships between fiction and empathic 
abilities appear not to be unique to literary narratives, nor to fiction-in-print. Rather, medium 
and genre were both important in associations between fiction and empathic abilities, and 
narrative modes that invite an active, imaginative form of engagement may particularly 
support empathy. Based on the current findings, if required to choose a mode most likely to 
benefit empathy, printed prose would represent the best candidate. However, the print-
exposure scale was based on established ART measures, whereas the film and play scales 
were designed for the study and may be developed and validated in the future.  
The Study 1 findings contribute to previous research in three key ways: first, they 
highlight the importance of different media and genre formats in relationships between fiction 
and empathic abilities, as well as other factors that may influence these relationships which 
will be addressed later in this chapter. Second, they lend some support to the proposal that 
fiction particularly supports the experience-sharing inferencing strategy, due to the positive 
prediction for fantasy. Third, they demonstrate associations with altruism, which has received 
limited prior attention (only one prosocial behaviour effect size was included in Dodell-Feder 
& Tamir’s, 2018, meta-analysis). Considering Study 1’s positive prediction for altruism but 
not empathic concern (which can represent a precursor to altruism; see Chapter 2, Section 
2.2), future research may examine pathways from fiction to prosocial behaviour that preclude 
the concern mediator.  
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8.2.2 Empathy is multidimensional: Summary and discussion of Study 2 results  
If you can learn a simple trick, Scout, you’ll get along a lot better with all kinds of folks. 
You never really understand a person until you consider things from his point of view […] 
until you climb inside of his skin and walk around in it. (Lee, 1960, p. 35) 
Lee’s character, Atticus Finch, advocates sharing in the experiences of others in order to 
understand and relate to them. Experience-sharing represents one approach to inferring 
others’ mental states, and in Chapter 3 it was argued that regular fiction-readers may 
particularly excel at using this strategy (and Study 1’s correlational evidence lent some 
support to this proposition). Study 2 aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of experience-sharing 
compared to mentalising for interpreting the mental states of others, and their relationship to 
fiction-exposure. Whereas Study 1 employed self-report measures of empathic abilities, Study 
2 used a behavioural measure involving the attribution of affective states, in order to rule out 
the effects of socially desirable responding.  
8.2.2.1 Contrasting empathic inferencing strategies. Study 2 participants were asked to 
estimate the emotional ratings given in response to a series of pictures by a group of target 
“experiencers”. In one condition, participants viewed the same pictures as the experiencers, 
and were therefore able to base their estimates on their own emotional responses to the 
pictures. In the other condition, participants viewed pre-recorded videos of the experiencers 
viewing the pictures and were able to base their estimates on the experiencers’ facial 
expressions. These conditions were mapped onto the mentalising and experience-sharing 
routes to empathic accuracy outlined in the empathy model established in Chapter 2. In the 
original study on which this task was based (Zhou et al., 2017), the experience-sharing route 
was found to be more effective than mentalising but was nevertheless undervalued by 
participants. As readers engage their own emotions as proxy for those of fictional others, it 
was hypothesised that fiction-exposure would lead to higher empathic accuracy overall, that 
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this effect would be greater when using the experience-sharing strategy, and that frequent 
fiction-readers would be more likely to appreciate the value of this strategy. 
8.2.2.2 The impact of context. As discussed in Chapter 2, Ickes (1997) distinguished 
empathic accuracy from empathic inferencing: empathic accuracy represents a state of 
understanding attained using a given inferencing strategy. Intrinsic to any assessment of 
empathic accuracy, therefore, is the indexing of levels of error. The results of Study 2 showed 
that empathic accuracy differed as a function of mentalising versus experience-sharing 
strategy, as well as valence and target. In contrast to Zhou et al.’s (2017) findings, neither 
strategy was found to be more effective. The strategies entailed similar levels of error; 
however, this error was in opposite directions: estimates using the mentalising approach 
tended to be over-positive and estimates using the experience-sharing approach tended to be 
over-negative. 
There are at least three reasons that this finding may have occurred. First, it could 
represent a systematic difference in mentalising and experiencing-sharing outcomes: the well-
documented bias toward negative stimuli (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001) 
operates when interpreting another person’s facial expressions (see Kauschke et al.’s, 2019, 
review) but not when instantiating another’s emotion, because people tend to regulate their 
own negative emotions in order to minimise negative states (Baumeister et al., 2001). Second, 
these differences could simply have emerged as an artefact of the contrasting stimuli used 
(pictures versus videos). For example, Johnson (2012) found that bias towards fearful facial 
expressions was only observed when faces were presented for longer (2 seconds compared to 
500 milliseconds), indicating that deliberative rather than automatic processes facilitated the 
bias. Negative bias in the current study could have arisen as a result of attention paid to 
unfolding dynamic facial expressions compared to still images. Third, because the measure 
relies on the experiencers accurately interpreting and reporting their own emotional reactions 
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to pictures, original target ratings may have been subject to bias. To test whether the finding 
reflects a genuinely systematic effect of strategy, which represents a promising area of 
enquiry, future research could incorporate established or independently coded stimuli and 
attempt to vary inferencing strategy without varying the stimulus presentation mode.  
8.2.2.3 The impact of fiction-exposure. Fiction-exposure and nonfiction-exposure were 
both positively associated with empathic accuracy, such that the more fiction or nonfiction 
people had been exposed to, the smaller their errors when estimating the experiencers’ 
emotional ratings. However, relationships were stronger for fiction-exposure, and this was in 
line with the results from Study 1, where general preferences for fiction genres were more 
strongly associated with empathic abilities than preferences for nonfiction. It also aligned with 
previous research showing larger correlations between fiction-exposure and empathic abilities 
(Mumper & Gerrig, 2017). Furthermore, fiction-exposure was found to positively predict 
empathic accuracy when controlling for nonfiction-exposure (as well as when controlling for 
age and foil selection on the ART), and this effect held across both mentalising and 
experience-sharing strategy conditions.  
The Study 2 findings supported the general prediction that higher fiction-exposure 
would be associated with higher empathic accuracy, but they did not support the hypothesis 
that this effect would be greater for participants in the experience-sharing condition. 
Similarly, fiction-exposure did not contribute to the likelihood of selecting one strategy 
condition over the other (an indirect measure of perceived value of the strategies). This 
suggests that both inferencing strategies may be enhanced by repeated exposure to fiction.  
8.2.3 Effects of immersion in fiction on empathic accuracy: Summary and 
discussion of Study 3 results  
A great book should leave you with many experiences and slightly exhausted at the end. 
You live several lives while reading it. (Styron interviewed in Cowley, 1958, p. 274). 
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Narrative invites getting “lost” (Nell, 1988, p. 8) or becoming immersed in a story, 
whereas exposition invites action (Keen, 2007). Study 3 examined the causal effects of 
immersion in fiction on empathic accuracy for cognitive and affective content using two 
established empathy measures (a naturalistic fiction-based task and a classic vignette task). 
Despite an initial pilot study, a text pretest, and two immersion manipulation pilots, the 
cognitive load manipulation ultimately failed to significantly vary any of the facets of 
immersion measured: transportation, identification with character, or feelings during reading. 
The effect of the cognitive load manipulation in Experiment 4 (manipulation pilot) was 
promising but was only observed in the small sample when trait fantasy was controlled.  
It may be that cognitive load manipulations do not influence immersion when reading, 
because rather than requiring any cognitive elaboration, the effects of immersion may be 
peripheral or indirect (see Djikic & Oatley, 2014) and therefore unimpacted by cognitive load 
(e.g., Rocklage et al., 2018; Tormala & Petty, 2004; Zemborain & Johar, 2007). Furthermore, 
as social processes are practiced, they become less effortful and less likely to be impacted by 
competing mental tasks (Mar, 2018a), and so experience with getting immersed in stories may 
reduce the impact of the dual task paradigm. Future research could re-examine the utility of 
this method by additionally employing a no load control group, or by developing alternative 
approaches to manipulating immersion dimensions, and examining the effects on empathic 
accuracy post-reading. Doing so could shed new light on the pathways between immersion 
dimensions and empathic components. 
8.2.3.1 Immersion and empathy. In Study 3, all immersion scales (transportation, 
character identification and affective empathy) were associated with the ability to accurately 
infer the mental states of story characters (SST explicit scores). Furthermore, the three 
immersion dimensions were generally positively associated with trait empathic abilities, 
which lent support to the overlap between empathy and immersion postulated in Chapter 3. 
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However, there was no correlation between affective empathy (the production of feelings 
during reading) and fantasy (which measures the tendency to engage imaginative processes as 
well as emotion-sharing). This highlights the multidimensionality of immersion, and that the 
cognitive mechanisms that serve certain features of immersion do not necessarily support 
empathic skills. The notion that fiction-engagement does not always benefit empathy will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
8.2.3.2 Causal effects of reading. An exploratory analysis revealed some supporting 
evidence for causal effects of reading a passage of fiction on empathic accuracy compared to 
not reading: reading appeared to increase empathic accuracy for story characters’ mental 
states (SST explicit scores). Because there was no expository nonfiction-reading control 
group—the comparison was between fiction-reading and no reading—it is not clear how 
much variance can be attributed to reading the specific stimulus story versus general reading 
processes (although research showing effects of fiction and nonfiction, e.g., Mumper & 
Gerrig, 2017, suggests that some variance in empathic abilities is unique to fiction).  
 There was no causal effect of reading on the Yoni test measure of mentalising. Power 
may have been insufficient to detect the small effect of fiction-reading (Dodell-Feder & 
Tamir, 2018) on the Yoni task. Another explanation is that as the SST is a naturalistic 
measure that may recruit experience-sharing strategies, it captured variation in ability that the 
Yoni test did not probe. Alternatively, the reading exercise may have primed general 
comprehension of the SST text which, in turn, increased empathic accuracy scores 
(comprehension accounted for the majority of the increase in empathic accuracy). 
Comprehension may be essential to fiction effects, but it remains unclear whether the effects 
of comprehending one narrative correspond to increased accuracy for other (narrative or non-
narrative) empathic content. Furthermore, as the SST may recruit both mentalising and 
experience-sharing processes, it is unclear how far each inferencing pathway contributed to 
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accuracy. The effect of fiction-reading on the SST was only observed when controlling for 
age, gender, fiction-exposure, and text comprehension, which emphasises the influence of 
other factors in fiction effects. Overall, evidence for the effect of fiction-reading on empathic 
skills was promising, but limited. 
8.3 Factors Impacting Relationships between Fiction and Empathic Abilities  
8.3.1 Individual differences 
Previous research has shown that age and gender relate to empathic abilities and can 
interact with task stimuli (e.g., Richter, Dietzel & Kunzmann, 2010), that gender impacts 
fiction effects on empathic abilities (e.g., Mar et al., 2009), and that age positively predicts 
ART scores (e.g., Kidd & Castano, 2017a). In the present research, gender differences were 
shown on the IRI subscale measures of empathy, in line with Davis (1980, 1983), but not on 
the self-report altruism scale, which matched Rushton et al.’s (1981) findings. Males and 
females did not differ on immersion (which reflected, for example, Green & Brock, 2000, 
Experiments 1 and 4) or on the behavioural measures of empathic accuracy (in line with 
Dodell-Feder et al., 2013; in Study 3 Experiment 1, females scored higher than males on the 
SST, but this was not replicated in Experiment 5). Generally, exposure to fictional print did 
not vary by gender (which aligns with Mar et al., 2006). However, males recognised more 
film names than females on the FMET in Study 1 and more nonfiction authors on the ART-R 
in Study 3. In the present research, age positively predicted fantasy and altruism (Study 1) and 
positively correlated with fiction-exposure (Study 2; in line with Kidd & Castano, 2017a). 
These findings highlight the importance of accounting for the impact of gender and age in 
research examining the effects of fiction-exposure.  
Verbal abilities can influence both engagement with fiction and performance on some 
tests of empathic abilities. Studies have shown that the development of mentalising abilities is 
linked to language skills (e.g., Milligan, Astington & Dack, 2007), and less skilled readers can 
FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES 
 
 239 
find it more difficult to become immersed in stories (Nell, 1988). The SST requires 
interpretation of a stimulus text, and the Yoni test (along with other established measures like 
the RMET) require the application of linguistic terms. However, the SST text is easy to 
comprehend (Flesch Reading Ease Score = 93 on a scale of 0-100 where higher scores 
indicate easier texts) and the Yoni test predominantly relies on the selection of images 
(requiring simpler mental state terms than the RMET). As proposed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3, 
researchers can account for demand characteristics through the concomitant use of both 
language-based and pictorial empathy tasks.  
Dispositional factors such as openness to experience (Mar et al., 2009), and 
motivational factors such as social needs (e.g., Gabriel & Young, 2011; Mar et al., 2009), 
mood (McQuail, 2010; Zillman, 1988; see also Mar et al., 2011), and the need for cognition 
(Shim, Lim, Jung & Shin, 2018) may play a part in fiction-selection, immersion, and their 
effects. Exploratory results from Study 1 (Appendix B) showed that differences in motivation 
can impact relationships between medium and empathy. For example, watching a film to 
improve mood was associated with higher empathic concern, but watching a film due to 
feeling one “should” have seen it (perhaps due to social pressures) was negatively associated 
with empathic concern. Future research may identify interaction effects of presentation 
channel with individual differences and motivational factors. This could contribute to an 
understanding of the why particular formats are selected and the effects of those selections. 
Subsequently, this could inform interventions aiming to present stories in ways that will 
maximise their impact on empathy. 
8.3.2 Narrative mode 
“One reads alone, even in another's presence” (Calvino, 1980/1998, p. 147), although 
reading was not always a solo exercise. The proliferation of printed books that could be read 
in private, and repeatedly, led to the development of reading as an individualistic pastime 
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(Lagerfeld, 1986). This facilitated intimate emotional engagement with texts, and subjective 
interpretation of their messages. Now, again, the fiction landscape is changing. Fiction is no 
longer confined to the page or to transient oral tellings. Today’s stories can be viewed 
repeatedly onscreen and interacted with using virtual headsets. Rose (2011) argued that, 
“people have always wanted to in some way inhabit the stories that move them. The only real 
variable is whether technology gives them that opportunity” (p. 88). Medium is a probable 
antecedent of immersion (van Laer et al., 2014; see also Mangen & Kuiken, 2014) and so 
immersive processes may vary across media formats. It has been suggested that the process of 
receiving narrative content and identifying characters has become so ingrained that the 
medium through which the content is presented functions merely as a transmitter 
(MacDorman, 2019). However, the present findings provide evidence of multiple dimensions 
along which both fiction media and content can have effects (see also Gentile et al., 2009, 
who made the same argument based on their study of video games).  
Some variation in empathic abilities appears unique to processes associated with fiction. 
This may reflect functional differences in narrative versus exposition, or the uniquely open-
minded style of engagement entailed by framing a text as fictional (Keen, 2007). Further 
research is required to model the impact of specific textual features within genres, though the 
present research indicates that features of both medium and genre that invite active 
engagement may particularly support empathic and prosocial development. 
8.3.2.1 Participatory modes of fiction-engagement. The difference between fiction-
engagement and the flight simulation metaphor (see Chapter 3, section 3.4.1; Mar & Oatley, 
2008; Oatley, 1999; 2011b; Oatley & Djikic, 2017), is that the outcomes of fictional 
interactions are predetermined. With fiction, the reader (or viewer) cannot test out the 
consequences of their actions as they can in the artificial cockpit. However, trial-and-error can 
be facilitated in interactive modes of fiction-engagement such as video games, interactive 
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films, acting and improvisation (a script may be defined, but actors can test the consequences 
of their delivery). Participation may augment the effects of the social simulation, and this 
represents an exciting area for further research.23 For example, it would be interesting to 
explore the extent to which participation in fictional simulations leads to behavioural 
outcomes compared to the more passive, traditional modes of reading or viewing. In the 
present research, there was some evidence of a positive relationship between acting 
experience and altruism. However, portraying a character can be approached using different 
methods that invite different degrees of imagination and emotional engagement (e.g., 
Gallagher & Gallagher, 2019). Future work with actors may present a unique opportunity to 
gain insight into the qualitative differences between ways of becoming immersed in stories 
and characters, and how far these may recruit and enhance mentalising and experience-
sharing components of empathy. 
8.3.3 Latency  
The present research provided evidence for positive associations between fiction and 
empathic abilities but limited support for immediate causal effects. It may be that causal 
effects of fiction on empathic abilities occur via repeated exposure to fiction. Alternatively, 
fiction may influence empathic abilities, but effects may only emerge after an incubation 
period (e.g., Hakemulder, 2004). Drawing on the narrative persuasion literature, research has 
suggested that the persuasive effects of fiction may be progressively internalised over time 
(“sleeper effect”; Appel & Richter, 2007; Kumkale & Albarracín, 2004). In terms of effects 
on empathy, research has indicated that playing prosocial video games can lead to later 
 
23 Focalisation and immersion could also be manipulated in video games: A preference for inverting the Y-axis 
(which results in the control pad’s “up” action moving the avatar backwards instead of forwards) has been 
shown to relate to immersion (Frischmann, Mauloua & Procci, 2015) and may influence identification with the 
avatar. More traditional modes, too (e.g., reading, film-viewing), are increasingly interactive due to the internet 
facilitating commentary from both laypeople and critics (see Rose, 2011). The intention to take part in online 
communities and express views in public forums might motivate a distinctive–perhaps analytic–style of 
engagement.  
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prosocial behaviour (Gentile et al., 2009), and Bal and Veltkamp’s (2013) study of the effects 
of transportation into fiction presented some evidence of an increase in empathic concern 
following a two-week incubation period. Therefore, effects of fiction, including those 
influenced by immersion, may be not be observed through immediate testing (or may be so 
small as to require high-powered observations). The lack of evidence for long-term effects has 
led some authors to call for further research (e.g., Mar et al., 2011). Considering that the 
evidence-base for correlational effects is far more developed than for causal effects (and this 
contrast is visible both in the extant literature and in the present research), causal, longitudinal 
studies would be of great benefit to a research agenda aiming to assess the durability of causal 
effects. 
8.3.4 Contextual variables 
As shown in Study 2, differences in target mental state content, the person being 
empathised with and the strategy recruited, may all influence empathic accuracy. Empathy 
judgments can be biased: in Study 2, perceivers tended to be conservative in their estimates of 
targets’ emotional ratings, and the directions in which biases occurred (based on the positive 
or negative valence of estimates) varied depending on empathic inferencing strategy 
condition. Observed biases may differ depending on target characteristics such as gender 
(Garrido & Prada, 2017), expressiveness (Allport & Vernon, 1933), and similarity to the 
perceiver (Adams et al., 2010; Matsumoto et al., 2009). They may also differ depending on 
the type (cognitive or affective) and complexity (e.g., first- or second-order) of mental state 
content, and mode of presentation (e.g., naturalistic versus pictorial; Richter et al., 2010). 
Examining the influence of context variables on the deployment of inferencing strategies 
could facilitate a nuanced approach to indexing individuals’ empathy. Similarly, the prosocial 
behaviour component was measured in Study 1 using a self-report measure of altruism. This 
scale contains questions about helpful acts towards strangers, acquaintances and charities. 
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These scenarios can differ in terms of social visibility; for example, a charity donation could 
be made privately on the internet, whereas giving money to a stranger, or donating blood, may 
be more public. Future research could address the differences between prosocial acts and how 
far they may be influenced by fiction engagement. 
8.4 Methodological Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research  
There were several limitations in the present research project; some of which have been 
identified in the study-specific discussions above. This section presents more general 
methodological limitations and recommendations for addressing these in future research.  
8.4.1 Limitations of measures 
8.4.1.1 Measures of empathic abilities. The self-report empathy scales (used as 
criterion variables in Study 1 and control variables in Studies 2 and 3), and immersion scales 
(Study 3) required participants to accurately reflect on their own thoughts and behaviours and 
so they may be subject to bias. This can take the form of socially desirable responding, where 
participants provide answers that adhere to positive social norms (e.g., presenting oneself as 
altruistic), or from a disproportionate sense of one’s own skills (Kidd et al., 2016, noted that 
the predictability of popular fiction characters can engender a sense of competence in 
empathy, and so this may be particularly relevant to the genre correlations). Alternatively, 
participants may try to support the researcher’s aims, they may generally provide positive 
(acquiescing) or negative (dissenting) responses, or they may simply not pay attention to the 
questions. In order to remedy these limitations, irrelevant items were included within self-
report scales to mask the hypotheses, attention check questions and reverse-scored items were 
included, and internal reliability was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha, which enables the 
detection of inconsistencies within response sets.  
The empathic accuracy task created for Study 2 relies on the experiencers’ abilities to 
accurately reflect on, and consistently index, the valence and intensity of their emotional 
FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES 
 
 244 
responses to pictures. This approach presents greater ecological validity than, for example, 
schematic faces such as the Yoni test used in Study 3 (e.g., Dobs, Bülthoff & Schulz, 2018). 
However, as participants did not directly estimate the experiencers’ affective responses, rather 
they estimated the ratings provided by the experiencers, this comes at the cost of an 
objectively “correct” set of values against which to verify participant estimates. Furthermore, 
the extent that mentalising and experience-sharing processes were induced by the empathic 
accuracy task (Study 2) is not certain. As participants in the experience-sharing (“simulation”) 
condition had access to photographs of the experiencers during each trial, they may have 
based their estimates on their knowledge of other similar people. In sum, they may have 
employed a mentalising approach. Conversely, participants that viewed the videos may have 
drawn on their own responses to the experiencer reactions. Nonetheless, the association 
between accuracy and lifetime fiction-exposure, as well as the observed difference in 
directions of error, merit further investigation. Future research could remedy these issues by 
assessing concurrent validity with established mentalising and experience-sharing measures.  
8.4.1.2 Measures of fiction. ARTs establish familiarity with specific selections of 
authors as indirect measures of exposure to fiction, but they do not reflect depth of 
engagement or enjoyment. A one-point increase for recognising the name “José Saramago” is 
attained whether participants have read and re-read Saramago’s full catalogue, skimmed 
through one of his books, or simply heard his name in conversation. External factors such as 
age, location, cultural differences, education levels and experiences (e.g., differences in 
school syllabuses) are likely to affect recognition rates. Nevertheless, previous research has 
lent support to the validity of ARTs, showing that familiarity with authors correlates with 
measures of reading ability and habits (Mol & Bus, 2011; Rain & Mar, 2014; Stanovich & 
Cunningham, 1992; Stanovich & West, 1989; Stanovich et al., 1995; West et al., 1993). The 
validity of the FMET, on the other hand, would need to be established through further 
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research. However, the observed associations between media-exposure and respective media 
preferences (Study 1) indicate its promising capacity to characterise fiction habits.  
The ARTs and FMET used in the present studies were not analysed at the level of their 
genre subcomponents. Future research could index the FMET along genre dimensions in 
order to ensure that it contains sufficient breadth. This approach could facilitate an 
examination of the effects of genre-exposure across different media (for examples of ARTs 
used to measure genre-exposure, see Black et al., 2018; Kidd & Castano, 2017a). 
Furthermore, the FMET was restricted to fiction, and as fiction and nonfiction print-exposure 
tend to correlate (Mar et al., 2006, 2009), nonfiction dimensions could be usefully developed. 
Studies 2 and 3 focused on the effects of print, and Study 1 examined print, film and play-
exposure. While the FMET represents a development of the ART, it still provides only a 
narrow view of the variety of modes though which fictional stories can be accessed. Study 1 
indicated that media were differentially associated with empathic abilities in terms of both 
strength and direction (e.g., positive associations with preference for novels and negative 
associations with preference for TV). Future research could expand the FMET in order to 
examine these differences in more detail and to better reflect the multiplicity of the fiction 
landscape. 
Study 3 failed to vary self-report immersion using a cognitive load manipulation and, 
compared to previous studies (e.g., Green & Brock, 2000), immersion scores were generally 
low. Features specific to the selected text may have attenuated effects on immersion 
dimensions (e.g., the specific characters and themes depicted). Employing a variety of texts 
would allow future researchers to examine effects and generalise beyond a single passage 
(this introduces heterogeneity when comparing genres between groups, but nested statistical 
models can circumvent this issue; Panero et al., 2016).  
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8.4.1.3 Statistical power and reliability. Multiple comparisons were reported in the 
present research (the correlation matrices in Studies 1 and 3, and tests conducted on both raw 
and absolute scores reported in Study 2 were not corrected for multiplicity). However, 
correcting for the reporting of both raw and absolute scores in study 2 (by applying a 
Bonferroni correction) did not affect the main pattern of results, and patterns of association 
tended to internally replicate (for example, the pattern of correlations in Study 3 Experiments 
1 and 5). Other statistical tests incorporated corrections for multiple comparisons (e.g., 
ANOVA and Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons). Violations of test data 
assumptions were reported and addressed.  
The causal effects of immersion in Study 3 were likely underpowered, and future 
research could explore the impact of the cognitive load manipulation using a larger sample. 
The selected fictional text was a short excerpt from a longer novel. Research has indicated 
that sensorimotor simulation is higher for full narratives than unconnected sentences extracted 
from narratives (Kurby & Zacks, 2013) and, similarly, immersion may be weaker for short 
extracts compared to full narrative arcs (containing antecedents, consequences and resolutions 
to events). Using short passages precludes generalising the results to naturalistic reading, but 
future longitudinal research employing full narratives may very usefully address this issue. 
This would provide a more ecologically valid perspective on fiction leisure-reading and 
contribute to clearer estimates of the sizes of fiction-reading effects.  
In extant studies using short passages, researchers have tended not to alter published 
original works of fiction (as was the case with the Study 3 stimuli), an approach that offers 
ecological validity but comes at the cost of experimental control (Willems & Jacobs, 2016). 
Some authors have incorporated original and altered versions of texts (e.g., Hakemulder, 
2004), which can facilitate the isolation of specific textual elements and measurement of their 
effects (e.g., focalisation and foregrounding devices such as imagery and metaphor). This 
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approach may be too resource-heavy to use in longitudinal designs, but cross-sectional 
research employing textual manipulations, combined with longitudinal approaches examining 
naturalistic reading, may work contemporaneously to clarify the strength of the impact of 
fiction-reading. 
8.5 Making Sense of the Results: How Does Fiction-engagement Benefit Empathy? 
Humans had built a world inside the world, which reflected it in pretty much the same way 
as a drop of water reflected the landscape. And yet ... and yet ... Inside this little world they 
had taken pains to put all the things you might think they would want to escape from–—
hatred, fear, tyranny, and so forth. Death was intrigued. They thought they wanted to be 
taken out of themselves, and every art humans dreamt up took them further in. (Pratchett, 
1988, p. 328) 
Pratchett observed that people use fiction to explore challenging themes. This invokes 
Keen’s (2007) suggestion that fictional worlds function as safe zones wherein readers can 
explore themes and scenarios without real-world consequences. Nettle (2006) proposed that 
human relationships are central to fiction, and Mar and Oatley (Mar & Oatley, 2008; Oatley, 
1999, 2016) suggested that the function of fiction is to support social development by 
simulating social experiences. This theory offers a solution to the paradox that fictional 
characters must sufficiently resemble real-world others in order to generate emotion while, at 
the same time, the reader knows that they are not real (Radford & Weston, 1975). Fiction 
simulations are not “direct impressions of the world” (Oatley, 2011b, p. 16), rather they are 
dreamlike imitations of real events (Oatley, 2011b). Veering off the runway in a flight 
simulator would induce a similar, but not identical, emotional reaction to doing so in a real 
plane. Similarly, the scenarios explored in fiction are inconsequential, and may invite 
emotional engagement for precisely this reason (Keen, 2007). Just as flight simulators 
function to develop pilots’ competencies in a cockpit, fictional narratives may develop 
readers’ competencies in matters of social life.  
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 The current research examined three overarching questions: (i) what is the nature of 
relationships between different narrative modes and empathic abilities? (ii) what is the nature 
of relationships between fiction and mentalising and experience-sharing strategies for 
empathic accuracy? (iii) what is the role of immersive processes in fiction effects on 
empathy? These questions were addressed in the current studies with varying levels of 
success. 
 8.5.1 What is the nature of relationships between different narrative modes and 
empathic abilities? 
Addressing the first question, the collective findings indicated that both media and 
genre differences are associated with empathic abilities including altruistic behaviour, which 
may represent a downstream consequence of fiction effects on empathy. Print-exposure 
(reading) and engaging with comedy or postmodern genres may particularly support empathic 
skills, due to the active, writerly modes of engagement that they entail. However, more 
formulaic narratives, too, may benefit empathic abilities, potentially via different routes. 
While most of the extant research evidence indicates that stories can impact empathy through 
the development of social processes (Mar, 2018a), the findings that different thematic genres 
relate to different empathic faculties suggests that people may also learn and apply knowledge 
accumulated through engaging with specific social themes and scenarios. 
8.5.2 What is the nature of relationships between fiction and mentalising and 
experience-sharing strategies for empathic accuracy? 
Addressing the second question, fiction-exposure was found to be associated with 
empathic accuracy both when sharing in the same experience as a target and when 
interpreting a target’s facial expressions. Fiction-exposure was not found to uniquely support 
one mode of inferencing over the other, rather it may support both routes to empathic 
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accuracy. It remains to be seen how far fiction-engagement can causally enhance each 
strategy.  
8.5.3 What is the role of immersive processes in fiction effects on empathy? 
Addressing the third question, the impact of immersive processes in empathic accuracy 
remains unclear. Immersion dimensions appear to relate to self-reported empathic traits 
(mentalising, experience-sharing and concern dimensions), as well as to behavioural measures 
of empathic accuracy (for cognitive and affective content), and so these relationships merit 
further enquiry. This would help to determine how far imaginative and affective dimensions 
invoke social processes, support the understanding and retention of social content, or facilitate 
both non-exclusively (see Mar, 2018a). This, in turn, could contribute to debate on the extent 
that real-world empathy requires the self and other to remain distinct and involves imaginative 
versus isomorphic processes (e.g., Cuff et al., 2016; see Gallagher & Gallagher, 2019, for an 
overview).  
8.5.4 The question of causation  
In line with the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, the present research provided evidence 
that fiction-exposure and empathic abilities are positively associated, while the causal 
evidence was far weaker. It could simply be the case that people who are higher in empathic 
abilities—or particular empathic components—tend to engage more with fiction. If so, fiction 
may simply represent a “virus of the mind” (Brodie, 2009) that has hijacked the human 
capacity for multiperspectivity and ability to decipher complex social scenes but offers 
nothing by way of improvement. Pinker captured this idea in his discussion of “pleasure 
technologies”:  
We enjoy strawberry cheesecake, but not because we evolved a taste for it. We evolved 
circuits that gave us trickles of enjoyment from the sweet taste of ripe fruit, the creamy 
mouth feel of fats and oils from nuts and meat, and the coolness of fresh water. Cheesecake 
packs a sensual wallop unlike anything in the natural world because it is a brew of 
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megadoses of agreeable stimuli which we concocted for the express purpose of pressing 
our pleasure buttons. Pornography is another pleasure technology. . . . the arts are a third. 
(Pinker, 1997, p. 525).  
The view that fiction can be beneficial—cognitively and socially—is seductive. It 
means that engaging with stories for leisure is not merely entertaining or enjoyable; it is 
healthy too (Nell, 1988, coined the term “ludic readers” to refer to people that read for 
pleasure and relaxation more than once a week, p. 7). Of course, different fictions are not 
always pleasurable but are compelling (e.g., the horror novel Dracula, Stoker, 1897/2019; or 
the melodramatic film Dancer in the Dark, Von Trier, Jensen & Windeløv, 2000). However, 
extending Pinker’s metaphor from the arts, broadly, to fiction, specifically, risks being overly 
reductionist. It implies that longstanding literary classics have no greater intrinsic value than 
daily soap operas. The idea that fiction-engagement is merely a symptom of people’s 
cognitive capacities does not explain the different outcomes observed in causal studies that 
have contrasted text genres (e.g., Kidd & Castano, 2013, 2018b; Kidd et al., 2016; Van Kujik 
et al., 2018); it may tell part of the story, but it does not provide the complete picture.  
Part of the picture concerns the beliefs of fiction–empathy researchers themselves. In 
literary theory, empathy has always represented an assumed, typical reaction to a literary text, 
helping to distinguish literature from other text genres (Keen, 2007; Pinotti & Salgaro, 2019). 
The idea that fiction can function to support real-world empathy is perhaps particularly 
appealing to researchers who, identifying as writers or readers themselves, are drawn to study 
the topic, and so the extant literature may have been biased by studies generated by 
“bibliophiles” (see Koopman, 2018). As author Zadie Smith recently commented, “if fiction 
had a belief about itself, it was that fiction had empathy in its DNA, and that was the product 
of compassion […] This was what fiction believed about itself, but like all beliefs not a little 
of it was always wishful thinking” (Smith, 2019, p. 9). 
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 This (perhaps “wishful”) thinking not only represents what fiction might believe about 
itself, but also what psychologists might believe about fiction. Several empathy researchers 
have employed narrative-based stimuli as naturalistic alternatives to pictorial and vignette 
tasks (see Chapter 2 for examples). Implicit in this approach is the assumption that fiction-
induced empathic processes are equivalent to real-world empathic processes. Psychological 
research in the field of fiction’s effects on empathy is also based on this supposition, which 
Pinotti and Salgaro (2019) argued is a misinterpretation perpetuated by psychological 
researchers such as Mar and Oatley. However, the theory that fiction supports empathy—even 
that it functions to do so—does not necessarily assume that fictional empathic processes and 
real-world empathic processes are the same, rather it assumes that they are related. The 
simulation is considered to imitate the real world sufficiently well that some of the same 
cognitive mechanisms are activated, and that feelings experienced during reading reflect, but 
are not the same as, feelings experienced during similar real-world events (e.g., Oatley, 
2011b). Neuroscience research outlined in Chapter 3 has lent some support to this theory (also 
see Mar’s, 2011, meta-analysis). The extreme argument that fiction-induced empathy has no 
real-life consequences falls short of explaining the robust associations between fiction-
exposure and empathic abilities shown in the scientific literature. The degree to which the 
“peculiar” aspects of “fictional empathy” (Pinotti & Salgaro, 2019, p. 150)—empathic 
experiences unique to literary-engagement—lead to real-world psychological or social 
change, however, remains a central question for future research to continue to explore.24 
While the idea that fiction has no effect on empathy may be disappointing to 
“bibliophiles” (Koopman, 2018), the idea that fictional empathy is not unique or mystical, but 
is underpinned by the same processes as run-of-the-mill, everyday empathy could be just as 
 
24 This question may differ across modes of fiction. For example, it is not yet known whether audiences process 
actors in performances like they process fictional characters in novels, whether they perceive them as 
essentialist representations of traits and states, as real people telling lies, or as complex everyday people 
(Goldstein & Filipe, 2018). 
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unappetising. Robust causal evidence of the behavioural consequences of fiction-engagement 
is required to substantiate the claim that fiction is functional, and that its central function is to 
potentiate empathic growth. The present literature appears to indicate a small, positive effect 
overall, but is sufficiently mixed as to warrant further investigation.  
8.5.5 Fiction and empathy and the assumption of something “good” 
For every Uncle Tom’s Cabin there is Birth of a Nation. For every Bleak House there is 
Atlas Shrugged … Every single one of these fictions plays on its readers’ empathy: not just 
high-minded writers like Dickens, who invite us to sympathize with Little Dorritt, but also 
writers of Westerns, who present poor helpless colonizers attacked by awful violent Native 
Americans (Landy, n.d., as cited in Bloom, 2016, pp. 48-49). 
Research examining how fiction may causally enhance empathy is predicated on two 
assumptions. The first is that fiction is “good” and may have the power to change things for 
the better. The second is that empathy is “good” and that increasing it is inherently beneficial. 
Keen (2007) pointed out that if the premise that fiction can alter readers’ characters for the 
better is accepted, so must be its opposite: that fiction can also “possess darker powers” (p. 
25). If fiction can change people’s attitudes and beliefs (e.g., Green & Brock, 2000), it may 
also have the power to propagate stereotypes, alienate, distance and dehumanise (research 
examining fiction’s antisocial outcomes has predominantly focused on video games, e.g., 
Fraser, Padilla-Walker, Coyne, Nelson & Stockdale, 2012; for a recent meta-analysis of 
effects on aggression, see Prescott, Sargent & Hull, 2018; for an overview, see Rose, 2011). 
Fiction-engagement could have a negative social impact by providing a means to escape 
pressing social issues; bystanders can perform a “mental disappearing act” through reading in 
order to avoid taking prosocial action (Keen, 2007, p. 25). To prevent this, some modes of 
fiction, such as Epic Theatre, purposefully employ techniques designed to emotionally 
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distance audiences in order to provoke rational and critical evaluation of the ideological issues 
presented.25  
Real-world empathy does not automatically, directly or inevitably lead to helping (e.g., 
Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987), and the behavioural consequences of fiction-induced empathy are 
equally uncertain (e.g., Keen, 2007). While the fiction simulation may function as a mental, 
“moral laboratory” (Hakemulder, 2000), if fiction is used as an escape, this could come at the 
cost of real-world prosocial action. Study 1 showed that self-report altruism was positively 
predicted by fiction-exposure (and previous research has provided some evidence of causal 
effects, e.g., Johnson, 2012; Johnson et al., 2013; Koopman, 2015). Further research 
examining causal effects on behavioural measures is required to substantiate the association 
between fiction, empathy, and prosocial, ethical behaviours.  
The concept of empathy has become ideologically entangled with ethics. In response to 
the “empathy hype” (a wave of interest in empathy in aesthetics and the humanities over the 
past 20 years; Pinotti & Salgaro, 2019, p, 144), Bloom (2016) and others (e.g., Breithaupt, 
2019) have argued that empathy can be detrimental. Echoing Pinker’s (1997) depiction of the 
arts as providing the “sensual wallop” (p. 525) of cheesecake, Bloom (2016) designated 
empathy as, “sugary soda, tempting and delicious and bad for us” (p. 13). In other words, 
what feels good in the moment, might not be so good long-term. Bloom suggested that 
empathy can be misguided, short-sighted and biased, and argued instead for a utilitarian 
approach to “rational compassion” (his prior research having shown that compassion 
dissociates from experience-sharing; Bloom, 2017). He presented an example in which 
 
25 Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956) wrote several plays that functioned as forums for political and social issues to be 
scrutinised, camouflaged as entertainment. For example, The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui (Brecht, 1941/1993) 
chronicled the rise of a Chicago mobster as a satirical allegory for the rise of Hitler and the Nazi party prior to 
World War Two. Emotional engagement was discouraged through techniques such as breaking the “fourth wall” 
(the imagined wall separating actors from spectators, through the characters directly addressing the audience, for 
example), as it may have reduced spectators’ abilities to elaboratively reflect on the political commentary of the 
piece.  
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someone high in empathy might seek a “warm glow” (p. 99) by donating small amounts of 
money to multiple charities. He pointed out that this approach could be financially detrimental 
to the charities because of the associated processing costs and resources spent following up on 
those donations. He cautioned that, “if you want to harm some organization that supports a 
cause you object to, one mischievous way to do so is to send them a $5 donation” (p. 99). 
However, Bloom’s scenario does not present a problem with empathy per se, rather it presents 
a problem with defective knowledge about an action’s outcome. Empathy is not really pitted 
against reason, because empathy is not given the chance to do its job—empathy does not have 
all the information. Rational compassion, too, may find itself lacking, in the absence of 
information with which to make a rational choice.  
There are two broader issues with the idea that reason represents an antidote to 
empathy. The first issue is the implication that one prosocial act is objectively more valuable 
than another (which serves to further conflate empathy and ethics) in relation to complex and 
contextual social issues. This is illustrated in Bloom’s example of the “considerable debate” 
(p. 99) that surrounds Western aid provisions to developing nations: on the one hand this can 
be considered a helpful and socially conscious act; on the other, it could have negative, 
downstream consequences for local economies. The second issue, of practical importance to 
the current research agenda, is that Bloom’s (2016) argument defines empathy in terms of its 
isomorphic, affective component (see Zaki, 2017). This version of empathy may be 
characterised by feelings of distress, which activate avoidance rather than helping. As 
described in Chapter 3, distress tends to be self-oriented and concerned with the alleviation of 
one’s own suffering, rather than with that of another, which distinguishes it from the other 
empathy dimensions (e.g., Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Davis et al., 1999; Penner et 
al., 1995). Whereas Bloom (2016) argued that affective empathy creates a “spotlight” (p. 9) 
which biases the direction of moral efforts, Zaki (2017) suggested that the spotlight can be 
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controlled and usefully redirected. Emotion regulation abilities, for example, can direct 
empathisers toward non-isomorphic empathic concern and away from personal distress 
(McCall & Singer, 2013). Zaki conceded that the empathy spotlight can be misdirected, 
biased, and can foster both moral and immoral outcomes. He called for scientists to consider 
when empathy most aids empathisers and targets, in order to “help people tune their 
emotional lives accordingly” (Zaki, 2017, p. 60).  
 Fiction-engagement represents one method for tuning emotional life, though it may 
not always be a force for good. Some content, and some modes of engagement, can have 
negative social outcomes. For example, fictional empathy may perpetuate biases through 
over- or under-representation of individuals and groups (e.g., Iguarta, Barrios & Ortega, 2012; 
see also Smith, 2019), which may bolster real-world empathy biases. However, if fiction can 
foster the empathic components that engender prosociality (e.g., concern rather than distress), 
it may support the ability to flexibly redirect the empathy “spotlight” in order to promote 
helpfulness, cooperation and equity.  
Future research may usefully investigate the processes through which fiction can impact 
real-world helping. It may be that accumulating social information through fiction generates 
an awareness of the experiences of particular people or groups, which can alter attitudes and, 
consequently, behaviours towards those individuals and groups (a route that may overlap with 
persuasion). Alternatively, the processes of engaging with fiction may enhance empathic 
abilities in general, leading to an increased tendency toward prosocial behaviour. These 
alternative routes could be examined using stories that vary in terms of prosocial or antisocial 
characters and outcomes. For example, the story composed for Study 3 presents a positive 
outcome to an altruistic act performed by the protagonist. A second version of the story could 
depict a negative outcome to the same act. If fiction alters behaviour through the 
accumulation of knowledge informed by the content of the story, participants would be 
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expected to exhibit different levels of altruistic behaviour depending on the version of the 
story that they had read. In contrast, if story-induced empathic processes lead to altruism, 
behaviours should not differ depending on the outcome of the story. Such questions highlight 
the importance of the multidimensional approach to fiction-induced empathy in clarifying its 
consequences, costs and benefits. 
8.6 Contribution and Implications 
8.6.1 The multidimensional approach 
The measures employed in studies of empathy “tell us not about the nature of empathy 
but about certain ways in which empathy can be achieved” (Smith, 2017, p. 709). To adapt 
McLuhan’s (1964/1994) statement (the “medium is the message”), in psychological research 
on empathy, for the most part, the measure has been the message. The multidimensional 
framework adopted in the present research enabled a reconsideration of previous findings of 
fiction effects on empathy in terms of the modes of measurement employed, and the empathic 
processes probed by those measures. This approach enabled results from existing correlational 
and causal studies to be categorised according to mentalising and experience-sharing, concern 
and prosocial behaviour components. In so doing, it offered some explanation for the 
currently mixed findings in the field of fiction effects on empathy—heterogeneity across 
fiction stimuli and empathy measures—and promoted a granular approach to modelling their 
relationships.  
The research lent supporting evidence to the hypothesis that fiction-exposure and 
empathic abilities are positively associated. Fiction-exposure was shown to positively relate to 
mental state content, measured using both self-report and behavioural tools. This result 
aligned with previous findings that nonfiction, too, positively relates to empathic abilities, but 
that the effect is not as large as for fiction, indicating that there is something special about 
fiction in terms of its impact on empathic processes. The research extended this line of 
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enquiry by showing positive relationships between empathic abilities, print and theatre 
exposure, as well as negative relationships with preferences for TV and film. Genre 
preferences were differentially associated with empathic abilities. Due to the exploratory 
nature of Study 1, the results for media and genre effects were preliminary. However, the 
FMET tool laid the groundwork for further research employing pluralistic fiction-exposure 
measures in order to explore the effects of a wider range of media and genres.  
The approach to measuring empathic accuracy taken in Study 2 enabled the relative 
efficacy of mentalising and experience-sharing routes to be examined. The nuanced approach 
to measurement, employing both absolute scores to assess magnitude, and raw scores to 
assess directions of effects, extended Zhou et al.’s (2017) prior research. It facilitated the 
discovery that mentalising and experience-sharing strategies lead to similar levels of error, but 
in opposite directions. This difference did not moderate the relationship between fiction-
exposure and empathic accuracy, suggesting that fiction-exposure may strengthen empathic 
accuracy via both routes. Future research may establish whether this finding replicates. This 
represents the first study to directly compare the relationship between fiction-exposure and 
mentalising versus experience-sharing routes to empathic accuracy. The systematic approach 
taken in Study 3 contributed limited evidence of a positive effect of a reading task on 
empathic accuracy and some evidence of relationships between empathy and immersive 
processes. A method for manipulating immersion in a popular narrative was identified, which 
may be tested in future research using different story texts. Study 3 highlighted the 
multifaceted nature of immersion, which includes imaginative processes, identification, and 
emotional engagement, and which may differentially relate to empathy components.  
8.6.2 Influential variables 
The research highlighted several variables that can impact empathic accuracy and the 
relationships between fiction and empathic abilities. These include both demographic 
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variables such as gender and age, contextual variables, such as characteristics of the target 
person, valence of the mental state content and empathic strategy employed. The latter, in 
particular, was shown to influence not the magnitude, but the direction of bias generated when 
estimating another’s emotional experience. Further research may fruitfully develop this line of 
enquiry, in order to further clarify the efficacy of mentalising versus experience sharing 
inferencing strategies and the role of fiction-exposure in their development.  
8.6.3 Measures developed 
Taking a multidimensional approach necessitated the employment of a range of 
measures, and three tasks were designed or developed as part of this research: the FMET was 
created for Study 1, which facilitated a more comprehensive assessment of fiction-exposure 
than previous ARTs. An empathic accuracy task was produced based on Zhou et al. (2017) for 
Study 2, which extended the research agenda by examining the impact of inferencing strategy 
on accuracy for the emotional experiences of other participants. The ART-R (Mar et al., 2006) 
included recently published authors (for Studies 2 and 3). These materials are available for 
use in future research. Additionally, three texts, including one written for the study (Appendix 
F), were subjected to analyses of readability and immersiveness across three dimensions. 
These texts and data may be useful for future researchers selecting and working with narrative 
stimuli.  
8.6.4 Implications for knowledge of empathy and fiction 
In Chapter 2 it was suggested that individual differences in fiction-engagement 
processes should be taken into consideration by researchers using narrative-based empathy 
tasks. The current investigation of the influence of immersion dimensions on empathic 
accuracy task performance was inconclusive. However, the research did reveal differences in 
levels of exposure to, and outcomes of, engaging with fictional film and print media. This 
suggests that individuals may respond differently to empathy tasks presented using film or 
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print (e.g., the MASC or SST; see Chapter 2), and so furthering the exploration of fiction 
effects across media channels would not only inform research in fiction, but it also has 
implications for the use of fiction stimuli in empathy research more broadly.  
Chapter 3 invoked De Vignemont and Singer’s (2006) observation that there are “nearly 
as many definitions of empathy as people working on the topic” (p. 435). Cuff et al. (2016) 
argued that determining an agreed, single definition of empathy would support researchers to 
develop measures and compare results across studies. Empathy is conceived in the present 
research as multidimensional phenomenon: it cannot be described in terms of a singular 
psychological state or process; rather a range of processes may be recruited in service of 
empathic accuracy (in line with Smith, 2017). Empathic accuracy represents an 
epistemological phenomenon: an emergent form of knowing that is constituted through the 
recruitment and interactions of prior knowledge and present processes. Thus, it has been 
argued in the current research that a unidimensional definition of empathy is not achievable 
due to the complex nature of the phenomenon and the range of constituent lower and higher 
order cognitive and affective processes. Moving forward, the field may begin to converge on 
a multidimensional definition that encompasses the range of psychological processes involved 
in understanding others. 
Fictional narratives recruit and potentially strengthen processes associated with 
empathy, and it is for this reason that they have been widely used as naturalistic stimuli in 
measures of the ability to accurately attribute mental states. While it is generally accepted that 
people mentally simulate events in fictional narratives, the nature of the fiction simulation is 
underdetermined (Willems & Jacobs, 2016): it remains unclear which aspects of fictional 
worlds people simulate, and the cognitive mechanisms through which these forms of 
simulation may influence empathy. Taking a multidimensional approach to fiction, as well as 
to empathy, calls for an in-depth study of specific narrative features and forms that entail the 
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processes associated with empathy dimensions. Due to the complexity of the question of how 
fiction may benefit empathy, progress will be incremental rather than immediate. Continued 
research will gradually contribute evidence that converges on the antecedents, processes and 
consequences of fiction-developed empathy. In turn, this will shed light on empathic 
inferencing processes, described by Ickes (1997) as the “second greatest achievement” (p. 2) 
of the human mind after consciousness. The fiction landscape is multidimensional and 
changing, and the present research represents a step towards a more nuanced and 
comprehensive understanding of its social impact.  
8.6.5 Social implications 
The current research has implications for supporting empathic development in NT 
adults and groups with characteristic deficits. In a study of American college students, self-
reported empathic concern and perspective-taking were shown to have dropped in recent 
decades (1979-2009; Konrath, O'Brien & Hsing, 2011). Zaki (2019) proposed that this may be 
due, in part, to an increase in the number of people living alone, and the anonymous, urban 
communities in which they live. The results of the current study, as well as results from 
previous research, indicate that engaging with stories can develop the ability to accurately 
interpret the thoughts and feelings of others, feel concern for others and feel motivated to 
alleviate their suffering. In this way, fiction-engagement may buffer against a decline in 
empathy. These findings could be particularly meaningful to individuals and organisations 
working in person-centred contexts such as social care which, by definition, require empathic 
skills. Taken forward, the multidimensional approach may also inform interventions with 
groups that experience social difficulties by systematically treating the specific deficit (such 
as emotion identification in alexithymia, mentalising in autism and affect-sharing in 
psychopathy; e.g., Freedman et al., 2013). Present and future evidence of the psychological 
impact of stories may benefit organisations proposing—and seeking funding for—arts-based 
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interventions aiming to promote prosocial development and positive interpersonal 
relationships.  
8.7 Moving Forward 
Fiction simulations may increase knowledge of the experiences of distant others and 
strengthen the processes that people use to understand them (e.g., Mar et al., 2018a). Both of 
these effects may serve to reduce the misconception that others’ experiences are very different 
to one’s own, and to expand people’s empathy—or their tendency to deploy empathic 
strategies—beyond the immediate ingroup (see Singer, 1981/2011). There is some evidence 
that readers internalise the social identities that they discover in fiction. Gabriel and Young 
(2011) found that readers tended to identify more with the social group that they had read 
about, even when groups were fantastical (in this case, vampires and wizards). The 
mechanisms engaged through fiction may increase flexibility around self-other distinctions 
and this flexibility may extend to other aspects of cognition. For example, experience with 
fantasy and science-fiction genres, which require consumers to imagine new environments 
governed by unusual physical laws and social norms, has been linked to increased flexibility 
in both moral and physical judgments (Black et al., 2018).  
The extent to which empathy for the ingroup—the “empathy circle” (Pinker, 2011; 
Singer, 1981/2011)—may be expanded through engagement with fiction is yet to be fully 
explored. The introduction to this thesis made reference to several organisations using arts 
engagement practices designed to develop social skills and to improve social experiences. 
These organisations have focused on the development of empathy and prosocial behaviours in 
different human groups (e.g., children, prisoners, medical and social care workers). However, 
future research may identify the potential effects of fiction-induced empathy for other animals 
(“interspecies empathy”; Pinotti & Salgaro, 2019, p. 151; see also Grandin & Johnson, 2009) 
and the environment. For example, researchers in sustainability (e.g., Chapman, 2015) have 
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begun to foreground empathy as an antidote to planned obsolescence—a feature of design that 
limits the life of a product and leads to waste—and arts organisations have developed 
programmes aimed at engendering positive behaviours toward animals and nature (e.g., 
Marks, Chandler & Baldwin, 2016). The recent proliferation of environmental and eco-fiction 
genres may be shown to influence attitudes and behaviours towards pressing environmental 
issues (e.g., David, 2016), through foregrounding the plight of animals and natural 
environments. Empathy targets in fiction need not be human to be humanlike (see Mar, 2009; 
Mar & Oatley, 2008). It was established in Chapter 2 that people show an automatic tendency 
to attribute mental states to objects and shapes (exemplified in Heider and Simmel’s, 1944, 
classic study). Titchener both highlighted people’s affection for books and encapsulated this 
tendency when he posed the following question: 
What lover of books has not shifted the place of certain volumes on the shelf, because he 
could not bear to put good and bad, sound and trivial, side by side,—as if the books would 
feel the incongruity? (Titchener, 1909; as cited in Lanzoni, 2018; pp. 66-67) 
As fictional depictions can imbue objects with humanlike characteristics, future research may 
establish how far this can be exploited and translated into real-world action. Exploring this in 
more depth would both provide information about the parameters of fiction-induced empathy 
processes and help to determine the potential impact of fiction-induced change at both micro 
individual and macro societal levels. 
8.7.1 Questions for future research 
Based on previous research and the current findings, three directions for future research 
are proposed: 
1. Model the relationships between fiction and prosocial behaviour: Which fiction-engagement 
processes mediate effects on prosocial behaviour? What is the impact of contextual variables 
(e.g., the social context of the prosocial act)? 
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2. Examine the effects of specific social content variables: What is the impact of varying 
narrator (reliable, unreliable), protagonist (prosocial, antisocial) and multiperspectivity (tracking 
small and large character networks)? 
3. Establish the parameters of fiction-induced empathy: What are the short and long-term 
effects of self-directed fiction-engagement on empathy? To what extent can fiction affect 
empathy and behaviours towards non-human others, objects or environments? 
8.8 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter outlined the results of the empirical work conducted and discussed the 
findings in relation to extant research and the multidimensional approach proposed in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Factors affecting relationships between fiction and empathy were discussed. 
Limitations of the research were identified and the idea that fiction benefits empathy was 
critiqued in terms of the limited causal evidence and the implicit assumptions that fiction and 
empathy are objectively “good”. Epistemic and social implications were identified and 
potential avenues for further research proposed. 
In line with previous research in the field of fiction effects on empathy, the results 
indicated that fiction and empathic abilities are associated. The precise nature of the 
mechanisms involved remain uncertain, although the research identified some of the 
conditions under which fiction effects may occur. The multidimensional approach 
demonstrated that medium and genre are important factors in relationships between fictional 
content and empathic abilities. The research also showed that contextual variables, such as the 
identity of the experiencer, the nature of the target content, the type of stimuli employed, and 
the empathic inferencing strategy deployed for the task, can influence empathic accuracy and 
produce bias.  
The effects of fiction on empathy represents a complex area of enquiry. This complexity 
has been reflected in inconsistencies in the ways that empathy is operationalised, as well as 
heterogeneity across fiction effects. However, patterns of evidence have begun to emerge 
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indicating that fiction-exposure is associated with the mentalising, experience-sharing and 
concern components of empathy, as well as with prosocial behaviour, and that a range of 
contextual factors can influence those relationships. These findings have implications for 
understanding the processes and parameters of empathy, as well as the role that fiction plays 
in social life. It is recommended that future research take a multidimensional approach to 
studying the effects of specific features of fiction in order to examine pathways to empathic 
components, and to elucidate the antecedents and consequences of fiction-engagement. In so 
doing, the benefits of fiction for empathy, and its social impact, will begin to crystallise. 
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Vischer, R. (1873). Über das optische formgefühl: Ein beitrag zur ästhetik [About the optical 
sense of form: A contribution to aesthetics]. Leipzig: Credner.  
Von Trier, L. (Director), Jensen, P. A., & Windeløv, V. (Producers). (2000). Dancer in the 
dark [Motion picture]. Denmark: Zentropa. 
Wai, M., & Tiliopoulos, N. (2012). The affective and cognitive empathic nature of the dark 
triad of personality. Personality and Individual Differences, 52, 794-799. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.01.008  
Waite, M. (Ed.). (2012). Oxford English Dictionary (7th ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press.  
Wallentin, M., Nielsen, A. H., Vuust, P., Dohn, A., Roepstorff, A., & Lund, T. E. (2011). 
BOLD response to motion verbs in left posterior middle temporal gyrus during story 
FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES 
 
 315 
comprehension. Brain & Language, 119, 221-225. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandl.2011.04.006 
Walter, H. (2012). Social cognitive neuroscience of empathy: Concepts, circuits and genes. 
Emotion Review, 4, 9-17. http://doi.org/10.1177/1754073911421379  
Wang, J. J., Miletich, D. D., Ramsey, R., & Samson, D. (2014). Adults see vision to be more 
informative than it is. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 67, 2279-
2292. http://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2014.915331 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief 
measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 54, 1063-1070. http://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.54.6.1063 
Weinfurt, K. P. (2000). Repeated measures analyses: ANOVA, MANOVA, and HLM. In L. 
G. Grimm & P. R. Yarnold (Eds.), Reading and Understanding more multivariate 
statistics (pp. 317-361). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.  
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind 
development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72, 655-684. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00304 
West, R. F., Stanovich, K. E., & Mitchell, H. R. (1993). Reading in the real world and its 
correlates. Reading Research Quarterly, 28, 34-50. https://doi.org/10.2307/747815 
Whitman, W. (2017). Leaves of grass. Milton Keynes, England. (Original work published 
1855) 
Wicker, B., Keysers, C., Plailly, J., Royet, J. P., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (2003). Both of 
us disgusted in my insula: The common neural basis of seeing and feeling disgust. 
Neuron, 40, 655-664. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0896-6273(03)00679-2 
FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES 
 
 316 
Willems, R. M., & Jacobs, A. M. (2016). Caring about Dostoyevsky: The untapped potential 
of studying literature. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20, 243-245. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.12.009  
Winner, E., Brownell, H., Happé, F., Blum, A., & Pincus, D. (1998). Distinguishing lies from 
jokes: Theory of mind deficits and discourse interpretation in right hemisphere brain-
damaged patients. Brain and Language, 62, 89–106. 
http://doi.org/10.1006/brln.1997.1889 
Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining 
function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 
13, 103-128. http://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5 
Woronkowicz, J., Nichols, B., & Iyengar, S. (2012). How the United States funds the arts. 
[PDF file]. Retrieved from https://www.arts.gov/sites/default/files/how-the-us-funds-
the-arts.pdf 
Yang, Y. C., Boen, C., Gerken, K., Li, T., Schorpp, K., & Harris, K. M. (2016). Social 
relationships and physiological determinants of longevity across the human life span. 
PANAS, 113, 578–583. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1511085112  
Young, L., Bechara, A., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2010). Damage 
to ventromedial prefrontal cortex impairs judgment of harmful intent. Neuron, 65, 845–
51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2010.03.003 
Zaki, J. (2017). Moving beyond stereotypes of empathy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21, 59-
60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2016.12.004 
Zaki, J. (2019). The war for kindness: Building empathy in a fractured world. London, 
England: Robinson. 
Zaki, J., & Ochsner, K. (2012). The neuroscience of empathy: Progress, pitfalls and promise. 
Nature Neuroscience, 15, 675-680. http://doi.org/10.1038/nn.3085 
FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES 
 
 317 
Zemborain, M. R., & Johar, G. V. (2007). Attitudinal ambivalence and openness to 
persuasion: A framework for interpersonal influence. Journal of Consumer Research, 
33, 506–514. https://doi.org/10.1086/510224 
Zhou, H., Majka, E. A., & Epley, N. (2017). Inferring perspective versus getting perspective: 
Underestimating the value of being in another person’s shoes. Psychological Science, 
28, 482-493. http://doi.org/10.1177/0956797616687124 
Zickfeld, J. H., Schubert, T. W., Siebt, B., & Fiske, A. P. (2017). Empathic concern is part of 
a more general communal emotion. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 1-16. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00723 
Zillman, D. (1988). Mood management through communication choices. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 31, 327-340. Retrieved from 
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F000276488031003005 
Ziolkowski, T. (2011, December 8). Gilgamesh among us: Modern encounters with the 
ancient epic. London, England: Cornell University Press. 
Zipes, J. (2012). The irresistible fairy tale: The cultural and social history of a genre. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Zunshine, L. (2006). Why we read fiction: Theory of mind and the novel. Columbus, OH: 
Ohio State University Press. 
Zwaan, R. A. (2004). The immersed experiencer: Toward and embodied theory of language 
comprehension. In B. H. Ross (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (pp. 35-
62). New York, NY: Academic Press. 




Fiction Media Exposure Test names and percentage of participants that selected each name. Names in 
the print-exposure scale were taken from Behavior Research Methods, 40, Acheson, D. J., Wells, J. B., 
& MacDonald, M. C., “New and updated tests of print-exposure and reading abilities in college 




Scale Name % participants that 
identified name 
Print- J. R. R. Tolkien 84 
exposure George Orwell 82 
 Ernest Hemingway 81 
 T. S. Eliot 77 
 Virginia Woolf 77 
 F. Scott Fitzgerald 73 
 Harper Lee 71 
 Salman Rushdie 58 
 James Joyce 57 
 Tom Clancy 56 
 J. D. Salinger 54 
 James Patterson 53 
 Margaret Atwood 53 
 Maya Angelou 46 
 John Irving 45 
 Gabriel Garcia Marquez 33 
 Kazuo Ishiguro 31 
 Umberto Eco 30 
 Kurt Vonnegut 27 
 Alice Walker 27 
 Thomas Wolfe 25 
 Clive Cussler 24 
 Anne McCaffrey 19 
 Nora Ephron 17 
 Saul Bellow 17 
 Sue Grafton 14 
 Jonathan Kellerman 12 
 T. C. Boyle 9 
 Ann Beattie 4 
 Jane Smiley 3 
Film- Avatar 93 
exposure The Exorcist 92 
 Gladiator 90 
 Schindler’s List 89 
 Saving Private Ryan 88 
 12 Years a Slave 88 
 American Beauty 82 
 Rain Man 80 
 One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest 78 
 A Beautiful Mind 77 
 Spartacus 74 
 Lawrence of Arabia 72 
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 The Revenant 70 
 The Social Network 68 
 Kramer vs. Kramer 65 
 Doctor Zhivago 64 
 The Bridge on the River Kwai 60 
 The Piano 59 
 Platoon 56 
 Midnight Express 52 
 Love Story 48 
 The Descendants 44 
 Boyhood 44 
 The Hours 38 
 Babel 36 
 On the Waterfront 28 
 The Unbearable Lightness of Being 27 
 Ordinary People 26 
 The Cotton Club 22 
 The Robe 14 
Play- Cat on a Hot Tin Roof 62 
exposure Death of a Salesman 61 
 A Streetcar Named Desire 59 
 Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? 55 
 Pygmalion 50 
 The Crucible 49 
 Waiting for Godot 49 
 Oh What a Lovely War 42 
 Abigail’s Party 36 
 Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead 33 
 The Glass Menagerie 32 
 Look Back in Anger 27 
 Six Degrees of Separation 26 
 A Taste of Honey 22 
 Noises Off 20 
 Top Girls 18 
 Glengarry Glen Ross 17 
 Mother Courage and her Children 16 
 Six Characters in Search of an Author 14 
 Arcadia 13 
 Our Country’s Good 12 
 The Royal Hunt of the Sun 10 
 Present Laughter 9 
 A Raisin in the Sun 9 
 My Night with Reg 8 
 Fences 8 
 The Weir 7 
 Road 6 
 Pravda 5 
 Observe the Sons of Ulster Marching Towards the Somme 3 





Supplemental analysis Study 1.  
Partial correlations: Internal correlations remained significant among the IRI and 
FMET scales respectively, all ps < .001, and between altruism and all IRI scales, all ps < .01. 
Significant inter-correlations were as follows (df = 393): Fantasy remained associated with 
print-exposure, r = .17, p = .001, 95% CI [.07, .27], and correlations reached significance with 
play, r = .15, p = .003, 95% CI [.05, .24], and film-exposure, r = .15, p = .002, 95% CI [.05, 
.26]. Altruism remained associated with print-exposure, r = .12, p = .016, 95% CI [.01, .23], 
and play-exposure, r = .15, p = .004, 95% CI [.04, .25] but not film-exposure, r = .07, p = 
.153, 95% CI [-.03, .18].  
Perspective-taking (PT) and empathic concern (EC) remained associated with (df = 
344): preferences for romance, rPT = .12, p = .023, 95% CI [.02, .23], rEC = .24, p < .001, 95% 
CI [.13, .34], comedy, rPT = .14, p = .011, 95% CI [.03, .24], rEC = .20, p < .001, 95% CI [.09, 
.30], experimental/postmodern, rPT =.18, p = .001, 95% CI [.07, .29], rEC = .17, p = .001, 95% 
CI [.07, .27], and factual/documentary, rPT = .12, p = .025, 95% CI [.02, .23] rEC = .12, p = 
.027, 95% CI [.02, .23]; and empathic concern with drama, r = .16, p = .003 95% CI [.05, 
.27]. Fantasy correlated with drama, r = .28, p < .001, 95% CI [.17, .38] romance, r = .19, p < 
.001, 95% CI [.09, .28], comedy, r = .18, p = .001, 95% CI [.08, .30] and 
experimental/postmodern, r = .16, p = .002, 95% CI [.06, .27]. Altruism correlated with 
comedy, r = .18, p = .001, 95% CI [.08, .28]. experimental/postmodern, r = .16, p = .003, 95% 
CI [.04, .27], and factual/documentary, r = .12, p = .032, 95% CI [.01, .22]. Fantasy remained 
associated with: (df = 392) reading novels, r = .16, p = .001, 95% CI [.06, .26], and the 
negative relationship with TV approached but did not reach significance, r = -.10, p = .055, 
95% CI [-.19, -.001]. Altruism remained positively associated with plays, r = .17, p = .001, 
95% CI [.07, .27] and negatively associated with TV, r = -.17, p = .001, 95% CI [-.27, -.08] 
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and film r = -.11, p = .03, 95% CI [-.21, -.01]. The correlation with reading novels did not 
reach significance, r = .09, p = .093, 95% CI [-.02, .20]. 
Media selection: Media selection is based on social, developmental and dispositional 
factors (for a review, see Valkenburg et al., 2016). Escapism was the primary motivation for 
engaging with fiction media (except with plays, which tended to be motivated by an interest 
in the creatives), followed by mood management (Zillman, 1988): people tended to select 
media to maintain or improve their mood-state (Figure 1).  
Reading a novel because participants felt they “should” have read it negatively 
correlated with perspective-taking, rs (304) = -.18, p = .002, 95% CI [-.28, -.08], and fantasy, 
rs (304) = -.19, p = .001, 95% CI [-.30, .07], and watching a film because they “should” have 
seen it negatively correlated with empathic concern, rs (341) = -.11, p = .038, 95% CI [-.22, 
.001], fantasy, rs (341) = -.12, p = .023, 95% CI [-.23, -.02], and altruism, rs (341) = -.12, p = 
.029, 95% CI [-.22, -.02]. In contrast, results showed positive correlations between watching a 
film to improve mood with empathic concern, rs (341) = .14, p = .012, 95% CI [.04, .23], and 
using films for escapism with fantasy, rs (341) = .12, p = .029, 95% CI [.01, .23]. Altruism 
was positively associated with wanting to learn about a topic through watching film, rs (341) = 
.14, p = .01, 95% CI [.03, .25], TV, rs (295) = .18, p = .002, 95% CI [.06, .29], and plays, rs 
(222) = .17, p = .009, 95% CI [.04, .30], and reading a novel because of an interest in the 
writer, rs (304) = .12, p = .033, 95% CI [.01, .23]. Correlations between reasons for media 
selection and empathic abilities suggest a mediating role for media presentation in 
relationships between the antecedents and consequences of fiction-engagement, which 
constitutes a central concept in several media effects theories (Valkenburg et al., 2016). 
 
 


















Figure 1. Median rankings for reasons participants tended to engage with four media formats 
(watch a TV show, watch a play, watch a film, read a novel).  
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Adaptation of Art-R used in Studies 2 and 3.The ART-R was published in Research in Personality, 
40, Mar, R. A., Oatley, K., Hirsh, J., dela Paz & Peterson, J. B., “Bookworms versus nerds: Exposure 
to fiction versus non-fiction, divergent associations with social ability, and the simulation of fictional 
social worlds”, 694-671. Copyright Elsevier (2006). Adapted with permission from Elsevier.  
Note. *New name; **Amended.  
 
Updates to ART-R (Mar et al., 2006). “M. D. Johnson Spencer” was amended to “Spencer Johnson”. New names 
(10%) were added to each dimension (one in each genre). These were authors whose works have  been published or re-
published within 5 years of the time of scale construction (i.e., since 2013). Each critical dimension consisted of 55 
names and there were 40 foils in total. “Norman Mailer” represented a nonfiction author on the original task; however, 
as he is a recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for both fiction and nonfiction and renowned for his use of literary devices in 
nonfiction writing, selections for this author could represent familiarity with either fiction or nonfiction, and so the 
name was replaced with a nonfiction author of the same genre (“Mary Beard”). 
Fiction                                                                                                 
Romance Sci-Fi/Fantasy Suspense/Thriller Domestic fiction Foreign (translation) 
Sidney Sheldon  Robert Jordan  Dean Koontz  John Updike  José Saramago  
Danielle Steel  Douglas Adams  John LeCarré  W. O. Mitchell  Yukio Mishima  
Jackie Collins  Anne McCaffrey  Robert Ludlum  Alice Munro  Gabriel García Márquez  
Judith Krantz  William Gibson  Clive Cussler  Maeve Binchy  Albert Camus  
Nora Roberts  Terry Brooks  Sue Grafton  Carol Shields  Umberto Eco  
Iris Johansen  Terry Goodkind  Ian Rankin  John Irving  Milan Kundera  
Diana Palmer  Piers Anthony  P. D. James  Toni Morrison  Paulo Coelho  
Catherine Anderson  Arthur C. Clarke  John Saul  Amy Tan  W. G. Sebald  
Joy Fielding  Ray Bradbury  Patricia Cornwell  Rohinton Mistry  Italio Calvino  
Nicholas Sparks  Ursula K. Le Guin  Ken Follett  Sinclair Ross  Thomas Mann  











Stephen Hawking  Roland Barthes  Noam Chomsky  Jack Canfield  Faith Popcorn  
Stephen J. Gould  John Searle  Mary Beard*  Philip C. McGraw  Jim Collins  
Richard Dawkins  Jean Baudrillard Michael Moore  M. Scott Peck  Napoleon Hill  
Thomas Kuhn  Michel Foucault  Eric Schlosser  Robert Fulghum  Robert T. Kiyosaki  
Ernst Mayr  Bertrand Russell  Bob Woodward  Emma Bombeck  Stephen C. Lundin  
Douglas Rushkoff  Antonio Damasio  Pierre Berton  Jean Vanier  Peter S. Pande  
Amir D. Aczel  Daniel Goleman  Naomi Klein  Stephen R. Covey  Kenneth H. Blanchard  
Matt Ridley  Jeffrey Gray  Naomi Wolf  Melody Beattie  Peter F. Drucker 
John Maynard Smith  Joseph LeDoux  Robert D. Kaplan  Deepak Chopra  Barry Z. Posner  
Diane Ackerman  Oliver Sacks  Susan Sontag  Marianne Williamson  Spencer Johnson**  
Yuval Noel Harari*  Sam Harris*  Cordelia Fine*  Sarah Knight*  Sheryl Sandberg*  
Foils 
Lauren Adamson  John Coundry  Martin Ford  James Morgan  Dale Blyth  
Eric Amsel  Edward Cornell Harold Gardin  Scott Paris  Robert Emery  
Margarita Azmitia  Carl Corter  Frank Gresham  Richard Passman  Franklin Manis  
Oscar Barbarin  Diane Cuneo  Robert Inness  David Perry  Alister Younger  
Reuben Baron  Denise Daniels  Frank Keil  Miriam Sexton  Hilda Borko  
Gary Beauchamp  Geraldine Dawson  Reed Larson  K. Warner Schaie  Frances Fincham  
Thomas Bever  Aimee Dorr  Lynn Liben  Robert Siegler  Morton Mendelson  
Elliot Blass  W. Patrick Dickson  Hugh Lytton  Mark Strauss  Steve Yussen  






Mean Absolute Difference Scores Presented for Each Level of Experiencer and Valence 











Experiencer A 1.39 1.49 1.29 0.20 [0.07, 0.32] .005 
 B 1.74 1.80 1.67 0.13 [0.04, 0.23] .01 
 C 1.39 1.43 1.34 0.09 [-0.008, 0.18] .06 
 D 1.71 1.40 2.05 -0.65 [-0.78, -0.52] .001 
 E 1.15 1.31 0.98 0.33 [0.23, 0.43] .001 
 F 1.33 1.11 1.56 -0.45 [-0.55, -0.33] .001 
Valence Positive  1.61 1.63 1.59 0.04 [-0.06, 0.16] .40 
 Neutral  0.89 0.79 0.99 -0.20 [-0.29, -0.11] .001 
 Negative  1.85 1.84 1.86 -0.02 [-0.14, 0.11] .73 
Experiencer  A × positive 1.90 1.73 2.08 -0.35 [-0.58, -0.14] .007 
× Valence A × neutral 0.92 1.03 0.80 0.23 [0.08, 0.38] .002 
 A × negative 1.51 1.85 1.16 0.70 [0.51, 0.89] .001 
 B × positive 1.90 2.09 1.69 0.39 [0.24, 0.54] .001 
 B × neutral 1.12 1.03 1.21 -0.17 [-0.32, -0.03] .03 
 B × negative 2.13 2.17 2.09 0.09 [-0.12, 0.30] .41 
 C × positive 1.12 1.34 0.90 0.44 [0.31, 0.58] .001 
 C × neutral 0.91 0.62 1.22 -0.60 [-0.74, -0.47] .001 
 C × negative 1.95 2.12 1.77 0.35 [0.19, 0.51] .001 
 D × positive 2.06 1.58 2.56 -0.98 [-1.20, -0.76] .001 
 D × neutral 0.88 0.82 0.94 -0.12 [-0.26, 0.18] .10 
 D × negative 2.48 1.97 3.01 -1.04 [-1.34, -0.74] .001 
 E × positive 1.46 1.69 1.23 0.47 [0.33, 0.61] .001 
 E × neutral 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.02 [-0.12, 0.17] .78 
 E × negative 1.23 1.45 0.99 0.46 [0.32, 0.60] .001 
 F × positive 1.19 1.20 1.17 0.04 [-0.12, 0.20] .64 
 F × neutral 0.86 0.51 1.23 -0.72 [-0.86, -0.58] .001 
 F × negative 1.79 1.50 2.10 -0.60 [-0.78, -0.41] .001 
Note. 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals (using N = 1000 bootstrapping) for mean 
differences are presented in brackets. Experiencer D rated each negative image at -4 (the most extreme negative 
rating possible). Therefore, participants’ estimates could never be over-negative and so values or D × Negative 
could only be positive (and therefore identical to the absolute values). 





Mean Raw Difference Scores Presented for Each Level of Experiencer and Valence within 








Mean difference  
(i–j) 
p 
Experiencer A -0.17 0.10 -0.46  0.56 [0.38, 0.74] .001 
 B -0.19 -0.001 -0.39  0.39 [0.24, 0.51] .001 
 C 0.09 0.17 0.015  0.16 [-0.01, 0.32] .46 
 D 0.11 0.30 -0.10  0.41 [0.25, 0.56] .001 
 E -0.20 -0.14 -0.27  0.13 [-0.01, 0.26] .69 
 F 0.40 0.26 0.55 -0.29 [-0.44, 0.16] .001 
Valence Positive  -1.06 -0.76 -1.37  0.60 [0.44, 0.76] .001 
 Neutral  -0.10 0.21 -0.44  0.65 [0.51, 0.78] .001 
 Negative  1.18 0.90 1.48 -0.58 [-0.78, -0.38] .001 
Experiencer  A × positive -1.67 -1.33 -2.03  0.69 [0.43, 0.97] .001 
× Valence A × neutral 0.13 0.36 -0.13  0.49 [0.28, 0.70] .001 
 A × negative 0.92 1.16 0.66  0.51 [0.20, 0.79] .003 
 B × positive -1.46 -1.35 -1.57  0.22 [-0.002, 0.41] .055 
 B × neutral -0.21 0.30 -0.76  1.05 [0.84, 1.28] .001 
 B × negative 1.53 1.50 1.56 -0.06 [-0.31, 0.19] .65 
 C × positive 0.02 0.34 -0.31  0.64 [0.44, 0.85] .001 
 C × neutral -0.52 -0.09 -0.98  0.89 [0.67, 1.10] .001 
 C × negative 0.61 0.24 1.00 -0.76 [-1.06, -0.49] .001 
 D × positive -1.84 -1.17 -2.54  1.37 [1.14, 1.60] .001 
 D × neutral -0.21 0.16 -0.60  0.76 [0.57, 0.94] .001 
 D × negative 2.48 1.97 3.01 -1.04 [-1.35, -0.70] .001 
 E × positive -0.66 -0.47 -0.85  0.38 [0.15, 0.60] .006 
 E × neutral 0.02 0.34 -0.32  0.66 [0.49, 0.82] .001 
 E × negative 0.18 -0.18 0.56 -0.74 [-0.98, -0.51] .001 
 F × positive -0.75 -0.50 -1.00  0.50 [0.27, 0.71] .001 
 F × neutral 0.13 0.16 0.12  0.04 [-0.14, 0.22] .67 
 F × negative 1.46 0.90 2.04 -1.14 [-1.40, -0.88] .001 
Note. 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals (using N = 1000 bootstrapping) for the mean 
difference (simulation-theorisation) values are presented in brackets. 
 
 





The Wallet: Stimulus story created for Study 3.  
 
It was one of those rough, blustery Monday mornings when the wind seemed to find 
its way all around collars and right through scarves. The snow, which was gleaming white on 
Sunday afternoon, was melting now, and the pavements were lined with piles of grey ice that 
looked like big thick slugs. I walked past a red bobble hat wedged onto a melting ball of ice 
whose pebble smile was slowly sliding into a frown. I pulled my own hat down to my 
eyebrows; the wind was making my eyes water.  
I’d made an effort to look smart this morning as I had a meeting first thing with my 
boss, Sam. It was the end of my trial period in the new job, and there were two of us hoping 
to be chosen for one permanent role. There was a chance I’d end the day with no job to go 
back to, which made me nervous, and the cold wasn’t helping. I’m sick of winter, I thought, 
as a paving slab tipped beneath me, spitting stagnant water over my already-soggy shoes. I 
felt wet seep through the stitching and into my socks. Looks like it’s going to be one of those 
days, I groaned. 
I thought about taking the pavement along the main road, but I was running late so I 
decided to go through the park as usual. I was already drenched, and practically freezing. I 
hope they’ve fixed the office radiator, I thought. I was pretty much alone in the park—
everyone else was probably driving today, or staying at home, lucky them. A familiar red-
faced jogger ran towards me, the grass crunching under each bof bof bof of his trainers. As he 
rushed past I nodded to him, as I always do. ‘iya’, he panted, dropping the ‘h’. His expression 
was vacant with focus and exhaustion, and a few moments later his bof bof boffing faded out 
behind me. 
I checked my watch. Twenty-past eight—the train was due in five minutes! The 
station was just on the other side of the park, so I would make it, if I hurried. At the end of 
the park was a little mud path that led straight up to the platform. Taking this route would 
shave off a good three or four minutes, as long as it wasn’t too muddy, so I headed in that 
direction. I hadn’t brought an umbrella with me—the wind would have flung it inside out 
anyway—so I had settled on a woolly hat, which was fine if it didn’t rain too heavily. It was 
hardly the height of fashion, in fact I don’t even remember buying it. Someone must’ve left it 
at my house sometime, but a warm, dry head was more important than looking good in this 
weather.  
I was just wondering who the hell this hat belonged to, when something ice-cold 
slithered down the back of my neck. I put my hand to it. Just drops of water. Ice cold water. 
‘Eurgh!’ I murmured. I pictured one of those cartoon rainclouds hovering above my head and 
following me wherever I went. When I looked up, there was no raincloud, but a low-hanging 
branch of the huge old tree that marked the edge of the park. Its branches were twisted and 
brown and wet and its leaves quivered beneath melting ice. A huge, shabby blackbird 
screeched and flapped clumsily, and the branch quivered, icy water drenching me some more. 
‘Cheers for that!’ I yelled. ‘SQUAWK’ it responded, as it flapped away into the grey air. My 
hat was soaked now, and no longer any use to me, so I took it off, wrung it out a bit and 
shoved it in my pocket. The squeaky texture of the wet wool set my teeth on edge.  
I looked again at my watch. Only one minute until the train. The shortcut that lead to 
the platform was just ahead, and so with a sharp, cold intake of breath, I ran towards it. The 
mud had formed into a series of icy foot-shaped peaks and folds. Placing my feet in the 
imprints provided, and swinging my arms for momentum, I propelled myself up the slope. 
The rattle of the tracks signalled the approaching train. My foot slipped, I wobbled, waving 
my arms like a scarecrow to regain my balance. Just a few more steps—quick! Metal 
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screeched loudly against metal. I jumped off the frozen mud and onto the concrete platform. 
The train jolted to a halt and its doors opened: Bing! Bing! Bing! I paused just long enough to 
exhale. I made it. I jogged across the platform, stepped up over the gap and onto the train, 
jostling elbows with a man pushing his way on at the same time. 'Sorry' we mumbled at each 
other, without even looking up.  
I leant against the wall by the door and breathed. Not bad for someone who slept 
through their alarm, I thought. It was a busy train; some kids in school uniform had made a 
seat of the luggage rack, and were climbing right in as if they were sharing a bunk-bed. A 
young-ish couple stood near me, next to the door. They were standing so close to each other 
that at first I thought they were kissing, until I heard ‘just forget it,’ and saw that they were 
arguing, quietly and in secret. Realising I was staring, I tried to move my gaze nonchalantly 
towards the doorway, as if it had merely, unseeingly, passed them by in its search for the 
view. Yellow lines, concrete, a puddle. Something beside the puddle. My hat? I felt in my 
pocket. No, still there, still damp. I squinted. Small, square, dark—a wallet! Someone had 
dropped their wallet! I looked around for someone looking walletless. Nothing. What should 
I do? I didn’t want to just leave it there, but I needed to get to my meeting. I hesitated. 
Someone would be worried. Perhaps I should hand it in at the ticket office. That would be the 
right thing to do. If I didn’t get it, who knows what would happen to it… I jumped down off 
the train just as the doors Bing Bing Bing-ed and closed behind me.  
As the train engine groaned into action, I bent down to pick up the wallet. It was dry, 
so it couldn’t have been there long. Already regretful—the next train was half an hour 
away—I walked towards the ticket office. The sign on the door read ‘CLOSED’. Huh. I sat 
down on a cold, painted metal bench that sent a shiver through my legs, and opened up the 
wallet. It was nice, good quality leather or a very convincing fake. It had that musty leather 
smell, so I reckoned it was real. It was thick too, not with change, but with… cards? Yes, 
some. What else... notes! It was thick with notes! I counted them quickly, roughly, ten 
twenty, forty, ninety… there must have been two-hundred and fifty quid! Perhaps I could 
simply pocket some cash, and then leave it on the bench to be found…. No, I couldn’t do 
that. I didn’t know why someone had that much cash on them, but I couldn’t be certain that 
they were wealthy enough to lose it. Perhaps they needed it to pay off a debt, or to buy a 
present for their kid. No, I had to return it.  
I thumbed through the cards. Coffee shop card, supermarket points card, another 
coffee shop card, a passport sized photo of a baby… aha!… a driving licence. Bingo. I read 
the name: Field, Mr James, R. He looked smart in his photo and fairly young. Address: 13b 
Eric Street. Postcode: across town. I couldn’t get across town, I had to get on the next train. I 
checked the inside pockets. More coffee cards, credit card, debit card, library card… and then 
a little pile of rectangular business cards, each one with two rounded corners, top right and 
bottom left, and each one belonging to James Field, Armstrong & Grey Ltd., 44 High Street. 
The high street was only five or six turnings along the main road, so I reckoned James Field 
dropped his wallet as he got off the train and he’d probably be able to come straight back to 
collect it. I inspected the card more closely, turning it between my finger and thumb like a 
detective eyeing the evidence. The design was minimal, with a grey wavy line through the 
middle, and there was no job title, but there was a mobile number. I pulled my glove off with 
my teeth, took out my phone and started dialling.  
I was just preparing what to say to James Field’s voicemail when the ringing stopped. 
‘Hello’ came a man’s voice.  
‘Oh er hello, I um I’ve found your wallet. It had your business card in it so I…’ 
‘My wallet?’ 
‘Yes, that’s right. I thought I should call straight away as it has so much cash in it.’ 
There was a pause, followed by, ‘hang on, let me check… oh gosh I’ve lost it’.  




‘And you’ve found it?’ 
‘Yes at Oakley station.’ 
‘Oh goodness me, I didn’t even know it was gone! Thank you so much for calling!’ 
He sounded relieved. 
‘You’re welcome’, I said, ‘are you nearby? I’m still at the station. Or should I bring it 
to you after work?’ I cringed; why did I say that? 
‘Oh good grief no!’ He responded, politely. ‘I’m not far, I’ll co me to you. Can you 
wait? I’ll hop in a cab, so I’ll be there a-sap.  
‘Yes, I can wait, my train’s not till five-to,’ I said. 
‘Great. See you soon. Thanks.’ He hung up. 
A door creaked behind me and the ticket office opened.  
‘Sorry’, said a woman in train staff uniform, ‘you haven’t been waiting long have 
you? I was running late’. She held the door, and I walked towards the warm waiting area.  
‘Radiator’s on, so you can get toasty,’ she said. 
I sat on another painted metal bench, but this one was warm. I stretched my legs out 
and felt the heat from the radiator on my feet. I rested for a few minutes, leaning back and 
soaking up the warmth as if I was on a beach. My ankles scorched, and I liked it. With a jolt 
of anxiety, I thought of the meeting I was about to be late to. I quickly typed a text message 
with my gloveless hand, and sent it to Sam. 
 
RUNNING LATE, GOOD REASON, SEE YOU SOON FOR OUR MEETING. SORRY. 
 
I felt nervous. As I tucked my phone back into my pocket, a man appeared in the doorway 
and looked at me. I stood up, holding the wallet in my other, gloved hand, and waved it at 
him. 
‘Oh you superstar!’ the man said, gesturing at the wallet. It was James Field — I 
recognised him from his picture. 
I smiled. ‘It’s no problem’.  
James Field took the wallet, opened it and glanced inside the section containing all the 
cash.  
‘It’s all there?’ I asked. It sounded like a question, but I meant it as a statement: I 
didn’t steal any, if that’s what you’re thinking.  
‘Yes —good,’ said James Field. He paused for a moment, and gestured towards the 
platform, ‘I hope I didn’t make you late for anything’.  
‘Oh no… well… I missed my… but it's fine, I can get the next one…’ I muttered.  
‘Oh goodness me, no! You must take my cab. It’s just outside. I can call another.’ 
‘Oh, thanks’, I said. ‘That would be a great help. It’s just that I’ve got this meeting 
with my boss, and it’s the end of my trial period and I’m a bit worried. You see, there are two 
of us going for the same job and I really want to be the one that gets it… and now I’m 
running late and my boss really hates lateness… and so I was um just a bit um worried that I 
would be late. So um… yeah, thanks!’ I looked at the floor. Shut up, idiot, I thought.  
After a moment’s pause, James Field held out his hand to me. I shook it, instinctively. 
‘I’m James. Thank you so much for looking after my wallet for me,’ he said, slowly and with 
kindness. ‘I have a cab outside and I would be so happy if you would let it take you to work. 
On me, of course. And as an extra thank you, because you looked after my wallet for me even 
though it made you late for your meeting, I would like to give you this.’ I looked up then at 
James’s outstretched hand. Folded between two fingers was a little wad of notes.  
‘Oh no!’ I protested, shocked. ‘The cab’s great, though.’  
FICTION AND EMPATHIC ABILITIES 
 
 330 
‘Please’, said James, seeming like he really meant it. ‘I know it’s a rather tacky way 
to say thank you, but given that you’re in a rush I’d really appreciate it if you would take it. 
Your honesty and kindness has saved me so much worry and hassle, and I really want to say 
thank you. I’ve got the money, so please take it.’ 
I smiled and reached forward. ‘Ok… thank you,’ I said.  
‘No, thank you!’ Said James, and ushered me towards the taxi. 
A few minutes later I was rolling along the main road towards work. The car was 
warm, I could feel my hands again, and the driver had the radio on: ‘…we can expect clearer 
skies by the afternoon and even some sunshine in parts’. I smiled, looking out at the melting 
snow. I checked my watch—I was going to be on time after all, just as if I’d caught the train. 
I’d better text Sam again, I thought. 
 
HI SAM, ME AGAIN. PLEASE IGNORE MY LAST MESSAGE — I WILL BE THERE 
ON TIME FOR OUR MEETING AFTER ALL. 
 
As I put my phone away, I remembered that I was still holding the cash. I’d been so 
taken aback by James Field’s generosity, that I hadn’t even thought to count it! Ten, twenty, 
seventy, one-hundred! I gasped. I felt like I’d won the lottery! Well at least if I get fired, I’ll 
have this to tide me over! I thought. Wow. James Field. What a decent bloke.  
‘You alright?’ Asked the taxi driver—he must have heard me gasp. 
‘Yeah, I am.’ I replied, grinning, and meaning it.  
He smiled back, and pulled around the corner, coming to a halt right outside my office 
building. ‘Here you are’, he said.  
As I stepped out of the cab my phone buzzed; it was Sam, replying to my text. I felt 
my stomach tense. What if this had tipped it, and I was the one to be fired? Perhaps she’d tell 
me not to bother coming back at all. I opened the message. 
 
DON’T WORRY, I’M STUCK IN BAD WEATHER AND RUNNING 5 MINS LATE. 
THANKS FOR FINDING A WAY TO GET HERE ON TIME, YOU’LL BE GETTING MY 
JOB NEXT IF I’M NOT CAREFUL! 
 
My stomach relaxed. The driver pulled into the car park and up to the main entrance.  
‘It’s paid for. Have a nice day!’  
Stepping out, I waved back. ‘I will,’ I replied. ‘You too.’ I breathed deeply, and 
thought what an eventful day it had been already, and it wasn’t even nine o’ clock! It’s going 
to be one of those days, I thought, one of those very good days. 
 
